Haitians Debate the U.S. Occupation PORT-AU-PRINCE, OCTOBER 10, 1994 A lthough thousands of Haitians have greeted the occupying U.S. troops by literal- ly dancing in streets, a number of organizations in the democrat- ic and popular movement are emerging from hiding to con- demn the invasion and occupa- tion. Many student, peasant, neighborhood and church-based organizations from the decimat- ed-but not destroyed-popular movement are issuing press releases and position papers arguing that Haiti has been sad- dled with an insideous U.S. mili- tary presence sent to protect the Haitian army and elite, and that the country will soon be facing a harsh neoliberal "structural- adjustment" program. "The Yankees occupied Haiti for 20 years, under the same pre- text of reestablishing democracy in Haiti," said the National Popular Assembly (APN), a mass organization with base groups in several regions of the country. "Have we ever gotten that democracy?" Kbmbit Komilfo, a popular organization based in Grand-GoAve, a town west of the capital, issued a two- page statement on September 29 saying it is up to the Haitian population, not foreign troops, to create democracy here. "The Haitian people," said the group, "have to be really clear that if they want to end the coup and bury the Tonton Macoute system forever, they will have to count first on their own forces and on their own arms." Members of the group have been trying to return to their town. Although Grand- Goive is occupied by about a dozen U.S. soldiers, paramilitary bands still roam the streets at night, threatening to persecute members they find. The National Federation of Haitian Students (FENEH) said on September 22 that it totally opposes the occupation "perpe- trated against the legitimate aspi- rations of the Haitian popular masses and their arrival on the political scene." And on October 7, after several days of clashes with armed thugs, demonstrating students seized control of the university's school of adminis- tration, a bastion of support for the illegal regime. Professors associated with the C6dras regime, including Yvelie Honorat, wife of the first post- coup prime minister, were liter- ally chased away. Students and pro-democracy professors also regained control of the medical school, the teachers' college, and the science and social sciences colleges. -- HIB Cardoso Wins Brazilian Elections RIo DE JANEIRO, OCTOBER 11, 1994 In the first presidential elec- tions in Brazil since Fernando Collor de Mello resigned in dis- grace in 1992, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected president on October 3 with 54% of the vote in first-round balloting. He beat the socialist Workers' Party candidate, Luis Indcio "Lula" da Silva, who received only 26%. Cardoso's election ushers in a phase of political realignment which has economic stability as its princi- pal axis. Heading an alliance of social democrats and conservatives, Cardoso-who will take office on January 1, 1995-presented the country with a program of government based on the success of the "Real Plan," which he crafted during his ten months as economy minister in the Itamar Franco Administration. Under the tight-money plan, inflation has dropped from near 50% in June to only 1.51% in September. Cardoso's principal challenge will be to ensure con- tinuing stability and low infla- tion while enacting widespread social reforms, and maintaining the precarious political alliance that backed him. Cardoso's Vice-Presidential running mate, Marco Maciel, affirmed that his rightist Liberal Front Party (PFL) would not obstruct the enactment of social reforms. The President-elect has already warned that if the forces of the Right-whether his allies or those in the opposition- oppose these reforms, he will appeal directly to the population for its support, using the authori- ty of his electoral mandate of more than 33 million votes. "Brazil is not an underdevel- oped country; it is an unjust country," Cardoso said in his first public appearance after the release of the election results. The declaration awakened hope in sectors of the Left that the future president would govern as the progressive sociologist who wrote the 1973 book "Dependency and Development in Latin America," a classic of the Latin American Left. At the same time, Cardoso's statement sowed seeds of doubt among his conservative allies about how the power-sharing arrangement would work in practice. Cardoso's Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and its allies will control the Senate, but they will have to negotiate with other parties-situated from the center to the right of the Brazilian political spec- trum-to obtain the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Lula and the PT have already announced that they will not engage in "systematic opposi- tion" to the future government. 2NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 2 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASNEWSBRIEFS The former trade unionist said that he intends to become "a kind of prosecuting attorney for the people," demanding that Cardoso fulfill the promises he made during the electoral cam- paign. -Aldo Horacio Gamboa PRI Wins Yet Again MEXICO CITY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1994 " 4 etter a known evil than "an unknown good" is a common saying in Mexico. It captured the prevailing philoso- phy at the voting booths on August 21 when an unprecedent- ed 78% of Mexican voters turned out to elect a new presi- dent and legislature. Instead of voting in the sweeping change that many had either hoped for or feared, Mexicans granted another six years to the "known evil" of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has held power since 1929. PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n won with just over 50% of the vote, the nar- rowest but also perhaps the cleanest victory for the PRI in a presidential election. Conservative National Action Party (PAN) candidate, Diego FernAndez de Cevallos, made a strong showing with 26%, but the PAN lost its three governor- ships in the states of Baja California, Chihuahua and Guanajuato. Cuauht6moc Ctrdenas of the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) won a paltry 17% of the vote-a surprise given that many believed he had won the fraud- ridden elections of 1988. The PRI also won easy majorities in both the expanded 128-seat Senate and 500-seat Chamber of Deputies. If August's elections were cleaner than those of the past, the most praise should go to the conscientious work of the hun- dreds of thousands of election- booth officials, selected random- ly by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) on the basis of birthdays in November or Dec- ember. Despite widespread cyni- cism about the possibility of fair elections, they attended training classes in the new electoral process, and then sacrificed their Sunday to perform a civic duty for which they were not paid. Continued on page 45 The PRI probably did win more votes than any other party, but whether it won the majority or not is uncertain because of the many irregularities that still tainted the voting process. Thousands of citi- zens could not vote because of a lack of ballots at "special needs" voting stations (which made up 6% of the total stations), partially erased voters' lists, or difficulty in getting the new photo-ID voter registration card. Some voters had no privacy while voting, while at many booths PRI partisans attempted to sway voters. Tensions were high in the weeks leading up to the election. The Mexican army made sweeps through "problematic" areas of the country, while Mexican newspa- pers plastered their front pages with photos of U.S. army equip- ment rolling across the border. Cirdenas threatened massive civil disobedience if the PRI won by fraud, and many Mexicans feared a possible civil war. The Zedillo campaign slogan, "I vote for peace!," seemed to contain a veiled threat. Only a few days before the vote, armed men assaulted the leaders of the Civic Alliance, Mexico's most important electoral observation organization, at a public restaurant. Although over a decade of crises has weakened the PRI's grip on the country, the party proved once again that it thrives in uncertain times. For financial support, President Salinas turned to Mexico's billionaires, whose ranks swelled from one to 24 in the last seven years. Though a new law put caps on campaign donations, it nonetheless allowed for undis- closed donations of up to $6.5 mil- lion. The PRI flaunted its bottomless resources and sophisticated infra- structure by flooding the streets and air waves with a deluge of propaganda which far outstripped that of any other party. The party also stepped up its usual nation- wide distribution of "gifts" such as aprons, jackets, T-shirts, baseball caps, plates, buckets, notebooks, pens, bumper stickers and match- books stamped with the PRI logo. It also hosted free rock concerts for young people, sold low-priced produce to homemakers, and gave free haircuts to the general public. The greatest pork-barrel resource to which the PRI had access was the federal anti-poverty and public-works program, Solidarity, and its rural spin-off Procampo. In the months and weeks before the vote, Solidarity stepped up construction of roads, sewage systems, clinics and schools to cement alliances with PRI supporters or to combat politi- cal opposition. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to democracy in Mexico is the PRI's almost sacred impunity. It is near- ly impossible to make individuals accountable for corruption or out- right repression, a particular con- cern in restless areas like Chiapas where human rights abuses could escalate if international vigilance diminishes. Many nations praised Mexico's elections as cleaner than usual, but they should not be accepted as clean enough. -Alison Gardy Harsh Blow To Colombian Left BOGOTA, OCTOBER 7, 1994 A s Liberal president Ernesto Samper and the new Congress were sworn into office on August 7 in Bogota, hope for the emer- gence of a left, or even the center- left, alternative came crashing down. Two events brought home this collapse: the electoral disaster of the Acci6n Democritica/M- 19, and the brutal assassination of the only Uni6n Patri6tica (UP) sena- tor, Manuel Cepeda, on August 9. The M-19 once seemed on the verge of breaking the stranglehold of the two traditional parties on electoral politics in Colombia. In 1990, M-19 leader Antonio Navarro Wolff, just two months after making the transition from guerrilla leader to presidential can- didate, received over 12% of the vote. In special elections held later that year, this time for a Constitutional Convention, the M- 19 slate, headed by Navarro Wolff, garnered over 26% of the ballots cast. Despite having quickly estab- lished themselves as a viable polit- ical movement, the M-19 failed to distinguish themselves from the politicians who came before them, both ideologically and in practice. They joined the Gaviria govern- ment and soon became bogged down in patronage games. The Colombian voters responded harshly. In the Congressional races this March, the M-19 garnered a mere 2.8% of the vote. By con- trast, the Liberals and Conservatives-in an election where almost 70% of the eligible voters stayed home-received over 92% of the vote. The M-19's dele- gation went from nine senators to zero. In the presidential balloting last May, Navarro Wolff, once thought to be a serious contender for the presidency, received a pun- ishing 3.8%. The decline of the UP was more protracted and involved more bloodspilling. Perhaps no legal party of the Left has ever faced such a systematic campaign of physical extermination. After a while, the numbers lose all mean- ing, though not their ability to shock. Senator Cepeda was the 2444th member of the party to be assassinated since the party was founded in 1985. Among the mur- dered were presidential candidates, mayors, councilmen, congressmen and, of course, senators. Founded in 1985 by the Communist guerrillas, the FARC, the UP went on to win 14 seats in Congress in 1986. But the assault on the lives of UP members was unceasing. By 1994, the UP had been reduced to an inconsequential party, relying mostly on the aging machinery of the Communist Party of Colombia for their political sur- vival. They managed, however, to elect one senator in 1994-one more than the M-19. Senator Cepeda had widely denounced the existence of a cam- paign to exterminate the UP, but he was largely ignored. His murder forced President Samper-only two days after taking office-to confront directly the question of official involvement in human rights violations, including the assassination of elected officials. To his credit, President Samper did not sidestep the issue, as several of his predecessors had done. He insisted that bringing those respon- sible to justice and ending the reigning impunity will be a center- piece of his government. The day after Senator Cepeda was murdered, thousands of leftist mourners came together in the Plaza Bolivar to carry his coffin through the streets of Bogoti toward the national cemetery--a now routine ritual for the Left. This time, however, the marchers seemed deeply subdued. No longer defiant, as in the earlier marches for the M-19's slain presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro, or the two slain UP presidential candi- dates, Bernardo Jarramillo Ossa and Jaime Pardo Leal, the marchers could only hope that Samper would live up to his promise to end the dirty war. -- Marc Chernick Cuba-U.S. Talks NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 20, 1994 If last summer's exodus of Cubans to Miami was the conse- quence of a shortsighted U.S. immigration policy, then the Cuban refugee crisis was resolved by the agreement signed by the two countries in New York on September 9. If, on the other hand, the exodus was the consequence of the island's economic crisis, and if economic hardship isn't quickly eased, then not even the September accord will stop the exodus of Cubans. Any analysis of the negotiations between Washington and Havana over the thorny issue of Cuban migration rests on which of those perspectives one accepts. For the proponents of the first proposition, the results of the agreement favored Fidel Castro: while the issue of the U.S. blockade was left hanging, the immediate crisis was overcome. Moreover, Washington agreed to sit down and negotiate directly with Cuba, and U.S. immi- gration policy was reformulated. For those who believe that, given the difficult conditions in Cuba, the exodus will continue, Washington won at the negotiating table. The Clinton Administration didn't accede to Fidel Castro's demands to drastically raise the number of yearly visas, or to dis- cuss the issue of the blockade. In the end the two country's official positions remained frozen. The September 9 agreement focused on the prevention of risky departures from the island. The Cubans agreed to clamp down on illegal migration. In return, Washington authorized a minimum of 20,000 residential immigration visas per year to be issued to Cuban citizens who wish to come to the United States. Additional visas will be allotted for Cuban relatives of U.S. citizens, and the family-reunification category has been expanded. Many Cubans, however, believe that the "real agreement" between the two governments was not con- tained in the document signed in New York. Many are skeptical that Fidel Castro would agree to stop the exodus in exchange for an agreement which is essentially the same as the one signed in 1984. That accord-with which the United States never complied- also authorized the issuance of up to 20,000 visas per year. Nor do most Cubans believe that their government would agree to an accord that does nothing to cancel the measures announced by Bill Clinton in August which stiffen travel restrictions and ban remit- tances sent by Cuban Americans to their relatives on the island. From clues dropped in state- ments made by officials on both sides, many Cuban political ana- lysts have inferred the existence of "the other accord," not made pub- lic. It may include an agreement to continue discussions at a later date on some of the truly conflic- tive questions dividing the two governments: communications, family reunification, and drug trafficking. It may also include some measures to soften the blockade. The "other accord" may mean that the key issues will be back on the table after this November's U.S. elections. -- ALAI Sources The Haitian Information Bureau (HIB) publishes Haiti Info, a bi-weekly news bulletin, in Port-au-Prince. For subscrip- tion information: Haitian Information Bureau, do Lynx Air, Box 407139, Ft. Lauderdale, Fl, 33340; (e-mail: hib@igc.apc.org). Aldo Horacio Gamboa is a freelance correspondent. Alison Gardy is a regular contributor to NACLA. Marc Chernick is the acting director of the Latin American Studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. The Latin American Information Agency (ALAI) publishes the bi-weekly Servicio Informativo in Quito. For subscription information: ALAI, Casilla 17-12-877, Quito, Ecuador; (e-mail: info@alai.ecx.ec).
