Colombia has been wracked by civil war for 37 years and today the nation is at a crossroads: Either it will close off the possibility of ending the current conflict through negotiations, or it will succeed in bringing peace negotiations to a successful conclusion. Either it will take an authoritarian path that will suffocate its already restricted democracy, or there will be a new social pact that paves the way for democratic development.
Since 1998, the government of President Andrés Pastrana has been negotiating on and off with two insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Pastrana has received support for continuing the negotiations from sectors of the political and economic establishment that see the war as a brake on the nation’s economic well-being, but the peace process is opposed by other sectors, including the Colombian military, many large landowners, many members of the middle class and by a force which has only recently become one to be reckoned with: Carlos Castaño’s paramilitary Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC).
Significantly, the nation reaches this crossroads during a new phase in the decades-long conflict. Since 1995, the dynamics of the war have been changing; from a stalemated low-intensity war, it has become a higher intensity war with a clear tendency to escalate. Between the 1960s and the mid-1990s, the balance of forces between the guerrillas and the state did not allow either of the two to prevail. The military balance was comfortable enough that both actors developed vested interests in maintaining a low-intensity war without taking the risks of escalation with no assurance of victory. At the same time, both sides made sure that they acquired enough resources to not lose the war outright.[1] The recent intensification has made the conflict more costly for everyone involved: the guerrillas, the state, the dominant classes, the peasants, and the urban middle class. One of the main factors that changed the war’s dynamic is the rise of paramilitarism as a political and military force around which Colombia’s most reactionary elements are rallying. But the debate over the peace process is now being affected by three outside factors. These are the U.S.-sponsored “War on Drugs,” the rise to power of Venezuela’s leftist President Hugo Chávez and, most recently, the U.S.-declared “War on Terrorism.” The interplay between these factors will determine which fork in the road—the one pointing toward peace and democracy, or toward authoritarianism and more conflict—Colombia will take. [2]
The rise of paramilitarism as a unified political-military force in the latter part of the 1990s changed Colombia’s internal war from one in which the state and its armed opposition faced off against each other, to a more complex, three-way interaction. This has led to the recent overall intensification and escalation of the war. One sign of the intensification is the increasing national military budget: Colombia’s military spending was 1.8% of GDP in 1994; by 2000 it had risen to 3.7%. Another sign is the use of new and heavier armaments by all parties in the conflict—all of whom have larger forces in combat: The government now has modern helicopters and surveillance planes, many provided by the United States. The paramilitaries have their own helicopters and heavy weaponry. The guerrillas have obtained anti-aircraft missiles and routinely employ very destructive bombs made from gas cylinders. The $1.3 billion U.S. aid package and the deployment of U.S. Special Forces personnel in high conflict areas such as Caquetá has further escalated the war.
Colombia’s rapidly rising homicide rate is another symptom of the conflict’s intensification, since most of the killings are committed either by organized crime or the paramilitaries. In the 1970s, the annual homicide rate was 28 per hundred thousand residents; in the 1980s this increased to 60 per hundred thousand, remaining at that level until 1997, then rising again to 64 per hundred thousand per year by 2000. The number of mass killings also increased significantly in the post-1995 period; in 1994, 505 people were victims of massacres whereas in 2000, 1226 people were victims of mass killings, mostly committed by paramilitaries.[3]
The paramilitaries are not a new phenomenon in Colombia, but they have recently taken on new forms. Since the 1940s, paramilitaries of some sort have existed in different regions of Colombia, chiefly to protect the interests of the large landowners; in the 1980s new paramilitary groups were set up to serve the needs of drug traffickers and the then-emerging narcobourgeoisie. Nonetheless, in 1986 they had only a few hundred members with no national command structures. In fact, today’s most prominent paramilitary group, the AUC, had only 93 men in 1986. Now it has some 8,000 combatants. The group’s rapid and dramatic growth started in the early 1990s and picked up momentum in the 1995-2001 period after the creation of a unified command structure under Carlos Castaño’s leadership.
Today’s AUC is different from the paramilitaries of the 1940s and 1980s in three fundamental ways: The AUC now has a unified structure operating at the national level. It has a clear political agenda with a defined discourse that articulates the type of political system and economic order that the group wants. It relies on its own income-producing capabilities independent of the state and other sources of financing. Its annual income ranges between $200 to $300 million, much of this derived from the drug trade and money laundering activities.[4] This means that although the AUC has close ties with the Colombian military, it is not dependent on the military for its continued existence and, indeed, as documented in a recent Human Rights Watch report, the AUC often pays members of the military to do its bidding rather than vice versa.[5] The AUC is perhaps the first extreme right organization in Latin America to succeed in building such an independent military-financial structure. The death squads, paramilitary groups and peasant patrols of El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru pale in comparison.
At least 1,000 of Castaño’s force previously served in the Colombian military. More than 53 retired Colombian military officers, along with foreign mercenaries from Israel and the United States, have worked with the AUC as advisers and participated in AUC actions. This has professionalized the AUC’s mode of action. In terms of armaments, the AUC has 14 state-of-the-art helicopters equipped for military operations, 11 small planes, and rapid boats with mounted machine guns. In other words, the organization has nearly become a classically defined army. The cost of maintaining such an army is estimated to be between 50 and 80 million dollars a year.
The AUC also receives support from several important sectors of Colombian society that oppose a negotiated peace. They seek to change the dynamic of the conflict to the point that the guerrillas are forced to surrender or become considerably weakened, thus averting the possibility of any social, economic and political reform that would remove the privileges guaranteed by Colombia’s archaic institutions. These sectors include large landowners and key members of the agribusiness elite, among them cattle ranchers and owners of banana and flower plantations and sugar and palm oil processing plants. This is particularly true in the departments of Bolívar, Cauca, Middle Magdalena, Urabá, César, North Santander, and the Oriental Plains, areas affected by the guerrilla’s policy of forced “taxations.” Other opponents of the negotiations include members of the Colombian narcobourgeoisie who have bought up about four million hectares of fertile land, land speculators in areas that are undergoing economic development propelled by highway construction, industrialization or tourism, and owners of lands that are rich with natural resources such as oil, gold, coal, nickel, and emeralds. Conservative political circles within the dominant elite, sectors of the military establishment that have had close links with the AUC, and some sectors of foreign capital, particularly oil and coal companies such as Occidental and British Petroleum, also oppose a negotiated settlement that could undermine their interests.
The specter of an authoritarian path becomes more real, however, when we factor in the increasing appeal of the AUC to the elusive “middle class” whose swinging political mood is gravitating toward the right as reflected by opinion polls conducted in the last two years. For example, polls taken in 2001 showed that Alvaro Uribe Vélez, a presidential aspirant and a representative of the extreme right, had between 15% and 20% support, mainly in urban middle class sectors.[6]
The right-wing swing by the middle class stems from a general malaise induced by the protracted conflict that has been exacerbated by Colombia’s gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis has created unprecedented levels of unemployment, reaching as high as 20% in urban centers. Due to the relative political weakness of the left and the guerrillas in the urban areas, the ideological sphere is uncontested and is instead dominated by a counter-revolutionary discourse which seeks to justify paramilitary actions. Castaño speaks of the AUC as engaging in “legitimate defense” of “honest citizens” against the guerrilla forces.[7] Uribe Vélez’s discourse is similar to Castaño’s: They coincide in their preference for a military path that does not contemplate either concessions to the guerrillas or reforms. Not suprisingly, Uribe Vélez’s political fortune also seems to be on the upswing.
At the same time, however, there are several important social groups that do favor a negotiated settlement. Chief among them is an informal grouping, nicknamed “the Cacaos,” that includes key members of the Colombian bourgeoisie, among them the owners of the country’s largest industrial, financial and media companies. Collectively their firms account for about 25% of Colombia’s gross domestic product. These sectors of the Colombian economy are increasingly integrated with transnational capital and global markets, and the views of the Cacaos represent a social and political rupture with the more conservative landowning classes that form the paramilitaries’ base of support. The Cacaos are staunch supporters of President Pastrana and his peace strategy and most likely will support presidential candidate Horacio Serpa, who has pledged to continue talks with the guerrillas. Last year, 14 members of the Cacaos met on their own with FARC leaders to discuss possibilities for a settlement and other issues.
Some economists have estimated that violence and war in Colombia reduce the country’s economic growth by 3% to 4% annually and slow Colombia’s integration into the international capitalist system; Cacaos spokesmen take the view that Colombia’s civil war has become costlier than a negotiated peace. Now the coincidence of a global economic recession, Argentina’s economic crisis and Washington’s new war on terrorism are putting new brakes on the Colombian economy and, in the Cacaos view, provide added incentives for a peaceful end to Colombia’s long conflict.
The growing political and military power of the AUC put President Pastrana on the defensive because of his support for peace negotiations. But, ironically, he was saved by the FARC, the state’s archenemy, when the guerrillas agreed to peace talks. The guerrillas are the other important force weighing in in favor of the peaceful path; their leadership has come to realize that reaching a historic compromise under the current balance of force—while insurgent military strength is challenged but is not yet in decline—could lay the foundations of a social democracy in Colombia. The guerrillas also recognize the new correlation of world forces produced by the U.S. “anti-terrorist” campaign.[8]
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Colombia’s Ministry of Defense pushed for an anti-terrorist bill which would grant the military powers beyond those already granted under a new “Law of Security and National Defense” which went into effect in August 2001. The new law resurrected the infamous “Security Statute” introduced by President Turbay Ayala in the late 1970s, which led to serious human rights violations and hundreds of disappearances. Under the new security law, the military has been granted additional powers to exercise counterinsurgency strategies with little if any civilian oversight. Moreover, the new security law re-asserts the role of the army in managing police functions, which will mean more restrictions on political freedoms and civil liberties, and more human rights abuses. The law also exempts the military from any budgetary cuts.
Now, as part of the proposed anti-terrorist package, the military wants still more powers, including the right to detain suspects without trials. The anti-terrorist law would also significantly increase sentences and reduce the minimum age required for incarceration from 18 years to 16 years. More importantly, the bill reinstates an article of the 1886 Constitution which allows the government to declare a State of Emergency during which constitutional rights are suspended. In this way the so-called anti-terrorist war is providing an excellent smoke screen for the most reactionary social forces to conquer more political space at the expense of the democratic process.
At the same time, the massive U.S. military aid package provided by Plan Colombia, combined with the rise of the extreme right, creates the conditions for the reactionary elements of the Colombian military to boldly oppose Pastrana’s peace efforts. The military has repeatedly tried to derail the peace process: It objected to a prisoner exchange with the guerrillas that had been proposed as a means of building confidence in the peace process, and has continued to harrass the FARC in the zona de despeje, or demilitarized zone, that guerrillas were granted as part of the negotiations. And if the lessons of history are of any use, the peace negotiations under former presidents Betancur, Barco and Gaviria failed partially because the military dragged its feet. U.S. support for the so-called Plan Colombia, unwittingly or wittingly, is strengthening the political and military posture of the extreme right and providing more arms for continuing the conflict. This has contributed to a growing belief among the military commanders that they can defeat the insurgency within a few years.
But last year’s inclusion of the AUC on the U.S. State Department list of the world’s terrorist groups—alongside the FARC and ELN—raises the question of how the AUC’s listing will affect the future dynamic of the war. It is important to note that the AUC is a group that is friendly to U.S. policy and economic interests in Colombia, and is likely to receive more lenient treatment from the United States than the FARC and ELN, both of which have antagonized Washington. As a result of their inclusion on the terrorist list, AUC personnel are more likely to suffer inconveniences such as the denial of visas to visit the United States than to be subject to a serious effort to eradicate the group or curtail its finances. One factor to consider is that the DEA, CIA and other U.S. agencies are reported to have had contacts with the AUC’s leadership. Due to the covert nature of these contacts, it is hard to judge their character and depth. But it’s clear that some U.S. agents consider the AUC more of an asset than a liability. Moreover, U.S. personnel involved in combat in Colombia have to contend with the fact that the AUC is the archenemy of their enemy—the AUC is not targeting their forces while the guerrillas are.
In contrast to the AUC, the FARC and ELN have attacked U.S. economic interests in Colombia and threaten to undermine the neoliberal economic model championed by Washington. What’s more, the FARC and ELN kidnapped 92 U.S. citizens between 1980 and 1998, 12 of whom died in captivity. Thirteen more U.S. citizens were kidnapped in Colombia in 1999; in 2000 three U.S. activists working with the indigenous U’wa were killed by the FARC. A former CIA official wrote that the kidnappings show that “Americans risk becoming collateral victims in Colombia.”[9] Also worrisome to U.S interests is the increasing affinity between the Colombian guerrillas and the leftist regime of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. U.S. officials fear that the relationship could aid the spread of revolutionary movements throughout the Andean region. So while AUC brutality poses an “embarrassment” to Washington, the Colombian guerrillas are seen as a real enemy. Within this perspective, the AUC’s inclusion on the terrorist list will most likely turn out to be only a symbolic act, one politically necessary to mute critics in Congress and human rights groups, even as the paramilitary is quietly used as a tactical ally.
At this point, it remains to be seen which path Colombia will follow. But the paramilitaries are expanding their power within a global context shaped by the U.S. war on terrorism. This may be diminishing the chances of a historic democratic compromise, though, as the events of September 11 demonstrated, the course of history is unpredictable and the dynamic of Colombia’s conflict may yet be shaped by unexpected factors.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Nazih Richani is director of Latin American Studies at Kean University. His book Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia will be published this spring by SUNY Press.
NOTES
1. Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace In Colombia (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002).
2. In my article,“The Political Economy of Violence: The War System in Colombia,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Summer 1997), I offered an explanation of why the civil war has been protracted. That analysis was based on the war system approach which also underlies the present article. Systems theory instructs us to analyze the universe of our inquiry in terms of interconnections of variables, unforeseen consequences of actor’s behavior, and contingencies, all of which affect the modes and dynamics of the interrelationship between the variables.
3. The October 2001 Human Rights Watch report “The Sixth Division” says that, “According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, paramilitaries acting with the tolerance or support of the security forces were responsible for 79 percent of the political killings and forced disappearances registered in Colombia between April and September 2000. Guerrillas were believed directly responsible for 16 percent of the recorded killings and abductions considered international humanitarian law violations. The security forces were believed directly responsible for 5 percent of the political killings and forced disappearances recorded in the same time period.” www.hrw.org/reports/2001/Colombia
4. These estimates are based on police data.
5. For example, according to the HRW report: “In the department of Putumayo the AUC paid monthly salaries to local army and police officials based on rank. Captains received between U.S. $2000 and $3000. Majors received $2500 and lieutenants $1500. In the department of Cauca, soldiers moonlighting as paramilitaries can earn $500 per month. These salaries far exceed the average Colombian’s monthly income.” See http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/colombia In the Valle del Cauca at least 30 police and army officers are on the payroll of the AUC. See “La nomina secreta de los paramilitares II, El Tiempo ,October 21, 2001.
6. At the same time, organized labor and the left have yet to demonstrate their strength in this arena. As Dietrich Rueschemyer et al. observed, if the middle class swings to the right and the working class is weak, then most likely this weakens the chances of a democratic option. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 167.
7. See the AUC website http://www.aucolombia.com and the related site http://www.colombialibre.net
8. This is more true for the FARC than for the ELN, which has been considerably weakened.
9. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 134.
