When Ecuador's Congress voted to impeach Presi- dent Abdalh Bucaram on the evening of February 6 by declar- ing him "mentally unfit to govern," it was responding to political pres- sures welling up from virtually all sectors of society. After months of sporadic protests against neoliberal austerity measures, a broad spec- trum of social movements had called for a nation-wide 48-hour strike on February 5 and 6 to demand the President's impeachment. As many as three million indigenous activists, organized by the Confed- eration of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), marched in protest of Bucaram, saying he betrayed the people who elected him last May by ignoring his promise to "put the poor first" and by implementing harsh austerity measures. Based on traditional indigenous law-"Do not lie; Do not steal; Do not be lazy"-the pro- testers also condemned the rampant corruption that had become perva- sive under Bucaram's rule. On February 4, indigenous pro- testers had closed the main roads throughout the country in prepara- tion for the strike, and they kept Melina Selverston is director of the Coalition in Support of Amazonian Peoples and Their Environment, a Washington D. C.-based nongovernmental organization. them blocked for the duration of the street protests. Quito was without gasoline. Banks were closed. There was no public transportation. Also participating were public and pri- vate trade unions, the national orga- nization of teachers, women's groups, high school and university students, small business associa- tions and even the Catholic and Anglican churches. Perhaps most remarkable was the support of the Chamber of Commerce, which encouraged its members to close their doors during the 48-hour protest. In addition to pressure from business as well as the popular sec- tors, Congress had received a letter from the country's three past presi- dents-Osvaldo Hurtado, Rodrigo Borja and Le6n Febres-Cordero-- urging that Bucaram be impeached. Complaints from some quarters that Congress' actions were uncon- stitutional because no medical evi- dence was provided to determine Bucaram's true mental state were overlooked given this sweeping mandate. (Some members of Congress wanted to impeach Bucaram on charges of financial misconduct, but that would have required a lengthy legal process.) After the impeachment vote, it became clear that the Constitution had no process for naming a succes- sor, and the ensuing power struggle left the country with three declared presidents for an entire day. Bucaram dismissed the impeach- ment as a conspiracy orchestrated by the oligarchy and tried to rally the military around him by promis- ing a 25% salary increase. In the meantime, Vice President Rosalia Arteaga declared herself Bucaram's natural successor, while Congress named its president, Fabian Alarc6n, as Ecuador's new head of state. (Alarc6n, who has been elected to his post three times with the back- ing of three different parties, seems more committed to power than to any particular ideology.) U.S. media coverage of the events bypassed the months of popular protest against Bucaram's economic policies that led up to his ouster, focusing instead on this elite shuffling for power. The media pitched the story as if it were complaints of corruption from the business sector that were the principal force leading to Congress' decision to rout Bucaram. Elite sectors of society were indeed enraged by Bucaram's cor- ruption and the resulting flight of foreign investment. When he took office last August, Bucaram placed friends, allies and family members in key commerce and customs posi- tions, especially in his native port city of Guayaquil. Importers com- plained they were being charged several illegal taxes, including a Vol XXX, No 6 MAY/JUNE 199711 0 8 0 I o Vol XXX, No 6 MAY/JUNE 1997 11UPDATE / ECUADOR 15% "party tax." The Chamber of Commerce said that the bribes importers were forced to pay to retrieve a shipment were often worth more than the shipment itself. One of Bucaram's body guards, who sometimes collected "party- taxes," says that Bucaram pocketed up to $25,000 a day in this way for his personal use-mostly to buy votes. Yet the routing of Bucaram had as much to do with the demands made by civil society against the imple- mentation of neoliberal austerity measures as it did with the displea- sure of big business over wide- spread corruption. Without the mas- sive and sustained protests demand- ing Bucaram's removal, it is unlikely Congress would have impeached him given the questionable constitu- tionality of its actions. Nor was this the first time that the majority of Ecuadorians rejected free-market oriented economic reforms. A dra- matic indigenous uprising in 1993 forced then-President Sixto Durdn to roll back his plans to privatize the agrarian sector. Similar protests since then have stopped the planned privatization of other state enter- prises such as utility companies, and the social-security system. n what seems to be an emerging pattern in Latin American poli- tics, Bucaram, former mayor of Guayaquil and prominent member of the Arab community of Ecuador's coastal region, got elect- ed by proclaiming his rejection of neoliberalism only to abandon his populist promises in favor of eco- nomic austerity once in office. In presidential elections last May, he beat out leading candidates Jaime Nebot, who reeked of the tradition- al oligarchy, and Freddy Ehlers, a popular TV talk-show host who was endorsed by the country's powerful indigenous movement. Bucaram's populist antics-which included singing on television with scantily clad women-made him seem a refreshing alternative to traditional elite politicians and earned him the nickname, "El loco," "the crazy one." His promise to make popular participation a core part of his gov- ernment, moreover, seemed to chal- lenge Ecuador's entrenched oli- garchy, which was appealing to poor Ecuadorians. Bucaram won the broadest victory in Ecuadorian electoral history, capturing 20 out of 21 provinces. Not long after becoming president in August, 1996, Bucaram's popu- larity began to slip. While his pop- ulist theatrics continued (such as the hero's welcome he gave Lorena Bobbit, the Ecuadorian American who cut off her husband's penis), he quickly ditched his campaign promises and began implementing classical neoliberal measures to re- duce the state's role in the economy. To the delight of international investors, Bucaram hired the former chief economist of Argentine President Carlos Menem, Domingo Cavallo, to assist in developing fis- cal austerity measures. In November he raised gas and utility prices, and he planned to peg the local currency to the dollar, a move that would sta- bilize the currency at the expense of popular buying power. Despite its initial enthusiasm, international business was soon dis- mayed by the blatant corruption that Bucaram seemed to condone. "Unless a dramatic attack is rapidly made on the systematic corruption now afflicting this country," said U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador Leslie Alexander in a highly publicized speech in January, "it will be my duty to officially warn my fellow citizens of the dangers of investing here." This was a dire warning for a country in which about two-thirds of all foreign investment comes from the United States. Given the chaos surrounding Bucaram's ouster, and the tense competition between Arteaga and congressional leader Alarc6n to suc- ceed him, some feared that the mili- tary would be tempted to take con- trol and install its own brand of order. Instead, the military publicly withdrew its support for Bucaram late on February 8 and urged the country's political leaders to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Ironically, it was the military that brokered an agreement, which allowed Arteaga to run the country for a few short days until Congress modified the Constitution so that it could legally choose a new president until popular elections are held in May, 1998. As soon as the constitu- tional changes were made, Congress named Alarc6n president for the sec- ond time. The agreement also called for a scaling down of economic aus- terity measures, including a reduc- tion of utility prices to their previous levels. t soon became clear, however, that this latter concession was less a commitment to rethinking the viability of neoliberal policies in Ecuador than an attempt to assuage angry protesters. Indeed, since Alarc6n took over, he has focused his efforts on proving Bucaram's corruption, while the questioning of neoliberal policies that prompted the popular mobilizations against him has barely been addressed. Civil society remains shut out of ongoing negotiations over econom- ic reform. And while Alarc6n ordered cuts in the price of gasoline and utilities, he is continuing with other austerity measures. The election of Alarc6n, it seems, was a successful response to elite concerns over finding a status-quo leader who would support the structural-adjustment policies re- quired by the international finance system. The people of Ecuador won the impeachment of Bucaram, but for many, the struggle to defend their rights in the face of neoliberal economic reform has just begun.
