Bolivia heads to a second round of elections on October 19 amid an acute economic crisis and a fractured left. After the 2019 coup and a year of violent and corrupt rule by the de facto regime of Jeanine Añez, Evo Morales’ Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party returned to the presidency. Luís Arce, elected in October 2020, oversaw a gradual slide into economic and political crisis. Both inept and corrupt, his government fractured the party and provoked rampant inflation and a nationwide fuel shortage.
Morales, who, over three terms from 2006 to 2019, oversaw a period of unprecedented economic growth and redistribution of wealth, was barred from running due to questionable rulings of the Constitutional Court. He has vociferously opposed Arce, his former finance minister, and his followers staged multiple blockades in the months before the first round of voting in August. Morales maintains a strong base of support, especially in rural areas, despite facing charges of statutory rape. Some observers blame Morales for the 2019 coup and Arce’s errors, but the most pressing issue now is the return of the Right and the likelihood that those responsible for the coup and mass killings will never be brought to justice.
The most pressing issue now is the return of the Right and the likelihood that those responsible for the coup and mass killings will never be brought to justice.
The first round on August 17 led to the surprising victory of Rodrigo Paz representing the Christian Democrat Party. A veteran of three right-leaning parties and son of ex-president Jaime Paz Zamora, Paz claims he’s a centrist who represents a new vision. In the October 19 runoff, Paz faces former president Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga of the establishment neoliberal right. Together, their parties now hold more than the two-thirds congressional majority needed to change the constitution and make other sweeping changes—which both candidates have pledged to do. It is unlikely they will use this power to pursue justice for the victims of 2019.
With the MAS irrevocably splintered, Morales called on his supporters to submit null votes. Some 20 percent of the electorate did. Andrónico Rodríguez, Morales’s former chosen successor, won only 8.5 percent, while the “official” MAS candidate, Interior Minister Eduardo Castillo, stumbled in with a mere 3 percent. Though some read this as a “failure” of Morales’s political project—often branded as socialist—it is important to underscore that Morales’s political orientation is more focused on sovereignty and the grassroots than doctrinaire socialism. The first round results reflect an indictment of Arce’s inability to manage an economic crisis tied to declining gas revenues and a weakened currency. Still, the Right has seized the opportunity to portray socialism as a failure and demonize Morales—and eliminate the possibility that an “Indio” could ever be president again.
Impunity, Again
To make matters worse, Bolivia’s judiciary, packed with high-ranking judges who illegally extended their mandates, is already pandering to the Right. Just days after the August vote, the head of the Supreme Court ordered a review of the pre-trial detention of three key coup leaders. Santa Cruz governor Luis Fernando Camacho and Potosí civic leader Marco Pumari have since been released. Another court annulled trials against Añez, her ministers, and security forces for the 2019 Huayllani and Senkata massacres. While excessive use of pretrial detention is a problem in Bolivia, these moves alarmed victims and human rights defenders. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the United Nations called this “a setback in the search for timely and adequate justice for victims of serious human rights violations” that undermines Bolivia’s legal obligations and constitutes “a revictimization of those affected.”
Though technically released to house arrest, Camacho has returned to his gubernatorial duties and enjoys the Right to move without restriction. Soon after his release, the U.S. charge d’affaires, Debra Hevia, donated firefighting supplies to his government and embraced him for a photo op—foreshadowing a larger U.S. role and alliances between Bolivia’s right and the Trump administration. Añez, serving a 10-year sentence for illegally appointing herself president, continues to submit appeals and is likely to be freed soon. All the military officers charged for the 2019 coup and killings have been released.
Not only did Arce fail to attempt much-needed justice reform, but he also made little effort to shore up democratic institutions in the wake of the coup. He repeatedly promoted military commanders who backed the coup, dropped investigations into foreign mercenaries, and failed to reform the security forces. Despite the prosecution of a handful of para-state militia leaders, also involved in the coup, these right-wing groups continue to operate. This ongoing impunity further erodes the rule of law.
The Candidates
Meanwhile, the two candidates are engaged in an increasingly dirty exchange of insults. Quiroga, who served as vice president under former dictator Hugo Banzer and briefly as president, from 2001 to 2002, has been the cultivated favorite of the United States. In the 1990s, he served as the spokesperson for “Plan Dignidad,” a military-backed coca eradication program imposed by the United States, and during his time in office, the U.S.-funded mercenary outfit known as the “Expeditionary Task Force” murdered a number of people in the Chapare coca growing region, including union leader Casimiro Huanca.
Quiroga has since launched three failed presidential bids and has sought to curry favor among conservatives from Argentina to Washington. His team includes former advisors of Ecuadoran President Daniel Noboa. Recently, Quiroga appeared on TikTok in front of the U.S. Capitol, seeking to cozy up to the Trump administration. While in Washington, he also met with former Air Force special operations officer Michael Jensen, Trump’s director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council. Jensen is closely tied to the deepening militarization of U.S.-Latin American relations.
Quiroga’s vice-presidential candidate, ‘JP’ Velasco, is a tech bro and political novice who campaigns wearing a MAGA-style cap reading “Make Bolivia Sexy Again.” He has been called out for racist anti-Indigenous tweets from his past. Backers of Quiroga include Branko Marinkovic, the Croatian Bolivian vegetable oil mogul long associated with the hard-right agrarian elite of eastern Bolivia. Yassir Molina, head of the Resistencia Juvenil Cochala, a paramilitary motorcycle gang that terrorized Cochabamba during the 2019 coup, has also actively campaigned for Quiroga. Molina recently started parole after serving four years for a criminal organization.
On the other side is Rodrigo Paz, who brands himself as a pragmatic centrist and promises “capitalism for all.” His father’s party, the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR), began as a leftist organization, but it later moved to the right. Paz has bounced around: he was a militant in his father’s MIR, later joined PODEMOS (now Quiroga’s party), then represented Comunidad Ciudadana (led by Carlos Mesa). He now wears the jersey of Bolivia’s Christian Democratic Party.
As mayor of Tarija, Paz gained a reputation for corruption—allegations he blames on MAS political persecution. Paz is betting on support from the city of El Alto and disillusioned former MAS supporters without an option on the left. He praises the “capitalism” of El Alto, an economically vibrant, mostly Aymara city. Like Quiroga, Paz made the obligatory trip to Washington, where he spoke at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and met with mid-level U.S. officials. Despite publicly rejecting the idea of IMF loans to Bolivia, Paz reportedly met with representatives of the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
His running mate, Edman Lara, is a former police officer from rural Cochabamba, though he does not identify as Quechua. He became popular on TikTok for his social media feeds exposing police corruption during the Arce government. Lara has cultivated ties with El Alto and evangelical groups. Attempting to increase support in the Andean west against a right-wing base in the Eastern lowlands, Lara has called Quiroga and his supporters “killers,” “racists,” and “colla-haters” (colla refers to people from the highlands). His brash populism resonates with grassroots Bolivians lacking a left-wing option, but his vision is far from progressive. Known for being a loose cannon, Lara has even claimed he would jail his own running mate if Paz broke the law.
While Paz and Lara strike a more populist tone that may leave some space for negotiation, Quiroga will undoubtedly try to dismantle much of what the MAS built and restore the United States to its tutelary role.
After his first round victory, Paz received an endorsement from perennial presidential candidate and loser Samuel Doria Medina, a cement and Burger King mogul who initially made his fortune as the privatization czar for Paz’s father, Jaime. Nicknamed the q’encha, an Aymara word that roughly means “jinxed,” Doria Medina campaigned unsuccessfully for the presidency for over 20 years. His economic advisor quickly joined Paz’s team.
The Stakes Ahead
Whatever the outcome on October 19, Bolivia’s deepening economic crisis will likely force the next president to turn to the IMF in an attempt to paper over the growing deficit and fuel shortages. An austerity program reminiscent of the 1980s looms as a real possibility. Efforts to reboot the lithium export project will involve privatization and foreign investment. While Arce promoted Russian and Chinese contracts, they violated Bolivian law and never received congressional approval. Quiroga says he will scrap the contracts, join forces with Argentina and Chile to build a lithium hub, and privatize the sector— promising Bolivians direct dividend payments “like a mutual fund.” Paz has been hard to pin down, but says he will consult residents of Potosí and that a new lithium law is needed. Either way, privatization of lithium and the elimination of fuel subsidies would increase political tensions. Judicial attacks will likely multiply, though none will address the crimes of 2019.
Morales will face a renewed legal assault as the Right retaliates for coup prosecutions and attempts to further erode his legacy. Quiroga says he will send Morales to prison, while Paz says he will let the courts determine Morales’s fate. Any renewed persecution of Morales will intensify the conflict between the state and social movements. While Paz and Lara strike a more populist tone that may leave some space for negotiation, Quiroga will undoubtedly try to dismantle much of what the MAS built and restore the United States to its tutelary role.
The U.S. regime appears to lean toward Quiroga, who leads Paz 47-39 in the only available poll. But polls are unreliable. Missteps by Paz and his running mate Lara appear to have unsettled right-leaning and wealthy Bolivians, while evidence of Quiroga’s running mate’s racist tweets and hardline rhetoric has disturbed moderate and grassroots voters. Win or not, Paz’s party has the most seats in both houses of Congress, ensuring him a sizable slice of the state pie.
As always, hope for the future lies in Bolivia’s social movements. Yet they are weak and divided after years of infighting and MAS dissolution. The challenge now is to rebuild.
Kathryn Ledebur is the director of the Andean Information Network, based in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
Bret Gustafson is a NACLA co-executive editor and the author of “Bolivia in the Age of Gas”.