Nearly one out of every four Haitians now resides outside the country. Its size and strong ties with the homeland have made this diaspora-Haiti's "10th Department"-a political and economic force that every Haitian government must reckon with. When at a cam- paign-planning session in Octo- ber, 1990, President Jean- Bertrand Aristide referred to Haitians living abroad as the "10th Department," he had little idea how indelible a mark this new concept would leave on the Haitian sociopolitical landscape. Although the then priest of St. Jean- Bosco-one of the poor- est parishes of Port-au- Prince-was well-known as a consummate neolo- gist, even some of his A family at a street fair in one of Brooklyn's Haitian neighborhoods. closest advisors dismissed the new term as another passing fad in the succulent and colorful Haitian Creole language. Haiti is divided into nine regions known in French as "departments." Aristide christened as the "10th Department" the estimated 1.5 million Haitians resid- ing in major cities such as New York, Boston, Miami, Chicago, Montreal, and Paris, as well as in Africa, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in the Caribbean. Nearly one out of every four Haitians now resides in the diaspora. Its size and strong ties with the home- land have made the "10th Department" a political and economic force that every Haitian government must reckon with. Haitian immigration began when laborers started traveling to Cuba to harvest sugar cane in the 1920s, in the midst of the U.S. occupation of Haiti. By the 1930s, due to deteri- orating working condi- tions in Cuba, these braceros started mov- ing across the border into the Dominican Republic to work in the sugar fields there. With- in a few years, tens of thousands of Haitians of varied professions followed the cane cut- ters, and successfully integrated into Domini- can society. Although these Haitian workers were crucial to the Dominican economy, some Dominicans-mainly politicians and intellectuals-saw their presence as a second occupation of their country. (Haiti had occu- pied the Dominican Republic from 1823 to 1844.) This deep resentment culminated in the massacre of 30,000 Haitians in 1937 by Dominican dictator Gener- al Leonidas Trujillo, who felt the migrants threatened his country's security. This temporarily halted the migration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic. But by the early 1950s, it had resumed, and continues to this day. When the brutal dictator Franqois "Papa Doc" Duvalier took power in fraudulent elections in 1957, the ensuing repression changed the nature of Haitian immigration. Intellectuals were the first group to be targeted as the Tontons Macoute-Duvalier's private militia-brutally suppressed academia's opposition to his rule. Papa Doc openly encouraged the Haitian intelligentsia to leave the country. In fact, he invited VOL XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 199441 Jean Jean-Pierre is a musician and radio journalist He is the host of the weekly English and Haitian Creole program Radyo Neg Mawon on the short-wave radio station Radio for Peace Interna- tional. VOL XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 41REPORT ON HAITI the United Nations to open offices in Haiti to recruit Haitian profes- sionals to go to Zaire and other newly independent African nations which were in dire need of doctors, nurses, teachers and lawyers. Haitian journalist Andre Charlier refers to that early wave of Haitian exiles, which included him, as the "first Haitian brain drain." In subsequent years, a sys- tematic terror campaign orches- trated by Duvalier, combined with labor shortages in the United States, generated a substantial flow of immigrants to the United States. In December, 1972, a group of Haitian refugees landed on the shores of Miami in a flimsy craft after braving the high seas. These Haitians were not truly the first Haitian boat people. After all, the first boat leaving Haiti for the United States sailed in 1776, car- A family at home in QL rying recently freed Haitian ferredrelocation sites slaves who had volunteered to of an earlier generation participate in the War of Indepen- dence against England. Furthermore, prior to 1972, hundreds of Haitians had sailed to the Bahamas, where it was easier to obtain a U.S. tourist visa. The Bahamas' open immigration policy and proximity to Miami made it a perfect corridor to the United States. The new "boat people" phenomenon, however, was a direct result of the unremitting hardship wrought by a rudimentary economy and a repressive dictatorship. These conditions were reinforced by the passing of power from Papa Doc to his 19-year-old son, Jean- Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier in 1971. It did not take long before this new wave of refugees became an inte- gral part of the Haitian community living in the United States. They participated in weekly church services, in music dance parties, and other community activities. But all did not go smoothly. The Haitians who immi- grated to the United States during Baby Doc's reign tended to be blacker, poorer and less skilled than the earlier generation of immigrants. The new mix was a microcosm of Haitian society. Haiti is structured by a complex caste system that stems from French colonial rule. While economic sta- tus can be either inherited or acquired, social status-- in a country that is 95% black-is mainly based upon epidermal hue. The lighter the skin, the heftier the privileges. Although dark-skinned, middle-class Haitians traditionally headed the great majority of ue fo n. governments, the mulatto elite retained significant spheres of power and influence in every regime. Even at the height of Franqois Duvalier's so-called "noiriste" (black-oriented) rev- olution, the mulatto elite kept its privileged status. Papa Doc once bragged about his daugh- ter marrying a rich mulatto. For those Haitian mulattos who were used to these advan- tages, life became more com- plicated in the United States, where race is not solely deter- mined by skin shade. Some Haitian mulattos found them- selves grouped in the same cat- egory with the poorer, dark- skinned new immigrants. Being in large part non-profes- sionals, some upper middle- class, light-skinned Haitians had to compete for the same ens-one of the pre- manufacturing and cleaning r wealthier immigrants jobs with people who were once their gardeners, cooks, and maids. Haitian-born maga- zine editor Joel Dreyfuss alludes to this phenomenon when he calls the United States "the great equalizer." The Haitian elite found some solace in French-lan- guage Sunday church services, and certain social activities where women could wear beautiful dresses and men, stylish suits. In a nation where Haitian Cre- ole is the vernacular, the elite has always used French to alienate the masses. In New York, former residents of Petionville and other wealthy Haitian neighbor- hoods preferred to live in Queens, Long Island or Manhattan rather than Brooklyn, where most of the new immigrants settled. These artificial and imaginary boundaries went beyond geography. These upper-class Haitians derisively referred to the newly arrived as the "just come," or the "unsophisticated ones." Ironically, even among the post-1971 immigrants, many of those who had arrived in the United States by airplane felt compelled to distinguish themselves from the "boat people." With the overthrow of Baby Doc Duvalier on Febru- ary 7, 1986, Haitians in the diaspora began returning in droves to Haiti. For a brief period, thousands of Haitians poured back into the country. Some complet- ed construction of the homes they had started years ago; others established new businesses. But when the military-taking advantage of the democratic move- ment's divisions-stepped in to fill the political vacu- 42 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 0 4 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 42REPORT ON HAITI um, these new returnees turned around and left. Once again, Haitians in the diaspora entered a state of limbo. It is a commonplace in the Haitian The Haiti community that most discussions among more than two Haitians will people" b inevitably revolve around politics. Haitians in the diaspora are no excep- impetus fI tion to the rule. Politics in the home- land has always captured their atten- of new tion. Prior to 1971, the single purpose of most Haitian political groups in the America diaspora was the overthrow of the organizati Duvalier regime. Most Haitians of this generation believed that they their tr( would return to their country once this temporary obstacle disappeared. became The politically ambitious took advantage of this deep-seated desire cry for exit to return that so many Haitians har- bored. Some of these "candidates" raised-and many pocketed for them- selves-large sums of money to plot the overthrow of Papa Doc. One such candidate, Bernard Sansaric, a Sena- tor in the current Haitian parliament, organized annual invasions of Haiti over the course of almost two decades. With two exceptions-when he sent a few subordinates to their deaths-his groups never reached Haitian shores. (A recently published docu- ment alleged that the Senator was a CIA operative.) Other would-be invaders only succeeded in dropping a few gas explosives on the Haitian capital. These attempts consistently failed because the opposition movement never had a strong and well-organized base in Haiti. In addition, unlike its support for the Miami Cubans, the United States consistently applied the Neutrality Act to prevent these Haitian exile groups from reaching Haiti. The Haitian "boat people," although not admitted to the United States in great numbers, became the impe- tus for the rise of new Haitian-American political organizations while their treatment became a rallying cry for existing ones. This new influx, says Lionel Legros of the Haitian Information Center in Brooklyn, represented "a turning point in Haitian immigration to the United States." In contrast to the secretiveness of traditional political activity in the diaspora, the new groups began to stage public demonstrations to denounce the U.S. role in Haitian politics. Until then, Haitians had protested with their faces hidden for fear of being recognized by the hundreds of spies working for Papa Doc Duvalier. a e H a st Divisions between the old and new generations of Haitian immigrants made unity within the diaspora almost impossible to achieve. A multitude of political organizations-80 at last in "boat count-have sprung up in the last cou- ple of years. "90% of these groups are came the composed of 20 people or fewer," says Jocelyn McCalla, executive director for r the rise National Coalition for Haitian Refugees. This fragmentation, he adds, Iaitian- makes it "hard to politically influence their representatives, whether local or political national." In a "permanent ad hoc" ns, while approach, these groups come and go depending on the nature and duration atment of the crisis at hand. These differences were momentarily rallying put in abeyance in April, 1990 when over 85,000 Haitians and Haitian- ing ones. Americans shook the Brooklyn Bridge in one of the largest marches ever orga- nized in New York. They came out to protest against the U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA), which had included Haitian-born immigrants among the high-risk groups prohibited from donating blood because of the HIV-virus. The specter of ostracism, job losses and stigma forced Haitians of all walks of life-doctors, lawyers, and factory workers-to come together in protest. The FDA lifted the ban a few weeks later. Many saw this important victory as the seed that would grow into a more organized, unified diaspora. But the "10th Department" remains riven by divisions among the different Haitian groups. The common thread weaving all the different politi- cal groups into a single fabric has always been oppo- sition to the Duvalier regimes and their military suc- cessors. But marring even this basis of unity is the knot of conflicting political and social interests. These conflicts are reflected in the fractious relations among the three major competing Haitian weeklies. Pub- lished mostly in French, these newspapers were- before the advent of daily radio programs-the way that the "10th Department" kept abreast of events in Haiti. A mirror of the rips and tears in Haitian society, the rivalry among these weeklies often borders on ide- ological war. Haiti Observateur, the voice of the conservative sector, is the oldest of the three. It was founded in 1971 in Manhattan. Raymond Joseph, its owner and editor, staunchly opposes Aristide. His virulent attacks against the exiled president have earned him the ire of most of the "10th Department." Indeed, VOL XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 43 VoL XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 43REPORT ON HAITI CES: 6,9.12,14 KR r SERVATEUR Le Pepe estjs dupe .. nM _a__vai ain.e.tsa.dn_ Do_ 1,0 DO 1n Z M-1__ m^^I iDoche de E LETAT HATIEN UTISLS POUR G FONCTIONNAIRES EN EXtL; ET FINA 0UR RESTAURER LA DOMOCRATIE "J'uLL~In ore ~ Uc- -.- = - b"-sz--- La grande offensive du retour ddgai arm~e pronisEe comme issue A la The rivalry among Haiti's three weekly newspapers--all published in the United States--borders on ideological war. many consider Haiti Observateur the voice of the putschists. Joseph's acidic editorials are often direct- ed at HaYti Progras, the second oldest newspaper. Founded in Brooklyn in 1983, the paper has a Marx- ist-Leninist political slant. An early supporter of Aris- tide, HaYti Progrds became one of his most outspoken critics, even though its co-director, Ben Dupuy, was the Haitian President's ambassador-at-large until last July. The paper accuses Aristide of selling out to the international community. Completing this three-way literary scrimmage is Ha'ti en Marche. Following a more moderate line, this Miami weekly, founded in 1986, is perhaps the most recognized among the three by the international com- munity. Its editors, Marcus Garcia and Elsie Etheart, won the 1990 Maria Moors Cabot Prize awarded annually by Columbia University for excellence in journalism. The unyielding support of Harti en Marche for Aristide has landed it the sobriquet "mouthpiece of the bourgeoisie" by Haiti Progras. With circulations ranging from ten to 50 thousand each, these three weeklies are filled with political analyses and commentaries, and are considered the Haitian "think tanks." Even though Harti Progrds and Haiti en Marche are opponents of the military regime, all three newspapers are allowed to be distributed in Haiti. Of course, because the majority of Haitians do not read French, the papers' influence is somewhat muted. Radio, by contrast, seems to be the optimum medi- um of communication among the diaspora as it has always been in Haiti. Wherever Haitians reside, a radio program in Haitian Creole on AM/FM or short- wave can be found. The oldest, L'Heure Haitienne, is a political weekly program on Columbia University's WKCR FM. It was founded in 1972. The latest addi- tions in the tri-state area are sub-stations Radio Tropi- cale and Radyo Solby. Transmitting on special AM frequencies, these two stations do not fall under the direct control of Federal Communications Commis- sion (FCC) regulations, and listeners must have spe- cial receivers to pick up their programs. Because of the Haitian passion for politics, the sum of all the programs on these stations amounts to a 24- hour-a-day-long talk show in New York. The frustra- tion and anger at the political situation back home among radio hosts and listeners who call in sometimes translate into high-decibel shouting matches. Radio is also the foremost vehicle for political activism. Through radio announcements, thousands of Haitians can be assembled for a demonstration with only a day's notice. In the "10th Department," radio gives a voice to the voiceless. Even the Haitian military and their supporters have managed to use this medium in the diaspora-some say for large sums of money-to spread their propaganda. W hen Aristide took office in February, 1991, he suggested to a visiting group of Haitian 6migr6s that they form a "10th Department" organization. He understood that the "10th Depart- ment" had tremendous financial and political clout. Haitians living abroad annually send over $100 mil- lion back home to families and relatives, estimates Fritz Martial, a prominent Haitian economist in New York. The U.S. State Department last year publicly denounced such transfers for spoiling the already porous OAS embargo against the military regime. In addition to remittances, Haitians also dig deep to con- tribute to political causes. According to Cesar Dismay, Aristide's campaign treasurer, two thirds of the $300,000 spent on the priest's 1990 presidential bid came from the diaspora. In a gesture of solidarity with the newly elected Haitian president, the "10th Depart- ment" raised nearly $600,000 on April 28, 1991, to help finance a number of development projects. Yet the wealth of Haitian emigrants is a double- edged sword. Haitians returning home have come to be disparagingly called "diaspo" because those who had never left the country resented their "developed" 44NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 44REPORT ON HAITI attitude. Many visiting Haitians were easily recognized by the "air of superi- ority" they exuded, the American lingo they sometimes interjected in their Haitian Creole conversation, and their flashy material acquisitions. Friction arose from the perception that Haitians on the outside saw themselves as "bet- ter" than those who live in Haiti. Aristide helped create the "10th Department" organization in an effort to bridge the chasm that traditionally divided the diaspora from Haiti. Father Gerard Jean-Juste, a long-time activist, became general coordinator. Jean-Juste, a liberation theologian and the first Haitian priest to be ordained in the United States, defines the organization as a "gathering of the large Haitian fam- ily organically connected to the native Ra is the fc vehicle fo active Throug announce thousa Haitians assembled not land and united by the same ideal to work, so that one day the sun of freedom and prosperity will shine on our beloved Haiti." His committee held a democratic gen- eral assembly on April 14, 1991. A central committee was formed to oversee regional committees represent- ing each city of the diaspora. The "10th Department" organization was supposed to be the big tent that would house Haitians from all walks of life. The orga- nization held numerous fundraising appeals, which raised hundreds of thousands of dollars to help the new government. In this context, it is important to remem- ber that the United States, which has a tradition of sup- porting Haitian dictators, never assisted the Aristide Administration financially or otherwise. The "10th Department" organization is not, howev- er, without its critics. Activist Jocelyne Mayas of New York, a staunch supporter of the democratic move- ment, thinks it could have accomplished more. A founding member of the group, she complains about the organization's lack of "transparency." She acknowledges the group's efforts to hold periodic organizational elections, but says they have not been really democratic and that "nepotism dominates the process." Others feel that the "10th Department" orga- nization has been too directly linked to the Aristide government. The September 29, 1991 coup caught the "10th Department" organization in the middle of consolidat- ing and defining the roles of the many groups working under its umbrella. "We were forced to shift our focus to mobilizing the community," says Guy Victor, presi- dent of the New York chapter of the organization. Indeed, it was a daunting challenge to stretch an embryonic group to play the roles both of social unifi- er and of messenger to the world of the disastrous con- sequences of the coup. Yet the orga- nization managed to spearhead sever- Jio al successful political actions. On )remost October 11, 1991, over 60,000 people blocked downtown Manhattan for r political hours to protest against apparent tacit U.S. support of the military coup. The /ism. "10th Department" organization also h radio deserves credit for the turnout of between 260,000 and 300,000 Hait- :ements, ian-Americans who voted over- tnds of whelmingly for Bill Clinton in the last U.S. presidential election. S can be The coup had, ironically, the salu- tary effect of bringing together the at a day's different factions of the "10th Depart- ice. ment." Haitians not previously "involved in politics became active. They discovered that the decision- making center affecting Haiti's future is not Port-au-Prince, but Washington, D.C. Increas- ingly, the community is making its voice heard through the telephone and the fax machine. Many Haitians now routinely contact their U.S. political rep- resentatives, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon. The Haitian President reciprocates the "10th Department's" loyalty through his frequent radio addresses and his many public appearances at community functions. Haiti's history abounds with military coups. But thanks to the tenacity and courage of Haitians in Haiti and the diaspora-both dark-skinned and mulattos- the latest coup has not taken hold. While the interna- tional community led by the United States waffles, the "10th Department" has kept the issue of President Aristide's return alive for over two years. Illustrative of its influence is the fact that negotiations between Aristide and coup leader Raoul C6dras last July were moved from United Nations headquarters to Gover- nors Island for fear of "disruption" by the Haitians of the "10th Department." Now that the Haitian military has reneged on the Governors Island accord, there is talk once again with- in the "10th Department" of armed struggle. The vis- ceral reaction of most Haitians is a desire to wipe out the Haitian thugs who have in the past two years dri- ven Haiti into the abyss. The majority of Haitians abroad, however, believe that the best way to restore democracy in Haiti is to continue exerting pressure on the international community to compel the military to abide by the agreement. A consensus on how to do this, however, has yet to emerge. Nonetheless, as diplomatic efforts fizzle, the "10th Department" remains an invaluable sociopolitical and financial asset for Haiti today, and in the years to come.
