Like their southern cone counterparts who, while living under the harsh repression of authoritarian regimes, came to reevaluate their earlier hostility to "bourgeois democracy," so Colombia's intellectuals have come to value an end to armed conflict as a necessary precondition for any future political struggle. Guerrilla war continues with- out reprieve in the northern Andes. After a decade of attempts to bring Colombia's long- standing insurgency to a peaceful resolution, some guerrillas have laid down their arms, while others continue to recruit among Colom- bia's rural and urban poor. Today, as violence increases in many sec- tors of Colombian society, the armed movements have more mili- tary power than at any previous point in their history. But in the Colombia of the 1990s, the guerrillas' political voice is hardly heard amid the din of a multiplicity of groups-indige- nous, urban, regional, local, black, campesino, feminist, university-- trying to break out of the straitjack- et of traditional politics. While Colombia's fragmented Left has Marc Chernick is currently a visiting pro- fessor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogota, and a member of NACLA's editorial board. He is working on a comparative study of political vio- lence in Colombia and Peru sponsored by the Guggenheim Foundation. become polarized between those who continue to believe in armed struggle and those who do not, the guerrillas' armed actions and eco- nomic terrorism seem only to underscore their political isolation. For nearly half a century, Colombia has experienced succes- sive waves of war and violence, from the inter-party civil war between Liberals and Con- servatives in the 1940s and 1950s-known as la Violencia-to the guerrilla insurgencies and revo- lutionary focos of the 1960s and 1970s, to the multifaceted orgy of violence among guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitary groups that first seduced, then corrupted and atomized Colombian society in the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the principal political cleavage was between the mutually exclusive nineteenth-cen- tury agendas of the Liberal and Conservative parties. In the face of political exclusion during periods of single-party hegemony, each of Colombia's traditional parties turned to armed struggle as a legit- imate form of political opposition. In 1958, after a decade of extreme political violence, the two traditional parties agreed to share power. Old enemies found them- selves, at first somewhat awkward- ly, on the same side. Opposition politics was redefined. The princi- pal political division was now between those who accepted bipar- tisan rule, and those who did not. Again, many who were excluded by the narrowly cast two-party hegemony felt justified in taking up arms as a legitimate form of political opposition. The revolutionary guerrillas date from this period. In the mid 1960s, the Fuerzas Armadas Revo- lucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN), and the Ej6rcito Popular de Liberaci6n (EPL) were formed. The FARC, born of earlier peasant struggles and Communist organiz- ing in the countryside, also mobi- lized former Liberal guerrillas and peasants in the new zones of agri- cultural colonization to oppose the NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 8UPDATE / COLOMBIA The funeral procession for Juan Gabriel Cuadros, a trade unionist in Medellin who was gunned down on his way to work in December, 1987. Since the 1980s, the bipolar con- flict between government and guerrillas has turned into a multipolar shooting gallery. established political regime in Bogoti. The ELN was formed by Colombian students in Havana who sought to replicate the experi- ence of the Cuban revolution in Colombia, and saw the closed bipartisan system known as the National Front as the equivalent of other forms of Latin American despotism. Finally, the Maoist EPL was founded, reflecting the larger Sino-Soviet split. In the early 1970s, the April 19th Movement (M-19)-named for the date the presidential election was overtly stolen from a progressive candidate in 1970-was founded. The M-19 represented a "second- generation" movement. It was more urban, and combined the languages of nationalism and Colombian poli- tics with a heterodox Marxism. All of these movements found the soil of politics particularly con- ducive to guerrilla struggle. They operated in zones that had long tra- ditions of armed rebellion against the state, in some cases dating back to the mid-nineteenth century. While revolutionary focos failed to take root or win an enduring social base elsewhere in South America, they prospered in Colombia. Many on the Left empathized with or sup- ported the armed movements; they viewed them as a legitimate form of opposition to an oligarchically dominated system that relied on emergency powers and the armed forces to maintain public order. Yet by the 1990s, the fault line of politics had frag- mented almost beyond recognition. In the 1980s, the bipo- lar conflict between government and guerrillas turned into a multi- polar shooting gallery, with com- plex, shifting alliances emerging among guerrillas, drug traffickers, paramilitary groups, local political bosses, and the state. Partially fueled by the boom in drug exports to insatiable Northern markets, violence escalated, returning to levels not seen since the 1940s and 1950s. The drug trade gave new resources to all actors. Colombian society appeared to be drowning in its own rivers of blood, much like during la Violencia. The state appeared to be on the verge of col- lapse. Not only was it no longer able to maintain order, but it had also become a major source of dis- order and a central contributor to the political violence. Indeed, it had already partially collapsed in certain geographic zones and in the exercise of many of its func- tions, most notably maintaining order, providing security, and administering justice. Violence, once again, became the principal currency of politics, and the principal catalyst of social decay. Amid the escalating chaos, a new political fault line now came to rest between those who contin- ued to advocate a politics of armed opposition-both on the Left and Right-and those who rejected such a path. Three successive presidents- Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), Virgilio Barco (1986-90) and Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) sup- ported negotiating with the guerril- las. Each, in his own way, sought to re-legitimize Colombian poli- tics, and the stewardship of the tra- ditional parties, by advocating political reform and the reincorpo- ration of the armed opposition. Unlike the generals who led the archetypal Latin American "dirty war" in Argentina, Colombia's reforming presidents sought to dis- tance themselves from reactionary violence, and attempted-with only partial success-to limit the state's involvement. Yet each step forward was accompanied by an escalation of political violence, particularly directed against amnestied guerrillas and new par- ties and movements on the Left. Out of the antagonistic conflict between the dirty war and the peace process emerged the founda- tional note of Colombian politics for the 1990s and the early twenty- first century. Four guerrilla move- ments-the M-19, the majority of Vol XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 9UPDATE / COLOMBIA the EPL and two smaller groups-- surrendered their arms in exchange for political guarantees and partici- pation in the writing of a new con- stitution for Colombia [see "An Interview with Navarro Wolff," page 12]. The political experiment raised great expectations. M-19 leader Antonio Navarro Wolff served as co-president of the Constitutional Assembly, together with represen- tatives from the Liberal and Con- servative parties. What emerged was one of the most enlightened political charters to be found any- where, with major advances in human, civil, social, minority and ecological rights. The 1991 Consti- tution provides a still unrealized The Intellectuals' Letter Santa Fe de Bogota, November 20, 1992 Seriores Coordinadora Guerrillera Sim6n Bolivar: As a group of convinced democrats who oppose violence and authori- tarian solutions of all kinds, we have the moral right to question the legiti- macy and the effectiveness of the actions that you have pursued now for many years. In the current circumstances, we oppose the means you use to carry on your struggle. Armed struggle, instead of leading to greater social justice, has engendered all kinds of extremisms, such as the resurgence of reac- tionary violence, paramilitary forces, merciless crime and excesses commit- ted by the armed forces, which we condemn with equal energy. We don't believe that you represent the popular will. On the contrary, your actions have created a climate of political and ideological confusion which is converting Colombia into a battle camp in which the most com- mon form of free expression is that made through the barrel of a gun. Such a situation cannot lead to a common dream of a democratic and joy- ous society. Your war, understandable in its origins, now goes against the grain of history. Today your standard tactics include kidnapping, coercion and forced contributions, all of which are an abominable violation of human rights. Terrorism, which you had always condemned as an illegitimate form of revolutionary struggle, is today a daily recourse. Corruption, which you also rejected in the past, has contaminated your own ranks through your dealings with drug traffickers. How is it that you ignore the traffick- ers' reactionary nature as well as their contribution to the breakdown of our communities and society? The untold and useless deaths on both sides, as well as the systematic attacks against the national wealth and the ecological disasters that you have caused are a price too high for a country that has already paid too much. Colombia deserves better. It is time for a deep and patriotic reflection, and a radical rectification of years of mistakes. It is time to search for a new and innovative form of politics more in tune with the realities of today's world. Your war, gentle- men, lost its historical significance long ago. Recognizing this fact in good faith will also be a political victory. Antonio Caballero, journalist; Gabriel Garcia Mirquez, writer, Nicolas Buenaventura, historian; Fernando Botero, painter; Eduardo Pizarro, soci- ologist; Apolinar Diaz Callejas, lawyer; Alvaro Camacho, sociologist; Daniel Samper, journalist; Luis Alberto Restrepo, philosopher; Salomon Kalmanovitz, economist; Gonzalo Sanchez, historian (plus another 50 sig- natures). S framework for a new democratic politics, together with broad visions of multiculturalism and a united and democratic Latin Amer- ica. For nine months after the pro- mulgation of the new Constitution, the government held separate negotiations with the remaining guerrilla movements-the FARC, the ELN, and a dissident faction of the EPL that had refused to surren- der its arms. The guerrillas were now united in the Coordinadora Guerrillera Sim6n Bolivar (CGSB). First in Caracas and then in Tlaxcala, Mexico, negotiators from each side struggled over the terms of a cease-fire agreement and a negotiating agenda. By March, 1992, the negotiations had completely collapsed; both sides prepared to resume the war. In the second half of 1992, despite the new Constitution, and the emergence of the M-19 as a politi- cal force, armed confrontation increased. "El pais nuevo," forged in the democratic crucible of the Constitutional Assembly, appeared to be stillborn, or at best, retarded in its development. In this context of renewed despair, peace became a desired end in itself for many on the Left, including many of the nation's leading intellectuals. Like their southern cone counterparts who, while living under the harsh repres- sion of authoritarian regimes, came to re-evaluate their earlier hostility to "bourgeois democracy," so Colombia's intellectuals came to value an end to armed conflict and a restoration of peace as a neces- sary precondition for any future political struggle. n late 1992, a group of intellec- tuals decided to publicly denounce armed struggle through an open letter to the Coor- dinadora Guerrillera [see "The Intellectuals' Letter," this page]. Increasingly, both the unarmed NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10UPDATE / COLOMBIA Left and the government began to blame the guerrillas for the contin- ued violence and the slow pace of change. The letter was the fruit of an intense, often soul-searching debate among Colombia's histori- cally left-leaning intellectual elite. The signatories, including Nobel- laureate Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez (who crafted the final version), the renowned painter and sculptor Fer- nando Botero, and a group of uni- versity professors centered at the National University of Colombia, had come together to define a new politics. The timing of the letter's publi- cation was controversial. On November 9, two weeks before the letter was published, President Gaviria had appeared on national television to announce a major new offensive against the guerrillas in the wake of the breakdown of negotiations in Tlaxcala, Mexico, and to publicly reinstate emer- gency rule in the face of the crisis of public order. What was disturb- ing to some, though not all, was the fact that the letter, which The Guerrillas' Response The mountains of Colombia, December 2, 1992 Sefiores Antonio Caballero, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Nicolas Buveaventura, Fernando Botero and the other signatories of the letter: We extend our greetings and thank you for your important observations on the persistence of armed insurgency in Colombia. We, too, would like to share with you some of our reflections which we hope can be of some use. It is important to underscore that the revolutionary guerrilla struggle in Colombia developed and continues to grow as a result of the permanent violence of the state that impedes with fire and blood the existence of an opposition to the establishment. Armed struggle has not been either an end or an objective. It has simply been a means by which to resist aggression and fight for democracy and dignity.... The truth is that well before there emerged revolu- tionary armed struggle in Colombia, there existed a dirty war which was fought with complete impunity. The infamous "pajaros," paramilitary groups and state intelligence forces have been the principal protagonists of this long history of terror. All of Colombia has been a witness to their actions, which at times have been characterized by selective assassination, and at other times have included massacres and genocide. Always, our nation has been forced to live with torture, disap- pearances, authoritarianism and collective intimidation which have obliged many compatriots to choose the route of exile as an extreme recourse in defense of their physical and moral integrity. It must be said that if certain practices and historical conceptions have lost their historical significance, it is pre- cisely the practice of state terrorism and the systematic use of institutional mechanisms to assassinate and "dis- appear" political opposition. Such practices have convert- ed despotism into the natural form of governing.... The CGSB [Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar] remains committed to the search for a political solution to the crisis. We reject the government's calls for an "integral war." We propose an integral solution and a lasting peace.... You, the "convinced democrats, opposed to violence and authoritarian options" could use your newspapers, magazines, university posts and public fora to work for a change in the current atmos- phere of aggression.... The CSGB rejects and condemns drug trafficking. You should not let yourselves be confused by a dishon- est plot cooked up by the U.S. Embassy, the Presidency of the Republic, the intelligence services and a couple of Bogota publications that actively attempt to derail our commitment to the most noble causes in Colom- bia.... The CGSB welcomes the different proposals that have been put forward by various groups to halt the escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war. Particu- larly important are the proposals for national and inter- national mediation that would supervise the implemen- tation of a future agreement, ensuring that each side respects its commitments while enforcing compliance to the agreed upon rules of the game. We also support those proposals that seek to include a broad range of representatives from Colombian society in the negotiat- ing process and to seat them at the negotiating table. The forms of struggle that the Colombian people have chosen to achieve a better future was not a free decision. It was imposed on them. They were not given a choice. It is incumbent on us all to work toward a solution that creates an environment where the recourse to arms is only a bad memory of our unfortu- nate history. Again, we appreciate your interest and your initiative to communicate with us. We hope you will persist in your efforts for peace. Between us, surely, we can cre- ate the necessary elements that will close the door to further bloodshed. Sincerely, Compatriotas, Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar Manuel Marulanda V., Alfonso Cano, Rabl Reyes, Timolen Jimenez, Ivan Marquez, Manuel P6rez Martinez, Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, Pablo Tejada, Francisco Galan, Milton Hernandez, Francisco Carabal- lo, Diego Ruiz. E Vol XXVII, No4 JAN/FEB 1994 11UPDATE / COLOMBIA appeared in Colombia's leading daily, El Tiempo, under the head- line "Your war, gentlemen, has lost its historical force," seemed to echo the words of the President. The letter from the intellectuals, although written and conceived before the imposition of emergency rule and Gaviria's belligerent speech, put the intellectuals and the President on the same side oppos- ing armed struggle. And the con- text of the letter's publication made it appear that the intellectuals were directly endorsing the President's policy of escalated war. There was an eleventh hour debate about whether or not the letter should be published given the new political conditions. Many still believed in a negotiated settlement. But the deci- sion was unanimous to go ahead; no one consulted withdrew his or her signature. Even those who still believed in a negotiated settlement wanted their voice heard that the current incarnation of the guerrillas was no longer worthy of support. The letter did not open up the debate as many had hoped. In fact, it reinforced the government's position, deferred the democratic opening, and moved politics fur- ther down the road to open hostili- ties. In the circumstances of Colombia's war footing in late 1992, the response from the CGSB [see "The Guerrillas' Response," p. 11] was ignored. Only the Com- munist newspaper, Voz, printed the letter signed by Manuel Marulanda Velez, the legendary commander of the FARC who first took up arms in the 1940s as a Liberal guerrilla, Manuel P6rez, the ex- communicated Spanish priest who leads the ELN, and six other guer- rilla commanders. The letter from the guerrilla comandantes answered the intel- lectuals' concerns and attempted to open the door to a renewed dia- logue, with them and with the gov- ernment. Yet their letter, although respectful, underscored a funda- mentally different analysis of poli- tics in Colombia. For the guerril- las, armed struggle continued to be an extension of popular mobiliza- tion, not its chief obstacle. The promise of a new political order established through the institutions of the 1991 Constitution remains quite remote to the daily lives of many of their followers in the remote reaches of the Andes and throughout the numbingly verdant Amazon basin. Meanwhile, the guerrilla war con- tinues to shape the direction of national politics. The government is investing heavily in elite counter- insurgency sol- diers and heli- copters, in an effort to profes- sionalize-and win-the war. Par- ticularly with the A sentry guards renewed legitima- region. cy offered by the 1991 Constitution, and the seismic changes in world affairs, the gov- ernment and the military believe that the long-elusive goal of mili- tary victory is now possible. The Minister of Defense cockily declared that it would take 18 months. As a result, the gunfire, bombs and accumulating corpses are threatening to drown out the new politics. For many, the Constitution still has the potential to become a strong and compassionate midwife capable of birthing the new soci- ety. However, consolidating democracy and waging counter- insurgency war are not compatible political processes. The new soci- ety can emerge only in the context of a negotiated settlement to the decades-old war. s the intellectual Left strug- gles to find its voice, many of the"other Colombias"are moving forward without it. This is best represented by the stunning emergence of the indigenous and black movements, creating a new politics of identity that is redefining the old political game and leaving many of the old Left on the side- lines. It is notable that no indige- the entrance to a FARC guerrilla base in C nous or black leader, or intellectual or activist associated with their cause, signed the letter to the CGSB. Neither does the Left's tormented revisionism appear to be finding an echo among the young and restless. At the National University of Colombia in Bogota, once a center of guerrilla support and recruit- ment, neither the legal Left nor the Colombian guerrilla seems to com- mand much respect. There, and on other university campuses, the emerging movements are the Shin- ing Path-inspired Red Guards, and a belligerent and irreverent group called Anarchists to Combat. The Red Guards burned the ballot box during a recent student election, symbolically copying the actions of Shining Path when it began its rev- olutionary war in Peru. They have also begun to directly challenge other sectors of the Left, as well as university authorities. In mid-Sep- tember, wielding arms and wearing ski masks, the Red Guards burned the car of the Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences, a sociologist and former militant in the Commu- nist Party. In like manner, Anar- chists to Combat recently kid- napped the university's president and imprisoned him in a people's jail on campus. The intellectuals themselves have be- gun to re-interpret their own past as well as the role of the Left in Colom- bia. Some are work- ing with the M- 19/Democratic Alliance (M-19/AD). Others are working with community- based social move- ments. Many are being recruited to work with the Lib- olombia's Uribe eral party, now fully in control of the country's destiny. But to a growing number of peo- ple outside the cultural main- stream, the debate over revolution- ary focos versus grassroots democ- racy and popular mobilization seems irrelevant-a relic of a failed past. Neither the discourse of the guerrillas, nor of the democ- ratizing intellectuals, nor of the amnestied guerrillas such as the M- 19 has any resonance. And the cauldron of political violence con- tinues to overflow. The govern- ment, the aspiring democratic Left, the ex-guerrillas and the guerrillas remain caught in a bloody embrace, defining the political struggle in their own "enlightened" terms. Meanwhile, the nation, increasingly atomized in self-inter- ested groups, is now creating poli- tics without them.
