For the second time in less than a decade, Ecuador is attempting to make the transition from dictatorship to democratic rule. The first attempt. in 1972, ended in dismal failure. The elections scheduled to end the civilian dictatorship of Velasco Ibarra were preempted by a military coup. Today, the military itself is preparing to step down and hold Presidential elections in 1978. Why this graceful retreat to the barracks? Contrary to official rhetoric, the military's decision to relinquish power can hardly stem from a sense of "mission accomplished" or "a job well done." The military government that seized power in 1972 called itself "nationalist and revolutionary." Its claim to legitimacy was its pledge to carry out fundamental reforms and to "end the monopoly of wealth by a privileged few." The balance sheet, after 5 years of military rule, shows that no reforms have been implemented; that land tenure has remained untouched; that conditions have deteriorated for the popular masses, despite the expectations aroused by the discovery and export of oil. Instead, the military rulers of Ecuador have carried out the dictates of the ruling class, by substituting repression for reform and providing a stable climate for investment. Candidate Asaad Bucaram Having abandoned its reformist tasks, the military has lost all support from progressive and popular sectors. Yet the main pressure for a return to civilian rule has come from within the ruling class itself. Eager to resume direct control of the state apparatus, Ecuador's traditional parties have been calling for free elections since 1974. Initially, the government resisted such pressures. But in 1976, a new group of officers took power in a bloodless coup and proclaimed the restoration of "democracy" as its primary task. Immediately, the wheels of the electoral machinery were set in motion. A national plebiscite was planned for mid-1977 to vote on a new constitution, and Presidential elections were set for January, 1978. An assortment of miniscule parties, devoid of any mass base, met to plan their political comeback. To date, more than 20 parties or movements, the majority situated on the right wing of the political spectrum, have declared their intention to participate in the elections. The list of probable candidates is packed with the familiar names of Ecuador's ruling elite, including several past presidents. Despite these elaborate preparations, however, many are doubtful that the elections will ever take place. Indeed, a replay of 1972, with virtually the same cast of characters, is not improbable. The man most likely to win any freely held elections in 1978-as in 1972-is Asaad Bucaram, candidate of the populist CFP (Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares). One-time mayor of Guayaquil, Bucaram draws his largest following from the suburblee, the sprawling slums of the coastal cities. He is regarded as quasi-fascist by the Left and dangerously demagogic by the Right. In 1972, the probable victory of Bucaram prompted a military coup. If elections are held in 1978, Bucaram is predicted to win 40% of the vote, with no other candidate winning more than 25%. It came as no surprise, then, when the military announced last month that the election schedule would have to be pushed back for at least nine months. The official explanation-bureaucratic delays in voter registration-left few people convinced. Rather, it appears that the military-and the ruling class-are stalling for time to ensure the election of a suitable successor. Several scenarios have been suggested as possible outcomes of this process. 0 Since the President must be elected by an absolute majority, the possibility of a second round, or run-off, has led to frantic attempts to form alliances among the splintered parties of the Center and Right. The Conservative Party has called for a National Civic Front to counter the CFP menace, while parties of the Center (Christian Democrats, Democratic Left, etc.) have proposed a Center-Left Coalition. It is still much too early to tell whether any of these proposed coalitions would stand a chance of beating Bucaram on the second round. 0 If this coalition-building seems doomed to failure, many believe that the military will appoint an interim civilian President. The most likely candidate for the post is Galo Plaza -past President of the Republic (1948-1952) and current President of the Electoral Tribunal. The interim President would then convoke a constituent assembly as a prelude to new elections. * If all else fails, both the military and the ruling class would probably prefer a perpetuation of military rule to a Bucaram Administration. Currently, a wave of strikes in the cities and peasant unrest in the countryside are being severely repressed by the military government. They could easily be used as a pretext for postponing a return to constitutional rule and sharpening the repressive character of the present regime. While the electoral maneuvers of the ruling class and the military continue, the Ecuadorean working class, the peasantry and the popular masses view the process with increasing apathy. Parties on the Left are still too weak to provide an organizational alternative. Yet whether the outcome of this process is a civilian or military form of government, the new regime will most certainly be faced with growing popular unrest and a more organized working class and peasantry. As a continuation of its past work (see Volume IX, No. 8, Ecuador: OU Up for Grabs), NACLA will continue to provide periodic analyses of events in Ecuador over the coming year. By Janet Shenk BIBLIOGRAPHY NACLA's Report on Ecuador (Vol. IX, no. 8) is still available and provides an excellent list of biblio graphical sources on Ecuador. Since its publication, however, several new studies have appeared that may be of interest to our readers. Equateur: Nouvelle Strategle de L'lmperiallsm: Reformisme Bourgeois et Lutte des Classes, June. 1976. Available in French from CEDETIM. 94 rue Notre Dame des Champs, Paris 6. CCP France 17.546.1o. Ecuadort Grietaa en La Dontnalon, by Pairicio Jioncayo. 1977.' Available in Spanish from the Escuela de Ciencias de la Informacion, Universidad Central, Quito. Ecuador. El Capltallimo Ecuatoriano Contemporaneo: So Fundonamileto, by Cesar Verduga. 1976 Available in Spanish from the Instituto de Investiga. clones Economicas y Politicas. Faculiad de Ciencias Economicas, Universidad de Guayaquil. Ecuador. 27 DATELINE e DATELINE (GUYANA CHEDDI JAGAN INTERVIEW To many observers, recent developments in the small (population I million), English-speaking country of Guyana appear quite contradictory. Although the present Forbes Burnham government rose to power on the coattails of a by-now classic CIA destabilization attempt in the mid-1960 's, Burnham's People's National Congress party [PNC has recently moved the country to a radically different path. Burnham has linked Guyana to the b6lc of non-aligned countries, established friendly relations with Cuba, nationalized the nation's important bauxite mines and proposed to bring a system of "cooperative socialism " to Guyana. Is Guyana developing as a progressive, anti-imperialist force on an increasingly repressive continent? Do Burnham's policies warrant the support of progressive forces in Guyana? These were some of the questions put to the former Prime Minister ofGuyana, CheddiJagan, when he visited NACLA-East in April Jagan, whose grandparents came to the then British Guyana from India as indentured immigrants and whose parents were sugar workers, first came to the government in 1953 when his People's Progressive Party (PPP) won the elections. Shortly after, the British intervened, claiming a "Communist takeover" of the government, and dismissed Jagan. He came back to win the general elections in 1957 and again in 1961. In 1962-63, the country was beset by a series of strikes and lock-outs which-as was disclosed later--were the handiwork of the CIA and its allies in the AFL-CIO. The destabilization campaign again knocked Jagan out ojoffice. What follows is a summary of some of the issues discussed by Dr. Jagan during his visit to the NACLA offices. According to Dr. Jagan, the Forbes Burnham government is essentially a reformist regime in the mold of the Chilean Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei. Much as Frei, Burnham sees a type of "cooperative socialism" as the solution to the nation's economic problems. Such a solution proposes that production be organized on the basis of cooperatives (without defining either the question of ownership or the nature of the relations of production on the cooperatives), and that the cooperative sector of the economy would become the dominant area. In a similar vein, Burnham has undertaken the nationalization of several of Guyana's largest bauxite producers, including the Reynolds Metals Company's subsidiary, Guyana Mines Limited. But much remains hazy on the nature of the agreement between Reynolds and Guyana. The nationalization occurred after Guyana slapped a higher tax on bauxite production. Reynolds refused to pay and took the issue to court. Soon after, however, the case was withdrawn and the company nationalized. The question remains why Reynolds was willing to pay a similar tax in Jamaica and not in Guyana. One possibility, put forward by Jagan, is that the terms of the nationalization settlement were far more favorable than producing under the new tax. Again, this can be compared to the U.S. copper companies' acceptance of the very favorable "Chileanization" of copper under Frei. In the end, however, Burnham's reformist solution, referred to as "people's capitalism" by one PNC minister, has resulted in more intense economic problems in Guyana rather than in any resolution of those contradictions. By the early 1970's Guyana was beset by a high rate of inflation, declining production in rice and sugar-two of the country's most important crops-financial problems, and the existence of a large bureaucracy created by the PNC. Given these conditions, Burnham increasingly resorted to force to crush the labor movement when it pressed for higher wages or better conditions. Such was the case in the important sugar workers strike of 1971. Even though Burnham's reformism heightened many of the contradictions inherent in the Guyanese economic system, the intensification of class struggle arising out of those contradictions began to push Burnham to adopt more progressive stands on many measures. The major factor in this has been the increasing unity within the working class, particularly between sugar workers and bauxite workers. Since the major strike of sugar workers in 1971, for example, bauxite and sugar workers have come out in support of each other's struggles. This growing unity is undercutting generations of working class divisions based on race, divisions highlighted by the fact that most of the PPP's support originally came from East Indians (particularly sugar workers), while the PNC drew its support from the Black population (urban and bauxite workers). Together with other factors, this growing unity has 28 DATELINE DATELINE pushed Burnham to the Left of his own PNC. Thus, he has become a strong supporter of the consortium of bauxite exporting countries and adopted a more independent foreign policy including the strengthening of ties with Cuba and North Korea. CRITICAL SUPPORT These moves have led Jagan and the PPP to adopt a posture of "critical support" for the Burnham government, supporting its anti-imperialist and progressive measures, opposing any reactionary policies adopted by the PNC, and criticizing any obstacles the government places in the path of worker unity or the struggle for socialism. Within this policy, adopted at the PPP's 1975 congress, Jagan argues that the balance "can be weighted more toward the criticism than the support" due to the balance of forces in Guyana at the present time. Jagan sees the greatest danger to Guyana's march toward socialism in the right-wing of the PNC, a fairly weak faction which lacks a mass base in the country. And, while Burnham has been trying to mobilize support for his own position by arguing that the greatest danger to the workers comes from the outside (i.e., the United States, Brazil or Venezuela), Jagan argues that the main danger is an internal one should the Right be able to gain control of the PNC. Jagan and the PPP see two ways in which the working class could achieve power in Guyana. The first is by means of a political solution. This would imply the formation of a broad national government to represent the interests of the working class, peasantry, progressive intelligentsia and merchants. Jagan does not rule the PNC out of such an alliance, but sees their participation as unlikely since the PNC "will not consider this if they are not the ruling force." The strength of the Marxist force in such an alliance, as well as the strength of the Right will determine, in the final analysis, if the struggle will be a violent one, according to Jagan. Should the political solution fail, Jagan argued that Guyanese would have to be mobilized across class and racial lines to prepare for a confrontation. By Steve Volk Back issues of NACLA'S Latin America and Empire Report VOLUME X: 1976 Vol. X, no. 1; THE PENTAGON'S PROTOGES Latin American Militaries: Two Models, Many Problems (4 pgs.) From MAP to FMS: Security on a Cash Basis (4 pgs.) Finishing Schools for Gorillas: U. S. Military Training (10 pgs.) Urban Counter-Insurgency Operations (3 pgs.) U. S. Military Assistance Programs, 1946-75 (Chart) (4 pgs.) Charts on Training of Foreign Military Personnel (4 pgs.) 29 VENE; BRAZIL Volumes X (1976) and XI (1977) ORDER FROM: NACLA-East: P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, N.Y. 10025 NACLA-West: P.O. Box 226, Berkeley, California 94701 PRICE: All Issues cost $1.25 plus 254 postage 29 DATELINE * DATELINE Vol. X, no. 2: NICARAGUA Sandino and the Rise of Somoza (5 pgs.) Somoza: State and Estate (4 pgs.) Central American Fixer (4 pgs.) Washington's Baby (9 pgs.) The Revolutionary Challenge (9 pgs.) Major Foreign Investments (3 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 3: AMAZING GRACE: THE W. R. GRACE CORPORATION The Story of W. R. Grace and Co. (12 pgs.) Grace's Chemical Reaction (9 pgs.) Last Tango in Lima (7 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 4: CHASE'S ROCKY ROAD (THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK) The Genesis of Chase (2 pgs.) Chase in Latin America (6 pgs.) Puerto Rico in New York (3 pgs.) Workers' Pensions (7 pgs.) Chase's Work Force (4 pgs.) Financing Black Capitalism (7 pgs.) Bankers' Coup in New York City (5 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 5: U. S. UNIONS IN PUERTO RICO Early Courtship (4 pgs.) Tying the Knot (8 pgs.) Marriage on the Rocks, Militancy on the Rise! (8 pgs.) Teamsters in High Gear (8 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 6: HARVEST OF ANGER: AGRO-IMPERIALISM IN MEXICO'S NORTHWEST The Unmaking of the Mexican Revolution (7 pgs.) Runaway Crops: The Big Tomato Deal (6 pgs.) Organizing in the Sunshine State (1 pg.) Dope, Dollars and Death: The Mexican Heroin Connection (1 pg.) Merchants of Repression: U. S. Police Exports to the Third World (8 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 7: BITTER FRUITS: THE DEL MONTE CORPORATION California: Planting the Seeds of Empire (8 pgs.) Unrest in the Canneries (1 pg.) Mexico: Canned Imperialism (4 pgs.) Hawaii & Philippines: Plantation Plunder (7 pgs.) Del Monte's African Safari (1 pg.) Guatemala: Del Monte's "Banana Republic" (7 pgs.) Vol X, no. 8: OIL IN THE CARIBBEAN, FOCUS ON TRINIDAD The Caribbean Export Refining Center (11 pgs.) Focus on Trinidad (16 pgs.) Caribbean Island Refineries and Associated Facilities (Chart) (pg. 1) Vol. X, no. 9: CHILE: RECYCLING THE CAPITALIST CRISIS The Capitalist Crisis and the Chilean Coup (9 pgs.) Political Economy of the Junta (14 pgs.) Perspectives: Alternatives & Alliances (5 pgs.) Vol. X, no. 10: TIME OF RECKONING: THE U.S. AND CHILE The Policy Dilemma (8 pgs.) Death Merchants (1 pg.) The Debt Dilemma (5 pgs.) Investment Dilemma (6 pgs.) Foreign Investments Over $100,000 Since Sept. 1973 (Chart) (1 pg.) Banks to the Rescue (2 pgs.) Aid: Facts and Figures (5 pgs.) VOLUME XI: 1977 Vol. XI, no. 1: ARGENTINA Argentina: The War Goes On (14 pgs.) Firmenich: A Political Analysis (6 pgs.) Bankrolling the Junta (Chart) (1 pg.) Sources and Resources (1 pg.) Arms, Technology & Dependency- U. S. Military Co-Production Projects Abroad (Chart) (6 pgs.) Dateline (6 pgs.) Vol. XI, no. 2: NO ISSUE Vol. XI, no. 3: CAPITAL'S FLIGHT: THE APPAREL INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH The Needle Trades (6 pgs.) An Industry on Wheels (7 pgs.) Labor's Response (15 pgs.) Dateline (7 pgs.) Vol. XI, no. 4: ELECTRONICS: THE GLOBAL INDUSTRY Run for Their Money (8 pgs.) The View From Abroad (7 pgs.) The Job You Save May Be Your Own (7 pgs.) Dateline (6 pgs.) 30 DATELINE * DATELINE HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD a 21 minute color documentary -featuring the personal accounts of Laura Allende and Carmen Castillo, both released from prison as a result of international pressure -emphasizing the role of women in the Chilean Resistance and in the International Solidarity movement "Each woman, each group, can spend just a little time organizing campaigns, participating in this way in the great historical task of liberation of the people of Latin America." Laura Allende 111110 TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD For further information contact LATIN AMERICAN FILM PROJECT * P.O Box 315 * Franklin Lakes. N J. 07417 * (201) 891-8240 I I Il I II II I In fortcomng issus: Daniel Ben-Horin: Television and the Left Barbara Easton: Feminism and the Contemporary Family Robert Fitch: Planning New York City Articles on pohtical parties, trade umons, and social movements in the United States Im recent issesN: John Judis and Alan Wolfe: American Politics at the Crosroads Fred Block: Marxist Theory of the State Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English: The Manufacture of Housework Max Gordon: The Communist Party of the 1930s and the New Left. with a response by James Weinstein Richard Lichtman: Marx and Freud SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AGENDA PUBLISHING COMPANY 396 SANCHEZ STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94114 NAME ADDRESS CITY STATEIZIP " Subtcrption (6 issues) 10 0 Foreignsubscription s11 "O Back issues $2 (list by number) " James Wcinstein's Ambgluus Legacy $3 with abscription "o The Polincs of Womn's Libemrwo.: s "o Capitalism and be Family: $1.50 (Discount available on five or more copies of each pamphlet)
