Antonio Navarro Wolff, a coman- dante of the former urban-based guerrilla movement M-19, is now running for president as the candi- date of the M-19/Democratic Alliance (M-19/AD) in the May 1994 elections. He was interviewed in his Bogota office last November by Marc Chernick. In 1990 the M-19 decided to accept the government's offer- and conditions-to negotiate a new and lasting peace accord. How had your original conceptions of democracy and revolution in Colombia changed? Our original idea was that the people would take up arms and head to the mountains as a result of the general dissatisfaction with politics in the country. This had occurred in other historical periods when peasants had taken up arms and fled to the mountains in rebel- lion. But two things had changed in Colombia. One, we discovered that Colombia is a much more urban country than we had originally believed-that people from the city are reluctant to take up armed action in the mountains. The only people who go are the most mar- ginal or those with a very highly developed political orientation who make a conscientious and ideologi- cal decision. Second, the country began to open up politically, which for us came as a great surprise. Opportunities for politics appeared that previously had not existed. Such as? Well, the possibility of organizing alternative parties and ad-hoc political movements that stood a chance of success, without being excluded. However, this was also the period when the Uni6n Patri6tica, born from the earlier peace accords with the FARC in the mid-1980s, was being brutally liquidated. Yes, but you have to carefully analyze the earlier peace process. The Union Patri6tica was part of a project that advocated the simulta- neous pursuit of armed struggle and political struggle. This type of project is not viable. Given the con- ditions in Colombia, we could not have an armed wing and an unarmed political party. This might work in Ireland or Spain, because there are different considerations, particularly with regard to respect for human rights. But here in Colombia, no. This does not mean, however, that one cannot create an alternative political party as an unarmed movement, or as a move- ment which has completely dis- armed. This is what we have done, and we have gained support. Does this imply a change in your conception of revolution? Absolutely. It implies a change in the way the revolution is made and in the very conception of revolu- tion. The triumph of the revolution through the force of arms that allows the complete restructuring of politics and institutions is not the same thing as reaching power through elections where you have to govern within the limitations of existing institutions. We chose the latter path because of the impossi- bility of the former. Colombia was becoming an urban country. No one has been able to create an army in the cities. In the cities, you can create support groups. But an army as such, which is necessary to fight a guerrilla war, has to be built up in the countryside. We could either persist in a politics that was not viable and thus forfeit the pos- sibility of ever gaining power, or choose a path that was more polit- 12 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12 NACTA REPORT ON THE AMERICASUPDATE / COLOMBIA "Colombia was becoming an urban country. No one has been able to create a guerrilla army in the cities. In the cities, you can create support groups." ically viable despite the inherent limitations. Is the M-19/AD a party of the Left and are you the presidential candi- date of the Left? Of the center-Left. For the M-19/AD,what is the cen- ter-Left? I would say that we continue to subscribe to the thesis of our earlier years. We are fighting for democra- cy, for political democracy, for the democratization of the economy. We are fighting for social justice and we believe in a concept of the coherent nation-not the idea of a weakened nation which has arisen in the wake of the newer processes of globalization. The national reality exists. It has its own meaning and purpose. This is not chauvinism. We don't want to fall into the newer forms of nationalism which are now appearing in the world, but this does imply a different notion of development for Colombian society. What is your position on armed struggle and the groups which today continue to sponsor armed insurgency? I believe that it is not possible to win a civil war in this country through revolutionary action. How- ever it is also unlikely that you will lose. The guerrillas won't lose. They can't be defeated, at least in the foreseeable future. The guerrillas can persist in this country for 20 or 30 more years, without reaching power. Although the country is now urban, there continues to exist an important social base among the peasants which supports and sus- tains the guerrillas. The question to ask is, what are they fighting for? To achieve certain objectives or to maintain positions that they have won? My position is that a guerrilla Candidate Navarro Wolff speaks to the press in Bogota. movement that does not have a possibility of reaching power, but which persists in armed action, is a guerrilla movement that will inevitably begin to lose coherence. It may persist, but its internal posi- tion will begin to erode. It will dete- riorate because the guerrillas are losing their political perspective. Does the M-19 have a role in any future negotiations with the guer- rillas? Of course. Especially if we win the presidential elections. [Navarro smiles.] Look, we have supported all the peace initiatives. We withdrew from the current administration when the government chose to pur- sue a politics of "integral war." For us, peace is basic. We believe that supporting peace is the best way to win support among public opinion, That is our experience. The desire for peace is so great among the population that any movement that embraces it will gain followers. We are committed to the peace process. Further, there are sufficient elements today to create a real poli- tics for political change. What would you do as president to reach a negotiated settlement with the guerrillas? I believe that the government has to be willing to make concessions. The current government's position amounts to little more than the call for a unilateral surrender [by the guerrillas]. In our case, we made such a unilateral gesture in exchange for a degree of political participation. We also have a great deal of public support which we don't owe to the government. Our laying down of arms was based on our evaluation of the situation and our appreciation of the tide of pub- lic opinion. And I believe that we made the right decision. Despite the fact that this continues to be a bipartisan political system, we have become a significant political force. Our influence counts in the political life of the nation. This was the prin- cipal benefit we gained by aban- doning armed struggle. The historical conditions faced by guerrillas still under arms are not the same. We were the first. Today, a similar process would be like a second chapter to what we did. It would not have the same impact, and it would place the guerrillas in an inferior position in relation to us and with respect to public opinion. For this reason, the current guerril- las are not likely to make similar unilateral gestures. As a result, you have to negotiate with them and you have to make concessions. You have to make changes in the con- stitutional structures, and as a result of an enduring peace process, you have to reduce the size of the armed forces. If a true peace is realized, you don't need so many men under arms. If you dis- arm the guerrillas, you also have to disarm the military. This is obvious. In general, the current politics of war is a mistake.
