The killing of ex-Sandinista soldiers in Esteli, the hostage crisis, the often Machiavellian role played by Humberto Ortega, and the ever deepening tensions within the Sandinista party itself-these incidents or critical issues have placed Nicaragua on the brink of what appears to be an impending collapse. A decade and a half after the ouster of the Somoza re- gime, Nicaragua is a coun- try torn by political and social strife. The killing of ex-Sandinista soldiers in Esteli by Sandinista army units, the seizure of hostages by former Con- tras and then the counter seizure of UNO politicians by Sandinista adherents, the increasingly contradic- torv and often Machiavel- -- Aj . . .. . . . . . . . . lian role played by San- dinista army chief Hum- berto Ortega, and the ever deepening tensions and d within the Sandinista party i all these incidents or critical have placed Nicaragua on th of what appears to be an in ing collapse. Media coverage of what pening in Nicaragua tends to the Sandinistas for the prese array, ignoring the fact th starting point for underst Nicaragua's current chaos election of Violeta Cham( February, 1990. Even aft elections, the Sandinistas- Roger Burbach is the director of t ter for the Study of the Americas. a NACLA staff member from 1 1980, and is currently a men NACLA's editorial board. A Contra soldier guards kidnapped Sandinistas in August, 1993. ebates won over 40% of the popular tself- vote-remained the most consoli- issues dated and stabilizing political force e brink in the country. President Chamorro npend- and her son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo, who became the de facto is hap- prime minister, recognized this blame reality when they agreed to accept nt dis- many of the changes that had hat the occurred during the decade of San- anding dinista rule. These changes includ- is the ed the agrarian-reform program, rro in the Constitution and government er the infrastructure created under the -who Sandinistas, and perhaps most crit- ically, the existence and institu- he Cen- tionalization of the Sandinista He was 1973 to army. Fiber of But this modus vivendi was chal- lenged almost immediately by the Contras, their backers in Miami, important fac- tions of the UNO coali- tion, and the U.S. gov- ernment, all of whom were intent upon rolling back the revolution. The existence of the Sandin- ista army in particular was anathema to the foes of the revolution, particularly the CIA and the Pentagon, which were determined to dis- mantle and destroy an Quilali in army that had inflicted heavy damage on the surrogate forces they had supported for the better part of the 1980s. This is why the Bush presidency, and now even the Clin- ton Administration, have been determined to remove all Sandin- ista influence within the army and turn it into a force that will not dare to challenge U.S. interests or dictates. While refusing to dismantle the Sandinista army and depose Hum- berto Ortega as head of the army, the Chamorro government did decide to follow Washington's recipe on the economic front by implementing neoliberal policies. These policies hit hard at the pub- lic sector, threw many people out of work, and caused a depression in agricultural production, the NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 4UPDATE / NICARAGUA mainstay of the Nicaraguan econo- my. In most Latin American coun- tries, similar neoliberal measures were implemented during the course of the 1980s. By 1990 the state sector throughout much of the continent had been dramatically curtailed with only limited public resistance. But Nicaragua proved to be a different story. The revolution had awakened a popular and class con- sciousness that adamantly resisted the neoliberal measures. By July, 1990, Managua was paralyzed by massive strikes and demonstrations in the streets. On the surface, this general strike-with its takeover of roads and highways, and the erec- tion of brick barricades-appeared similar to the popular insurrection that led to the toppling of the Somoza regime. But unlike the late 1970s, the protesters did not have a revolu- tionary program or banner around which the population could coa- lesce and take political power. The Sandinista party leadership had not called for the general strike, and in fact many leaders believed that a period of social peace, and even austerity, was necessary for the country to move forward. The San- dinistas were divided between the leadership which at times moved in tandem with the Chamorro govern- ment in quest of stability, and the popular sectors which were willing to take to the streets and even take up arms against the government. The dichotomy continues to this day to be a major fault line tearing apart the Sandinista party and the country as a whole. To a certain extent, this is a con- flict between the haves and the have-nots within the Sandinista movement. Many Sandinista lead- ers, in the infamous pinataa," took over houses, lands and even gov- ernment buildings and funds dur- ing their final days in office, putting themselves in a much bet- ter position to weather the neolib- eral policies of the Chamorro gov- ernment. The resources they appro- priated were actually quite limited compared to what has been swin- dled by other governments in Latin America, like those of Carlos Andr6s P6rez in Venezuela, Fer- nando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and even Violeta Chamorro, where, according to many in Nicaragua, corruption-though much less publicized-has reached proportions akin to the Somoza era. But by its actions, the Sandin- ista leadership severely damaged the moral and political authority that it once held. It had, after all, come into office as a "party of a new type," a party that was sup- posed to be immune to the tradi- tional forms of corruption. he Sandinista army and police--insurers of peace and stability in the coun- try-were supposed to be above the political fray and infighting. Initially there was a clear consen- sus within the Sandinista party that the army had to remain intact and under de facto Sandinista control. But Humberto Ortega, the army and the police soon found them- selves at the epicenter of the politi- cal and social earthquake tearing apart Nicaragua. During the strike and street uprisings of July, 1990, the army and the police stood largely on the sidelines, unwilling to repress the demonstrators and workers who paralyzed traffic and production. But as time went on, Humberto Ortega was driven to use the military to clamp down on the popular sectors that had once been his allies. The Chamorro government, backed by Washing- ton, ordered Ortega to take over worker-occupied farms and facto- ries, to repress street demonstra- tors, and to fight against dissident elements in the countryside who sometimes took up arms to protest the government's grueling eco- nomic policies. Compelled to support govern- ment policies, Ortega and the army became divorced from the popular sectors and the base of the Sandin- ista movement, the very forces that had given the army its legitimacy and strength in the long war against the Contras and the United States. Ortega himself, recognizing that he was objectively sustaining some of the very political forces he had once fought against, began to initiate clandestine operations designed to keep the far right in check. Under the Sandinista govern- ment, the Interior Ministry was in charge of special operations and units designed to deal with the armed opposition and the old Somocistas. For instance, the assassination of Somoza in 1980 in Paraguay was orchestrated out of the Interior Ministry with the assis- tance of internationalist guerrilla units that had collaborated with the Sandinistas during the final stages of the war against the Somoza regime. With the victory of Violeta Chamorro, Sandinista control of the Interior Ministry abruptly ended, and the army became the only institution with the capacity to deal with opponents of the revolu- tion. There is little doubt that a Sandinista special unit assassinated Enrique Bermlidez, an old Somocista and the former military head of the Contras, in February, 1991. As one high-ranking civilian member of the Sandinista Front who was on the scene at the time of the assassination noted, "this was a professional operation. Only the army or elements linked to it could have done it so cleanly." And it is also likely-although no hard evidence exists-that Humberto Ortega and the head of military intelligence, Lenin Cerna, orchestrated the formation of the Ejdrcito Punitivo de la Izquierda (the Punitive Army of the Left), which launched its activities in Vol XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 5UPDATE / NICARAGUA November, 1992 with the assassi- nation of Arges Sigueira, head of the Association of Confiscated Property Owners, an organization bent on reclaiming for the "Miami boys" the lands and properties that had been expropriated under the Sandinistas. Led by Frank Ibarra, who may have been an active- duty officer at the time of the assassination, though the Army denies it, this small armed group carried out a few subsequent actions of limited importance, and is now inactive. Humberto Ortega's dual level of operating, instead of winning him allies and securing his hold over the military, actually turned all sides against him. The accidental slaying of 16-year- old Jean-Paul Genie in 1990 by over-anxious bodyguards of Ortega and the subsequent attempts to cover up the killing emboldened many of Ortega's opponents. By late 1992, even leaders of the Sandinista move- ment were calling for him to step down, arguing that he had become a solitary figure who followed his own designs, bent Fo only on amassing personal ta fr( power. The tarnished image of the San- dinista army also made it possible for foes of the military to raise questions about clandestine opera- tions carried out during the years of Sandinista rule. One of the more mysterious incidents of the Sandin- ista period that has been reopened to discussion is the La Penca bombing of 1984. The target of the bombing was Ed6n Pastora, one of the more popular leaders of the Contras at that time. He escaped but eight people died, including three journalists. Because of Pasto- ra's more moderate views and his maverick style of operating, many independent investigators-includ- ing some present at La Penca-- concluded that more right-wing sectors of the Contras in collusion with the CIA were responsible for the assassination attempt. Now, however, new information has surfaced indicating that the Sandinistas had a role in the bomb- ing. While some make the more extreme claim that this was solely a Sandinista operation, others like rmer Sandinista and Contra leader Eden Paste Iks with reporters about the injuries he sustain om the bombing at La Penca in 1984. Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan suggest that it may have been a Sandinista operation in which the CIA also had a hand. The most likely interpretation is that the bombing was carried out by a rogue international unit with ties to the Interior Ministry. The National Directorate of the Sandinistas appears to have had no direct involvement; as Honey and Avir- gan acknowledge, several months before the La Penca operation, the directorate even decided not to act against Pastora because the divi- sions he fomented within the Con- tras worked to the Sandinistas' advantage. An Interior Ministry official at the time reports that TomBs Borge, a member of the directorate and the head of the ministry, was caught off-guard by the assassination attempt. Accord- ing to this official, Borge launched an internal investigation of the affair and actually fired or dis- placed some of those associated with the bombing. Regardless of who was responsi- ble for La Penca, it has to be borne in mind that the 1980s was a convoluted time of war and conflict. Above all it cannot be forgotten that the real and consistent terrorists were the Contras and the CIA. The San- dinistas faced military foes who used the most brutal and atro- cious practices-torturing and killing teachers, agricultural technicians and peasants, as well as destroying civilian eco- nomic targets like port facilities, food-storage depots and bridges, which made people's daily exis- tence and survival difficult or impossible. But today, given the end of the war and the damaged reputation of the Sandinista leadership-and the army in particular-it is relatively easy for the international press and 'ra sectors of the U.S. government 2d to blame everything on the San- dinistas while completely ignor- ing the U.S.-backed campaign of murder and terror. The explosion of an FMLN arms cache in Managua in May is anoth- er event that has to be understood in the context of the extended con- flict throughout Central America. There is no doubt that the Sandin- istas overtly and covertly assisted many of the guerrilla movements in Central America, particularly the FMLN which was fighting against a murderous regime that was fully backed and funded by the United States. With the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elec- tions, many of these support opera- tions were dismantled. Others con- tinued, including some limited logistical backing and political support. Certainly sectors of the 6 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6UPDATE / NICARAGUA Sandinista leadership-including Humberto Ortega and Tomis Borge-knew of the arms cache that blew up in Managua. Howev- er, in light of the assassination of two high-ranking FMLN officials in October and the very tenuous peace process in El Salvador, the Sandinistas should certainly not be faulted for looking the other way or even assisting the FMLN. Indeed such collaboration is in the long-term interest of the survival of the Left in a region where right- wing forces are still very deadly and capable of carrying out mur- derous activities and campaigns. The uncovering of the arms cache has been used as the "smok- ing gun" by the press and U.S. government officials to heap all kinds of accusations on the Sandin- istas. One of the more insidious claims is that the Sandinistas were somehow involved in the New York bombing of the World Trade Center after the discovery of five fake Nicaraguan passports in con- nection with the investigation into the bombing. Charges that Sandin- ista leaders were involved in preparing documents for those who undertook the New York bombing are totally baseless. Indeed an FBI informant has admitted that the passports came from a ring in the U.S. Embassy in Managua. mong the Sandinistas, it was not these charges but the rebellion in Estelf in July that tore at the heart and soul of the Sandinista movement. When Victor Manuel Gallegos, a popular retired officer of the Sandinista army, led 150 ex-Sandinista sol- diers into Esteli to protest the poli- cies of the Chamorro government and to demand land for his sol- diers, he thought that the govern- ment and the army would negotiate with him, just as they had done with uprisings of a similar nature that have taken place all over Nicaragua since 1990. But the takeover of Esteli occurred at a moment when Ortega was under increasing political attack by the right wing and the United States. When Chamorro and Lacayo told him to retake the city, he applied the maximum force in order to demonstrate his loyalty to the government. The result was over 40 dead, mainly ex-Sandinista soldiers who supported Gallegos. Few revolutions have been neat or of short duration. Once new social and political forces are unleashed at the base, it is diffi- cult to contain them. For Sandinistas this slaughter was shocking. It was simply incompre- hensible that Sandinista soldiers, who had once fought together against the Contras, were now killing each other. This incident has led to much soul-searching within the Sandin- ista party. For the first time, there is now serious discussion about reno- vating the party leadership. Hum- berto Ortega and his brother Daniel appear to be increasingly at odds over where the Sandinista move- ment should go. It was in fact Dan- iel who may have helped encourage the takeover of Esteli when a cou- ple of days earlier he had suggested in a public speech that confronta- tional grassroots actions against the regressive social and economic policies of the Chamorro govern- ment were legitimate. There is some discussion in Managua whether this split between the Orte- ga brothers is real or simply being staged for popular consumption. But it makes little difference which view one takes. The fact is that Daniel is responding to a real rebel- lion at the base of the Sandinista party which is fed up with Sandin- ista leaders who collaborate with the Chamorro government. It is clearly too early to tell whether or not a new form of democratization will take hold in Nicaragua. But even if the process of social upheaval continues, it is important to remember that ever since the era of modern social rev- olutions began with the taking of the Bastille in France in 1789, few revolutions have been neat or of short duration. Once new social and political forces are unleashed at the base, it is difficult to contain them and find a new equilibrium. The Cuban revolution, with its rel- atively short guerrilla movement and the quick consolidation of the revolutionary party in power, is the exception rather than the rule. And now that the concept of the van- guard party has largely collapsed, revolutions will inevitably be more complex and difficult. It is often forgotten that the other great twen- tieth-century revolution in Latin America, that of Mexico, began in 1910, and did not really consoli- date until the government of Ldzaro Cirdenas in 1934. The rev- olutionary bloodshed, turmoil and destruction in Mexico were much more severe and prolonged than they have been in Nicaragua. We also need to remember that Nicaragua is still very much a part of Central America, where similar social processes have been set in motion. El Salvador and Guatemala may at present be less chaotic, but they are clearly in the midst of social transformations that will very likely lead to tumultuous and conflictive moments as they grope for a new social order that is more responsive to popular demands and interests.
