On the streets of Venezuela, there’s little fanfare surrounding the country’s upcoming regional and legislative elections. Campaign posters from the ruling party that once covered street corners and lamp posts are largely absent. Gone too are the loud, sweeping rallies that once drew enthusiastic crowds from both government and opposition camps during last year’s presidential race. In their place, just a scattering of low-key campaign efforts for individual candidates.
Despite the muted lead-up, the May 25 vote still matters for both the administration in power and the opposition boycotting the vote. It’s the first national vote since the 2024 presidential elections, which were widely discredited both domestically and internationally, and symbolizes another key moment in Venezuela’s ongoing political battle over power, legitimacy, and who gets to shape the country’s future.
For President Nicolás Maduro and his socialist government, these elections offer a chance to restore a veneer of legitimacy, rally a weakened base, and project stability to the international community. For much of the opposition, boycotting the vote is a form of resistance—rejecting what they see as an illegitimate government and election stripped of basic electoral guarantees. For voters, the real decision isn’t who to vote for—but whether to vote at all.
“Turning the Page on July 28”
For many analysts, Sunday’s elections are less about regional representation than about helping the government stage a political recovery after last year’s post-election crackdown and detention of protesters that sparked widespread international condemnation. They offer Maduro a chance to divert attention from July 28, 2024 — the presidential election date that remains fresh in the minds of many Venezuelans and further eroded Maduro’s credibility. The government-aligned National Electoral Council (CNE) announced Maduro had won without publishing official results, while opposition tallies indicated that their candidate, Edmundo González, had secured 67 percent of the vote in a landslide victory.
“Maduro’s government is doing everything it can to turn the page on the 2024 presidential election—so no one talks about it anymore,” said Jesús Castellanos Vásquez, a Venezuelan political scientist and electoral expert. “The Maduro government urgently needs some kind of legitimacy and some kind of popular support expressed at the polls, after what happened in the presidential election, where it lost its support base.”
Typically held later in the year, regional and legislative elections were brought forward, which analysts see as an attempt by Maduro to regain legitimacy and reassert control through the ballot box. With 569 seats at stake—including 285 National Assembly members, 260 state legislators, and 24 governors—the vote offers a strategic opportunity to secure loyal supporters and potentially help Maduro strengthen his grip on power.
For Carmen Beatriz Fernández, a political scientist and consultant who specializes in elections, the government’s attempt to project democratic normalcy masks a deepening authoritarian shift. She argues that refreshing these political seats serves to bolster legitimacy ahead of constitutional reforms Maduro and his regime want to push through.
“These reforms would make them feel more secure in holding onto power and would allow them to rig future elections much more easily,” Fernández said.
Proposed constitutional reforms in Venezuela aim to change around 80 articles of the current constitution, including tougher measures against those seen as threats to the government, raising concerns about increased repression. But Maduro has implied the reforms would also see a diversification of the economy and a new level of power would be created that he’s termed ‘communal power,’ by empowering grassroots organization.
Fernández points to the creation of a new Venezuelan state, framed through appeals to “national sovereignty,” and the resulting increase in legislative seats as part of this broader strategy to reassert control.
A Colonial-Era Dispute
In 2024 following a controversial referendum, Venezuela created a new state called Guayana Esequiba, named after the disputed Essequibo territory that is currently controlled by neighbouring Guyana. As a result, some Venezuelan voters in border states will be able to elect a governor and eight National Assembly members for this new 24th state. The move has drawn sharp criticism from Guyana and the International Court of Justice, which is charged with resolving the dispute—though Caracas rejects the court’s jurisdiction.
Rich in minerals and offshore oil, the region has been claimed by Venezuela since colonial times. An 1899 arbitration awarded it to British Guiana—now Guyana—but Venezuela calls the ruling a “back-room deal.”
Despite the crescendo of nationalist rhetoric around the topic, Phil Gunson, Senior Analyst on Venezuela at the International Crisis Group, said that guessing the government’s true aim with its Essequibo strategy is difficult.
“It’s hard to believe they genuinely think this strategy will ultimately enable them to swallow two thirds of Guyanese territory,” Gunson said. He explained that it is possible Venezuela thinks Guyana will eventually buy them off with part of the oil revenues from the Stabroek block—waters off the Essequibo coast controlled by Guyana but that Venezuela still claims. The U.S. oil company ExxonMobil discovered vast oil reserves there in 2015 and the territorial dispute has since gained renewed traction.
Guyana’s fairytale economic boom from these oil revenues contrasts starkly with the decline of the Venezuelan economy. Guyana’s per capita GDP has increased from $6,950 in 2020 to $20,560 in 2023.
Conversely, Venezuela’s per capita GDP had plummeted to $3,772 by 2020—less than a quarter of what it was just six years earlier. Analysts and economists largely attribute this economic deterioration to corruption and economic mismanagement, further exacerbated by U.S. sanctions. While the economic panorama has somewhat improved in recent years, it is still marked by a severe devaluation of the bolívar and low monthly wages for public sector workers.
An “Event” or an “Election?”
But while focusing attention on Essequibo, the Maduro government has revealed few details about the actual process of the May 25 vote itself. For Castellanos, the vote should be seen more as an “event” than an actual “election” due to a lack of guarantees and transparency.
The National Electoral Council’s (CNE) public website, which previously hosted election results, the voter registry, and timelines, has been offline since July 2024. The government claims it was hacked. “Supposedly several electoral audits have been carried out—voter registry audits, machine configuration audits, among others,” Castellanos said. “But there is no empirical evidence—no photos or videos—of any of the audits having taken place.”
With just days to go before the vote, the CNE has tried to quash these concerns, announcing there would be 15,736 voting centers nationwide and that audits of machines, software, procedures, and vote counts were underway. The Electoral Council has called Sunday’s elections a “key point” for building trust in the electoral system.
A Divided Opposition
While in 2024 the opposition urged the public to get out and vote on July 28, this time they’re calling for them to stay at home and abandon the government. In one of her latest posts on social media, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado wrote: “You have the POWER to say NO.”
Machado and other opposition figures argue that Maduro lost any claim to legitimacy after the flawed 2024 vote and his refusal to relinquish power. Consequently, these elections are also illegitimate, especially amid ongoing political repression, the detention of opposition leaders, and widespread human rights abuses. According to the NGO Foro Penal, 895 political prisoners are currently being held in the country.
Yet some breakaway opposition candidates have chosen to participate in the elections, believing abstention only benefits the Maduro administration. This includes figures like Henrique Capriles, a former presidential candidate and prominent opposition leader, and Manuel Rosales, former governor of the state of Zulia.
Fernández explains that the dilemma of whether to participate in or boycott elections is a repeated theme for the opposition. “It’s a dilemma that doesn’t have an easy solution, because you have very powerful arguments in favor of not participating and you also have good arguments in favor of participating,” she said.
But what weakens the opposition is the fracturing of a unified narrative. “When the opposition can’t reach a unified agreement, that’s a win and the best-case scenario for Maduro.”
Appeasing the international community?
Maduro is unlikely to win recognition from democratic governments, but he still seeks approval from authoritarian allies. In May, he visited Moscow and signed a strategic partnership agreement with President Vladimir Putin, pledging to deepen economic ties.
Relations with the West have deteriorated since the disputed 2024 vote. The Trump administration reimposed sanctions and revoked Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela—a key blow to the country’s struggling oil sector. The license is set to expire on May 27.
Still, Maduro can’t afford to ignore Washington. “Publicly they treat the departure of Chevron and other ‘western’ oil companies with indifference. They say they are perfectly capable of carrying on without them,” Gunson said. But, he added, the reality is quite different. According to Gunson, Caracas has to “tread carefully” with regard to the United States, because Washington has considerable leverage over the Venezuelan economy in particular.
“Venezuela is predicted to enter another recession this year and inflation may come close to 300 percent,” he explained. This economic crisis is worsened by the use of sanctions, which disproportionately target working-class Venezuelans and are often ineffective as a tool for pressuring the government.
The Issue of Migration
Migration is also shaping the political mood. Around 7.9 million Venezuelans have fled the country in the past decade and deportations from the United States have become a sensitive issue that Maduro has to navigate.
As part of a broad strategy to tackle what he terms illegal immigration, President Trump has sent hundreds of Venezuelan migrants — whom he alleges entered the United States illegally — to El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), following an agreement with President Nayib Bukele. Trump accused them of being violent gang members.
Earlier this month, Maduro thanked Donald Trump and envoy Richard Grenell for the repatriation of a two-year-old Venezuelan girl separated from her parents by U.S. immigration officials, calling her return “an act of justice.”
But domestically the messaging was quite different. The government quickly folded the incident into its anti-imperialist narrative, describing the case as a “kidnapping” and celebrating the child’s return as a heroic “rescue” from foreign powers. The government has repeatedly accused opposition parties of collaborating with foreign “imperialists,” especially the United States, branding them as traitors to the nation. “It uses sanctions and the ill-treatment of immigrants ‘as a stick with which to beat the opposition,’” Gunson explained.
For Castellanos, the government’s own strategy—and external events related to the treatment of Venezuelans abroad—have had a paradoxical effect on the upcoming vote. “Everything generated around it has only served to reinforce memories of the presidential election,” he said.
Turnout on May 25 is expected to be low. What that means for Venezuela’s political future remains uncertain.
Catherine Ellis is a freelance journalist covering stories mainly in Colombia and Venezuela. Her work focuses on topics from politics, to migration, human rights and the environment.