

Venezuela's Wounded Bodies: Nation and Imagination During the 2002 Coup



Venezuelans protest President Hugo Chávez's shake-up of PDVSA, the state oil company, on April 10, 2002.

By Fernando Coronil

DURING LATIN AMERICA'S POLITICAL "left turn" of the last decade, each progressive government in the region has followed its own distinctive historical trajectory.¹ Common to all, however, have been intense struggles over the development and control of natural resources. This is not surprising in a part of the world dominated by processes of capitalist accumulation based on nature-intensive industries. Despite regional governments' attempts to diversify their economies, such industries as large-scale agriculture, mining, and hydrocarbons remain Latin America's international comparative advantage and main productive activity. In the case of Venezuela—where President Hugo Chávez ignited the left turn with his election in 1998—control of the state-run oil industry has long been at the center of power struggles.

Ever since Venezuela became a major oil producer in the 1920s, these struggles over oil have shaped national politics at every level, defining the relation between citizens and nation, the formation of social classes, and the constitution of the state as the country's central political and economic agent. Elsewhere I have argued that as a result of these contests, the Venezuelan nation has been imagined as consisting of "two bodies": its social body (citizens, people) and its natural body (territory and natural resources, especially oil, which by law belongs to all Venezuelans).² As a result of efforts to influence policy decisions and gain access to oil wealth, "democracy" has been understood in Venezuela as the participation of all citizens in the nation's two bodies; it has meant the generalization not just of political rights but also of the right to benefit from the na-

*Fernando Coronil is Presidential Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. He is the author of *The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela* (University of Chicago Press, 1997), and of the forthcoming *Crude Matters*, a comprehensive examination of the 2002 coup in Venezuela.*

REPORT: COUPS

tion's wealth. Opposition to the state, whether dictatorial or democratic, has been typically cast as a critique of the private or partisan appropriation of the nation's wealth.

As these notions took root as taken-for-granted premises of social life, it became commonsensical in Venezuela to believe that the state's primary duty is to establish a harmonious relationship between the nation's two bodies. And it fell to the president, as the embodiment of the rich petro-state, to play the role of the savior who protects and unifies them. Thus, in political contests, leaders' claims to legitimately represent the nation have come to depend on their ability to present credible national development projects to the collectivity. They typically promise one version or another of "progress." Opposing the regimes that preceded them, all potential saviors claim that under their rule, the nation's collective wealth will finally be safeguarded and used for the common good. These conceptions of state, nation, and the presidency have animated much of recent Venezuelan history, achieving during historical junctures the power of a material force capable of influencing outcomes.

This was the case in 2002, when the imaginary of "two bodies" informed the actions that led to the ousting of Chávez at dawn on Friday, April 12, followed by his return to power the following Sunday, April 14. Yet these conceptions of the Venezuelan state not only affected events, but were resignified by them. Three critical moments during the April days reveal recent transformations in Venezuelan social relations and collective imaginaries: the anti-Chávez opposition march of April 11; the media representation of the Llaguno Bridge Massacre, which took place during the march; and the self-proclamation of business leader Pedro Carmona as president on April 12.

WITH THE PROMISE OF HIS BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION, Chávez was elected in 1998 with 56% of the national vote. Supported by the country's poor majority, he also enjoyed the support of many sectors that thought he would continue the traditional politics of alliances and compromises. But by the end of 2001, it was clear that Chávez was breaking the rules of the game. Without consulting influential economic and political actors, he used his legal powers to implement a controversial set of policies—49 decrees affecting a variety of areas, including the energy sector, agricultural lands, and seas and rivers.

By early 2002 Chávez's approval rating had fallen to about 30% from a soaring 80% the previous year. The opposition had taken form as a political bloc that feared Chávez was either an authoritarian ruler, a socialist in disguise, or both, and opposed his attempt to control the state oil company, *Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.* (PDVSA). In a country accustomed to celebrating its social harmony, however illusory,

people split furiously into two factions, each more passionate than the other and convinced that only it possessed the Truth. Chávez's opponents came out against not only the management that the state wanted to impose on PDVSA, but its entire oil policy. Most favored returning to the policy of former PDVSA president Luis Giusti, who had sought to make Venezuela a major oil power by maximizing production rather than increasing prices, and thus distancing Venezuela from OPEC and its regulations. Perhaps the most publicly criticized Chávez measure in the oil sector was an oil subsidy to Cuba.

But it was Chávez's appointment of a partisan managerial board to PDVSA during the first weekend of April 2002 that set in motion the events leading to the coup. Chávez rudely announced on his nationally broadcast TV show, *Aló Presidente* (Hello, President), that he was firing a handful of PDVSA executives and replacing them with close supporters who would bypass the promotion ladder normally required to reach such leadership positions. As PDVSA president he named Gastón Parra Luzardo, an academic with theoretical expertise on petroleum but without managerial experience in the industry. Opposition leaders used this breach of meritocratic procedure as a banner to rally people against the administration. They called for a protest march under the familiar political slogan "Not one step back" (*Ni un paso atrás*), intended to establish a kinship between their movement and other historically significant struggles for democracy, including Chile's protests against the authoritarian rule of Augusto Pinochet.

From the opposition's point of view, the nation's natural body was endangered by Chávez, whom they viewed as an autocrat threatening to monopolize power and mismanage Venezuela's precious resources. From an opposite perspective, the Chavistas viewed the opposition's meritocracy discourse as a smoke screen—a "mythocracy," as Chávez frequently called it—meant to hide their intention of ousting the government and taking over the national oil industry. According to official spokesmen, the new board of directors was composed of known and respected career petroleum experts, each with more than 20 years of experience in petroleum affairs; they had only skipped over a few merit levels to reach the directorship (between four and seven levels out of a total of 36); and similar changes had occurred in the past without arousing any protest. The fundamental problem was one of politics, not management norms, according to Chávez and his supporters.

Convinced that the country was being led adrift, the opposition sought to rid Venezuela of Chávez. Now the same discourse that helped propel Chávez to power—the defense of the nation's wealth on behalf of the people—would be

used against him. Although the opposition's public efforts to oust him took the form of a legal public gathering, certain powerful, backstage sectors sought to be rid of Chávez by any means necessary. On April 11, the opposition mobilized the largest protest march in the country's history up to that point from its base in eastern Caracas. An ardent crowd gathered in the recently baptized Meritocracy Square in front of PDVSA headquarters, where they had a permit to assemble. Although the march was cast as a protest against the breach of meritocracy in the oil industry, for many, including some who were involved in conspiracies at that time, its goal from the beginning was to oust Chávez.

Moved by their own desires as well as instigated by those who had a preconceived plan, the protesters quickly radicalized their aims. By mid-morning, they went from defending meritocracy to demanding Chávez's resignation. At noon leaders redirected the march toward the Miraflores Palace, the president's office and residence. As it moved from eastern to western Caracas, traversing about seven miles to Miraflores, the march expanded, reaching several hundred thousand (estimates range from 300,000 to 1 million). The extraordinary size of the march strengthened the opposition's perception that the whole country was with them and that history was on their side. On that day, chanting slogans from other historic struggles—for example, "The people, united, will never be defeated"—the marchers came to believe that their collective action could wrest control of the state, save the country from misrule, and change the course of history. As the opposition newspaper *El Nacional* put it, in an article commemorating the third anniversary of April 11: "The feeling of power of these masses of humanity was absolute."³

Although the goal of ousting Chávez, however premeditated, was publicly presented as a pressing political demand in the early hours of the demonstration, the afternoon's bloody events made it possible to present his ouster as an urgent moral necessity. In several areas around Miraflores Palace and the Llaguno Bridge over Baralt Avenue, 19 people were shot dead. Soon afterward, widely watched news on private networks reported that the government had carried out these killings. The video produced by Venevisión, a network owned by Gustavo Cisneros, a major opposition leader, showed images of people wearing the signature Chavista red shirts firing from the bridge, while a voice-over asserted that these were government officers and sympathizers firing on "peaceful demonstrators." The repeated airing of this video magnified its significance and sense of truth.

The Llaguno Bridge Massacre, as it came to be known, quickly transformed a civil rejection into an open military rebellion against Chávez. The image of government representatives and supporters firing from Llaguno Bridge, to-

gether with images of dead or wounded bodies, were repeatedly shown to demonstrate the absolute illegitimacy of a government that had killed "innocent people." Major civilian figures insisted that it was no longer possible to tolerate a government that had "soiled its hands with the blood of the people," as veteran leader and Chávez's political mentor Luis Miquilena proclaimed on the evening of April 11. They were joined in the evening by the top military commanders of the four armed forces who one after the other announced their rejection of Chávez; their objection to the president's controversial order to contain the demonstration using Plan Ávila, a military contingency plan to maintain order in Caracas, had already created a ground for their rebellion.

The video images of the Llaguno massacre were shown to officers at military bases to legitimize the demand for Chávez's renunciation. They were also circulated by the media in the United States, Europe, and other Latin American countries, where they were used to back up official declarations, such as that of Bush administration press secretary Ari Fleischer, whose statement on April 12 emphasized that Chávez had provoked his own downfall for having attacked protesters. "We know that the action encouraged by the Chávez government provoked this crisis," Fleischer said. He added: "According to the best information available, the Chávez government suppressed peaceful demonstrations. Government supporters, on orders from the Chávez government, fired on unarmed, peaceful protesters, resulting in 10 killed and 100 wounded."⁴

Never before had an attack on the nation's social body inspired such an outpouring of sympathy from the country's elite and media. It is instructive to compare it with the massacre that took place in 1989 during the uprising in Caracas known as the Caracazo, in which the state forcibly suppressed a massive protest against declining economic conditions and structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund. The National Army killed almost 400 protesters, whose deaths, in contrast to those 19 in April 2002, were accepted by the political elite and the media as a necessary measure to safeguard the social order in a period of neoliberal restructuring. No major leaders, parties, or civil society organizations protested the massacre; COFAVIC, the NGO that took it upon itself to help the victims and their families, worked practically alone and against the current. In contrast, on April 11 and 12, the Llaguno massacre was repeatedly presented by the opposition as proof that Chávez had lost all legitimacy to rule the nation.

The massacre remains a controversial event. But while it is possible that Chavistas fired at the marchers from the bridge or elsewhere at one point or another, there is no doubt that the Venevisión video misrepresents what happened at

REPORT: COUPS

that specific time. The wounded and the dead shown on the Venevisión video were not people on Baralt Avenue, as the voice-over reported, but on the bridge itself; the video had no angle of vision over Baralt Avenue. Another video taken at exactly the same time with a view of both Baralt Avenue and the Llaguno Bridge shows Metropolitan Police officers on foot and from armored vehicles shooting at the Chavistas on the Llaguno Bridge (the police force was under the command of opposition leader Alfredo Peña, the mayor of Caracas). At that time, the government TV station was taken over by opposition forces and so could not present an alternative view. At this critical juncture, opposite ideas were in battle, not in dialogue; the power of evidence became drowned by the evidence of power. Those who controlled the media managed to define public truths.

Accounts of the events that followed also remain controversial and confusing to this day. The official story is that Chávez, seeking to avoid a bloodbath, followed the advice of his domestic and international advisers (mainly Fidel Castro) and agreed to let General Lucas Rincón—his only three-star general, the highest military rank—announce his resignation in the early morning of April 12, so long as certain precautions were taken regarding his departure from the country. Nevertheless, minutes after this announcement, the officers at Fort Tiuna (an army base near downtown Caracas) changed the condition that had been negotiated. They objected to letting Chávez flee to Cuba, demanding instead that he be tried in Venezuela for the killings of the previous day. Chávez then refused to sign the text of his resignation that had been faxed to him. Still, seeking to avoid a bloody confrontation and to negotiate with those who seemed to hold the power of arms in those confusing times, he agreed to be held under arrest.

The opposition's various versions of the story share the notion that Rincón announced Chávez's resignation, either in recognition that the president had lost power (and this is the most widespread belief) or as a trick to gain time so that Chávez could find out who was really against him. In either case, and despite the constitution's provisions governing the chain of command, according to the opposition this situation created a *de facto* power vacuum on April 12. Many in the opposition, in fact, still argue that there was no coup; Chávez abandoned the seat of power, and the opposition took a place that had remained empty.


Early on the morning of April 12, with Chávez in custody, Vice President Diosdado Cabello in hiding, and the National Assembly disbanded, the Chavista state, so centered on the figure of the president, was in effect suddenly decapitated. A group of officers and civilians at Fort Tiuna took up the functions of the state with no more legitimacy than the might of power. Far from public scrutiny, this small group, clearly

acting on the basis of predesigned plans, however incoherent, and with the apparent aid of high military commanders and other key national and international actors, put the final touches on previously elaborated decrees and on the terms of the transition. As planned, they named an interim president, Pedro Carmona. At dawn on April 12, through a televised announcement, they presented the new president to the nation.

IN A CEREMONY THAT ASPIRED TO BE SPECTACULARLY historical, Carmona inaugurated himself as president in Ayacucho Hall at Miraflores Palace on the afternoon of April 12. In that solemn ceremony, he also named some members of his cabinet; summarily dismissed the National Assembly, the state governors, and municipal leaders (all of them democratically elected); disbanded the Supreme Court; and fired the attorney general and the people's defender. He annulled Chávez's 49 decrees. Finally, he changed the country's official name back from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to simply Venezuela, and he suspended the agreement to provide subsidized oil to Cuba.

Carmona's inauguration included two highly symbolic actions that implicitly evoked, at a historically crucial juncture, the imagery of a wounded nation and its new guardian state. As if to communicate his desire to heal the wounds in the nation's social body, Carmona began his speech by asking for a moment of silence in honor of the fallen from the previous day and offered to help the victims' families. And in a gesture that indicated his intention of safeguarding the nation's natural body, Carmona took special care to name General Guaicaipuro Lameda as the new president of PDVSA. Illustrating the importance of PDVSA in the whole drama, Carmona called Lameda to offer him the state oil company's directorship at about 6:30 a.m. on April 12, right after he was chosen as interim president. In a way, it was Carmona's first act as president. Lameda, a competent engineer, had demonstrated that he admired the opposition's corporate model of PDVSA and agreed with the views of its former president, Luis Giusti, who was at that time a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and an informal energy consultant to President Bush.

Yet restoring the Giusti agenda in the PDVSA was not enough to sustain the Carmona government. His unilateral liquidation of democratically established government institutions alarmed many of his own supporters. In the historical contingency of that moment, other options seemed possible. Carmona could have gone through the National Assembly to be named interim president, as many advised him to do. Or, even within the political framework that he chose, he could have included a wider swath of society,



Pedro Carmona was sworn in as president of Venezuela on April 12, 2002, in a ceremony that aspired to be spectacularly historical.

His failure to organize a more inclusive and representative administration—in the context of an opposition that comprised various factions operating as a coalition—amounted to breaking the opposition's implicit pact. If Carmona had not committed the political transgression of excluding elements of his own coalition, the legal violation of liquidating government institutions would likely have been accepted.

What certainly did happen, though, is that a wide range of Venezuelan society immediately rejected Carmona's actions. Many felt that instead of changing the country's course and entering into history as the nation's savior, he had derailed the opposition; the repression against Chavista leaders and activists confirmed fears among some that the new regime might be far from democratic. Commenting on these events in their aftermath, sharp observers like the political analyst Carlos Blanco argued that the popular mobilization against Chávez did in fact force him from power on April 11, whereas the "real coup" was carried out against the opposition on April 12, when Carmona took power for himself. Other commentators, including reporters from *Newsweek*, presented Carmona's taking office as a "hijacking" of the coup, or as "a coup within a coup," an interpretation I believe is more accurate, since it recognizes not just the coup against the opposition on April 12, but also the coup against Chávez on April 11.⁵

The head of the military, General Efraín Vásquez Velasco, who resented Carmona for having failed to name him defense minister, forced Carmona to set things straight—or

at least less crooked. Heeding Vásquez, Carmona called for a session of the National Assembly to select the provisional president on the afternoon of Saturday, April 13. As a solution, it was a perfectly logical proposal: Aside from offering a mantle of legality, it signaled that Carmona was willing to include a variety of social groups and to engage in political negotiations; power would be shared, not concentrated. But as a course correction, not only was it too little, too late, it was far too blatant. Carmona convened the assembly with little credibility, having dissolved the body the previous day with the stroke of a pen. But more importantly, he had already lost power.

At Miraflores, the Presidential Guard, which surprisingly had not been replaced by the insurgents and had feigned to support and serve Carmona, retook the presidential palace and arrested the members of his cabinet who were there for their swearing-in ceremony planned for Saturday afternoon and had not managed to escape. In an inverted replay of the events of Friday, when insurgent officers threatened Chávez that they would attack Miraflores if he did not resign, the officers supporting Chávez now threatened, through their spokesman General Raúl Baduel, commander of the paratroopers stationed in the nearby city of Maracay, to shell the insurgents if they did not support the constitutional order.

The opposition forces quickly folded. The streets that they had occupied so massively and dramatically on April

REPORT: COUPS

11 were populated after April 12 only by growing numbers of Chávez's followers. In contrast to the military officers supporting constitutional rule, who had gained the firm loyalty of midlevel officers in direct command of the troops, the high-ranking officers who rebelled against Chávez, having no true control over any troops, had little choice but to surrender, flee, or be arrested. When the National Assembly finally made its appearance on the political scene late on that confused Saturday afternoon, it was not to legitimate Carmona, as he had proposed under the pressure of changing circumstances, but to show that the Constitution was still in effect and to return the Chávez administration to power. TV viewers could see the National Assembly president swearing in the vice president, Diosdado Cabello, as president; in this spectacle of state power, they could not see that the National Assembly in fact had not convened—it was a ceremony performed by two men. Hours later, at four in the morning on Sunday, April 14, the television news broadcast Chávez's return to the presidential palace in the midst of an emotional crowd, where he was recognized as the president he had legally never ceased to be.

DURING THE CHÁVEZ PERIOD, BASIC IMAGES OF THE nation and the state, formed throughout the course of the 20th century and already modified by the country's economic crisis of the 1980s, have been significantly transformed. The myth of the political system in place before Chávez, known as the Fourth Republic, was that of a modernizing capitalist project led by the state on behalf of the nation as a whole. In contrast, the foundational myth of Chávez's Fifth Republic is a project of social justice on behalf of the majority in the context of an uncertain modernity in a world dominated by U.S. imperialism. Earlier presidents promised to bring the material and cultural accomplishments of advanced capitalist nations to all in a nation imagined as a united society; Chávez has promised justice and improved living conditions to the majority of a nation divided into the rich and the poor. For Chávez, "justice" means creating a new moral community; previously it was a matter of catching up with History; now it is a matter of creating a new History. The events of April 2002 expressed but also intensified the nation's social polarization, as well as the consolidation of these two alternative national imaginaries.

This ideological polarization shaped the April events as well as their ongoing public representations in terms of two contrasting narratives. For the opposition, Chávez lost all legitimacy by wounding the nation's two bodies: its population and the core of its economy, the oil indus-

try. For his supporters, Chávez had protected the nation from a privileged group that wanted to regain the benefits they had enjoyed in the past. The coup encouraged Chávez to concentrate further powers in the presidency. Stimulated in part by winning the referendum on his rule in August 2004 (after regaining popularity through the social service "missions" he began to create in 2003), Chávez increased his control of every branch of the state and of society. The fear of his critics seemed to have been validated early in 2005, when Chávez proclaimed that Venezuela would be a socialist nation.

After winning his reelection in 2006, Chávez further intensified efforts to exert state control over society, to turn the armed forces into a defender of the "socialist" fatherland, to integrate the parties that supported him into a unified socialist party, and to promote various forms of popular participation in production and decision-making. However, after the defeat of his constitutional reform in the referendum of December 2007 (his first major electoral setback), he was forced to modify his program of socialist change—not so much to abandon it as to try to implement it through other means. On February 15, 2009, he won a referendum that modifies the constitution so as to allow the indefinite reelection of the president. For the opposition, all of these developments confirmed long-held fears, as Chávez concentrated power in his person and sought to move the country toward a form of socialism whose closest model, despite claims to novelty, seems to be Cuba.

There are significant differences among "leftist" governments in Latin America. Yet even socialist-inspired presidents must govern societies that depend on financial resources generated by the capitalist economy. This includes Chávez, who criticizes the inequities and irrationality of capitalism—and who seeks to reduce these inequities, to democratize social services, and even to develop at the margins collective forms of ownership—but who is constrained to promote national development through capitalist accumulation. Ironically, their attempt to maximize national income continues a long colonial tradition of relying on developing the region's comparative advantages in cheap labor and, more importantly, natural resources.

In the last decade under Chávez, Venezuela has become even more dependent on oil and ever more entangled in capitalist markets and long-term associations, including with China, today's global capitalist factory. While a torrential oil income (often calculated as more than \$900 billion in 10 years) provided benefits in health, education, and subsidized food to large sectors of the population, Venezuela is facing an escalating foreign debt, a significant decline in industrial and agricultural production, the highest inflation

rate in Latin America, alarming insecurity and criminality, and, ironically in a country with abundant energy and rivers, severe shortcomings in the provision of water and electricity. After more than a decade of Chávez's rule, the widening gap between the regime's claims and its accomplishments has become increasingly visible and onerous.

For those who believe in Chávez, he still embodies public virtue itself, which he has come to identify with socialism; in a country where socialism, as represented by socialist or Communist parties, has historically had a miniscule ideological presence, socialism for many of the president's supporters means not so much a particular doctrine, but whatever Chávez stands for. For those who oppose him, he appears typically disguised as a socialist donning the mask of a "socialism of the 21st century" yet following the models of the bureaucratic socialisms of the 20th century. Or, worse, he is perceived as an authoritarian ruler wearing a democratic mask who cares only about power and creating a state-capitalist regime that has promoted the emergence of a new privileged class, the *boliburguesia* (Bolivarian bourgeoisie)—a nou-

veau riche sector of parasitical capitalists dressed in revolutionary costume. Removing Chávez's mask has become the task of the opposition. From the Chavistas' perspective, the opposition's defense of democracy is voiced by leaders who had no qualms about overthrowing democratic institutions and ignoring legality in 2002 by violent means; their call for democracy and critique of Chavismo hides their partisan ambitions and oligarchic interests.

Yet there is an emerging common ground. Despite these dramatically polarized imaginaries, the pursuit of political change on behalf of the majority through democratic elections has become a deeply rooted ideal shared both by the opposition and the government. This is largely attributable to lessons derived from the 2002 coup, which helped to delegitimize coups as political weapons and to value democratic procedures. In a political culture characterized by grand promises, there are now growing pressures to make actions match words. Almost a decade after the coup, the legitimacy and power of both the Chávez government and the opposition increasingly depend on their ability to make their proclaimed ideals correspond to effective political practices. ■

Adíos, Uribe

1. More than 400 examples of Morris's work can be found at youtube.com/user/morrisproducciones.
2. Cited in report made to the UN Universal Periodic Review by the Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Observatory of the Colombia-Europe-United States Co-ordination Group, as noted in "Extrajudicial Executions: A Reality That Cannot Be Covered Up" (2007–8), fact sheet, available at ddhcolombia.org.co.
3. See the Colombia Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre's figures at the webpage dedicated to Colombia at internal-displacement.org.
4. See National Security Archive, "Body Count Mentalities: Colombia's 'False Positives' Scandal, Declassified," Electronic Briefing Book no. 266, gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB266/index.htm.
5. See Jasmin Hristov, "Legalizing the Illegal: Paramilitarism in Colombia's 'Post-Paramilitary' Era," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 42, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 12–19, 38–39.
6. Some of the documents can be viewed at Adam Isacson, "Files Point to DAS 'Political Warfare,'" blog post, April 14, 2010, cipcol.org/?p=1467.
7. Al Jazeera, "Israel 'to Assist' Flotilla Inquiry" (online), August 2, 2010.
8. The video, titled "Álvaro Uribe Vélez Speeches Referring to Human Rights Defenders and Journalists," can be viewed at youtube.com/watch?v=Uod82uOxoaE.
9. Morris's coverage of the Potosí massacre is available online: "CONTRAVÍA: Caso Cajamarca - Otro 'falso positivo' (Parte I)," youtube.com/watch?v=h6wSaGD10Tg; "CONTRAVÍA: Caso Cajamarca - Otro 'falso positivo' (Parte II)," youtube.com/watch?v=hSwBYtoQyrs&feature=related.
10. Morris's report on the hostage release, titled *Colombia, hora de la paz*, can be viewed at youtube.com/watch?v=87HQdNyr1fQ.

Last but Not Least

1. Jan Susler, "Puerto Rican Political Prisoners in U.S. Prisons," in Ramón Bosque-Pérez and José Javier Colón Morera, eds., *Puerto Rico Under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights* (State University of New York Press, 2006), 123.
2. Frances Rosario, "Recogen firmas por la liberación de Oscar López Rivera," *El Nuevo Día* (Guaynabo, Puerto Rico), online article, January 20, 2011.

3. Jan Susler, "The Campaign for the Release of Puerto Rican Political Prisoner Oscar López Rivera," unpublished paper (undated): 2.
4. Quoted in Ben Fox, "Examiner: No Parole for Puerto Rican Nationalist," Associated Press, January 5, 2011.
5. Susler, "The Campaign," 3.
6. Lourdes Lugo, "Pierluisi, Gutierrez y Jimenez exclaman; San Sebastian te espera Oscar," *La Voz del Paseo Boricua* (Chicago) 7, no. 10 (January 2011): 10.
7. *Libertad* (spring 1998): 1–2.
8. Cándida Cotto, "Insisten en reclamo de libertad para Oscar López Rivera," *Claridad* (San Juan, Puerto Rico), January 13, 2011.

Introduction

1. Quoted in BBC News, "Bolivia's Morales Rages Against US 'Coup-plotting,'" November 23, 2010.
2. Jesse Freeston, "Get Me the Paraguayan President's DNA: Three Devastating Wikileaks from Latin America," *The Real News* (blog), December 1, 2010; Pratap Chatterjee, "Al-Qaida's South American Connection," *The Guardian* (online), December 6, 2010; Ben Dangl, "The Ambassador Has No Clothes: WikiLeaks Cable Lays Bare Washington's Stance Toward Bolivia," UpsideDownWorld.org, December 1, 2010.
3. Ambassador Craig A. Kelly, "A Southern Cone Perspective on Countering Chavez and Reasserting U.S. Leadership," cable, 07SANTIAGO983; Ambassador William R. Brownfield, "Armed Forces Commander Padilla on Farc, Hostages, Palanquero, Regional Relations, and Human Rights," cable, 08BOGOTA1391.
4. Ambassador Hugo Llorens, "Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup," cable, h09TEGUCIGALPA645.
5. Ambassador Charles A. Ford, "President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales: Personal Reflections of Ambassador Ford Ref: Official Bios on File," cable, 08TEGUCIGALPA459.
6. Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, "Deconstructing Preval," cable, 09PORTAUPRINCE575.
7. Michael Shifter, "Mal momento para filtraciones," *El Espectador* (Medellín), November 30, 2010.

NOTES

The 2009 Coup and the Struggle for Democracy in Honduras

1. Ana Bellver, *Strengthening Performance Accountability in Honduras* (Institutional Governance Review, World Bank, March 9, 2009).
2. Rocío Tábora, "Gobernabilidad, cultura política y participación ciudadana," in *Democracia y Gobernabilidad: Evaluación y Perspectivas* (Tegucigalpa: CEDOH, August 2010), 147–55.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Banco Central de Honduras statistics cited in CEPAL, "Honduras," data sheet, eclac.org/ilpes/noticias/paginas/7/34687/Honduras_final.pdf.
5. *La Prensa* (Tegucigalpa), "Honduras: Envío de remesas bajó un 7,9%," February 9, 2010.
6. Amnesty International, "Honduras: Human Rights Crisis Threatens as Repression Increases," August 18, 2009, amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR37/004/2009/en; Inter-American Human Rights Commission, "Honduras: Human Rights and the Coup d'État," cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Honduras09eng/Toc.htm.
7. For human rights abuses under Lobo, see Inter-American Human Rights Commission, "Preliminary Observations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on Its Visit to Honduras, May 15 to 18, 2010," December 30, 2009, cidh.org/countryrep/honduras10eng/honduras10.situation.htm; Amnesty International, "Honduras Failing to Tackle Coup Rights Abuses," June 27, 2010, amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/honduras-failing-tackle-coup-rights-abuses-2010-06-25.
8. Quoted in Ida Garberi, "Honduras: 'no somos cinco, no somos cien, prensa vendida cuántanos bien,'" *El Libertador* (Tegucigalpa), February 25, 2010.
9. "Secretary Clinton on Honduras's Independence Day: U.S. Congratulates People of Honduras on 189 Years of Independence," statement, September 13, 2010, america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/September/20100913170522su0.1281964.html.
10. See Rodolfo Pastor Fasquelle, *Historia de Centroamerica* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988).

Haiti's Election Debacle

1. See "Congresswoman Waters & Colleagues Urge Secretary Clinton to Support Fair, Free, Inclusive Haitian Elections," press release, October 7, 2010, waters.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=211192; Jennifer Clibbon, "Haitian Human Rights Lawyer Mario Joseph Slams Elections, Aid," CBC, November 25, 2010.
2. "Protest Letter of Haitian Members of Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission," Isabeau Doucet, trans. (unofficial), from *Le Matin* (Port-au-Prince), December, 14, 2010, canadahaitiaction.ca/content/protest-letter-haitian-members-interim-haiti-reconstruction-commission.
3. Arnaud Roberts, "Haïti est la preuve de l'échec de l'aide internationale," *Le Temps* (Geneva), December 20, 2010.
4. "OAS Removes Special Representative in Haiti From Post," *The Latin American Herald Tribune*, December 26, 2010.

Corporatism, Charisma, and Chaos

1. Simon Romero, "Standoff in Ecuador Ends With Leader's Rescue," *The New York Times*, September 30, 2010.
2. Rafael Correa, "Un intento de conspiración perfectamente coordinado," in *Ecuador: El Fracaso de un Golpe de Estado* (Caracas: Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Comunicación y la Información, 2010), 54.
3. Tatiana Caba, "Ecuador Troops Rescue President From Rebel Cops," the Associated Press, October 1, 2010.
4. *Hoy* (Quito), "Ocho muertos y 274 heridos dejó rebelión policial en Ecuador," October 1, 2010.
5. Correa, "Un intento de conspiración," 68.
6. See Juan Paz y Miño Cepeda, "Responsables históricos," *El Telégrafo* (Guayaquil), November 1, 2010; Rafael Quintero and Erika Silva, "Ecuador: la alianza de la derecha y el corporativismo en el 'putch' del 30 de septiembre del 2010," unpublished manuscript.
7. Correa, "Un intento de conspiración," 63–64.
8. Correa, "Discurso en el Congreso de la Confederación Latinoamericana de

- Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC)—Vía Campesina," Coliseo de la Universidad Central del Ecuador, Quito, October 12, 2010.
9. Eva Golinger, "Detrás del golpe en Ecuador: la derecha al ataque contra ALBA," October 1, 2010, voltage.net.org/article167135.html.
10. *El Comercio* (Quito), "Las condiciones en que trabaja la tropa fueron un detonante de la insurrección," October 10, 2010.
11. See Paul Dosh and Nicole Kligerman, "Correa vs. Social Movements: Showdown in Ecuador," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 42, no. 5 (September/October 2009): 21–24, 40.
12. Juan Ponce and Alberto Acosta, "Pobreza en la 'revolución ciudadana' o ¿pobreza de revolución?" *Vanguardia* (Quito), November 15–21, 2010.
13. Luis Alberto Tuaza, "La relación del gobierno del presidente Correa y las bases indígenas: política pública en el medio rural" (unpublished manuscript).
14. Rafael Correa "Discurso de Posesión del Presidente de la República, Economista, Rafael Correa," Quito, August 10, 2009.
15. Rafael Correa, "Experiencia de un Cristiano de Izquierda en un Mundo Secular," Oxford Union Society, October 26, 2009.
16. Rafael Correa, "Intervención Presidencial en el Centésimo Octogésimo Séptimo Aniversario de la Batalla del Pichincha," Quito, May 24, 2009.
17. Rafael Correa, *Ecuador: de Banana Republic a la No República* (Bogotá: Debate; Random House Mondadori, 2009), 195.
18. Jeffery R. Webber, "Indigenous Liberation and Class Struggle in Ecuador: A Conversation With Luis Macas," *UpsideDownWorld.org*, July 17, 2010.

A Realigned Bolivian Right

1. *El Deber* (Santa Cruz, Bolivia), "Luis Núñez denuncia en la OEA violación de derechos de cívicos," December 27, 2010.
2. Roger Burbach "How Bush Tried to Bring Down Morales: Orchestrating a Civic Coup," Counterpunch.org, November 18, 2008.
3. "An Open Letter to the US State Department Regarding Recent Violence in Bolivia," nacla.org, September 22, 2008.
4. Bret Gustafson, "9/11: Bodies and Power on a Feudal Frontier," *Caterwaul Quarterly* 2 (spring–summer 2009), caterwaulquarterly.com/node/85.

Venezuela's Wounded Bodies

1. This article is based on a chapter in Jonathan Eastwood and Thomas Ponniah, eds., *The Revolution in Venezuela: Social and Political Change Under Chávez* (Harvard University Press, forthcoming). My gratitude to Pablo Morales for his helpful editorial suggestions.
2. For more on this, see Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (University of Chicago Press, 1997).
3. "El sentimiento de poder de esas masas humanas era total," *El Nacional* (Caracas), April 11, 2005.
4. Quoted in a White House press release dated April 12, 2002.
5. Joseph Contreras and Michael Isikoff, "Hugo's Close Call," *Newsweek*, international ed., April 29, 2002. The "coup within a coup" phrase comes from Omar G. Encarnación, "Venezuela's 'Civil Society Coup,'" *World Policy Journal* 19, no. 2 (June 2002): 38.

Mexico: The Cost of U.S. Dumping

1. Timothy A. Wise, "The Impacts of U.S. Agricultural Policies on Mexican Producers," in Jonathan Fox and Libby Haight, eds., *Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican Corn Policy Since NAFTA* (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas; University of California, Santa Cruz, 2010), 163–71. The report is available in both Spanish and English, together with the background papers on which the report is based, at wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=631837.
2. See GATT Article VI, Sec. 2.2, for the WTO definitions of dumping.
3. See Eduardo Zepeda, Timothy A. Wise, and Kevin P. Gallagher, *Rethinking Trade Policy for Development: Lessons From Mexico Under NAFTA* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook, December 2009), available at ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/Carnegie.html.