On November 28, 1993, when Luis Donaldo Colosio was unveiled as the presidential candi- date of the governing Institutional Revolution- ary Party (PRI), the future of President Carlos Salinas' "modernization" project-Salinismo-appeared to be on firm footing. Public opinion polls showed President Salinas to be widely popular; the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) guaran- teed the continuity of the regime's free-market eco- nomic policy; the center-left opposition led by Cuauht6moc C.rdenas appeared to be stalled and iso- lated; and despite some ups and downs, the PRI had maintained its alliance with the conservative opposi- tion National Action Party (PAN). Colosio was successfully being carried along by his carefully manufactured salinista image as a young member of the Clintonian generation of change. His candidacy was universally interpreted as an attempt to continue the policies of Salinas. After all, Colosio had grown politically within the shadow of Salinas, coor- dinating his electoral campaign in 1988, directing the PRI, and running the ministry responsible for the Luis Hernandez is an advisor to the National Coordinating Com- mittee of Coffee Cooperatives (CNOC) in Mexico City, a researcher at the Center for the Study of Change in the Mexican Countryside (CECCAM), and a frequent contributor to the daily paper La Jornada. Laura Carlsen is a freelance journalist based in Mexico City. Translated from the Spanish by NACLA. administration of social, housing and environmental policy. The conduct of this ministry was particularly important because one of its arms, Pronasol-the pro- gram designed to combat extreme poverty-was intended to create a new social base for the Salinas project. Although five other precandidates-tapados (con- cealed) as they are called in Mexican political jargon in an allusion to cockfighting-were formally in the running for the presidency, in fact Colosio faced only one principal rival, Manuel Camacho. During the course of the Salinas Administration, Camacho was mayor of Mexico City, and was able to use the enor- mous discretionary powers of the office to openly negotiate conflicts with the political opposition. As a consequence, Camacho became known as one of the more democratic members of the regime, and simulta- neously, earned the enmity of important groups with- in the PRI. When Colosio was destapado- unveiled-as the presidential candidate, Camacho refused to follow the "rules of the game," and did not present himself with the rest of the aspirants to con- gratulate the winner. On the contrary, he gave up his post as mayor, announcing that he had aspired to be the presidential candidate and intended to remain in politics. Salinas then appointed him minister of exter- nal relations. Camacho's independent attitude was the first lightning bolt in the impending Mexican political storm. NACI8A REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 0 0 18REPORT ON MEXICO Like a stone dropped into a pond, the Chiapas insurrection produced waves that rippled through Mexican society. These waves met waves produced by other stones, and old fights among the members of the political elite reappeared and intensified. On January 1, the day that NAFTA was slated to take effect, the storm itself began to materialize. On that date, the country was supposed to awaken as a member of the First World. The indigenous-peasant uprising in Chiapas, however, demonstrated that Mex- ico was closer to Central America than to its neigh- bors to the north. Like a stone dropped into a pond, the Chiapas insur- rection produced waves that rippled through Mexican society. These waves met other waves produced by other stones. The Chiapas uprising, led by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), broke the domi- nant political bloc in two. The governing classes found themselves divided over how to confront the conflict-with repression, or with a negotiated solu- tion. Old fights among the members of the political elite reappeared and intensified. In the same way, the armed uprising prompted the recomposition of deeply rooted forces within the Catholic Church, and led to a redefinition of the limits of the church-state relationship. In the last few years the most conservative positions within the Church had rapidly gained ascendancy-in part due to an alliance with the Salinas Administration-and the most pro- gressive positions had found themselves practically abandoned. The Chiapas conflict sparked a radical turnaround in this correlation of forces. The Bishop of San Crist6bal, Samuel Ruiz-a cornered figure, on the verge of being transferred to the Vatican for his work at the side of the poor of his diocese-quickly became the central figure in the peace negotiations. The Papal Nuncio, on the other hand, saw his political presence diminish overnight. The Church, led by Bishop Ruiz, responded forcefully to governmental accusations that it was intellectually responsible for the indigenous uprising, and through its actions gave support and legitimacy to a negotiated solution to the conflict. The peasant insurrection precipitated a significant rebirth of civil, popular and peasant movements. Peo- ple poured into the streets to demand an end to the hostilities. Thousands of peasants and members of indigenous communities demonstrated their solidarity with the EZLN. This civic effervescence was enhanced by media coverage-mainly by the sheer number of articles and editorials explaining or justify- ing the uprising in independent newspapers and maga- zines. Establishment writers, appearing in mainstream Mexican magazines like Vuelta and Nexos, saw in this coverage a dangerous apology for violence. Their opinions, however, were drowned out in the clamor. for peace, international pressure, and the strug- gle of those within the Administration who wanted a negotiated solution led to a governmental policy of negotiation. Salinas named Manuel Cama- cho commissioner of peace, and the conflicting parties agreed that Samuel Ruiz would serve as mediator. Meanwhile, Patrocinio Gonzalez, the Minister of the Interior-ex-governor and strong man of Chiapas- had to give up his position, as did the present Gover- nor of Chiapas, Elmer Seltzer. In the Ministry of the Interior, Jorge Carpizo, a former police chief close to Salinas but distant from the PRI was named defender of human rights. The charismatic political figure of Camacho and the enormous importance of the negotiating process over- shadowed the presidential candidates and the electoral campaign. Colosio and his political platform were rel- egated to the interior pages of the national newspa- pers. Only Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas was able, despite his initial stumbling, to emerge relatively unscathed from the conflict. Camacho's favorable publicity combined with his refusal to endorse the candidacy of Colosio made him appear to be the real force for change. In fact, he used the situation to try to construct a democ- ratic center both within and outside the PRI. The con- fusion was such that President Salinas felt obligated to unveil Colosio for a second time as the candidate of the PRI, thus violating the commitment of the Chief Executive not to engage-overtly-in partisan poli- tics. Meanwhile, other pieces of the national political puzzle were rapidly shifting. The armed uprising waved the banner of Zapata and zapatismo in the face VOL XXVIII, No 1JULY/AuGusT 1994 19 VOL XXVIII, No 1 JULY/AUGusT 1994 19REPORT ON MEXICO A peasant march on April 10, 1994, commemorating the 75th anniversary of the death of Emiliano Zapata. of the Salinas Administration which had attempted to clothe its agrarian reforms in the image of el Caudillo del Sur, Zapata himself. This demonstrated that while the salinista agrarian reforms (primarily the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution, privatizing peasants' ejido holdings) might be supported by the national directors of peasant organizations, and perhaps by the legislative powers, they were a long way from being endorsed by the peasants themselves. At the same time, the uprising radically called into question the pact between ethnic groups and the government. From one day to the next, groups of rural producers who had basically identified themselves as peasants began to assume the identity of indigenous people. Above all, the armed insurgency showed, with absolute clarity, the enormous importance of the rural question for national stability, despite the fact that only a quarter of the workforce is rural. It made clear that any policy of modernization would have to take the existing rural population into account, and that any attempt to leave this sector out would have immense social and politi- cal consequences. In the course of just a few weeks, non-governmen- tal organizations (NGOs) came to play a very impor- tant role as "windows" through which the Chiapas insurgency could be related to the rest of the country. NGOs like the Chiapas-based Convergence For Peace (CONPAZ) and the Fray Bartolom6 de las Casas Center for Human Rights were crucial in organizing popular sympathy for the uprising, and formulating a series of relevant political responses to the initial demands of the EZLN to democratize the country. As a result, eight of the nine registered political parties (with the exception of only the small center-Left Pop- ular Socialist Party) signed an Agreement for Peace, Democracy and Clean Elections with the objective of giving credibility to the August 21 vote. On February 20, 51 days into the uprising, the "Working Days for Peace and Reconciliation" were initiated. In the Cathedral of San Crist6bal de las Casas, negotiations began between the government and the EZLN. The government's responses to the indigenous demands were then brought back to the communities-in-arms for consultation. Colosio's campaign was nonetheless unable to take off. In early March, the center-left candidacy of Cdr- denas' Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) gained sympathy day by day, as the campaign of the other important opposition party, the PAN, was deflat- ing. In response, Colosio began to take more radical stands in his campaign. On March 6, at a rally com- memorating the sixty-fifth anniversary of the PRI, he proposed the necessity of separating the party from the state. Little by little, he began to adopt many of the opposition's demands as his own-among them, the presence of electoral observors, and electoral trans- parency. In a private meeting on March 16, Colosio and Camacho signed an alliance. The new pact implic- itly broke a series of alliances Colosio had made with more established interest groups to secure his nomina- tion. In a March 22 press conference, Camacho ended speculation about his intentions by announcing that he would not seek the presidency this year. One day later, on March 23, Colosio was assassinated. The assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio sank the country into a trough of insecurity and anxi- ety. To begin with, many believed the murder was a crime of the state, a settling of accounts within the system, evidence of a war among the distinct clans NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 0 0 0 3 5 N a 20REPORT ON MEXICO As the political crisis intensified, the Mexican economy showed the weakness that belied its apparent strength. The Clinton Administration even felt compelled to authorize a line of credit of $6 billion to prop the economy up and ensure political stability. of the "revolutionary family." It became very quickly apparent that it was not the work of a lunatic, but the result of a conspiracy. The corpse of the candidate was transformed into part of the internal war. The most hardline sector of the PRI immediately mobilized to place responsibility for the assassination on the shoul- ders of Camacho, and thereby derail any attempt on his part to reemerge as a candidate. The modernizers filtered information to the press, attempting to impli- cate members of the old political class in the assassi- nation. For their part, members of the Jurassic political establishment spread the version of a settling of accounts within Salinismo which resulted from the candidate's break with the President. Any solution to the Chiapas conflict immediately froze, since rumors of Camacho's involvement in the assassination weakened his ability to negotiate. The Zapatistas suspended the process of consultation and placed themselves on "red alert." They indicated that they thought Colosio had been assassinated at the orders of those who wanted a military solution to the Chiapas conflict. The ranchers from Chiapas and the rest of the country began to actively mobilize, seeking to put a brake on land seizures-around 125,000 acres to date-and to force a resolution of the conflict in their favor. The prospects for a peaceful solution diminished in the short run. The internal struggle to designate a new candidate of the official party was, once again, contentious, bloody and difficult. When the dust settled, Salinas chose Ernesto Zedillo, a young technocrat without deep roots in the party. Many old members of the PRI saw the nomination as an affront which would cost the party dearly. The nomination of Zedillo opened yet more wounds in this internal war, and simultaneously sowed more doubts about the possibility of a victory in clean elections. As the political crisis intensified, the Mexican econ- omy showed the weakness that belied its apparent strength. The rapid slide of the value of the peso-8% between January and March-produced a capital flight of about $11 billion; there was a drastic rise in interest rates, and inflation grew beyond all expectations. The year seemed to have left behind all possibilities for economic growth. The Clinton Administration even felt compelled to send in reinforcements. The U.S. government underwrote its commercial partner by authorizing a line of credit of $6 billion to prop up the Mexican economy and ensure political stability. But the climate continued to worsen. Two important businessmen were kidnapped. And a few days after the nomination of Zedillo, an explosion shattered a bank in the city of Monterrey. While the government announced that the explosion was an accident caused by a gas leak, private experts asserted that the bank had been bombed. This added yet another element of uncertainty to the picture. People became convinced that an unknown war was raging within the country. This political conflict is now developing within the framework of the August 21 presidential elections. Whatever the electoral results may be, it is of para- mount importance that they be credible. Despite modi- fications to the electoral law, the governing party con- tinues to have a substantial organizing and administrative role in the electoral process. The elec- tions are being held in a context of a generalized lack of credibility, in which the democratic citizenry are not inclined to support any more hoaxes. The Chiapas conflict also remains alive, though the civic and peasant mobilization initiated by the indige- nous rebellion never quite succeeded in articulating itself on a national basis. Its momentum was slowed by the assassination and the ensuing climate of political decomposition and uncertainty. In mid-June, the Zapatistas rejected the government's 34-point peace plan, mainly because it did not adequately deal with questions of political democracy. Zedillo then declared the talks a "failure" and Camacho, citing a lack of offi- cial support, resigned as negotiator. All this adds another element of uncertainty to the possibility of a post-electoral political explosion. Mexico is living at the end of an era, as the 65-year- old regime of an official state party draws to a close. One of two scenarios is likely to be played out in the country's immediate political future: either the various parties will agree to a national pact of conciliation, and a fragile coalition government will lead a transition to political democracy, or a full-fledged political con- frontation will occur, and Mexico's future will become even more uncertain than ever.
