Just when we thought that no new extraordinary events could occur for a long time in Venezuela, an unimaginable double earthquake measuring 7.2 and 7.5 on the Richter scale struck—incomparable to any other tragedy in the country’s history. Less than a year ago, the Caribbean nation saw Washington impose a naval and financial blockade against it, which reached its climax on January 3 when a military intervention and bombing led to the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro. On March 17, the country celebrated a historic nationwide victory after defeating the United States in the thrilling final of the World Baseball Classic, the nation’s favorite sport. With a new interim government in the spotlight and the theft of its energy production by the northern superpower made blatant, it was imagined that the situation, one way or another, would begin to improve—at least economically. But at that very moment came the deadliest natural disaster in the history of the Caribbean nation.
The unprecedented seismic event that shook Venezuela on June 24 is expected to have an incalculable sociopolitical impact in multiple directions, putting critical aspects of the country’s political and social life at risk. According to the latest official figures, the death toll has surpassed five thousand, although the large number of people still missing beneath the rubble raises fears that the final number could be exponentially higher. Beyond the apocalyptic images broadcast during the emergency, it is essential to provide context and define the true scale of the disaster.
La Guaira: Ground Zero, Once Again.
Although the capital and the rest of the country have suffered significant material damage and loss of life, we can truly speak of an apocalyptic catastrophe, without exaggeration, in the state of La Guaira. The federal entity with the smallest land area in the country, it has suffered losses of enormous proportions, both material and human. The number of collapsed and structurally damaged buildings can be counted in the hundreds. Vast areas of high-rise residential buildings with dense populations were completely devastated, leaving almost no building untouched. The collective tragedy is compounded by the fact that this territory was already marked by previous socio-environmental disasters, such as the Vargas tragedy of December 1999—a mudflow event—and the severe flooding of 2006.
Fortunately, working-class neighborhoods were not affected on a large scale, meaning that hundreds of these communities survived with relatively little damage. Because of the region’s deep cultural identity—especially its Afro-Venezuelan heritage—once the emergency has passed, residents will be ready to rebuild their state despite the large number of jobs that have been permanently lost.
When considering the magnitude of the earthquake, the city of Caracas did not suffer widespread devastation.
When considering the magnitude of the earthquake, the city of Caracas did not suffer widespread devastation. The most serious structural consequences were concentrated in a few specific neighborhoods and middle-class residential areas. In those places, most homes survived—some with minor damage and others with damage still under evaluation—but building collapses did not become widespread. It appears that the 1967 earthquake laid the groundwork for structural designs capable of withstanding such a severe event. No major damage was reported to bridges, highways, shopping centers, or the Metro network. Of course, given the amount of energy released by the seismic event, numerous buildings were affected, but civil engineering inspections conducted by a presidential commission dedicated to this effort are still underway to determine the extent of the actual structural damage.
It is possible that nationwide the damage is extensive, but there has not been severe devastation across most states. The National Government has established more than 100 temporary shelters, where it has accommodated more than twenty thousand people.
X-Ray Of The Social Fabric
The considerable human toll is taking place within an already weakened socioeconomic framework, which hinders not only the recovery capacity of the affected sectors—many of them beneficiaries of public housing programs following previous disasters—but also the actions of the Venezuelan state, which historically served as the primary source of civil protection during past natural emergencies. The current logistical capacity of public institutions is incompatible with that of 1999, 2006, or 2010, periods in which massive landslides caused by extreme rainfall occurred but in which the country was not experiencing the financial suffocation or the economic crises it has faced in recent years. At that time, the state’s response was measured by the hundreds of thousands of refugees who received comprehensive assistance and tens of thousands of new homes. Today, we do not know how it can be measured.
The United States has announced $300 million in aid, and the International Monetary Fund approved the release of $346 million of Venezuela’s own resources that the financial institution had frozen for political reasons. However, this aid is small when compared to the number of barrels of Venezuelan oil that President Donald Trump himself claims have already been sold. The United Kingdom and Europe also continue to hold Venezuelan assets, though they show no signs of wanting to change this situation, even in the face of the collapse brought about by the tragedy.
At present, the Venezuelan population—once the initial phase of shock subsides and the official count of those killed, injured, and displaced is completed—will be forced to rebuild without the support of its now-vanished oil wealth, which is currently being held hostage by Washington. It faces a public sector that is constrained both budgetarily and diplomatically, still burdened by the effects of the runaway hyperinflation of the past five years and possessing severely diminished financial reserves.
This situation imposes an enormous challenge that exceeds what other nations typically have to withstand in the face of natural events of this magnitude. Governments generally experience a marked decline in their public image and in assessments of their crisis management because of widespread public dissatisfaction and the unlimited demands of affected communities. In Venezuela’s case, the social and political impact of this event remains to be seen, though widespread discontent has already erupted in response to the state’s inaction during the first hours after the double earthquake. This anger has been compounded by a generalized crisis in public services, such as the daily power outages occurring across nearly the entire national territory.
The Geopolitical Landscape After The Earthquake
Under these conditions, Venezuela will likely see its challenges multiply, especially given the enormity of the tragedy and the fact that its leadership is cornered by a lack of funds. It is, therefore, an administration that must maneuver under extreme tension, using the few real tools at its disposal. Working in its favor is the broad institutional experience that the state has accumulated through past events in which previous Chavista authorities managed to overcome obstacles and even emerge politically strengthened thanks to direct and large-scale assistance to those affected.
It is unclear whether these forces intend to establish a military “beachhead” to gain greater control over the territory or, on the contrary, whether they will withdraw once the disaster response is over.
Nevertheless, a crucial part of this context is the uniqueness of a provisional administration that emerged out of U.S. military action; the government lacks the legitimacy provided by electoral processes and coexists with the pressures of persistent foreign interference in its military, political, and social leadership. Humanitarian aid has brought a deployment of U.S., Israeli, and other countries’ troops. It is unclear whether these forces intend to establish a military “beachhead” to gain greater control over the territory or, on the contrary, whether they will withdraw once the disaster response is over.
In this way, the current state of affairs, which Trump usually describes as “happy” since his intervention, could become less viable if economic conditions deteriorate rapidly and affected populations fail to receive an effective response from institutions that are financially strangled by the United States. Will the White House maintain its regime of economic sanctions in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe of this magnitude? Will it allow the collapse of a country with weakened institutional structures to turn into a major military, social, and political crisis that ultimately disrupts the flow, production, and secure commercialization of hydrocarbons? These are the crucial questions that the U.S. government will have to answer in the coming days or weeks.
Amid the paralysis caused by the natural catastrophe, the provisional authorities have a strategic window to achieve practical re-legitimization through their handling of the emergency, an opportunity not afforded to the political opposition. At the same time, however, poor management of the post-disaster period could see the government face the same fate as thousands of buildings in affected areas—definite collapse.
The External Opposition
María Corina Machado, the leading opposition figure abroad, traveled to Panama at the end of June and expressed her intention to return to Venezuela soon. From there, she issued a statement with a confrontational tone, attempting to politically capitalize on the critical situation in which the government is concentrating all of its efforts on mitigating the disaster.
According to reports from international news agencies, the Trump administration reportedly prevented her arrival on the island of Aruba—located just 30 kilometers north of the Venezuelan coast. Machado is said to be awaiting political approval from the Trump administration to complete her return.
Following this unsuccessful move, the opposition leader has been left in an extremely fragile position. If she is unable to enter the national territory, it will be evident that she lacks international support, leaving her as an unviable alternative at present. Meanwhile, the current government continues operating at half capacity on the ground.
Amid the tragedy, there is a strong determination to rebuild the country once again. Meanwhile, “politics” increasingly feels like a space of pointless confrontation.
Ociel Alí López is a sociologist and winner of the Clacso/Sida award for young researchers and the Caracas municipal literature prize. He is a professor at the Central University of Venezuela and writes on Latin America.