Leer esta entrevista en español.
In November 2025, the U.S. government presented its new national security strategy, which defines a new relationship with Latin America. It has come to be known as the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, or the “Donroe Doctrine.” “We want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; we want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations,” the document states.
Around the same time, the U.S. began threatening Venezuela’s sovereignty by seizing its oil tankers, bombing alleged drug boats in its surrounding waters, and moving troops to neighboring Caribbean islands. Soon after, it launched an attack on Caracas and kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro, accusing him of leading the nonexistent “Cartel of the Suns.”
What lies behind the “Donroe Doctrine?” Why did the U.S. invade Venezuela but not seek to advance a process of regime change in the country? What impact did the intervention have on Latin America, and what can be expected in the future?
To answer these questions, I spoke with Guillaume Long, an Ecuadorian politician and academic of French-British origin, former foreign minister of Ecuador, and senior fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, about these issues.
The interview was conducted in Spanish through a series of telephone conversations and has been translated and edited for clarity.
Daniel Cholakian: A few weeks have passed since the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, and it seems that the attack produced less tension than expected. How do you assess President Trump’s decision and its consequences for the region?
Guillaume Long: I think it’s too early to draw conclusions, but we can try to make some. The first is that the proposal set out in the U.S. National Security Strategy confirms the priority given to the Western Hemisphere. In a context of growing multipolarity, the U.S. has decided that it does not need to be present everywhere in the world, nor in all global scenarios.
However, I disagree with those who believe that it is merely a return to dividing the world into spheres of influence. There is some truth to that, but where it can intervene, the U.S. will intervene. No one can say that Nigeria is its sphere of influence. An opportunity arose, and it intervened.
What has changed is that it is no longer the global hegemon, with a presence in all areas. It will have a presence in some areas. One of those areas is the Western Hemisphere, which I believe will be prioritized. This is the first lesson: there is a prioritization of the Western Hemisphere among some global geopolitical areas.
Even neoconservatives like Marco Rubio have accepted that it is too costly to invade, occupy, and install the person they prefer in power. That is why they have not done so with [Venezuelan opposition leader] María Corina Machado
Another important lesson is that this U.S. presence will be primarily military. It is a reaction to a loss of economic hegemony. Today, most Latin American countries, and all South American countries except Colombia, have stronger trade relations with China than with the United States— the product of a gradual U.S. economic withdrawal from the region. Unable to respond with the same economic muscle as the Chinese, they are responding with security and military interventionism. This seems to be its only option, although it also retains control of the global financial system through the dollar, the Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other organizations. But this is more in the financial than the economic sphere, and it remains to be seen whether it will continue to maintain this dominance. Undoubtedly, the area where there is the greatest asymmetry with other major powers is the military sphere, and it is this advantage that the Trump administration is exploiting to regain some control. It is an economic problem that they are solving by military means. This is important, and I think it reveals a weakness and a certain impotence. In a way, Venezuela is a Pyrrhic victory.
DC: And specifically regarding Venezuela, what is your analysis of what happened after Maduro’s kidnapping?
GL: Perhaps the third lesson is that Trump does not want military interventionism with troops on the ground. He demonstrated this in his first administration and continues to demonstrate it now. We are seeing air strikes, which are a means, not an end. He is not seeking typical regime change by alluding to democratization, state-building, nation-building. Rather, it is about using military muscle to force negotiations. It is what he calls “the art of the deal.” I believe that force is just another component in a negotiation. He can negotiate with any actor as it is no longer a question of good or bad actors but rather the nature of the final agreement. Military pressure, bombing, and the kidnapping of a president are used as elements of negotiation.
DC: The policy of occupying territory and mobilizing troops to have a permanent presence on the global stage was very costly for the U.S. in the past—and seems difficult to sustain at present.
GL: Yes, it is costly. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, cost several trillion dollars and were also unpopular. In fact, Trump was elected in 2024 on the promise of no more endless wars.
Furthermore, these wars have not resulted in victories. Even according to their own parameters, not a single one of these wars has been successful. The Afghanistan war ended with an embarrassing withdrawal and the return of the regime that had been replaced 20 years earlier. The Iraq war was one of the greatest factors in delegitimizing U.S. hegemony worldwide. There is truly a consensus that putting troops on the ground is problematic. Even neoconservatives like Marco Rubio have accepted that it is too costly to invade, occupy, and install the person they prefer in power. That is why they have not done so with [Venezuelan opposition leader] María Corina Machado, even though she was Rubio’s preferred candidate. He accepted Trump’s decision to negotiate with someone he doesn’t like, seeking to subdue those local actors through military and economic threats.
DC: Regarding the financial power you mentioned, I wonder if the BRICS policy on the centrality of the dollar could be an emerging threat to the financial power of the U.S.
GL: Although the BRICS is not yet a group that promises alternative global governance, we must bear in mind that beyond the symbolic and the presidential summits, the most concrete thing in terms of institutionality is the bloc’s new Development Bank. When it is properly funded, it could pose very strong competition to the current Western hegemonic financial architecture. I think BRICS is saying that either global governance is reformed or they will maintain parallel governance. That is why there is increasing talk about BRICS in both Western politics and the media. They speak of it with fear, because it is perceived as a real threat.
DC: What can you say about the reactions of Latin American governments, regarding both Trump’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the intervention in Venezuela?
GL: Latin America has responded in different ways. Countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile have strongly condemned the intervention, others have responded half-heartedly, and still others have openly supported the violation of sovereignty. I think the fact that CELAC [Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] has not been able to issue a single statement, because it was boycotted by nine countries that support Trump, speaks volumes about the polarization in Latin America. However, Mexico and Brazil, which are confronting Trump, are not minor countries. They represent more than half of Latin America’s population and GDP. If we add Colombia, the third most populous country, the weight of the countries that opposed the invasion is not insignificant. More action is needed from Latin America, but this is not a time marked by collective action, either in Latin America or in the Global South. Regionalism and regional integration are very weak.
I think the fact that CELAC has not been able to issue a single statement, because it was boycotted by nine countries that support Trump, speaks volumes about the polarization in Latin America.
At this moment in Latin America, there are several countries that are aligned with Trump, but I don’t know if that will last long. In part, it is a result of fear. I believe these are short-term choices. It should be noted that for a regional power such as Brazil, it is no small matter that this is the first time the U.S. has launched a military attack on a South American country. With this action, Trump crossed the Rubicon and generated mistrust and suspicion in U.S. intentions. This will have long-term consequences as security and foreign policy doctrines in countries in the region may change.
DC: Given this moment of U.S. advancement in Latin America, what is the situation of the progressive or leftist political sectors in the region?
GL: They have been weakened by the brutal advance of the right in the region, but at least they are united on this issue. Previously, the issue of Venezuela divided the left greatly. At this moment, there is unity on the violation of international law, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, and the sovereignty of Venezuela. It is an unacceptable violation for those who supported Maduro and those who did not. These actions also violate declarations of Latin America as a “zone of peace,” which were very important in recent decades and [played a role] in the creation of UNASUR, CELAC, and other organizations and institutions.
DC: In this context of regional disarticulation and changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America, what is your opinion of the free trade agreement recently signed between Mercosur and the European Union?
GL: Generally speaking, I am not very keen about free trade agreements, especially when they are between countries in the Global South and countries with advanced, diversified, and industrialized economies. I don’t believe they are the way to achieve development; they can even be an instrument of economic reprimarization or condemnation to productive specialization. But, from a certain perspective, the Free Trade Agreement between Mercosur and the European Union has positive aspects. It allows for market diversification, avoiding being stuck between China or the U.S. There are always gray areas that, when negotiated well, must be taken advantage of. But the key point is that such an agreement is not the same when a government has a development plan with industrialization, sovereign policies, and strategic integration into the world, as when a government believes in the invisible hand of the market, non-intervention in the economy, and no planning. To put it more simply: I do not believe that an agreement like this is the same for a country like Brazil, with Lula as president, as it is for a country like Argentina, with Milei’s government.
Daniel Cholakian is a sociologist and journalist specializing in Latin America.