GROWING EVIDENCE OF SAMPER'S LINKS WITH CALI CARTEL BOGOTA, OCTOBER 1, 1995 Government raids in August that led to the arrests of top leaders of the Cali cartel yielded further evidence linking contri- butions from the cartel to Ernesto Samper's presidential campaign. While Samper point- ed to the arrests as proof of his will to fight the country's drug lords, documents found in the raid revealed that his campaign treasurer Santiago Medina had accepted a $50,000 check from a company known to be a front for the Cali cartel. Medina was ar- rested on July 26, and has of- fered evidence in exchange for reduced charges. Medina testified that under or- ders of Samper's campaign man- ager and later defense minister Fernando Botero Zea, he solicit- ed $2.4 million from cartel rep- resentatives and assured them that Samper would maintain the 1993 penal code that granted large sentence reductions to traf- fickers who surrendered. The Cali cartel, according to Medina's testimony, gave $1.2 million for the first round of elections in May and $4.9 mil- lion for the June run-off. Botero resigned on August 2 in light of these charges, and he was for- mally arrested two weeks later on charges of illegal enrichment and falsification of documents. A third Samper associate, Juan Manuel Avella, who served as administrative director of the Samper campaign and later headed the government's bank- privatization committee, was ar- rested on September 14 for his involvement in the affair. The Accusations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies is in- vestigating the president's in- volvement in the scandal. Mauricio Montejo, who de- signed most of Samper's cam- paign advertising, testified be- fore the commission that he was paid $375,000 in cash by the "public relations head" of the Cali cartel, journalist Alberto Giraldo. Montejo denies know- ing that Giraldo, now in jail, was connected to the cartel. In an appearance before the Accusations Committee on September 26, the president staunchly denied receiving money directly from the cartel. He insisted that if any drug money found its way into his campaign treasury, it was with- out his knowledge. The follow- ing day, Samper's lawyer, Antonio Cancino, was wounded in an assassination attempt. Some officials have accused un- defined "external forces"-in complicity with the attorney general's office-of trying to destabilize the government. -NotiSur and IPS MILITARY OFFICERS TO STAND TRIAL IN HONDURAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES TEGUCIGALPA, SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 A trial against 10 high-ranking military officers accused of human rights violations during the 1980s is about to get under- way in Honduras. The officers, including seven colonels, were part of the notorious Battalion 316, a unit financed and trained by the CIA in the early 1980s. The military officers were in- dicted in July on charges of at- tempted murder and illegal de- tention of six university students in 1982. The students, who were released after intense lobbying efforts by human rights groups, are key witnesses in the case. The last barrier to the trial was brushed aside in mid-September when the Supreme Court reject- ed an appeal presented by mili- tary defense lawyers charging ir- regularities in the process. The indictment is part of a broader government effort to end official corruption and impunity. Since the charges were made public, the military has conducted occasional tank maneuvers in the streets of the capital, prompting speculation that the military might resist submission to a civil- ian court. Judge Roy Medina, who is presiding over the case, has received anonymous death threats. On September 28, unidentified men asked for Judge Medina's whereabouts in the courthouse, and randomly shot at the court building. Such intimidation tactics fol- low thinly veiled threats by armed forces chief Gen. Luis Alonso Discua against the judi- cial system. "The armed forces will take action if there is any problem of partiality in the courts," said Discua shortly after the charges were publicized. He warned prosecutors against using the military as "scapegoats" for the abuses of the past, and he in- sinuated that Medina was part of a left-wing conspiracy seeking revenge against the military. Battalion 316 grew out of the collaboration between the Reagan Administration and the Honduran military to support wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The U.S. government possesses valuable classifed in- formation about Battalion 316's crimes, which Clinton Administration officials promise to declassify for use in the up- coming trial. The charges brought against the military officers have pro- voked intense debate about the broader issue of who bears re- VOL XXIX, No 3 Nov/DEc 1995 1 VOL XXIX, NO 3 NOV/DEC 1995 1NEWSBRIEFS ponsibility for the human rights violations, including 184 disap- pearances, committed during the 1980s. The military argues that the civilian regime is ultimately responsible. "We acted only in fulfilling our duty, following the orders of our superiors," said re- tired Gen. Daniel Bali, military chief in the 1980s. Former mem- bers of the civilian regime, how- ever, maintain that they were powerless to control the military during that decade. Others argue that the United States bears ultimately responsi- bility. Former president of Congress Carlos Montoya ar- gues that Honduran sovereignty all but disappeared under the weight of U.S. Cold War policy in Central America. "The real power in Honduras during that time," he said, "was the military, led by Gen. [Gustavo] Alvarez Martinez and the security agents of the United States, particularly the CIA." -NotiSur and IPS DEATH SQUADS REEMERGE IN EL SALVADOR SAN SALVADOR, AUGUST 20, 1995 T hey kill their victims at night with a single shot to the head. After an execution, they inform the press and local au- thorities. Their emblem, which appears on their announcements and threats, is the Salvadoran national shield and a mask that forms the words "Black Shadow." Four years into the postwar era, death-squad activity is on the rise again in El Salvador. This time around, however, the principal victims are not leftist activists, but sus- pected criminals and other "non- desirables." Fueled by the large number of firearms in civilian hands, the high rate of unemployment among ex-combatants, and the habits of violence left over from the country's 12-year civil war, crime has reached epidemic pro- portions. The justice system is overwhelmed, and-despite re- forms implemented in the peace process-generally considered inefficient and corrupt. The gov- ernment's failure to control crime is chipping away at its credibility and prompting death squads to reclaim their place in El Salvador as vigilante "crime- control" forces. In the name of "social cleansing," these groups execute petty thieves, small-time drug-traffickers, beggars, prosti- tutes, street children, and young gang members. The operatives are suspected of being former members of the military and old National Police. Some may also be carry-overs from the old death squads. Others fear that members of the newly formed National Civilian Police (PNC) may participate as collaborators or even organizers. Some analysts speculate that there may be links between or- ganized crime and the death squads. Since the signing of the peace accords in January, 1992, three different phases of death-squad activity can be identified, al- though the level of violence is not comparable to the death- squad terror of the 1980s. In the first phase, in mid-1992, death-squad activity appeared to be the violent last gasp of the ultra-conservative sector of the country. The death squads threatened human rights ac- tivists, members of the commis- sions investigating human rights abuses, and union leaders and members of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) emerg- ing from clandestine life. Warnings from the United Nations and threats of million-dollar aid cut-offs seemed to quell the vio- lence, raising suspicions of ties between the death squads and the government. The second phase coincided with the campaign leading up to the March 1994 general elections. Most of the victims were FMLN political candidates who were par- ticipating in elections for the first time. The violence seemed to sub- side after the conservative National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party swept the elections. The third and current phase began this year. But in contrast with the earlier two phases, the death squads today are principally targeting alleged criminals and those suspected of corruption. From January to July of 1995, three groups-the Black Shadow, the Temporary Executive Anti- Crime Commando, and Frenadia 187-have been accused of exe- cuting more than 30 people. At first, the government did not seem to take the death squads se- riously. Public Security Minister Hugo Barrera called them "a tasteless joke" and suggested that they were made up of "overgrown gang members." National Civilian Police Director Rodrigo Avila complained that the media were "making the groups out to be more of a threat than they actual- ly are." The Black Shadow catapulted to international attention when it threatened six Salvadoran judges in May. In an announcement sent to the media, the group accused the judges of letting off drug traf- fickers in exchange for bribes. The threats against the judges fi- nally prompted the government and the PNC to launch an in-depth investigation. In June, the PNC captured 14 suspected members of the Black Shadow. The preliminary investi- gation revealed that three of the suspected death-squad members were PNC agents, placing in doubt whether the purge of the old police force was in fact a success. The government's response to the general crime wave echoes El Sal- vador's authoritarian past. In March, President Armando Calder6n Sol initiated the "Guardian Plan" send- ing 5,000 soldiers to support the police and to patrol the highways and rural byways. At the end of July, the government announced that it would organize neighbor- hood-watch patrols, a measure that also brought flashbacks of the civil-defense patrols of the 1980s. Many Salvadorans, fed up with crime, are ready to concede the administration of justice to the death squads. In a recent call-in show on YSU, a popular San Sal- vador radio station, the majority of the callers supported the squads and their mission to restore "order." "If the police cannot deal with the criminals, then let the Black Shadow finish them off," said one San Miguel woman, quoted in the Salvadoran newspaper El Mundo. This popular support translates into dangerous legitimacy for the death squads. "When people be- lieve their demand for justice is not being met by the state, they view these groups sympathetical- ly," says Human Rights Commis- sioner Victoria Marina de Aviles. "However, these killings are creat- ing a climate of terror like we ex- perienced in the past, which was one of the principal causes of the war." -Terry Tracy WIDE SUPPORT FOR EZLN PROPOSALS IN PLEBISCITE MEXICO CITY, AUGUST 28, 1995 M ore than a million Mexicans overwhelmingly supported the Zapatista demands for justice and democracy in a referendum or- ganized by the guerrilla movement from Chiapas. Just under 98% of voters agreed that the principal demands of Mexicans are housing, work, food, independence, democracy and jus- tice. The proposal to unite "the different democratizing forces" in "a wide opposition front" received the backing of 92.2% of voters, while the achievement of "a polit- ical reform that guarantees democ- racy" had the backing of 95% of voters. Fifty-seven percent of vot- ers responded affirmatively to the question whether the EZLN "should turn itself into a new in- dependent political force, without uniting with other political par- ties." Ninety percent demanded that women be guaranteed pres- ence in significant posts. The majority of voters-who represent only 3% of Mexico's 55 million people-were concentrated in the capital and in the southern states of the country. The state of Chiapas recorded the greatest voter turn-out. More than 70,000 peo- ple-among them indigenous peo- ple, priests, businesspeople, and students as well as politicians and ranchers opposed to the EZLN-- cast ballots. Subcomandante Marco said the consultation's principal objective was to promote the coming to- gether of people who think that Mexico's political and economic system needs to be changed. The plebiscite, unprecedented in the history of armed movements in Latin America, was an autonomous social expression that demonstrated interest in democracy, said Sergio Aguayo, a spokesperson for the Civic Alliance, a Mexican NGO which organized the voting process. The international community was also invited to participate in the plebiscite. More than 55,000 people from 28 countries, many over the Internet, registered their opinions. -IPS A PENIS NAMED BRAULIO RIo DE JANEIRO, SEPTEMBER 25, 1995 T he Brazilian Minister of Health Adib Jatene suspended a con- troversial AIDS-prevention cam- paign which dubbed the penis "Braulio" after men named Braulio throughout the country called the minister's office and radio stations in protest. In the television ads, an actor holds a heart-to-heart chat with his sexual organ, recommending that it use condoms, and showing it- with a candle-how to do so. The boldness of the campaign and the reaction of the "Braulios" sparked a heated national debate. "They castrated my name," complained journalist Braulio de Souza in the Sdo Paulo daily Correio do Povo. In a press con- ference with Health Minister Adib Jatene, he gave the minister a penis-shaped toy with the name "Jatene" written in red ink. The journalist has decided to legally change his name to Claudio Lira. Braulio Monte Junior, a Sdo Paulo lawyer, filed a class-action lawsuit against the government for moral and material damages on behalf of a group of men named Braulio. The health minister indicated that while the ads would no longer use a proper name for the penis, the bold "content" of the campaign would be maintained despite criticism from the Catholic Church. Lair Guerra de Macedo, coordinator of the Program of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, said the blunt language was necessary to reach poor young men. Eighty percent of the 71,000 cases of AIDS registered today in Brazil are men between the ages of 19 and 35. -IPS Sources InterPress Service (IPS) is an international news service based in Italy. Its dispatches can be read on-line in the Peacenet conferences: ips.espanol and ips.english. NotiSur is available as a closed Peacenet conference: carnet.Iadb. For subscription information: Latin American Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131; (800) 472-0888. Terry Tracy works at Inforpress in Guatemala City, where she is the editor of Central America Report.
