How can we understand the many enigmas sur- rounding the presidency of Alberto Fujimori? Emerging practically out of nowhere, he defeat- ed novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990 presidential race. While previous administrations had suffered one policy failure after another in dealing with the country's economic and political crises, Fujimori had notable "success" stabilizing the country's erratic economy and defeating the Shining Path guerrilla insurgency. Finally and perhaps most puzzling, despite the high social costs of his economic model and the authoritarian style that has characterized his government, Fujimori has received consistently high popularity ratings from Peruvians of all social classes. Fujimori, an obscure agronomist and university pro- fessor of mathematics, was a novice in the political arena when he decided to participate in the 1990 gener- al elections. At the time, Peruvian law permitted a pres- idential candidate to run simultaneously for senate office. Fujimori ran as an independent candidate for both seats, but it was obvious that his aspiration was to become a member of parliament. Vargas Llosa, who was backed by Peru's principal power brokers and the U.S. establishment, was widely favored to win. To everyone's surprise, Fujimori came in second behind Vargas Llosa in the first-round vote, and went on to defeat him in the second round. New social and politi- cal circumstances made Fujimori's apparent "outsider" status attractive to voters fed up with politics as usual. Fujimori took power at an extremely difficult and complex moment in Peru's history. The corruption and mismanagement of the Alan Garcia administration (1985-90) had led to a sharp deterioration of state insti- tutions and of the public's confidence in government. The government was also widely discredited for its inability to quell Shining Path's violence. Peru was in dire economic straits as well. In retaliation for Garcia's refusal to pay the external debt, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared Peru "ineligible" to receive further international loans. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell 8.3% in 1988, and another 11.9% in NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Guillermo Rochabr&n is professor of sociology at the Catholic University in Lima. He is the author of Socialidad e individualidad: Materiales para una sociologia (Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Pera, 1993). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.REPORT ON PERU 1989. Hyperinflation Coming out of soared, from 1,722% in 1988, to 2,775% in nowhere, Fujimori 1989, and 7,650% in 1990. defeated Vargas Not only did Fujimori Llosa in 1990. He face a mountain of "problems that had then had "success" piled up over the stabilizing the years, but he assumed power in a virtual vac- economy and uum. He had no polit- ical program, no team defeating Shining of advisors, and no contacts or deals with the powers-that-be-- surprisingly, the business sector, the multilateral lend- despite the high ing institutions, the costs of his political parties, and the media. (The one economic model critical exception was the military.) Many and his observers expected authoritarian style, his adminstration to be a total flop, while he is popular others feared he would be a mere fig- among Peruvians urehead. Those prog- of all social classes. nostications were proven wrong. Shortly after taking office, Fujimori-- who had waged an electoral campaign against neoliber- al reform-made an about-face and implemented the very orthodox economic policies he had rejected. He did so in an extremely harsh fashion, in an attempt to stabilize the economy and bring inflation under control. In the short term, these measures aggravated the reces- sion and further jacked up inflation-gasoline prices increased 30 times overnight, while inflation for the month of August alone was 400%. In a country of 22 million inhabitants, the number of people living in poverty jumped from 9 to 14 million. The administration gradually introduced new mea- sures that virtually eliminated all forms of legal protec- tion for salaried workers. Job security was completely stamped out, and new rules governing contracts were established that reduced employers' obligations to their workers. For example, workers under 24 years of age are now considered "apprentices," which means they can receive salaries below the minimum wage, and they are not covered by the social-security system. Once inflation was brought under control and the economy had stabilized, the government turned its attention to satisfying Peru's international creditors. 1 Paying the external debt-referred to in the govern- ment's jargon as "international reinsertion"-was the top priority. One of the government's principal eco- nomic advisors joked about putting on knee pads before his meetings with the IMF to discuss Peru's debt. An IMF-mandated tax reform was implemented to generate revenue to pay off Peru's debt arrears. A cam- paign against tax evasion led by the new tax agency, the National Superintendency of Tax Administration (SUNAT), helped increase the government's coffers. Since 1990, SUNAT's directors have been trying to generate greater awareness of the importance of paying taxes and to link paying taxes to a broader concept of citizenship. The central government, however, seems interested only in collecting-as quickly and cheaply as possible-a certain percentage of the country's GDP, in order to comply with the annual agreements established by the IMF as part of Peru's debt-repayment plan. Each year, the government has agreed to higher rates: 10% in 1993, 13% in 1995, and 14.1% in 1996. The other component of international reinsertion was the market opening. To that end, Fujimori implemented the following policies: trade liberalization, drastic tariff reductions, and the privatization of state-run enterpris- es. His administration eliminated government regula- tions and subsidies, and the market now determines the cost of public services. neoliberal agenda was Fujimori's increasing intolerance for democratic checks and balances. Since the mid- 1980s, the military has had a strong pres- ence in national life due to its role in fighting the coun- terinsurgency war. Through Political-Military Com- mands established in areas declared as emergency zones, for example, the military exercises direct gov- ernmental control in more than a third of the country. The military's dominion over vast parts of the country resulted in grave and systematic human rights abuses in the 1980s. Under Fujimori, military control over the counterinsurgency war intensified, prompting a further deterioriation in the government's human rights record. Later, however, in an important shift in strategy, the government tried to win support from the civilian pop- ulation by engaging the military in civic-action cam- paigns in rural villages throughout the country as well as in shantytowns in Lima. Fujimori relies on information gathered by the National Intelligence Service (SIN) to maintain his lock on power. Consequently, the SIN-and its de facto head, Vladimiro Montesinos-has accrued a great deal of power and influence within his administration. It monitors the telephone conversations of key figures, both outside and within the government. This includes VoL XXX, No 1 JuLvYAUG 1996 17REPORT ON PERU the surveillance of members of the armed forces in order to prevent any organized resistance against the pro-Fujimori High Command. The SIN also tries to mold public opinion in the government's favor. It does so through public-opinion polls, hiring sympathetic journalists for government-controlled media outlets, and planting rumors and staging events to distract pub- lic attention when necessary. These authoritarian tendencies culminated in Fujimori's coup de main on April 5, 1992. He abruptly dissolved Congress and the judiciary, concentrating all the state's powers in the hands of the president. The cabinet of ministers became virtually irrelevant as Fujimori came to rely on a small number of advisors who had his absolute personal confidence. Fujimori justified the dissolution of the constitution- Paralleling his implementation of a neoliberal agenda was Fujimori's growing intolerance for democratic checks and balances. al order by blaming Congress for its "irresponsible, sterile, antihistoric and antipatriotic" behavior, "which favors the interests of small groups and party leaders over the interests of Peru." lie also pointed to a corrupt and inefficient system of justice, which he blamed for the release of convicted drug traffickers and guerrillas. More concretely, he criticized Congress for overturning a series of decree laws that he had proposed. It was intolera- ble, he said, that several laws designed to attack drug traf- ficking and its corrupting influence on government offi- cials were vetoed. Nor was Fujimori willing to allow Congress to pass laws that he believed imposed unacceptable limits on his ability to govern, such as one measure reducing the president's discretion in declaring different regions as emergency zones. What Fujimori was announcing-without naming it-was a revolution of sorts. With the new powers vested in the office of the presidency as a result of the coup, he sought no less than a radical modification of the structure of governance. He delineated the follow- ing objectives: greater legislative efficacy, an end to corruption within the justice system, the modernization of the state bureaucracy, an end to terrorism and drug trafficking, and the installation of a market economy which, in the medium term, would substantially improve living standards. Democracy was a worthy goal, he said, but it was impossible to obtain "true" democracy with Peru's "deceitful" formal democratic institutions. 2 Patricia Oliart is a ea her at the Rescarch Group for Development: (GRADE) in Lima. She is the co author of El Peru desde la escuela (nstituto de poyo Agrario 989). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA. The coup confirmed one of the most notable characteristics of Fujimori's administration: dis- dain for legal formalities. Fujimori systematically alters the rules of the game whenever he deems it necessary-either by creating new laws and applying them retroactively, or by modify- ing old ones to suit his purposes. For example, while Fujimori's new Constitution gives the pub- lic the right to call a referendum on unpopular laws, his hench- men in Congress have added new legal restrictions to impede the opposition from holding a referendum on the privatization of Petro-Perd, the state-owned oil company. T he sudden capture of Abimael Guzmbn and other top Shining Path Military troops patrol in leaders in September, 1992 was a building after Fujimori's, watershed for the Fujimori regime. Shining Path's military activities declined sharply thereafter, and it soon became evident that they no longer represented a major threat to the Peruvian state. New and repatriated capital began pouring into Peru, and the privatization process began to gather steam. The economy took off in the next two years. Peru's GDP grew rapidly, reaching 6.9% in 1993 and 12.9% in 1994. While these high growth rates have been lauded both locally and internationally as a sign of Peru's definitive economic recovery, these figures actually reflect a return to Peru's per capita GDP levels in 1989 and 1990. This growth is based on a boom in construc- tion-due primarily to a dramatic increase in govern- ment-funded public-works projects, largely designed to contribute to Fujimori's reelection. An increased demand for fishmeal exports also helped boost the economy. At the same time, however, the government has not tried to modernize Peru's productive capacity. The recovery of the fishmeal industry reinforces a trend that had been apparent even before Fujimori's market opening: Peru's return to its traditional reliance on pri- mary-product exports. The improved economic indicators for 1993 and 1994 led to a slight increase in salaries, but there was no visible effect on employment. Poverty remained a daunting problem, and continued to affect more than half the population. Surprisingly, this has not produced a generalized disorientation or anomie, much less frus- front of the Congress April 5, 1992 self-coup. tration. In fact, the population in general-including the poor-began to feel optimistic about the country's future. While some may doubt the reliability of public-opinion polls in Peru, it is indisputable that Fujimori enjoys steady, though not militant, support from all sectors of the popula- tion and all parts of the coun- try. 3 Fujimori's long-term and widespread popularity over the years-given the high social costs of his economic policies and his authoritarian governing style-has been one of the greatest enigmas surrounding his regime. A staggering 80% of the pop- ulation, for example, supported Fujimori's April, 1992 self- coup. It was international pres- sure, not local protests, that forced Fujimori to call congres- sional elections in November, 1992. After obtaining a congressional majority-by a slim margin-in those elections, Fujimori promulgated a constitution tailor-made to his wishes. The new Constitution permitted Fujimori to run for reelection in 1995, a race which he handily won. Some observers argue that the root of Fujimori's wide popular support is his authoritarianism, which they say is essentially a reflection of the authoritarian- ism inherent in Peruvian society. 4 If this were the case, the population's clear rejection of some of Fujimori's most authoritarian measures would be inexplicable. The amnesty law that the president pushed through Congress in June, 1995 is a clear example. The amnesty, which ended all judicial proceedings against military and police officials accused of human rights violations in the context of the counterinsurgency war, was opposed by 87% of the population according to one poll. The death penalty-enshrined in Peru's new Constitution in cases of treason, but not yet applied-is also unpopular among most Peruvians. Others explain his successful reelection in 1995 by pointing to the vast resources at his disposal through state-run programs like Foncodes. In reality, govern- ments of all stripes in Peru have had similar advantages. Fujimori was not the first to shore up his support by 5 inaugurating public-works projects, and doling out foodstuffs and other material goods, including luxury items like computers. But in contrast with his predeces- $ sors, Fujimori did not use public-works projects and NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICASREPORT ON PERU hand-outs as a tactic to cover up previous policy fail- ures or to win last-minute support. The electorate voted for Fujimori in 1995 because they felt that he had effec- tively resolved the country's two central problems: hyperinflation and guerrilla violence. It's important to understand how hyperinflation and violence profoundly affected people's daily lives. Hyperinflation meant more than just a decline in pur- chasing power; it signified continuous impoverishment, which sapped people's energy and made it impossible to think in terms of the future. By stabilizing prices, Fujimori helped ease people's anxieties, and made liv- ing in poverty more tolerable. People knew that they could count on their resources, however meager, having the same value tomorrow as they had today, and maybe even a little more. By contrast, the dramatic decline in the quality of public education and health care are not forefront in people's minds when judging the current situation. The growing violence of Shining Path created a gen- eralized feeling of insecurity among the population. In the late 1980s, Shining Path's military activities in Lima began to escalate dramatically. Once limited to occasional acts of sabotage and selective assassina- tions, the capital city was suddenly rocked by car bombs and "armed strikes." The anxiety was height- ened because this was not a war in which each individ- ual had a clearly defined position in the conflict. Most Peruvians saw Shining Path as distant, and did not con- done their violent methods. This was especially true among the urban poor, who were unwilling to become actively engaged in the organization. From their per- spective, Shining Path brought few benefits and entailed grave risks of being detained by the police or the military. At the same time, however, the urban poor's attitude toward Shining Path's violence was not simple condemnation or rejection. "In the violence exercised by others against the elites," one study con- cluded, "the urban poor seem to unleash their feelings of hostility and discontent against the rich, the politi- cians, and the authorities." 5 By vanquishing the Shining Path insurgency, the Fujimori regime alleviated a major source of collective anguish. ujimori's popularity cannot be explained without also taking into account the decline of various forms of organized opposition. Over the past decade, Peruvians have witnessed the disintegration of different forms of social organization that were a factor in Peruvian politics since the 1960s, in particular trade- union confederations and their local affiliates. The decline in union organizing is reflected in the steep reduction in strikes. The number of man-hours lost due to strikes totaled 36 million in 1978 and 38 million in Relatives grieve for those killed in a car-bomb attack by Shining Path in Miraflores, an affluent neighborhood in Lima. 1983, dropped to 15 million in 1990, and plummeted to barely a million in 1995.6 The labor movement was devastated by Peru's pro- longed and profound economic crisis, as well as by the guerrilla war. The virtual elimination of legal protec- tions for workers and the reduction of the state's medi- ating role in business-labor negotiations further weak- ened labor's position. As a result of the state's incapac- ity to respond to social demands, many people began searching for solutions to their problems in informal networks, family relationships, churches, and non- governmental organizations. Peruvians have learned to resolve problems on their own without the help of the state or politicians. Under these new circumstances- and as employment opportunities in government and other sectors of the formal economy have shrivelled up-a significant portion of the population seems to take solace in a growing "neoliberal" common sense that holds that it is better to be your own boss than to be a dependent wage worker. These social and economic factors also contributed to the long-term discrediting of Peru's political parties. If one single element were to define the current political conjuncture, it is the virtual disappearance of the "tra- ditional" political parties, at least if measured by their performance in recent elections. In 1980, for example, the centrist APRA and the conservative Popular Action (AP) and Popular Christian Party (PPC) together cap- tured more than 80% of the vote. The electoral rise of the left, particularly after the formation of a coalition of Marxist and progressive parties in the United Left (IU) in 1983, displaced AP and PPC. APRA and the IU alone garnered 75% of the vote in the mid-1980s. By 1995, however, all these parties combined captured under 10% of the vote. The IU, after winning up to a third of the vote in the 1980s, got a miniscule 0.57% in 1995. In a country where all the development models have been tried without success, politics has lost the mean- ing it once had in the popular imagination. "Identi- fication with-and not admiration for or consideration of-a candidate, is key to understanding the changes in Peru's political culture," says journalist Jos6 Maria Salcedo. "People no longer vote for what candidates offer, but for what the candidate is or appears to be. Peruvians, projecting their own virtues and defects on the candidates, now vote for those they feel are close to them and with whom they most identify. 'The political,' as a result, has become devalued as something far removed from daily life."' This devaluation of politics is reflected weekly in televi- sion comedy programs, which make fun of the country's politicians. Aside from their frequent appearances on these popular shows during election time, politicians engage in few other activities that bring them in touch with the elec- torate. "The origin of the cri- sis of the political parties is that they have been acting behind the back of the country that they claim to represent," says Carlos Ferrero, one of the few Congress members from Fujimori's coalition with a certain degree of indepen- dence. "They thought the peo- ple wanted a legislature inde- pendent from the executive, but the people believed that it was more important that the legislature help them obtain access to water and sewerage. The parties believed that if there were frequent elections, everyone would be 'content' In a country where all the development models have been tried without success, politics has lost the meaning it once had in the popular imagination. with the democratic system. What people really wanted was a system that provided them with security and order. The parties thus sought to 'defend' things that the people weren't really interested in, and they showed lit- tle interest in addressing the real problems that people suffered on a daily basis." 8 Perhaps the first symptom of the fatal decline of the traditional parties was the wane of party-line voting: since 1980, voter preferences have fluctuated wildly from one election to another. This disenchantment then began to translate itself into backing for candidates who cast themselves as "ordinary" people, like any neighbor on the street. This was the case for Alfonso Barrantes, VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AuG 1996 23 VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AUG 1996 23REPORT ON PERU the leader of the IU coalition who won the mayorship of Lima in 1983; Ricardo Belmont, the first self- declared "independent" who was elected as Lima's mayor in 1990 and 1993; and finally, Fujimori. Fujimori is not a charismat- ic leader who compels absolute support. On the con- trary, people carefully think through their backing for him. In a poll conducted last November, for example, while 75% of the people said that they approved of Fujimori's administration, in a separate question, only 27.5% said they were sympathetic to Fujimori and a mere 2.7% declared themselves "Fujimoristas." A hefty 56% said they were capable of supporting policies they considered positive, and of criticizing those with which they disagreed.9 F ujimori's economic successes over the last few years seem to be in A boy in a shantytown on the outskirts of Lima. The recent economic downturn has prompted a drop in Fujimori's popular support. Workers, university students and retirees have taken to the their declining I danger. Last year, the IMF began to worry that Peru's high growth rates were contributing to a growing trade deficit. As a result, it began to pressure the Fujimori government to "cool down" the economy, primarily through a cut in government spending. The growth rate has since dropped to approximately 6.9% in 1995 and -1.6% in the first quarter of 1996.1' Given ongoing concerns about the deficit, it seems unlikely that this downward trend will be reversed any time soon. The economic downturn has been paralleled by a relative decline in Fujimori's popular support in the polls. According to Apoyo, an independent polling firm, Fujimori's popularity has dropped from 73% in December, 1995, to 59% in May, 1996. Peru's incor- poration into the Brady debt-repayment plan and large new investments in gas exploration by Shell-Mobil-- announcements that the government hoped would improve its sagging ratings-had little effect. Clashes between protesters and the police have also become more common, as fishermen, construction workers, municipal-government workers, university students and retirees have taken to the streets to protest their declining living standards. According to one study, 68% of Peruvians now live in absolute poverty." A coherent and intelligent opposition would be able to take advantage of a moment like this when the economic tide is turning. And yet, the opposition has failed to gain the political upper hand even once since 1990. Fujimori has dealt a further blow to the opposition by passing new electoral laws which deny party status to any political group that obtained under 5% of the vote in 1995. As a result, only the Union For Peru (UPP), led by Javier P6rez de Cudllar, and Popular Action (AP), which regis- tered as a party under the previous legislation, are now legally recognized parties. All other political groups must obtain at least half a million signatures in order to participate in future elec- streets to protest tions. Without inflation, without iving standards. Shining Path, and without significant levels of eco- nomic growth, an era is coming to a close. Fujimori may have successfully demolished the previous order, but it is doubtful whether he can build new institutions capable of addressing the changing times and circumstances. Beyond specific aspects of public policy that are gov- ernment priorities, the country's public administration and public services are in a state of utter chaos. The "Fujimori phenomenon" is a consummated fact, though it is too soon to know how it will be judged by history. Perhaps Fujimori will be seen as the president who did the "dirty work" no one else dared to, in order to unblock Peru's clogged capitalist development. This meant doing away with everything or everyone who got in his way: former allies, the rule of law, Congress, and the Constitution. But Fujimori now faces a new moment in history. He can no longer justify his actions by appealing to the war against Shining Path and inflation. Opposition leaders and groups, which are now almost entirely unrelated to the "traditional" parties, have a golden opportunity- for the first time in six years-to build a viable opposi- tion movement and assume the political initiative. Whether or not they will be able to do so, however, remains an open question. Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori 1. The annual inflation rate since 1987 is as follows: 1987, 114%; 1988, 1,722%; 1989, 2,775%; 1990, 7,659%; 1991, 139%; 1992, 56.7%; 1993, 39%; 1994, 15%; 1995, 10%. National Institute of Statistical Information (INEI), Indice de Precios al Consumidor(Lima: INEI, 1996), p. 16. 2. El Peruano (Lima), April 6, 1992, as cited in C6sar Arias Quincot, La modernizaci6n autoritaria: La nueva institucionalidad surgida a partir de 1990 (Lima: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1994). 3. I have reviewed the survey data of two polling firms: Imasen, an agency completely independent from the government which employs some professionals from the left, and Apoyo, an inde- pendent firm of neoliberal orientation. In a comparison of polling results for 52 months, Imasen's registered approval rat- ings of Fujimori were higher than those of Apoyo in 26 cases, they coincided in 3 cases, and Apoyo's ratings are higher in 22 cases. In general, however, the levels and tendencies registered are broadly similar. 4. See Cesar Arias, La modernizacion autoritaria. 5. Jorge Parodi and Walter Twanama, "Los pobladores, la ciudad y la politica: Un estudio de actitudes," in J. Parodi, ed., Los pobres, la ciudad y la politica (Lima: Center for the Study of Democracy and Society (CEDYS), 1993), p. 75. This study was based on sur- veys carried out in poor districts in Lima at the end of 1990. 6. Cuadernos Laborales, several issues (Lima: ADEC-ATC). 7. Jos6 Maria Salcedo, Terremoto: ePor qu6 gan6 Fujimori? (Lima: Editorial Brasa, 1995). 8. Carlos Ferrero Costa, "Representaci6n politica, crisis de los par- tidos y construcci6n de la democracia en el Peri," Socialismo y Participacion, No. 73 (March, 1996), p. 68. 9. Imasen Confidencial (Andlisis y Sondeos de Opinibn), No. 36 (November, 1995). 10. Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCR), Boletin Mensual, November, 1995, and Nota Semanal, No. 18, May 10, 1996. 11. Adolfo Figueroa, Te6filo Altamirano and Denis Sulmont, Exclusion social y desigualdad en el Peru (Lima: International Institute of Labor Studies, 1996).
