That morning, in an act of military precision, ten Zapatista sympathizers drove into San Andras, jumped onto the kiosk where the two polling stations were located, burnt them and quickly left. On July 6, the day of its mid- term elections, Mexico un- derwent a seismic political change as the long-ruling Insti- tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its congressional majority as well as the governance of Mexico City for the first time in nearly seven decades. In the state of Chiapas, however, low-intensity war, intimidation and severe local conflict continued as usual. More than 550 voting booths along with the accompanying ballots were ei- ther not installed or were systemati- cally removed and destroyed in a coordinated protest movement call- ing attention to the lack of secure conditions for holding elections. "The Change" did not occur uni- formly throughout Mexico. The state of Chiapas remains akin to a separate country. While people in Mexico City con- tinued their celebrations into the fol- Lynn Stephen is Professor of Anthropology at Northeastern University During the summer of 1997, supported by grant #6168 of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, she observed the elections in Chiapas and the tense con- ditions surrounding them. Her latest book is Women and Social Movements in Latin America: Power From Below (Texas, 1997). lowing day, in Chiapas I witnessed more than 300 angry-looking mem- bers of the PRI, some holding large sticks, blocking the roads in the town of San Andr6s Larrainzar. The day before this blockade-the morning of election day-in an act of military precision, ten Zapatista sympathizers drove into San Andr6s, jumped onto the kiosk where the two polling stations were located, burnt them and quickly left. It all took place in three minutes. The day after, tensions were high. The townspeople talked about everyone being so heavily armed; no one was sure what would happen next. San Andr6s, the government seat of an indigenous Tzotzil Maya county, and a core region of support for the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), had been the site of the second round of peace negotia- tions between the EZLN and the Mexican government. The! Zapa- tistas broke off the negotiations in August, 1996 due to the absence of secure conditions for the talks. The EZLN believes those same insecure conditions now make fair elections impossible. Like many towns in eastern Chiapas, San Andr6s is distin- guished by having two govern- ments-one governing in rebellion, supported by the majority of the community (in this case under the banner of the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)) and the other under the banner of the PRI. These two governments have survived an uneasy co-exis- tence since 1995. But the night be- fore the elections, an angry mob of PRI sympathizers had ransacked the municipal building, broken a dozen windows, fired into an adjacent building, bashed the door of a women's craft cooperative and en- circled the community for 24 hours. Now the streets were abandoned, people were hiding in their houses, and the main square was blocked off. Outside the municipal building, some 20 supporters of the PRD gov- ernment-in-rebellion were half asleep on benches, having stayed awake the entire night to guard against further onslaughts from the PRI mob. Another 20 from the same group were on watch behind the building occupied by the govern- ment-in-rebellion. This scene is a mild version of what daily life is like in communities within the "conflict zone," a term NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10UPDATE / MEXICO used to refer to areas of Chiapas in which there are civilian supporters of the EZLN. Since the Zapatista uprising in 1994, more than a third of the state has been heavily milita- rized. The army has completed a major road project connecting pre- viously inaccessible communities to main population centers and facili- tating troop movement, and has built permanent installations in dozens of communities. All this has significantly altered the local econ- omy and culture. There are now between 25,000 and 30,000 soldiers permanently in- stalled in the regions of the state that are Zapatista strongholds. The army has taken over the state police forces of Chiapas, and is further augmented by the presence of thousands of fed- eral "public security" and judicial police. There are 17 major military barracks and 44 semi-permanent military installations in the conflict zone-and a soldier for every three or four inhabitants in many commu- nities. In addition, the Coordinating Group of Nongovernmental Organ- izations for Peace (CONPAZ) has identified seven different paramili- tary groups operating in the area. In the two months prior to the elections, dozens of people were killed and wounded in local confrontations be- tween the PRI and the PRD, and as victims of paramilitary and federal police forces. Prior to the elections in Chiapas, a wide range of independent organiza- tions, as well as PRD officials, re- peatedly tried to call attention to the insecurity and violent conditions in many parts of the state. As late as July 4th, the PRD protested the lack of proper conditions to the indepen- dent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), but to no avail. IFE declared that conditions were good enough to install all but 18 to 23 voting booths in the state and that the elections would be held as scheduled. With an electoral climate that re- sembles a low-intensity war, many communities announced their inten- tions not to vote and to prevent the installation of voting booths in places where the vote could not be guaranteed to be "free and secret." Since the warnings of unsafe condi- tions went unheeded, a coordinated strategy was carried out-primarily by civilian sympathizers of the EZLN-to remove the polling sta- tions so that the elections results would have to be annulled. Voters abstained in many places, and more than 550 voting booths and accom- panying voting materials were re- moved in an orderly fashion. Contrary to press reports, ob- servers who work with the Civic Alliance, a respected NGO, reported that many of these actions were car- ried out by unarmed individuals. (Ironically, the paramilitary group "Peace and Justice" which operates in the north of Chiapas carried out similar actions, but used arms to in- timidate voters.) In at least one vot- ing district that includes the munici- palities of Ocosingo, Altamirano, and Las Margaritas, the strategy of EZLN sympathizers appeared to be successful. More than 30% of the polling stations were either de- stroyed or not installed. Mexican law requires that if 20% of the polling stations are not properly functioning throughout the voting period, the elections in that district must be annulled. Annulments are also possible in three other of Chiapas' 12 electoral districts. The clearest solution to the con- flict in Chiapas and other states with significant indigenous popula- tions-including Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Hidalgo-is the implementa- tion of the Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture signed by the Mexican government in February of 1996. The Accords laid the ground- work for significant changes in the areas of indigenous rights, political participation, and cultural auton- omy. Above all, they recognized the existence of political subjects called There are now between 25,000 and 30,000 soldiers permanently installed in the regions of the state that are Zapatista strongholds. The army is augmented by thousands of federal "public security" and judicial police. "pueblos indios" (Indian peoples) and gave conceptual validation to the notions of "self-determination" and "autonomy" by using these ex- plicit terms in the signed accords. The PRD, with its new political power, can act as a political bridge in this critical political moment to bring the continued violence, mili- tarization, and poverty of these southern states to national political attention. The party can also work to jump-start the stalled peace talks in San Andr6s. The political space won by the PRD this past July is in part due to the Zapatista rebellion and the national political mobiliza- tion it engendered among Mexico's civilian population. If the party ig- nores Chiapas, the situation in the state will further deteriorate. The desperation felt in Chiapas has nowhere to go. Another armed up- rising would clearly spell suicide for the EZLN and its base commu- nities, but with no other options in sight, it is being seriously consid- ered by some. Now is the moment for the PRD to extend a hand to the south of Mexico and guarantee that the transition to democracy reaches all Mexicans-not just those in the center.
