U.S. Drug Czar Backs "Peruvian Rasputin" WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 1, 1996 n an October 1996 visit to Peru, U.S. Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey visited the presidential palace for a meeting with top government officials, including President Alberto Fujimori. During McCaffrey's visit, Vladimiro Montesinos-- known as the "Peruvian Rasputin"-also arrived at the palace, shocking the journalists covering the event. Since 1990, when he assumed the unofficial position of Fujimori's closest advisor and de facto head of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service (SIN), Montesinos had only once been photographed publicly, caught by surprise at a private party. Now he was looking straight into the cameras. The message was clear: despite well- founded allegations of involve- ment in both human rights viola- tions and drug trafficking, Montesinos has the complete backing of the U.S. government. In what appears to be yet another case of U.S. overseas intelligence activity gone awry, the U.S. gov- ernment may be providing protec- tion to Montesinos at the behest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The relationship between Montesinos and the CIA goes back several decades. In the 1970s, Montesinos was expelled from the Peruvian army after an unauthorized visit to Washington, where he was suspected of selling information to the CIA. He then launched a lucrative law practice defending accused drug traffick- ers, such as drug lord Evaristo Porras, now imprisoned in Colombia. Fujimori, who credits Montesinos with being the archi- tect of his government's antinar- cotics policy, has argued that this experience provides Montesinos with first-hand knowledge of the drug trade, thereby increasing his effectiveness at combating it. It may also, however, have cre- ated links difficult to sever. Allegations linking Montesinos to the drug trade continue to surface. In public testimony this past August, Peruvian drug kingpin Demetrio Limonier Chivez, known as El Vaticano, said that he paid Montesinos $50,000 a month from July, 1991 to August, 1992 in exchange for information on antidrug raids. A Peruvian DEA agent made similar allegations before an investigative congres- sional committee in 1993. And last October, the Lima weekly, Caretas, published a startling interview with Luis Izusqui, a for- mer associate of the L6pez Paredes brothers, now in jail for drug trafficking, who claimed that lawyer Javier Corrochano sought to pay Montesinos thousands of dollars in exchange for the release of the imprisoned traffickers. The Peruvian government has closed ranks and refused to allow any investigations into these alle- gations. As soon as El Vaticano's testimony was reported, Attorney General Blanca Nl61ida Col6n said that the Public Ministry would not investigate the charges. True to form, the Peruvian Congress echoed the government line. Then came the most startling defense-that of the U.S. government. In mid-September, State Depart- ment spokesman Nicholas Bums stated that the U.S. government believes that "no senior official" in Peru is involved in drug traf- ficking. In stark contrast to its actions in Colombia, the U.S. government did not even call for an investigation. This was widely interpreted in Peru as blanket sup- port for Montesinos, providing him with the protection he needed to avoid an official investigation. It also rekindled interest in Montesinos' relationship with the CIA. Concerns about Montesinos' ties with the CIA date back to the early 1990s, when Peruvian jour- nalist Gustavo Gorriti provided evidence that the CIA was giving financial assistance to an antidrug unit of the SIN that was involved in death-squad activity. While further evidence of the C.I.A.'s role in Peru has not been obtained, the SIN's participation in human rights violations is not in doubt. Montesinos appears to be the mastermind behind a death squad composed of SIN and mili- tary agents that has carried out some of the worst atrocities attributed to state agents since Fujimori assumed office, includ- ing the 1991 Barrios Altos mas- sacre and the killing of nine stu- dents and a professor from the La Cantuta University in 1992. Before traveling to Lima, Gen. McCaffrey's office stated that he would make no public comments on the Montesinos case. After the visit, his office claimed that U.S. officials did not know that Montesinos was to attend the meeting at the presidential palace. Yet, in a press conference held the day after the meeting with Montesinos, Gen. McCaffrey reit- erated the U.S. government's unwavering confidence in the Fujimori government and in the absence of corruption among high-level officials. This bol- stered views in Peru of overt U.S. support for Montesinos. Whether this support is unwit- ting or deliberate, it has under- mined the U.S. government's credibility in Peru on two fronts. First, support for Montesinos and the SIN-both deeply involved in egregious human rights viola- tions-weakens the U.S. govern- ment's credibility as a defender of human rights and democracy in Vo XXX No 4- JA/E 19 Vol XXX, No 4 JAN/FEB 1997 1NEWSBRIEFS Peru. Second, efforts to combat international drug trafficking may likewise be undermined by U.S. support for an individual who appears to be deeply linked to the drug trade. The U.S. government may in fact be aiding the very forces it purports to be combating through its antinarcotics program. -Coletta Youngers Arrest of Retired General Detonates Civil-Military Rift in Peru LIMA, DECEMBER 9, 1996 O n the morning of November 26, retired Gen. Rodolfo Robles was beaten, shoved into an unmarked car, and taken to Fort Real Felipe, where he was charged with insub- ordination, insulting a superior officer and defamation of the armed forces. Although Peruvian law considers retired army offi- cials to be civilians, Robles was brought before a military tribunal, which, had it found him guilty, could have sentenced him to up to 20 years in prison. The arrest of Gen. Robles-an outspoken critic of the government's human rights record and the growing power of the National Intelligence Service (SIN)-detonated a major con- frontation between President Alberto Fujimori and the armed forces. Fujimori criticized the arrest, but he avoiding challeng- ing the autonomy of the military courts by saying he would amnesty Robles if he were found guilty. This rupture of what has been a solid civil-military alliance was papered over on December 5, when Congress approved Fuji- mori's amnesty proposal. Two days later, Robles was freed. In 1993, Robles-the military's third highest-ranking officer- was forcibly retired after he pub- licly exposed the existence of a paramiltary death squad, known as the "Grupo Colina," operating under the orders of the de facto head of the SIN, Vladimiro Montesinos, and with the knowl- edge of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Gen. Nicolis de Bari Hermoza Rios. After a military tribunal charged him with insubordination and he began receiving anonymous death threats, Robles fled to Argentina. In 1995, after Congress passed a general amnesty, he returned to Peru, and continued to expose the involve- ment of the Grupo Colina in human rights violations. Robles' most recent allegation, concerning the involvement of members of the Grupo Colina in the October 17 bombing of a tele- vision station in the provincial town of Puno, appears to have been the immediate cause of his detention. Opposition to the arrest was massive and immediate, and included progressive and conser- vative sectors alike. The controversy came at a diffi- cult time for the Fujimori govern- ment. Charges of high-level involvement in drug trafficking, coupled with economic stagna- tion, have led to sharp declines in the President's popularity. In a November poll, only 41% of those interviewed approved his administration-a fall of 30 points from last January. Opposition was mounting, more- over, to recent legislation allow- ing Fujimori to run for a third term in the year 2000. The arrest of Robles, a leader of this opposi- tion movement, was initially interpreted as a sign of the Fujimori government's growing intolerance of dissent. Perhaps fearing further erosion of public support, Fujimori promised an amnesty to free Robles. Whereas in the past, Fujimori has steadfastly backed the military hierarchy, this time he has come down on the side of civil- ian authority. But what this means in the overall scheme of things is less certain. Fujimori is highly depen- dent on the military and the SIN, especially since the April 1992 auto- golpe. Fujimori's amnesty, notes Peruvian analyst Fernando Rospigliosi, "does not mean the reassertion of civilian control over the military. It is true that the freeing of Robles is an important triumph of the country's democratic forces and the independent press. But it does not imply that, at the level of gov- ernment, civilian authority has been reestablished over the military-- only that one faction triumphed over another." According to Rospigliosi, Montesinos may have urged Hermoza to get rid of the trouble- some Robles once and for all. Since military promotions and appoint- ments are decided in December, Hermoza's acts may also have been aimed at ensuring his continued tenure as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. After Robles' release, however, he now appears to be seriously discredited. If Hermoza were forced to step down, says Rospigliosi, Montesinos would gain greater control over the mili- tary. Given Montesinos' alleged ties to drug trafficking and death-squad activity, that would not augur well for Peru's future. -Maxwell A. Cameron Rightist Proclaimed Winner of Nicaragua's Elections MANAGUA, DECEMBER 12, 1996 Despite charges of fraud and other irregularities in Nica- ragua's October 20 presi- dential elections, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) proclaimed Arnoldo Alemin president-elect on November 22. Alemin, whose Liberal Alliance will be the biggest group in Congress, with 42 of the 93 seats, is scheduled to take office on January 10. Of the other 51 seats in Congress, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won 36, and nine other political parties will divide the remaining 15. Defeated Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega, who claims that the election results were fraudulent, said that his party would recognize their legality but not their legitimacy. Along with 14 other parties, Ortega sought to have the elections in the departments of Matagalpa and Managua annulled and reheld. The FSLN presented a 646-page report documenting irregularities and anomalies in the two departments, which make up approximately 40% of the electorate. The anomalies, according to party leaders, affected 72% of the 917 polling stations in Matagalpa. The data in hundreds of ballot tab- ulations had been altered, and dozens had false signatures and codes. More than a hundred polling stations reported more votes than the number of people eligible to vote; 88 were not in authorized locations and 280 were not legally constituted. On November 9, Matagalpa judge Mirna Vargas issued an arrest warrant for Alberto Blad6n Baldiz6n, electoral council president for the department and a Liberal Alliance member. He refused to answer a summons in connection with the almost 30,000 ballots police agents found on his property shortly after the October 20 election. The root of the problem, claim many FSLN leaders, is a 1995 elec- tion law which introduced elements of partisanship into the electoral process that had been avoided in the last two national elections held in 1984 and 1990. Specifically, this law mandates that party members, rather than independent profession- als, be selected as the heads of the departmental electoral councils. In turn, they have the power to name the heads of each voting precinct in their department. The departmental electoral councils in both Managua and Matagalpa were members of Alemdin's Liberal Alliance. After both of these departmental electoral councils rejected the requests to annul the election results, the CSE followed suit. While the head of the CSE, FSLN member Rosa Marina Zelaya, acknowledged that there had been some serious irregularities, she said she did not believe that the outcome of the elections was substantially altered as a result. The call to void the election results was not unanimous among the FSLN's ranks. Mariano Fiallos, former president of the CSE, and a highly respected Sandinista, said in a letter to the pro-FSLN daily, El Nuevo Diario, that the election irregularities and anomalies were not sufficient justification for void- ing the elections. He did, however, criticize the new election law, which he said made the 1996 elections the most complicated and difficult to organize in Nicaraguan history. Fiallos resigned from the electoral council last January precisely over that issue. The Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS), which split from the FSLN last year, made an official statement saying that the irregulari- ties did not appear to be sufficient to invalidate the election results. Ortega said he will take his seat in Congress as head of the FSLN par- liamentary group. He said that he would introduce reforms to the electoral law to make it possible to appeal the CSE's rulings, and to change the composition of the council, which he said was biased against the FSLN. -Toby Mailman, Weekly News Update on the Americas "Health Tourism" Booms in Cuba HAVANA, NOVEMBER 28, 1996 uba's dire need of hard cur- rency has led it to turn its national health service-- arguably the best in Latin NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS America-into a budding tourist attraction, and its corps of doctors into a profitable export commodity. A record 7,000 foreigners from 60 different countries have visited Cuba for medical treatment in 1996. Financial support is being sought for Cuban medical aid to develop- ing countries such as neighboring Haiti. And increasing numbers of Cuban medics are being hired out to foreign countries at highly prof- itable rates. "Health tourism"-essentially an industry of health resorts linked closely to surrounding hospitals which provide a wide range of sur- gical and rehabilitative treat- ments-became a popular business venture in the late 1980s. The state- run company, Servimed, has a monopoly in this field with 42 such centers. It has the potential to build many more as joint business ven- tures with foreign companies or investors. Last year health tourism netted a reported $23 million in profits, offering specialist treatment for vitiligo (a drastic change in skin pigmentation), psoriasis and retinosis. Other services offered include neurological rehabilitation, clinical care for HIV-positive patients and the fastest-growing area of all, plastic surgery. Resorts such as Servimed's newly built $7 million La Pradera complex, which opened last month on the outskirts of Havana, expect to make plastic surgery a priority. While some have criticized the new international drift of Cuba's health service, Servimed director Jorge Perera Horta stresses that growing health tourism is not taking away treatment and health facilities normally available to Cuban nation- als free of charge. "We work with the ministry of health," says Perera Horta. "Most of our profits-60%- are reinvested in developing our hospitals. The remaining 40% goes into other aspects of health care." Profits from projects such as these are being reinvested into Cuba's medical research, which is highly regarded worldwide. Tests began in September on what scien- tists and doctors hope will be the first cure for AIDS. Impressive progress has been made in research on how to prevent aging of the brain, which often leads to Alzheimer's disease. Cuba's medical expertise is well known. There are some 60,000 trained doctors in a country of fewer than 12 million inhabitants. But medical supplies are not always eas- ily available. Penicillin must often be bought on the black market with U.S. dollars, due to lack of stocks over the counter. Institutes such as Ciren, the inter- national center for neurological restoration in Havana, are forced to cater mainly to foreigners, charging competitive prices but in hard cur- rency. One visit revealed that fewer than one fourth of the beds were occupied by Cubans. Most patients were Latin Americans, though patients come from around the world, including, on occasion, the United States. -Latin American Weekly Report Sources: Coletta Youngers is Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America in Washington, D.C. Maxwell A. Cameron is associate professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. He is author of Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru (St. Martin's Press, 1994) and co-editor of The Peruvian Labyrinth (The Penn State Press, 1997). Toby Mailman is a journalist based in Managua who writes frequently for the Weekly News Update on the Americas, a weekly bulletin summarizing news in Latin America. For subscription information, contact the Nicaragua Solidarity Network, 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012, (212) 674-9499. Latin American Weekly Report is published weekly by Latin American Newsletters. For subscription information: Latin American Newsletters, 61 Old Street, London EC1V 9HX, England, (171) 251-0012, E-mail: WR@latin.ftech.co.uk.
