Although traditionally recognized as a peaceful country committed to democracy, which “ticos” celebrate as part of their national identity, Costa Rica has experienced moments of heightened sociopolitical violence and authoritarian attempts. The country has faced several political crises that have threatened its democracy, including the 1889–1902 period, the end of the Federico Tinoco dictatorship in 1919, the turbulent 1940s. During these episodes, groups in power attempted to use the executive branch to persecute political opponents, limit electoral competition, and expand presidential authority over Congress and the Supreme Court. However, a political culture rooted in democratic compromise provided viable pathways to resolve these crises.
Now, Costa Rica is once more going through a period of political upheaval. Starting in 2022, the current crisis is breaking with the country’s past. While Costa Rica has historically relied on elite political pacts to diffuse violence and channel popular discontent, this strategy is failing today under the influence of an anti-political discourse—known as “Chavismo Tico” (ChT)—that legitimizes violence rather than mediating it.
ChT is part of a right-wing “populist” global wave. Recently, right-wing nationalistic parties have arisen in Europe, the United States, and Latin America to challenge democracy by spreading a loss of faith in the system, and casting doubt on the principles of equality and equity. These movements frame themselves as representatives of the “majority’s will” while accepting violence as a legitimate means to achieve their goals. They advocate for a radical sociopolitical transformation by attacking the welfare state, multiculturalism, coexistence, and inclusion.
In Costa Rica, Chavismo Tico explicitly contends that the state operates as an autocracy cloaked in democratic formality. Grounded in populist rhetoric rather than empirical evidence, the movement has cast traditional political parties as a corrupt oligarchy intent on plundering state institutions. In response, it advocates for the establishment of a “Third Republic”—a radical departure from the “Second Republic” framework that followed the 1948 Civil War, threatening the country’s constitutional and institutional framework.
Costa Rica’s Violent Past
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Costa Rican society constructed a political culture grounded in consensus, universal male suffrage–women’s suffrage was only granted in 1949–and the norm that elite conflicts should be resolved through diplomatic negotiation rather than popular mobilization. Indeed, when the rank and file did become involved in political confrontations—such as between 1889 and 1902—the political class recognized that widespread instability threatened their interests and the national economy. As a result, politicians prioritized pactismo—negotiating mutually beneficial agreements between rival factions. Following the collapse of Tinoco’s dictatorship in 1919, elite actors institutionalized pactismo by adopting a policy of amnesty and reconciliation.
In Costa Rica, Chavismo Tico explicitly contends that the state operates as an autocracy cloaked in democratic formality.
Political violence also made an appearance in the 1940s. Then-president Rafael Ángel Calderón expanded the concept of democracy to include social justice, and this discourse drew the Costa Rican Communist Party (PPC) and Archbishop Victor Sanabria into the government’s orbit.
Some opponents perceived Calderón’s social reforms as a populist project designed to electorally disenfranchise the opposition. Others directly resisted structural measures, particularly the enactment of the Labor Code and the incorporation of Social Guarantees into the Constitution. At the same time, a significant faction grew alarmed by communist participation in the governing coalition and the rapid expansion of labor unionism. These disparate opposition groups coalesced, escalating political resistance into open street confrontations, and in February 1948, after Congress annulled the opposition candidate’s electoral victory, a civil war broke out.
The forms of violence that emerged during the 1948 Civil War reveal the profound social rupture that had occurred. Following the armed conflict and until 1958, repression became another expression of hatred against political enemies. At the time, political pacts cooled tempers once more and established elections as the decisive arena for political competition.
More spaces for confrontation would open up in the 1970s, as neoliberal reforms generated deep changes. Mobilizations against the neoliberal reform to the public company of telecommunications (popularly called Combo-ICE, 2000) and the 2005-2007 struggle between the “No” and “Yes” camps regarding a free trade agreement with the United States, deeply divided Costa Ricans. At that moment, it seemed the country was heading toward a new civil war, but democratic institutions once again settled the animosity and division between opposing political camps.
This time, however, the division did not completely fade. It took on new forms, ultimately leading Costa Rican society to radically reshape its political map over the last two decades. The strongest manifestation of this shift is the movement spearheaded by former president Rodrigo Chaves (2022–2026).
The Evolution of Rodrigo Chaves
After working at the World Bank for decades, Chaves arrived in Costa Rica in 2019 as a political unknown. He became Minister of Finance under the neoliberal government of Carlos Alvarado (2018-2022), and following a brief tenure–marked by disagreements with the president–he became an underdog candidate in the 2022 presidential race. After winning in the second round, Chaves soon emerged as a beacon of hope for sectors disillusioned with traditional political parties and the consecutive Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) administrations that had governed between 2014 and 2022.
Chaves’s growing base began to view him as a political savior, taking pride in his public insults and hostility toward his predecessors and representatives of other branches of government. This confrontational style proved effective for Chaves, who appeared more invested in cultivating this persona than in the mechanics of governance.
This confrontational style proved effective for Chaves, who appeared more invested in cultivating this persona than in the mechanics of governance.
Politically, this strategy yielded significant returns: the president maintained high approval ratings throughout his term—ending at 64 percent in February of 2026—and secured a decisive electoral victory for his party in the subsequent elections. Across public and digital spheres, supporters of the former president and his successor, current President Laura Fernández, remain convinced that the country is thriving due to the dismantling of a political “caste.” These staunch adherents actively counter critics with concise, combative rhetoric, declaring that their movement will remain in power until 2038.
Chaves has also managed to keep his political immunity from prosecution despite corruption scandals. In September 2025, the Attorney General requested the Legislative Assembly remove Chaves’s immunity as president so he could be tried on charges of abuse of power, claiming he pressured a communications firm tied to the presidency to pay $32,000 to his close associate and former adviser, Federico Cruz. The money allegedly originated from funds supplied by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. Chaves boycotted the proceedings, dismissing them as a political circus designed to undermine him. On September 23, legislators voted against stripping Chaves of his legal shield. Then, in October, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal asked lawmakers to remove his immunity arguing that Chaves had favored his own political party–Costa Rica’s electoral law prohibited the president from participating in electoral discussions–but again the Congress voted to favor Chaves’s immunity.
With Fernández’s victory, Chaves secured immunity for the next four years. Fernández handed him absolute authority as a ‘super-minister’, appointing him Secretary of the Presidency and Secretary of the Public Treasury, two positions that shield him from prosecution.
What is Chavismo Tico?
Chavismo Tico, the movement Chaves has built around himself, lacks an independent ideological framework. Its proponents have produced no foundational manifestos, texts, or theoretical works to inform their base. As such, ChT eludes traditional political categorizations; instead, it is characterized by a few key features,including aggressive public rhetoric, an explicit contempt for political opponents, its systematic evasion of accountability, the undermining of democratic institutions, and the construction of a quasi-messianic cult of personality surrounding Rodrigo Chaves.
Since the beginning, the most striking mechanism for attracting support has been Chaves’s confrontational language. ChT offers its followers a sense of retribution against an establishment accused of usurping the nation. This dynamic affords Chaves a dual advantage: it positions him as a public accuser while projecting an aura of unvarnished authenticity against perceived adversaries, which include rival political parties, public universities, independent media, and the other state institutions.
Supporters view Chaves as a reflection of themselves: he echoes their sentiments, mirrors their vernacular, and strikes out against opponents who are framed as enemies of “the people.” During the World Economic Forum in Davos in May 2022, Chaves declared that Costa Rica had suffered a “very significant decline,” asserting that his administration would ensure the majority benefited while historic elites lost their privileges. This antagonism toward predecessors became a central virtue cited by supporters, who credit Chaves with exposing the political class without compromise. Fernández, who assumed office in May 2026, has continued this strategy by declaring that her administration is going to create a Third Republic–meaning a radical rupture with the political project inaugurated after the 1940s.
When policy failures occur, Chaves’s authoritarian style shifts toward deflecting responsibility onto subordinates. This tactic reinforces his image as a paternal figure who disciplines—yet ultimately forgives—his administration. In late 2022, it was revealed that Health Minister Joselyn Chacón had paid a social media troll to target journalists critical of the administration. In response, Chaves accused the press of operating as “political hitmen” and dismissing the controversy as cheap gossip.
Supporters view Chaves as a reflection of themselves: he echoes their sentiments, mirrors their vernacular, and strikes out against opponents who are framed as enemies of “the people.”
Although the Sala IV (Constitutional Chamber) ruled in May 2023 that the president’s verbal attacks against journalists were unjustified violations of press freedom, the administration’s institutional pressure persisted. By May 2025, Reporters Without Borders had documented a continued decline in Costa Rica’s World Press Freedom Index ranking—dropping from 5th place in 2021 to 36th in 2025, and down to 38th today.
To Chaves and his followers, any democratic institution designed to limit executive power is categorized as an enemy. The movement has successfully propagated the narrative of a corrupt political class that extracts state resources through corrupt networks in the judiciary, the media, and higher education. Like similar movements, ChT relies heavily on a messianic image—promoted through assertions that Chaves is the greatest president in national history.
Throughout his administration, Chaves repeatedly accused Congress—dominated by opposition deputies—of embodying a legacy of political corruption. Furthermore, when facing investigations, he accused the Attorney General of representing the very political caste he sought to disrupt. In March 2025, this conflict escalated when Chaves led a public demonstration to the Attorney General’s office to demand his resignation.
His leadership style has proven to be popular. In the February 2026 elections, Chaves’s party won 31 of the 57 seats in Congress, and Chaves declared that he only needed to dominate the Judicial Branch to completely transform Costa Rica, setting up his new targets.
During her initial months in office, President Fernández adopted the populist style of her predecessor. She mirrored his rhetorical strategy by deploying vernacular speech patterns and sharp rhetorical devices when addressing the political opposition. Furthermore, Fernández has ceded significant public visibility to Chaves, enabling him to maintain media prominence and project an aura of presidential authority.
Simultaneously, her administration is intensifying its confrontation with the judiciary by threatening budget cuts, levying corruption allegations, and challenging the efficacy of judicial anti-crime policies. Shortly after taking office, Fernández demanded the resignations of Attorney General and senior Supreme Court magistrates, citing their failure to manage the ongoing security crisis. In tandem, pro-Chavez lawmakers have proposed transferring the authority to appoint the Attorney General to Congress. Fernández has also embraced penal populism, continuing the construction of a mega-prison modeled after Bukele’s CECOT.
Ultimately, the central contradiction of Chavismo Tico lies in its reliance on performative discourse over tangible policy outcomes. While failing to address systemic structural issues, the movement provides its base with a sense of political empowerment through the rhetoric of institutional disruption but it is eroding Costa Rica’s democracy.
David Díaz Arias is a Costa Rican historian and fiction writer. He is a professor of History at the University of Costa Rica (UCR) and holds a Ph.D. in History by Indiana University.