Looking beyond crude electoral calculations, a number of Clinton's foreign-policy specialists have pushed internally for a moderate relaxation of sanctions against Cuba, and a shift toward a pol- icy of more positive engagement. Since mid-1993, a behind-the-scenes debate has taken place over lift- ing specific parts of the embargo, implementing what U.S. officials call a "calibrated response" to changes in Cuba, and expanding the "track 11" pro- visions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) which allow for increased communications and people-to- people contacts between the two countries. that will hasten the evolution of democratic struc- tures inside Cuba while avoiding an outbreak of violence. Their premise for changing policy is based on several key realities: - The 35-year-old trade embargo is bereft of any national-security rationale. Supposedly initiated in response to Cuba's support for revolutionary move- ments in Latin America and the Soviet Union's mili- tary ties to Cuba, the embargo had lost these justi- fications by 1992. - A policy of pressure and isolation is unlikely to force democratic change in Cuba. Far more promis- ing is the model of Eastern Europe where full expo- sure to Western trade, aid and culture contributed to the collapse of Communism. - The United States, rather than Cuba, is diplo- matically isolated within the international commu- nity on the embargo issue. In November, 1994, the United Nations General Assembly voted 101-2 against the U.S. embargo. The only country that voted with Washington was Israel, which, in fact, has investments in the Cuban citrus industry and is helping Cuba expand markets in Europe. - If the "wreak havoc" strategy, as Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) describes the goal of the CDA, did result in upheaval inside Cuba, the results would be disastrous for U.S. national interests. A March 1995 Pentagon study, the first to incorporate the analysis of Russian specialists on Cuba, warned that "large- scale voleolnce in Cuba...would generate intense pressure for U.S. intervention." For these reasons, among others, the Clinton Administration conducted its first internal review of Cuba policy in the summer of 1993. Despite a promise made by Secretary of Si State Warren Christopher to Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) that, at a minimum, mid-1 restrictions on the ability of U.S. citizens to behind travel to Cuba would be lifted, the State Department sent only one recommenda- scenes tion to the National Security Council has o (NSC)--that the United States allow news bureaus to open in both Havana and over a r Washington. This recommendation was shelved, not because the NSC opposed it, rela Administration insiders say, but because it of sa was not substantive enough to warrant the political debate it would provoke. again In the fall of 1994, following a September statement by the Secretary of Statethat U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect "cal- ibrated responses" to changes in Cuba, an inter- agency task force drafted guidelines spelling out the reciprocal steps Washington would be willing to take if Castro's government acted to improve human rights conditions, legalize political parties, and move toward free elections. After the Republicans took over the House and Senate in mid-term elections last November, this policy pronouncement was shelved as politically unworkable. Indeed, the Republican sweep clearly weakened the hand of officials such as Sanford Berger, deputy director of the NSC, and Morton Halperin, the NSC's special advisor to the President for democratic initia- tives, who until recently was responsible for coordi- nating Cuba policy. Before joining the Admin- istration, Halperin had been Washington director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and had helped draft the "Free Trade in Ideas Act" that would have lifted the embargo on travel to Cuba. "The foreign policy objectives at stake in the context of an embar- go must be balanced against the right to travel, a fundamental aspect of individual liberty," Halperin testified before Congress in 1990. "It is anomalous to stifle individual freedoms at home in the name of promoting democracy abroad." Halperin continued to press for at least easing the ban on U.S. travel to Cuba. As recently as this March, President Clinton had an NSC proposal on his desk recommending softening the travel nce restrictions as well as publicly identifying the steps Castro's government would 993, a have to take to qualify for a calibrated id-the- U.S. response. Eventually, Halperin and others at the NSC lost the bureaucratic debate struggle to State Department, Treasury occurred and White House officials who wanted to curry favor with the Republican lead- noderate ership in Congress and Mas Canosa's political forces in Florida. "Mas Canosa (ation has his hooks in a number of strategical- nctions ly placed White House officials," a high- ranking national security policymaker t Cuba. conceded privately in April. Within the State Department, the point- men for the hardline position were deputy assistant secretary Michael Skol, and Cuba desk officer Dennis Hays. During internal reviews, they fought efforts to soften Washington's approach to Havana. They lobbied allies in Congress to shoot down White House trial balloons portending even small changes in the direction of policy. During hear- ings of the House Western Hemispheric Affairs Subcommittee in January, Skol launched into an unauthorized diatribe against Cuba, offending Cuban officials and undermining the good will that had developed between Washington and Havana during the September 1994 immigration talks. In April, only an NSC directive kept him from testifying before the same subcommittee in favor of the Helms- Burton bill. Their obdurate views, ironically, cost both officials their positions. After insulting a visiting British dele- gation on the United Kingdom's pro-trade posture toward Cuba, Skol was rebuked by his superiors. Shortly thereafter, he announced that he would resign from the State Department in October. Hays resigned his position as head of the Office of Cuban Affairs in protest against the May 2 accord. He has since been appointed Mexico desk officer-a career promotion. As of late July, the policy proposals for easing the travel ban and permitting the establishment of news bureaus were once again under consideration within the Administration.
