ARENA's hard-hitting campaign strategy attempted to exploit the cleavages in Salvadoran society wrought over a decade of war. The election became a fight between Right and Left, and the results were not good news for the Left. BY GEORGE VICKERS AND JACK SPENCE he camera focuses close-up on drawing paper and a small hand with a crayon sketching a female figure. A child's voice-over says "this is mommy," and goes on to draw a second male figure identified as "daddy." The hand then sketches a third smaller figure identified as "me." The drawing of "me" has only one leg, and the small voice says that this is the result of a ter- rorist mine. The child's soft voice tells viewers that the terrorists are hoping people will forget, but the child doesn't think mommy and daddy will forget. This slickly-produced anony- mous ad was shown frequently on Salvadoran television in the last weeks before the March 20 elec- tions in which nearly 1.45 million Salvadorans cast ballots for presi- dent and vice-president, deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and members of municipal councils. Other ads showed scenes of war from a decade earlier and warned that voting for the Left could bring a return of the conflict. A bumper sticker proclaiming "patria si, comunismo no" in the colors of the right-wing, nationalist ARENA George Vickers is director of the Wash- ington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Jack Spence is president of Hemisphere Initiatives. party, but without ARENA's name, began appearing before the second round of voting on April 24. These ads marked the dark side of the ARENA campaign. The anonymity was no doubt related to a United Nations-sponsored agree- ment among the candidates to wage a "high road" campaign. The threatening tone of the ads was repeated in campaign speeches in rural areas. It was an attack to which the Left, in essence, did not respond. The ARENA party easily swept all three elections. Its presidential candidate Armando Calder6n Sol nearly received the 50% needed to win on the first round (against six other candidates). In the second- round run-off, he defeated Ruben Zamora-the presidential candi- date for a coalition of leftist parties including the Farabundo Marti Lib- eration Front (FMLN)--by 68% to 32%. ARENA won 39 seats in the 84-member Legislative Assembly, giving it-together with its ally the National Conciliation Party (PCN)-a one-vote majority. ARENA also won 212 of the 262 municipal councils. The Left emerged from the elections as El Salvador's second force, surpass- ing the veteran Christian Democra- tic Party (PDC) and the PCN. Zamora placed well ahead of the Christian Democratic presidential candidate in the first round, and the FMLN won 21 seats in the Legisla- tive Assembly compared to the Christian Democrats' 18. The elections were the first since the January 1992 peace treaty which ended over a decade of civil war, the first in which all political groupings participated, and the first in which the three levels of elec- tions coincided in the same year. This set of coincidences prompted some to speak of the "elections of the century." The results shaped El Salvador's immediate future, but the campaign was in many respects about the past. ARENA's hard-hit- ting campaign strategy attempted to exploit the cleavages in Sal- vadoran society wrought over a decade of war. The election became a fight between Right and Left, and the results were not good news for the Left. Were the elections "free and fair"? The center and Left opposi- tion denounced what they called technical fraud, while others spoke of "irregularities." Even the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) admitted to a number of "anom- alies." Procedures were seriously flawed despite considerable inter- national assistance and extensive monitoring. Many people were unable to get voting cards. Some NA6CIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6UPDATE / EL SALVADOR 74,000 had their applications rejected, and nonexistent notifica- tion methods meant that several times that number-whose appli- cations were approved-never received voting cards. On election day, badly organized voting cen- ters and the mysterious absence of names from voting rolls prevented even more people from voting. Unclear signs, confusingly ordered voting tables, faulty transporta- tion-in general, procedures that made things more difficult for the poor and less educated-all hin- dered the process. Based on a "sys- tematic study," the UN human rights monitoring group ONUSAL estimated that 25,000 people who tried to vote were unable to do so during the first round. Opposition groups, other observer mis- sions, and many reporters put the number as high as 75,000. Taking into account people who had not received vot- Electoral proc ing cards, those pre- vador's city ha. vented from voting may have totaled 20% of the num- ber who did cast ballots. Did the "irregularities" alter the results? In the presidential race, they clearly did not. The outcomes of a small number of municipal races as well as one or two deputy seats may, however, have been affected. This is not insignificant given that two deputy seats became the margin of difference between an ARENA-dominated and a cen- ter-Left majority in the Assembly. Many of the problems were cor- rected by the second round. Cen- ters had fewer people to handle due to reduced turnout, down 10% from the first round. Obviously, however, fewer people came out to vote because of the earlier "irregu- larities" and the assumption that the race was not going to be close. he Left began the campaign at a serious disadvantage because the peace accords were not implemented in a full and timely manner. Under the Chapul- tepec accords, for instance, the National Police-a key component of the repressive national security apparatus in rural areas-was scheduled to be replaced by a new National Civilian Police force (PNC) well before the elections. edures were seriously flawed. People lined u II to try to obtain their voting cards. Because of delays in recruiting, training and deploying the PNC, however, the entire western part of El Salvador and much of San Sal- vador-areas where the majority of eligible voters live-were still patrolled by the old National Police on election day. Making matters worse, the military made a show of force on election day by patrolling many rural highways. Delays and obstructions hindered the implementation of the provi- sion in the peace accords for the transfer of lands to ex-combatants and to civilians in zones formerly controlled by the FMLN. Thus, key sectors of the FMLN's base of support have received few tangible benefits from the peace process, further undermining the Left's credibility. Implementation of the accords has been a process of constant renegotiation. This has occupied the time and attention of the FMLN's top leadership for most of the past two years, diverting its energies away from election prepa- rations. This problem was com- pounded by the FMLN's hierarchi- cal internal organization, according to which only the top ranks of the organization have the authority to make decisions. Adding to the log- jam, high-level deci- sions must be negoti- ated among the leadership of the five parties that make up the FMLN. It was not nearly so burdensome for the incumbent ARENA party to implement the peace accords and simultaneously launch an electoral campaign. First, the time-con- suming crises in the peace accords were generally the result of p at San Sal- the government's foot- dragging on imple- mentation-doing less, not more. Secondly, since ARENA has more trained people, more money, and the entire gov- ernment apparatus at its disposal, it could maneuver on the various playing fields without feeling unduly stretched. The FMLN's posture did not help matters. From the outset, the former guerrillas did not make enough effort to deepen popular understanding of and involvement in the peace process. Analysts at El Salvador's Jesuit Central American University (UCA) early on criti- cized the tendency of guerrilla leaders to favor behind-the-scenes bargaining with the Cristiani gov- ernment over popular mobilization as a method for ensuring compli- Vol XXVIII, No 1 JURY/AUGUST 1994 7 Vol XXVIII, No 1 JULY/AUGUST 1994 7UPDATE / EL SALVADOR ance with the accords. Because popular mobilization was down- played, Salvadoran voters were largely apathetic about the "elec- tions of the century" and vulnera- ble to death-squad intimidation. Just before the run-off, the head of ONUSAL's electoral division, Rafael L6pez Pintor, predicted a violence-free election day. Few incidents of violence had marred the last three months of the cam- paign period, he noted, and the first round of voting had gone rela- tively peacefully. By contrast, in December, ONUSAL's human rights division issued a report which concluded that the human- rights situation had seriously dete- riorated during the latter part of 1993. Its assessment followed the assassinations of two high-level FMLN leaders and numerous assaults on and killings of political activists not easily attributable to common criminals. It is difficult, if not impossible to measure the impact of such vio- lence on the electoral process. In El Salvador, the killing of a politi- cally prominent figure would no doubt have a considerably greater chilling effect than an assassina- tion in a country with a less bloody history. Pre-election polls indicat- ed that a majority of Salvadorans believe that death squads still oper- ate with impunity; reflecting peo- ple's continuing caution, a large majority declined to respond when asked who they thought sponsors the death squads. Violence, and the fear it instills, may well have ham- pered the Left's recruitment of local candidates and campaign activists, particularly in rural areas. ARENA entered the election with considerable advan- tages, among them the ben- efits of incumbency. Polls indicated that more Salvadorans gave credit to ARENA, than to the FMLN, for the last two years of peace. More- over, the economy, while not in great shape, had left most people better off than or in the same con- dition as two years ago. Structural- adjustment policies have had a soft landing in El Salvador because of significant foreign aid for post-war reconstruction and high levels of remittances from Salvadorans in the United States. ARENA had by far the best financed and best organized cam- paign. Its campaign platform was a blend of anti-Left rhetoric, a trum- peting of ARENA government achievements, and a populist promise of good things to come. Almost totally ignoring the Christ- ian Democrats, ARENA focused its attack on the Left. It accused the FMLN of standing for old- fashioned "failed ideas with a trag- ic history," and warned that a Left victory would usher in an econom- ic debacle. The Calder6n Sol message was taken to the voters via a massive media campaign which far out- stripped that of its rivals. El Sal- vador does not have campaign- spending limits or rules for report- ing sources of campaign funds. A study by Hemisphere Initiatives conducted midway through the campaign found that ARENA was spending six to seven times as much money on TV advertising as the Left coalition. The price-per-vote formula for state financing of campaigns also favored ARENA. Because parties do not know how many votes they are going to get, they borrow against their eventual totals, based on 70% of votes received in the previous election. In public financ- ing alone, this gave ARENA a 50% money lead over the Christian Democrats, and a 6-to-1 lead over the Left. This money advantage afforded ARENA the opportunity to run a huge variety of ads, and run them often. The party's production team was nimble. Several days after a Zamora ad said "I challenge" The FMLN's Achilles' h, has been lack of unit Personal squabbles ar conflicts over quotas power have eruptec among its five partie Calder6n Sol to a debate, the lat- ter-without mentioning his rival's name-replied that his only "chal- lenge" was building schools and bridges. Lavish pictures of schools and bridges washed across the tele- vision screen. The debate chal- lenge went unanswered. he FMLN entered the cam- paign as the underdog. The organization was a novice at electoral politics. It confronted the daunting task of converting a guer- rilla front forged on the battlefield into a viable political party. It also had to combat over ten years of government-dominated propagan- da, which painted the organization as a band of Communists and ter- rorists. The end result was a formi- dable barrier of distrust among Sal- vadorans. Polls revealed that at least 20% of the electorate viewed the FMLN with some degree of hostility, blaming it, rather than ARENA, for the war and economic destruction. Another 20% had doubts about the Left's ability to run the country. Given these circumstances, the FMLN did remarkably well. The group has adapted to peace and the rapid political change in Central America and the world by revamp- ing its ideology, party structure, and public image. To varying degrees, the five parties which make up the FMLN have shed their identification with "Marx- ism-Leninism." The FMLN eel -in particular, the Popular Forces of Liberation y. (FPL)-also demonstrated its ability to spread its id political organization over of the whole of El Salvador's territory. By election day, the FMLN claimed an organized presence in 252 S. out of El Salvador's 262 municipalities. The FMLN's Achilles' heel, however, has been lack of unity. Personal squabbles and conflicts over quotas of power have erupted among its five parties, requiring time-consum- ing leadership negotiations. The People's Expression of Renewal (ERP)-which during the war was called the Revolutionary Army of the People-emphasizes the need to consolidate Left power in civil society through the creation of a productive base and a media vehicle. Identifying itself with social-democratic ideology, it favors forging alliances with mid- dle-class elements and "moderniz- ing" entrepreneurs. The ERP viewed winning the 1994 elections as secondary and possibly even harmful to the country's stability. ERP leaders, most prominently Joaquin Villalobos, argued that the Left must acquire maturity and demonstrate administrative experi- ence if it is to make itself credible to the business sector and the broad Salvadoran public. By contrast, the FPL gives prior- ity to developing the Left's politi- cal base. It argues that the FMLN must establish a clear political identity if it is to win power later on. Adopting a more traditional Marxist perspective, the FPL emphasizes the need to control the state to ensure full compliance with the peace accords and develop an economic base. Disagreement between the two parties flared up over the choice of a presidential candidate for the FMLN-Democratic Convergence alliance. Villalobos backed a "cen- ter" candidate-Christian Democ- rat founder and wealthy business- man Abraham Rodriguez. Villalobos argued that Rodriguez would broaden the Left's electoral appeal and lure financial support from sectors of the elite. By con- trast, the FPL insisted on nominat- ing a distinct "left" standard bear- er-Rub6n Zamora. It argued that a fruitful negotiation with the Right could only occur after the Left demonstrated significant strength in the first round of vot- ing. The FMLN voted 3-2 to sup- port Zamora, and Villalobos accepted the choice. Perhaps the most unpleasant dis- pute involved the ERP's Radio Venceremos (the official voice of the FMLN throughout the war). Abiding by a previous agreement among the candidates not to engage in personal attacks, Venceremos refused to run an unsigned paid advertisement for the FMLN-Democratic Conver- gence alliance in April because it denigrated Calder6n Sol. The alliance responded by pulling all its ads from Venceremos. Thus in the campaign leading up to the run- off, the ex-official voice of the FMLN only ran ads for ARENA. The FMLN and their allies in the Democratic Convergence have, at times, also been at loggerheads. The two organizations ran compet- ing slates of candidates for deputies to the Legislative Assem- bly and the Central American Par- liament. At the municipal level, the Left was united in some places and divided in others. These divisions further undermined its credibility as a potential governing force, split the vote, and no doubt confused voters. If the Left had not run com- peting slates, it would probably have picked up two more Assem- bly seats and won a handful more municipal elections. 10 NACL4 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASUPDATE / EL SALVADOR The Left was also hampered by financial constraints. It did not have enough money to adequately target specific campaign messages to key sectors of the electorate- in particular women, youth, and rural voters-in which it knew its support was weak. In his ads, Zamora detailed how the coun- try's economic problems made common people suffer. Although he asserted he had solutions, the ads themselves did not indicate what these might be. On the whole, the FMLN's campaign was somewhat defensive and vague with details. In the end, it is not clear how much difference the campaigns made. ARENA's lavish spending did not substantially widen the gap indicated by pre-election polls, nor did the Left have the wherewithal to narrow the gap. ARENA was the front-runner in the polls from the beginning of the campaign, and its lead was never in dispute. Meanwhile, the Left consistently ranked ahead of the Christian Democrats in the polls. According to a February 1994 UCA survey, ARENA enjoyed sizable leads over the Left coalition among all age, educational and social groups, including lower-class sectors [see table this page]. Paradoxically, although a rural military force with a peasant army, the FMLN fared better in the cities. The Left cut significantly into the ARENA margin of victory in San Salvador, especially in its poor municipalities. While the FMLN did well in some of its traditional rural strongholds such as Las Vueltas and San Antonio Los Ran- chos in Chalatenango, ARENA swept most of the rural areas. The FMLN and Zamora did, however, surprisingly well in areas of the country such as Santa Ana and Ahuachapin where the Left had had little presence before. Ironical- ly, with respect to social sectors, the Left was stronger among the PARTY PREFERENCE BY SOCIOECONOMIC SECTOR Upper Upper Lower Worker Urban Rural Middle Middle Marginal None 0.8 2.6 2.7 4.0 3.4 2.5 ARENA 61.2 43.7 38.9 33.8 19.7 28.9 Left 18.2 20.5 18.9 19.0 15.8 10.4 PDC* 1.7 7.4 10.0 10.2 17.1 12.0 Others 1.7 2.2 3.0 2.3 1.3 4.1 Secret 5.0 11.8 10.0 12.5 20.1 15.4 No Response 11.6 11.8 16.6 18.2 22.6 26.8 * Christian Democratic Party Source: The Central American University (UCA), February, 1994. upper middle class than among the rural poor. Now that the elections are over, the divisions within the FMLN are likely to become more intractable. Leader- ship elections for the new Legisla- tive Assembly have already exac- erbated the tensions. After a 3-2 decision by FMLN leaders to boy- cott leadership positions to protest procedural changes that enhanced ARENA's control of the Assem- bly, the ERP and the National Resistance (RN) struck a deal with ARENA making the ERP's Ana Guadelupe Martinez vice-president and the RN's Eduardo Sancho a secretary of the Assembly. Schafik Handal, speaking on behalf of the other three parties within the FMLN, publicly denounced the move and announced the suspen- sion of eight leaders-including Villalobos-from party functions. The future of the accords is also very much in doubt. ARENA will likely cite its electoral victory as evidence that the people accept the government's interpretation of compliance. Meanwhile, ONUSAL is increasingly a lame duck, and its ability to pressure for compliance will dwindle. The fate of the land- transfer program and the new police force hangs in the balance. The elections also reveal that ARENA has broken through to a new level of support, receiving 200,000 more votes than it ever received before. In prior elections ARENA demonstrated a base sup- port of 400,000 to 500,000 votes; in the 1994 elections it garnered well over 800,000. Many of the new ARENA supporters voted in previous elections for the Christian Democrats. It will be difficult for the Christian Democrats to win these voters back, given the party's continuing disintegration. AR- ENA's majority in the Assembly and its firm control of municipali- ties will enhance its already awe- some institutional power. Fears that ARENA's strength and the Left's disunity may lead to a one-party state are, however, pre- mature. ARENA had a number of advantages this time which it will probably not have in future elec- tions: an economy with high levels of external support, two years of peace, a popular incumbent presi- dent, and an opponent with little electoral experience. Nevertheless, the results of the elections pose very serious ques- tions for those who hoped to con- solidate the peace process through elections. What has happened, instead, is a consolidation of power by the Right and a hastened frag- mentation of the Left. The center has collapsed, and Salvadoran society remains as polarized as before.
