In Cuba, Castro has publicly praised the new president. Privately, he had a friend ask Jimmy Carter to relay the message to Clinton that he would refrain from making provocative comments about the new president for at least his first year in office and hoped that Carter would advise Clinton to do likewise. What the President doesn't want to hear," a White House insider confided on the con- dition that I not name him, "are the words Cuba and Castro, because they ring with the sound of low-priority dilemma." The adviser was quick to point out that "Clinton has strong ideas on the issue, but it's far from his priority."' "The embargo itself makes no sense," said a National Security official, also on condition of anonymity, "but the fact is that the possible reward for dropping it doesn't correspond with the political risk. Carter tried to open up with Castro and got burned by the boat lift," he said, referring to Castro's opening of the port of Mariel in April, 1980. Although Castro claimed his decision to allow Cubans-including many "undesirables"-to emigrate to the United States was the result of U.S. provocations, the U.S. policy team saw it as a mean trick to pull during an election year against the first U.S. president to behave decently toward Cuba. A young Arkansas governor was also stung by the Mariel ploy. Lacking facilities to process all the incoming Cubans, President Carter sent thousands of them to Fort Chafee, Arkansas, where they subse- quently rioted, demanding to be released. Bill Clinton was embarrassed by the confrontation between the Marielitos and the local population who insisted he act to control these "foreigners" who were occupying Ozark mountain village streets and screaming in an alien language. Clinton did restore order, but the inci- dent damaged him as much as Carter. Indeed, it may have been a contributing factor in both of their elec- toral defeats in 1980. Thirteen years have elapsed since the Mariel exo- dus, but the old wounds still smart in the State Saul Landau is a senior fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. His most recent book is Guerrilla Wars in Central America (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993). Department and White House. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was Under Secretary in 1980, told a Meet the Press panel in February that he foresaw no improvement in relations with Cuba so long as Castro remains in power. Since his electoral victory, Clinton has said little publicly about Cuba, but on February 19 he reiterated a hard line in response to a letter from Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) who questioned the appropri- ateness of the U.S. embargo. Stressing "support for democracy" as the guiding principle for policy "not only to Cuba, but to Haiti, Peru and to our relationship with all other countries throughout the hemisphere and the world," Clinton declared that "I do not believe the United States can have a normal relationship with any country that has abandoned democracy, including Cuba." In Cuba, Castro has publicly praised the new presi- dent. Privately he had a friend ask Jimmy Carter to relay the message to Clinton that he would refrain from making provocative comments about the new president for at least his first year in office and hoped that Carter would advise Clinton to do likewise. 2 He told the friend that he thought Clinton was a responsi- ble politician and consequently would not see action against Cuba as a priority. 3 Despite the tough tone of the Clinton letter to Rangel, Fidel's appraisal of the president's agenda seems accurate. he Clinton transition advisors inadvertently sparked a controversy around the Cuba issue when they floated the name of Mario Baeza, a black Cuban American, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Baeza was an ideal "diversity" candidate, a Harvard Law School graduate and a New York lawyer with a leading Wall Street firm. He was practically unknown in the Latin American policy world, but the Clinton insiders who VOL XXVI, No 5 MAY 199335 VOL XXVI, No 5 MAY 1993 35REPORT ON US POLICY knew him called him a Renaissance man, brilliant of intellect, talented as an artist, and a whiz at corporate takeovers. More important, but unseen by most ana- lysts, Baeza represented a different paradigm for U.S. Cuba policy. He was a candidate of the anti-Castro Cubans who were registered Democrats, and who abhorred the hard-line CIA infiltration tactics of the past. Baeza did not buy into the language, or indeed the very epistemology of the 30-plus-year-old war against Castro. The Baeza nomination antagonized Jorge Mils Canosa and his Miami-based Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) cohorts. Baeza was not one of them; neither his skin color nor politics matched the interests of CANF board members. "Soft on Castro," said callers on Spanish-language radio stations in South Florida, citing as proof Baeza's attendance at a 1992 conference in Havana to look at busi- ness opportunities in Cuba. In response to this opposition, the Ivy League set and people on the Left began to rally to Baeza's cause. The opposition from Cubans from the Mariel boa the Right was successful. ansas in 1980. The incide In 1993 Jorge Mds Can- Clinton's defeat in the guber osa is the most powerful Cuban American. Mdis Canosa was among the half a million Cuban property owners, professionals and Batista supporters and func- tionaries (his father was a Batista official) who were welcomed by U.S. authorities in 1959 and 1960. He controls CANF, and 16 lobbying groups and PACs all directed at shaping a U.S. policy that tightens a noose around the economic neck of Cuba. CANF's passion to overturn Castro is reflected by some Democrats in the Clinton camp, including Congressman Robert Torricelli, author of the 1992 so- called Cuba Democracy Act, which penalized U.S. subsidiaries trading with Cuba as well as other nations who engage in commerce with the island. The New Jersey Democrat, also Chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, is liberal on domestic issues, but assumes a missionary posture when he hears Castro's name. "Castro will fall in months, not years," he predicted. 4 Torricelli believes that by clos- ing loopholes in the embargo while Cubans live under extreme austerity, the bill will catalyze existing anger and the populace will rise up and throw Castro and company out--i la Rumania. Torricelli led the congressional chorus against Baeza. Faced with the level of negative publicity that Mis Canosa promised should Clinton persist with Baeza, the Administration withdrew his name. Nevertheless, the Baeza nomination startled CANF leaders. They had anticipated that the Clinton people would have consulted them before announcing a candi- date. CANF proposed its own nominee, Simon Ferro, a man whose views on Cuba policy closely parallel those of Mds Canosa. The Foundation also let it be known that it would accept other candidates provided that they agreed with the policy of tightening the embargo. The Clinton Latin America policy team formulated a new short list designed to avoid Mis Canosa's ire, and chose Alexander Watson to be the point man on policy south of the border. Watson, a career diplomat who served as ambassador to Peru and was number two at the United Nations until February, 1993, was described by the anonymous national security official as a "decent chap who will bring a proper Latin American perspective to the job-not a Cuba focus." The conflict over the Baeza nomination dra- matized to the entire for- rift riot at Fort Chaffee, Ark- eign-policy community t may have contributed to that the battle over Cuba atorial election that year. policy was being waged largely outside of government circles. That Mgs Canosa's objection could derail Baeza's appointment brought reactions from sectors that had not been focused on Cuban or Latin American policy. The 42- member House Congressional Black Caucus voiced its support for Baeza, declaring that the opposition to him was racially based. Charles Rangel drafted a bill, now being circulated for support, to "drop the embar- go." While the bill is unlikely to gain wide backing, it indicates that the anger sparked by the Baeza incident has led to increased attention to CANF's "undue influ- ence" on policy. Editorial writers and pundits also began to question the unwarranted authority of this Cuba lobby. Richard Cohen, a syndicated columnist with the Washington Post raised questions about the race factor in CANF's opposition to Baeza and about the foundation's undue influence. "One knowledgeable senator put it to me this way," wrote Cohen, "'Granting M~is Canosa a veto power of the entire hemisphere is a very danger- ous move.' He understated matters. It's repugnant." 5 Cohen's column was reprinted in the Miami Herald and brought forth a furious op-ed piece by Mdis Canosa, who stopped just short of overtly threatening that he would reopen his battle with the Herald. 36 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 36REPORT ON US POLICY he logic of Rangel's approach-drop the embar- go, restore relations, and allow natural events to take their course-is embraced by a group of anti-Castro Cubans who oppose Mis Canosa's self- declared monopoly on opinions in the Cuban- American community. Cambio Cubano, a group head- ed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and backed by business and professional sectors, took issue with CANF poli- cies at a National Press Club conference in January. Gutierrez Menoyo accused Mis Canosa and his fol- lowers of being interested in making money from a new Cuba, not in patriotic ideals. Menoyo stressed "a peaceful politics of love, not revenge." If the current policy prevails, Menoyo said, "we fear civil war, a blood bath and foreign intervention. We want to avoid this. The people of Cuba don't want the U.S. marines again deter- mining our destiny." At the press conference, Menoyo backed the eas- ing of the blockade in return for democratic openings in Cuba. Menoyo also told the media that unlike CANF supporters, the mem- bers of Cambio Cubano had voted Democrat and that President Clinton ought to listen to them as representa- tives of the community. 6 As anti-CANF elements lobbied in February against the embargo and other harsh anti-Cuba measures, Mis The "Friendshi Canosa-controlled legislators urged Pastors for Peace President Clinton to take the 30- nomic embargo I year-old U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to the United Nations, making it international. Rep. Lincoln Diaz Balart (R-Fla.), who wrote the reso- lution, was joined by Sen. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), and Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). They are asking President Clinton to tighten the trade embargo because of alleged Cuban human-rights violations. Such gestures keep the Cuba issue hot even though such a resolution is unlikely to receive much support at a United Nations that in 1992 voted overwhelmingly to condemn the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Members of Congress, White House staff and expe- rienced reporters generally agree that to change Cuba policy, alternative domestic constituencies need to materialize to challenge CANF on the issues and show they can exercise some political clout. "They've got about a year to get their act together, I would say," my confidant, the Clinton insider said, "or else we'll prob- ably be stuck with the same old policy that on the one hand has failed to produce the desired results and that on the other hand works to shut down political space in Cuba." p c as As governments in the hemisphere move toward new levels of economic integration, following the path of transnational business and banking, U.S.-Cuban relations remain stuck in the past. The obsession that began with President Eisenhower shortly after Castro and the guerrillas marched triumphantly into Havana in January, 1959 has endured for over 34 years and nine successive U.S. presidents. The Cuban Revolution looms as a pernicious challenge to U.S. power. Given the legacy of imperial hubris as a guid- ing principle for behavior in the Caribbean and Latin America, it is as if the Cuba fixation is somehow indelibly etched in the oval-office chairs and absorbed osmotically by each successive president, since none seems to escape its dictates. In 1964 the United States suc- ceeded in twisting the arms of Latin American governments to eject Cuba from the Organization of American States and most other hemispheric organizations. And Washington convinced these less- than-courageous governments to break diplomatic relations with the Communist island. There was of course a Cold-War pretext for these actions in the 1960s. Since then, almost all of Latin America and the Caribbean has restored relations with Cuba, and the nent" caravan of region's foreign ministers routine- hallenged the eco- ly try to persuade Washington to t year. let go of its obsession and accept Cuba as another Third World nation, albeit one that distinguished itself from the rest by playing a significant role on the world stage for 30 years. The international community, says Michael Manley, former prime minister of Jamaica, has "separated the Cuba issue into two parts. Whatever one thinks of the Cuban regime is one issue, but the U.S. embargo is an anachronism from the past which impedes rational economic development for the region. The embargo has neither international support nor respect. Its main- tenance is seen as an extension of the political interest of a right-wing Cuban business group, a kind of tail wagging the dog." 7 Despite such articulate arguments for a rethinking of Cuba policy, change is not in the offing. "There are some things that might force the Cuba issue back into rationality," the national security official offered. "If the foreign drilling companies locate a large oil reserve we might be forced to reevaluate. Short of that, or the outbreak of civil war in Cuba, don't look for lots of changes, or for that matter much mention of Cuba in the headlines for the next few years." Clinton's Cuba Policy: A Low-Priority Dilemma 1. Conversation with author, January 31, 1993. In July, 1992, Clinton criticized Bush for not putting "the hammer to Fidel Castro." On October 11, 1992, Clinton sent a letter to Congress- man Torricelli and Florida Senator Bob Graham (R-Fla) congratu- lating them for the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act. "1 want to reaffirm my support for the Cuban Democracy Act," he wrote. "Fidel Castro remains one of the world's most ruthless dictators, and the Cuban people are deprived of their most basic human rights." In an interview by Diane Sawyer on Prime Time on March 4, when asked what he would like to say to Castro if he walked into the room, Clinton replied, "Haven't you learned that your system is no good? Give the Cubans their freedom. 2. Conversation with George McGovern, December, 1992. 3. Conversation between author and former head of state who spoke with Castro in January, 1993. 4. Bergen County Record, February 24, 1993. 5. Washington Post, February 4, 1993. 6. Among Menoyo's supporters are Max Lesnick, publisher of the liberal anti-Castro magazine Replica, Bernardo Benes, a banker who backed Jimmy Carter's human-rights policies, and Alfredo Duran, a successful Miami lawyer. 7. Conversation with author, March 18, 1993.
