On Nicaragua The analysis of your Nicaragua is- sue is a welcome relief from a polarized debate. On few topics has the lack of critical thinking of the U.S. Left been so apparent as on the subject of Nicaragua. Hopefully, the contribution NACLA has made will inspire the critical per- spective that seems so lacking. I salute your courage in embarking upon the task of opening discussion in the face of what are likely to be many objections. Michael Wyman Maryland I must say that I was disappointed in the Nicaragua report. Most of my dis- appointment comes from the tone, which is something like this: Yeah, the Sandin- istas faced impossible odds, but they blew it by driving new cars and running a fancy campaign. That is not an analysis, but an implication wrapped in what sounds like personal irritation. I expected better from NACLA, and I think the Sandinistas deserve better. Steve Slade California The post mortem over the electoral defeat of the FSLN, reflected in your June issue, has largely revolved around two rather sterile dichotomies. First, did the revolution move too fast, thereby leaving the population trailing in its wake, or was the process of change too slow, frustrating and disillusioning its supporters as the FSLN tried to placate the U.S. government and the Nicara- guan bourgeoisie? This debate has busied the Left since the days of Allen- de. A second discussion is over the balance between internal and external factors (specifically U.S. pressure) in causing the Sandinistas' downfall. The division into external and inter- nal elements is to some extent mislead- ing. What the Sandinistas did affected the level of international isolation and pressure they experienced. But more importantly for understanding the elec- tion result, it was precisely the unceas- ing military and economic attack from Washington which undermined the FSLN from within. The war and the economic crisis exhausted cadres and ordinary people alike, leading to a drop- off in popular organization that sapped the vitality of the revolution. The eco- nomic crisis forced the FSLN to pre- vent the trade unions from fighting for what their members really needed- wage increases and food. Such growing verticalism further discredited the mass organizations. The FSLN's best cadres went into the army, leaving a higher proportion of time-servers and party bureaucrats in government to irritate the public and undermine support for the revolution. As the political and economic op- tions narrowed, the FSLN twisted and turned (often up to 180 degrees). In the process, they made mistakes, alienat- ing key sectors of the population, but these were generally minor errors compared to the damage caused from outside. The unpalatable lesson of Nicaragua (and increasingly of El Sal- vador) is that the United States has the power to frustrate a revolutionary po- litical project in Central America. Duncan Green Latin America Bureau, London The FSLN's chances for rebuilding in the wake of its electoral defeat are clearly linked to a thoroughgoing and accurate analysis of the factors which brought it about, including mistakes committed by the Sandinistas. Hence, we applaud NACLA's contribution to this debate. But the task of deciphering the les- sons of the last eleven years suffers when it becomes an open invitation to "Sandinista-bashing," where any and all criticisms are seen as valid. In this regard, we would take issue with Carlos Vilas, perhaps less for what he says than for what he fails to say. First, the FSLN and the Nicaraguan revolution were the victims in an unequal battle with the United States. Vilas' search for "What Went Wrong?" essentially boils down to a "blame the victim" argu- ment. Precisely "what went wrong" is that Nicaragua was forced into the boxing ring with an opponent many times its material and military strength. The policies and tactics employed by the FSLN to assure the revolution's survival should not be evaluated as issues of "what went wrong," but as the terms under.which the contest un- folded. The substantial issue here, as Vick- ers mentions, is the constraints imposed on revolutionary processes by imperi- CONTINUED ON PAGE 3 alism and international conjunctures. As valid as many of the concrete obser- vations and punctual criticisms in Vilas' article may be, they are put forward in a fallacious framework which attempts to separate out "internal" from '"exter- nal" factors. He argues that faulty FSLN policies and practices led the revolution to cave in on itself, notwithstanding external pressure. We believe the inter- nal and external factors are inextricably linked and attempts to treat them inde- pendently distort, rather than clarify, the analysis. Kent Norsworthy Bill Robinson Texas The writers are co-authors of David and Goliath: The U.S. War Against Nicaragua (Monthly Review Press, 1987). Your issue was excellent. It is hard to imagine a better informed triumvi- rate than Carlos Vilas, George Vickers and Trish O'Kane. Their analyses of the causes of the FSLN defeat and prospects for the future are very sound. The only significant criticism I would offer concerns one factual error which appears in the Vilas article (p. 17) and is echoed by the editor in his intro- duction (p.9). In predicting that "a rapid decline of Daniel Ortega is...likely," Vilas states that "Already he has been removed from the party leadership, replaced by a triumvirate made up of Commanders Lufs Carri6n as coordi- nator, Bayardo Arce as treasurer, and Henry Ruiz in charge of foreign rela- tions." I checked with Paul Oquist, a Sandin- ista advisor and head of the new Insti- tute for Nicaraguan Studies, and with Reinaldo Tefel, the former Minister of Social Welfare and a current FSLN deputy in the National Assembly. Oquist confirmed my understanding that Ortega is the coordinator of the FSLN Executive Committee, Luis Carri6n is his chief of staff, and the other two members are Arce and Rufz in the positions indicated by Vilas. In Oquist's words, "The four of them make up the top echelon of the National Directorate office. Ortega is the undisputed head of the party." Tefel and his former vice minister, Ricardo Chavarrfa, when read the NACLA phraseology, gave essen- tially the same response and informa- tion as Oquist. In addition, recent events would seem to undermine Vilas' assertion that "Ortega's position in the party seems quite precarious." It was Ortega who negotiated the accord with the UNO government which ended the July strikes. And it was Ortega who gave the principal speech before the crowd of 60,000 that gathered on July 19 (in spite of the UNO government's suspension that day of all public transportation) to commemorate the eleventh anniversary of the revolution. Given this and his superbly graceful handling of the elec- toral defeat, I would not count him out quite yet. Thomas W. Walker University of Ohio The writer is the author of several books on Nicaragua. Vilas Replies Certainly, Daniel Ortega is the head of the FSLN, but many high-level Sandinistas, as well as rank-and-file members and observers, interpreted the appointment of Carri6n, Arce and Ruiz as I did. Since early April, changes in some aspects of the FSLN dynamic reinforce my position: the May and July strikes, the relative autonomy achieved by the Sandinista labor lead- ership, the celebration of the "Asam- blea de Militantes Sandinistas" with intense internal debate, the municipal and departmental elections of new party cadres, and the preparations for the first FSLN congress. Yes, Ortega gave the July 19 anniversary speech, as he has done every year since 1980. I will not dispute Tom's interpretation of this. But I must correct his sources regarding the agreement that ended the July strikes. Even if, as a political scientist, I don't consider signatures on documents a reliable indicator of popularity, Ortega's signature does not appear on the accord (Barricada, July 13, 1990, p. 3). Opportunities to agree with Robin- son and Norsworthy are so infrequent that I am happy to have the chance to stress our basic concurrence on the impact of war upon the elections. I start my analysis by asserting that the voting was conditioned by a decade of counter- revolutionary war (p. 11), although ap- parently they jumped over it. But my article goes beyond this, exploring additional factors, such as economic policies, cultural traits, party politics, mass demobilization, "spite voting," uneven distribution of gains and losses, and other elements recognized by the FSLN (Barricada, June 26-29, 1990). Robinson and Norsworthy's, and to a certain extent Green's, argument on "internal" and "external" factors is more formal than substantial. Being from, and in, the Third World, I recog- nize a strong "First World bias" in the argument. For us, the most practical way to fight imperialism starts at home. The question is not just war (history teaches us that social revolutions have always faced counterrevolution and imperialist aggression) but the way a revolution confronts war. Either it is an obstacle that lowers the intensity of social and economic change, reduces the level and extent of people's partici- pation, and encourages leaders' self- indulgence; or it is an extremely painful but unavoidable means to advance political and economic transformation and to ensure people's direct involve- ment in the process. Military defense can be based on the political protag- onism of the masses. My commentators take a one-sided approach that has been useful in gener- ating U.S. and Western European grass- roots solidarity, but has made it very difficult for revolutionaries to confront their own contradictions and distortions. This very approach indirectly contrib- uted to increased popular frustration, strengthened the arguments of the opposition, and-like it or not-nur- tured anti-Sandinista voting. I suppose much of our disagreement stems from a different relationship to the Sandinista Revolution. Robinson and Norsworthy's work was mostly with solidarity networks, independent agen- cies and the international community. Mine has been with peasant co-ops, rural workers, Indian communities and mass organizations. Green's final statement, that in or- der to survive Central American gov- ernments must come to terms with U.S. domination in the region, is descrip- tively accurate. But what about the people's survival? Carlos M. Vilas
