U.S. Drug Czar Backs
“Peruvian Rasputin”
WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 1, 1996
n an October 1996 visit to
Peru, U.S. Drug Czar Gen.
Barry McCaffrey visited the
presidential palace for a meeting
with top government officials,
including President Alberto
Fujimori. During McCaffrey’s
visit, Vladimiro Montesinos–
known as the “Peruvian
Rasputin”-also arrived at the
palace, shocking the journalists
covering the event. Since 1990,
when he assumed the unofficial
position of Fujimori’s closest
advisor and de facto head of the
Peruvian National Intelligence
Service (SIN), Montesinos had
only once been photographed
publicly, caught by surprise at a
private party. Now he was looking
straight into the cameras. The
message was clear: despite well-
founded allegations of involve-
ment in both human rights viola-
tions and drug trafficking,
Montesinos has the complete
backing of the U.S. government.
In what appears to be yet another
case of U.S. overseas intelligence
activity gone awry, the U.S. gov-
ernment may be providing protec-
tion to Montesinos at the behest
of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
The relationship between
Montesinos and the CIA goes
back several decades. In the
1970s, Montesinos was expelled
from the Peruvian army after an
unauthorized visit to Washington,
where he was suspected of selling
information to the CIA. He then
launched a lucrative law practice
defending accused drug traffick-
ers, such as drug lord Evaristo
Porras, now imprisoned in
Colombia. Fujimori, who credits
Montesinos with being the archi-
tect of his government’s antinar-
cotics policy, has argued that this
experience provides Montesinos
with first-hand knowledge of the
drug trade, thereby increasing his
effectiveness at combating it.
It may also, however, have cre-
ated links difficult to sever.
Allegations linking Montesinos to
the drug trade continue to surface.
In public testimony this past
August, Peruvian drug kingpin
Demetrio Limonier Chivez,
known as El Vaticano, said that he
paid Montesinos $50,000 a month
from July, 1991 to August, 1992
in exchange for information on
antidrug raids. A Peruvian DEA
agent made similar allegations
before an investigative congres-
sional committee in 1993. And
last October, the Lima weekly,
Caretas, published a startling
interview with Luis Izusqui, a for-
mer associate of the L6pez
Paredes brothers, now in jail for
drug trafficking, who claimed that
lawyer Javier Corrochano sought
to pay Montesinos thousands of
dollars in exchange for the release
of the imprisoned traffickers.
The Peruvian government has
closed ranks and refused to allow
any investigations into these alle-
gations. As soon as El Vaticano’s
testimony was reported, Attorney
General Blanca Nl61ida Col6n
said that the Public Ministry
would not investigate the
charges. True to form, the
Peruvian Congress echoed the
government line. Then came the
most startling defense-that of
the U.S. government.
In mid-September, State Depart-
ment spokesman Nicholas Bums
stated that the U.S. government
believes that “no senior official”
in Peru is involved in drug traf-
ficking. In stark contrast to its
actions in Colombia, the U.S.
government did not even call for
an investigation. This was widely
interpreted in Peru as blanket sup-
port for Montesinos, providing
him with the protection he needed
to avoid an official investigation.
It also rekindled interest in
Montesinos’ relationship with the
CIA.
Concerns about Montesinos’
ties with the CIA date back to the
early 1990s, when Peruvian jour-
nalist Gustavo Gorriti provided
evidence that the CIA was giving
financial assistance to an antidrug
unit of the SIN that was involved
in death-squad activity. While
further evidence of the C.I.A.’s
role in Peru has not been
obtained, the SIN’s participation
in human rights violations is not
in doubt. Montesinos appears to
be the mastermind behind a death
squad composed of SIN and mili-
tary agents that has carried out
some of the worst atrocities
attributed to state agents since
Fujimori assumed office, includ-
ing the 1991 Barrios Altos mas-
sacre and the killing of nine stu-
dents and a professor from the La
Cantuta University in 1992.
Before traveling to Lima, Gen.
McCaffrey’s office stated that he
would make no public comments
on the Montesinos case. After the
visit, his office claimed that U.S.
officials did not know that
Montesinos was to attend the
meeting at the presidential palace.
Yet, in a press conference held the
day after the meeting with
Montesinos, Gen. McCaffrey reit-
erated the U.S. government’s
unwavering confidence in the
Fujimori government and in the
absence of corruption among
high-level officials. This bol-
stered views in Peru of overt U.S.
support for Montesinos.
Whether this support is unwit-
ting or deliberate, it has under-
mined the U.S. government’s
credibility in Peru on two fronts.
First, support for Montesinos and
the SIN-both deeply involved in
egregious human rights viola-
tions-weakens the U.S. govern-
ment’s credibility as a defender of
human rights and democracy in
Vo XXX No 4- JA/E 19 Vol XXX, No 4 JAN/FEB 1997 1NEWSBRIEFS
Peru. Second, efforts to combat
international drug trafficking may
likewise be undermined by U.S.
support for an individual who
appears to be deeply linked to the
drug trade. The U.S. government
may in fact be aiding the very
forces it purports to be combating
through its antinarcotics program.
-Coletta Youngers
Arrest of Retired General
Detonates Civil-Military
Rift in Peru
LIMA, DECEMBER 9, 1996
O n the morning of
November 26, retired
Gen. Rodolfo Robles was
beaten, shoved into an unmarked
car, and taken to Fort Real Felipe,
where he was charged with insub-
ordination, insulting a superior
officer and defamation of the
armed forces. Although Peruvian
law considers retired army offi-
cials to be civilians, Robles was
brought before a military tribunal,
which, had it found him guilty,
could have sentenced him to up to
20 years in prison. The arrest of
Gen. Robles-an outspoken critic
of the government’s human rights
record and the growing power of
the National Intelligence Service
(SIN)-detonated a major con-
frontation between President
Alberto Fujimori and the armed
forces. Fujimori criticized the
arrest, but he avoiding challeng-
ing the autonomy of the military
courts by saying he would
amnesty Robles if he were found
guilty. This rupture of what has
been a solid civil-military alliance
was papered over on December 5,
when Congress approved Fuji-
mori’s amnesty proposal. Two
days later, Robles was freed.
In 1993, Robles-the military’s
third highest-ranking officer-
was forcibly retired after he pub-
licly exposed the existence of a
paramiltary death squad, known
as the “Grupo Colina,” operating
under the orders of the de facto
head of the SIN, Vladimiro
Montesinos, and with the knowl-
edge of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, Gen.
Nicolis de Bari Hermoza Rios.
After a military tribunal charged
him with insubordination and he
began receiving anonymous
death threats, Robles fled to
Argentina. In 1995, after
Congress passed a general
amnesty, he returned to Peru, and
continued to expose the involve-
ment of the Grupo Colina in
human rights violations.
Robles’ most recent allegation,
concerning the involvement of
members of the Grupo Colina in
the October 17 bombing of a tele-
vision station in the provincial
town of Puno, appears to have
been the immediate cause of his
detention. Opposition to the arrest
was massive and immediate, and
included progressive and conser-
vative sectors alike.
The controversy came at a diffi-
cult time for the Fujimori govern-
ment. Charges of high-level
involvement in drug trafficking,
coupled with economic stagna-
tion, have led to sharp declines in
the President’s popularity. In a
November poll, only 41% of
those interviewed approved his
administration-a fall of 30
points from last January.
Opposition was mounting, more-
over, to recent legislation allow-
ing Fujimori to run for a third
term in the year 2000. The arrest
of Robles, a leader of this opposi-
tion movement, was initially
interpreted as a sign of the
Fujimori government’s growing
intolerance of dissent.
Perhaps fearing further erosion
of public support, Fujimori
promised an amnesty to free
Robles. Whereas in the past, Fujimori has steadfastly backed
the military hierarchy, this time he
has come down on the side of civil-
ian authority. But what this means in
the overall scheme of things is less
certain. Fujimori is highly depen-
dent on the military and the SIN, especially since the April 1992 auto-
golpe. Fujimori’s amnesty, notes
Peruvian analyst Fernando
Rospigliosi, “does not mean the
reassertion of civilian control over
the military. It is true that the freeing
of Robles is an important triumph of
the country’s democratic forces and
the independent press. But it does
not imply that, at the level of gov-
ernment, civilian authority has been
reestablished over the military–
only that one faction triumphed over
another.”
According to Rospigliosi,
Montesinos may have urged
Hermoza to get rid of the trouble-
some Robles once and for all. Since
military promotions and appoint-
ments are decided in December,
Hermoza’s acts may also have been
aimed at ensuring his continued
tenure as commander-in-chief of
the armed forces. After Robles’
release, however, he now appears to
be seriously discredited. If
Hermoza were forced to step down,
says Rospigliosi, Montesinos would
gain greater control over the mili-
tary. Given Montesinos’ alleged ties
to drug trafficking and death-squad
activity, that would not augur well
for Peru’s future.
-Maxwell A. Cameron
Rightist Proclaimed Winner
of Nicaragua’s Elections
MANAGUA, DECEMBER 12, 1996
Despite charges of fraud and
other irregularities in Nica-
ragua’s October 20 presi-
dential elections, the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE) proclaimed
Arnoldo Alemin president-elect on
November 22. Alemin, whose
Liberal Alliance will be the biggest
group in Congress, with 42 of the 93
seats, is scheduled to take office on
January 10. Of the other 51 seats in
Congress, the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) won 36,
and nine other political parties will
divide the remaining 15. Defeated
Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega,
who claims that the election results
were fraudulent, said that his party
would recognize their legality but
not their legitimacy.
Along with 14 other parties,
Ortega sought to have the elections
in the departments of Matagalpa and
Managua annulled and reheld. The
FSLN presented a 646-page report
documenting irregularities and
anomalies in the two departments,
which make up approximately 40%
of the electorate.
The anomalies, according to
party leaders, affected 72% of the
917 polling stations in Matagalpa.
The data in hundreds of ballot tab-
ulations had been altered, and
dozens had false signatures and
codes. More than a hundred polling
stations reported more votes than
the number of people eligible to
vote; 88 were not in authorized
locations and 280 were not legally
constituted. On November 9,
Matagalpa judge Mirna Vargas
issued an arrest warrant for Alberto
Blad6n Baldiz6n, electoral council
president for the department and a
Liberal Alliance member. He
refused to answer a summons in
connection with the almost 30,000
ballots police agents found on his
property shortly after the October
20 election.
The root of the problem, claim
many FSLN leaders, is a 1995 elec-
tion law which introduced elements
of partisanship into the electoral
process that had been avoided in the
last two national elections held in
1984 and 1990. Specifically, this
law mandates that party members,
rather than independent profession-
als, be selected as the heads of the
departmental electoral councils. In
turn, they have the power to name
the heads of each voting precinct in
their department. The departmental
electoral councils in both Managua
and Matagalpa were members of
Alemdin’s Liberal Alliance.
After both of these departmental
electoral councils rejected the
requests to annul the election
results, the CSE followed suit.
While the head of the CSE, FSLN
member Rosa Marina Zelaya,
acknowledged that there had been
some serious irregularities, she said
she did not believe that the outcome
of the elections was substantially
altered as a result.
The call to void the election
results was not unanimous among
the FSLN’s ranks. Mariano Fiallos,
former president of the CSE, and a
highly respected Sandinista, said in
a letter to the pro-FSLN daily, El
Nuevo Diario, that the election
irregularities and anomalies were
not sufficient justification for void-
ing the elections. He did, however,
criticize the new election law, which
he said made the 1996 elections the
most complicated and difficult to
organize in Nicaraguan history.
Fiallos resigned from the electoral
council last January precisely over
that issue. The Sandinista Renewal
Movement (MRS), which split from
the FSLN last year, made an official
statement saying that the irregulari-
ties did not appear to be sufficient to
invalidate the election results.
Ortega said he will take his seat in
Congress as head of the FSLN par-
liamentary group. He said that he
would introduce reforms to the
electoral law to make it possible to
appeal the CSE’s rulings, and to
change the composition of the
council, which he said was biased
against the FSLN.
-Toby Mailman, Weekly News
Update on the Americas
“Health Tourism” Booms
in Cuba
HAVANA, NOVEMBER 28, 1996
uba’s dire need of hard cur-
rency has led it to turn its
national health service–
arguably the best in Latin
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
America-into a budding tourist
attraction, and its corps of doctors
into a profitable export commodity.
A record 7,000 foreigners from 60
different countries have visited
Cuba for medical treatment in 1996.
Financial support is being sought
for Cuban medical aid to develop-
ing countries such as neighboring
Haiti. And increasing numbers of
Cuban medics are being hired out to
foreign countries at highly prof-
itable rates.
“Health tourism”-essentially an
industry of health resorts linked
closely to surrounding hospitals
which provide a wide range of sur-
gical and rehabilitative treat-
ments-became a popular business
venture in the late 1980s. The state-
run company, Servimed, has a
monopoly in this field with 42 such
centers. It has the potential to build
many more as joint business ven-
tures with foreign companies or
investors.
Last year health tourism netted a
reported $23 million in profits,
offering specialist treatment for
vitiligo (a drastic change in skin
pigmentation), psoriasis and
retinosis. Other services offered
include neurological rehabilitation,
clinical care for HIV-positive
patients and the fastest-growing
area of all, plastic surgery. Resorts
such as Servimed’s newly built $7
million La Pradera complex, which
opened last month on the outskirts
of Havana, expect to make plastic
surgery a priority.
While some have criticized the
new international drift of Cuba’s
health service, Servimed director
Jorge Perera Horta stresses that
growing health tourism is not taking
away treatment and health facilities
normally available to Cuban nation-
als free of charge. “We work with
the ministry of health,” says Perera
Horta. “Most of our profits-60%-
are reinvested in developing our
hospitals. The remaining 40% goes
into other aspects of health care.”
Profits from projects such as
these are being reinvested into
Cuba’s medical research, which is
highly regarded worldwide. Tests
began in September on what scien-
tists and doctors hope will be the
first cure for AIDS. Impressive
progress has been made in research
on how to prevent aging of the
brain, which often leads to
Alzheimer’s disease.
Cuba’s medical expertise is well
known. There are some 60,000
trained doctors in a country of fewer
than 12 million inhabitants. But
medical supplies are not always eas-
ily available. Penicillin must often
be bought on the black market with
U.S. dollars, due to lack of stocks
over the counter.
Institutes such as Ciren, the inter-
national center for neurological
restoration in Havana, are forced to
cater mainly to foreigners, charging
competitive prices but in hard cur-
rency. One visit revealed that fewer
than one fourth of the beds were
occupied by Cubans. Most patients
were Latin Americans, though
patients come from around the
world, including, on occasion, the
United States.
-Latin American Weekly Report
Sources:
Coletta Youngers is Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America in Washington, D.C.
Maxwell A. Cameron is associate professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. He is author of Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru (St. Martin’s Press, 1994) and co-editor of The Peruvian Labyrinth (The Penn State Press, 1997).
Toby Mailman is a journalist based in Managua who writes frequently for the Weekly News Update on the Americas, a weekly bulletin summarizing news in Latin America. For subscription information, contact the Nicaragua Solidarity Network, 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012, (212) 674-9499.
Latin American Weekly Report is published weekly by Latin American Newsletters. For subscription information: Latin American Newsletters, 61 Old Street, London EC1V 9HX, England, (171) 251-0012, E-mail: WR@latin.ftech.co.uk.