RIO DE JANEIRO-Ever since Jan- uary 25, when a quarter of a million protesters converged on Sio Paulo's Praoa da S6, Brazil has tumbled ir- revocably toward a break with military rule. President Jodo Baptista Figueire- do--the fifth consecutive Army gen- eral to rule the country since the 1964 coup-seems resigned to having lost control of his celebrated abertura (or political opening) through which the Army was to have perpetuated its polit- ical power with nominally democratic institutions. Now, with the economic model lying in pieces and the country's social fabric stripped threadbare, Figueiredo has en- tered into negotiations with the mod- erate opposition. And, barring a vio- lent takeover by Army hardliners-the so-called duros-about the best deal the military can hope for is a safe passage back to the barracks. The current regime has acknowl- edged the inevitability of open presi- dential elections, but insists that the time is not ripe, that "the country is not ready for elections." They insist on keeping the currently instituted "elec- toral college" as the proper vehicle for choosing Brazil's first civilian presi- dent in 20 years, when Figueiredo's term ends in 1985. But they have al- ready agreed to move the election date from 1991 to 1988, and current nego- tiations-proceeding in fits and starts without true definition--could further advance the date to 1986. Additional proposals could bring to power a transitional president-or mandato-tampto--chosen by consen- sus of party leadership of the ruling Democratic Social Party (PDS), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) (the predominant opposition party which comprises a broad ideolog- ical spectrum), and other significant Mitchell Torton, a free-lance writer living in Brooklyn, NY, spent three months in Brazil last spring. Vice President Aureliano Chavez opposition parties. A 1985 constitu- tional assembly could also become part of an ultimate settlement. 90% Favor Direct Elections Until late May, many within the op- position believed that four to five mil- lion Brazilians demonstrating in the streets over the course of three months indicated a non-negotiable imperative for diretas jd-direct elections now. With 90% of the population supporting direct elections, according to polls, as well as virtually the entire business community and large sectors of the military itself, democratization seemed nearly inevitable. But the duros within the Administration stood fast, eventu- ally forcing even the most implacable sectors of the opposition to a gradualist approach. A number of recent events also indicate that the neo-fascist Right, never far from the nerve centers of Brazilian military rule, remains active. The most startling episode recalled images of the brutally repressive 1970s, and continues to stir controversy. No one was surprised to find Congressman Paulo Salim Maluf, a son of Lebanese immigrants and former (appointed) governor of Sdo Paulo, at the center of it. In the months before the campaign for diretas jd destroyed beyond repair the credibility of the electoral college, Maluf was running neck-and-neck to become Brazil's first civilian president since the so-called Revolution of 1964. The leading candidate was Interior Minister Mario Andreazza, an old friend of President Figueiredo, much tainted by the charges of mismanage- ment and corruption. Though momentarily outflanked by the president's personal favorite, Ma- luf--brash, aggressive, free-spending- seemed confident of his ability to pre- vail within the backrooms of the PDS nominating convention. From there, it would have been relatively easy to con- quer the electoral college, heavily rigged to favor the PDS candidate. This was the same route he had followed, in 1978, to overcome the official govern- ment candidate and become a bionico, or appointed, state governor--before gubernatorial elections were reinstated in 1982. Figueiredo is widely viewed as an indecisive and non-committal president, the more so since both his health and popularity experienced a precipitous decline in the midst of economic crisis. And so Figueiredo's support of An- dreazza was never well-defined. But the diretas jd movement was threaten- ing the underpinnings of his govern- ment-eventually winning converts within his own party, including Vice President Aureliano Chaves. Figueiredo then dropped his support for Andreazza, instead negotiating the issue of presi- dential succession with Gov. Tancredo Neves, a moderate opposition gover- nor from the interior state of Minas Gerais. The decline of Andreazza's fortunes did not, however, signal a rise in Maluf's. To the contrary, by opening participation in the presidential succes- sion to the opposition, Figueiredo criti- cally jeopardized the chances of both leading PDS candidates. As the politi- cian whom Senhor magazine (an op- position, business-oriented news weekly) called "one of the most hated men in the country," Maluf could in no way JULY/AUGUST 17prosper from even the most limited opening of the presidential succession. Brizola Named a "Bandit" And so, the third week in May, this man who long epitomized the most aggressive sector of the military's civil- ian power base, traveled south to Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul, the Gaucho State. There he called on ex-President General Emilio Gar- rastazu Medici, 78, who presided over perhaps the worst era of state terrorism since the founding of the republic. Medici had guarded a stony silence since the end of his term (1969-1974), as first President General Ernesto Geisel and then Figueiredo ceded greater and greater freedoms. But following the meeting, Medici appeared before the cameras at Muluf's side and, in a startling move, submitted himself to the press for 20 minutes-- the longest interview of his life. He denounced negotiations with the opposi- tion, criticized the records of his suc- cessors, hectored reporters, derided the 1979 political amnesty of "bandits" like Rio Governor Leonel Brizola (a populist governor of Rio Grande do Sul in the pre-coup period who exists as a symbolic nemesis of military rule) and labeled diretas jii "a joke." Afterward, Maluf said, "I admit a deep longing for the Medici era." The public was reminded of that era when, within days of the Medici in- terview, two offices were firebombed: the Sdio Paulo headquarters of Amnesty International and the offices of leading opposition industrialist Ermirio de Moraes. Also, still fresh in the public mind was the duro in President Figueire- do's own heart. Just before Easter, the president had placed Brasilia, the nation's capital, and 10 surrounding communities, un- der a modified state of emergency, as Congress prepared to take its long- awaited vote on the Dante de Oliveira constitutional amendment re-establish- ing direct presidential elections. The principal mobilizing point for the di- retas jd demonstrations, the amend- ment is perhaps the most popular single piece of legislation in Brazil's history. "Without a doubt, the objective of these emergency measures is to create a climate of fear among the legislators," declared Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula), president of the trade union-based Workers Party (PT). PMDB President Ulysses Guima- raes-also a presidential hopeful--de- livered an impassioned address on the floor of the Congress: "Any Congress- man or Senator who is intimidated is not a real public servant. Where is the insurrection to justify emergency mea- sures when we are demonstrating with millions of people in perfect order? The real threat to social peace comes from hunger, misery and the surrender to foreign interests." Figueiredo was unmoved, imposing the worst press censorship and repres- sion since abertura began. The Chamber of Deputies, encircled by the Army, narrowly missed the two-thirds vote necessary to send the constitutional amendment to the Senate. The next week, television and radio were back reporting the real news, which was that diretas was still in the air. Print journalists from left to right-- some of whom had been detained by the Army in Brasilia-excoriated Fi- gueiredo for imposing emergency mea- sures. Guimardes and Lula threatened to call out even larger demonstrations-- and only then did the president opt for negotiations. Brazilian Air of Festivity The movement that forced the gov- ernment to the negotiating table will surely go down as one of the more remarkable of recent history. The dem- onstrations were pervasively non-violent, almost Gandhi-like in their restraint, but with a particularly Brazilian air of festivity-though never permitting any doubt that, with the current economic crisis, political events amount to a mat- ter of life and death. The diretasjd campaign was to have reached its crescendo April 10 in Rio, where Gov. Leonel Brizola organized an awesome protest, providing free bus and subway service, a spectacular laser- beam light show projected off the fa- cades of modern office towers on the Avenida Presidente Vargas and a broad rostrum of the country's leading oppo- sition figures. "Rio is going to bury the electoral college" was Brizola's claim in the weeks leading up to the demonstration. As governor of Rio Grande do Sul from 1958 to 1961, Brizola had expropriated the telephone company and organized preparations for armed resistance to a 1961 coup attempt; in 1964, when his brother-in-law, President Joao Goulart, was overthrown, Brizola again was in the forefront of those endorsing armed resistance. Twenty years later, after 18 years in political exile and a startling political comeback, a greatly mellowed and far more accommodationist Brizola brought out one million working- and middle-class Cariocas for the largest single protest in Brazil's history. Six days later, in Sao Paulo this time, a million and a half protesters took to the streets. The Symphony Or- chestra of Campinas was brought out to perform, as was Samba queen Beth Carvalho. And Brazil's top soccer player-Socrates--announced he would scrap a multi-million dollar deal to play in Italy and remain in Brazil, if direct elections were held. Diretas ja had become a national fever, to rival the veryfutebol that had carried Socrates to stardom; as if 20 years of stifled expression had suddenly gotten loose. Up and down the 5,000 mile of the South Atlantic coastline, and deep into the interior, Brazilians poured into the streets wearing bright yellow T-shirts (from the country's flag, the movement's official color), singing the national anthem; samba groups carried their tambores down from shanty- towns and slogans appeared rekindling the long-buried memory of Joio "Jan- go" Goulart. Lines formed around the block for every showing of Jango, a fiercely partisan documentary portrayal of the only Brazilian president ever to die in exile. In the south, gigantic block letters appeared on factory walls reading BRI- ZOLA FOR PRESIDENT; and Plan- ning Minister Ant6nio Delfim Netto, architect of the fleeting economic mira- cle who now functions as the long arm of the IMF in Brazil, appeared in out- door murals bartering the country's sovereignty for a fistful of dollars. PDS Splits Over Electoral Issue The democratic contagion spread rapidly to widen rifts within Figueire- do's own Administration and party. REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 18Vice President Chaves came out pub- licly for diretas jac, effectively ending amicable relations with the president, and Chaves' own presidential ambitions were endorsed by former President Geisel, who was rumored to regret having chosen Figueiredo as his suc- cessor. Navy Minister Maximiano Fonseca was forced to resign in late March, the result of his barely disguised sympathies for Chaves and diretas. Immediately, the new Navy minister's two sons told the national press they were adamant supporters of the movement. And, in the weeks leading up to the April 25 vote, Congressman Jose Sarney, Jr. (PDS) joined the caucus of government- party defectors in favor of the Dante de Oliveira amendment--despite the ob- jections of his father, Sen. Jos Sr., until June national preside PDS. The elder Sarney resig Figueiredo rejected his bid ti PDS split by holding a party I Were it not for Figueired ified state-of-emergency an warnings that diretas j6i cou duce the pre-coup climate there remained a chance that sident votes, prodded by ov ing public opinion, could ha Dante de Oliveira to victory. weeks after the vote, only branch of negotiations kept I ment in abatement. By mid-June, however, clear that the ever deepening within the PDS were effect tralizing the possibility of a n Rosinha shantytown, Rio de Janeiro. Ninety percent favor direct ele t Sarney, settlement. And as the Report went to lent of the press, rapidly breaking developments ned when suggested that the presidential succes- o heal the sion would remain in the electoral primary. college-but with an important catch. o's mod- On July 4, Vice President Chaves and d oblique another PDS presidential candidate, uld repro- Sen. Marco Maciel, renounced their of 1964, candidates; and together with about 40 PDS dis- influential party dissidents, they formed erwhelm- a Liberal Front. With the joint support ve carried of the Liberal Front and a united op- And in the position, Gov. Tancredo Neves could the olive conceivably beat the government on its the move- own turf-that is, the electoral college. Meanwhile, the political intrigue, ma- it became neuverings and daily developments g divisions continued apace. ively neu- As everyone admits, Brazil's prob- ieaningful lems run far deeper than the question of :tions 1nasceso.Wovrsc cin ceeds Figueiredo--whether a pro-mili- tary technocrat like Maluf, or a leading ,,,;;,,ii ~ I1^r^.r--~ opposLUUn moderate RlJliL LL UUV. i alcredo Neves or a non-political draft choice like industrialist Ermirio de Moraes- the challenge will be to govern a country which strains at the breaking point. Clearly, it was the potentially vol- atile social situation to which Sio Paulo Governor Franco Montoro was alluding following the defeat of Dante de Oliveira, when he came out for negotiations with the Administration: "We want to put the political process back in the hand of professionals-and out of the streets." Montoro, a PMDB leader, was ex- pressing the sentiments of the moderate and conservative opposition. As much as they want an end to 20 years of dictatorship and the more recent addi- tion of an IMF overseer, the moderate opposition has little interest in deeper issues raised by popular movements and a centuries-old class structure that, exacerbated by the military's conserva- tive development model, has left 70% of the population completely excluded from the country's prosperity. There is little doubt that, once demo- cratization takes place, economic plan- ning will be shifted to a growth orienta- tion, modest social services instituted for the poor and the international debt renegotiated in more realistic terms. Less certain is the relationship that will develop between a liberal democracy and its disenfranchised majority.
