POLITICIANS SPECIALIZE IN TRANSFORM- ing complex world problems into symbolic bogey- men to scare up the vote. In this year's presidential campaign, no demon has proven more successful than Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander-in-chief of Panama's Defense Forces. From the relative obscurity of being a staunch U.S. ally in a small Latin American nation, he has been thrust into the limelight as the repre- sentative sine qua non of a hitherto unidentified spe- cies: "the drug-dealing Latin dictator." Democrats take special pleasure in deploying the Noriega demon because he also symbolizes the Reagan- Bush Administration's major fiasco of 1988 and what may well be "Reagan's Last Stand." John Weeks, professor of international politics and economics at Middlebury College, makes abundantly clear in "Of Puppets and Heroes" that the Administration not only failed to remove its unconditional ally, it effectively consolidated the General's hold on the country and con- verted him into a nationalist hero in the eyes of Latin America. Along the way, Panama's relatively prosper- ous economy was torn asunder, the civilian opposition was outflanked and divided, and the contempt most Panamanians feel toward the United States was dra- matically reinforced. Weeks examines why the Ad- ministration turned on its good friend and finds, as with so much of Reagan's foreign policy, that its obsession with Nicaragua was at the root. Like other political bogeymen, the Noriega demon was constructed from a partial and partisan reading of the facts. In "General Coke?" John Dinges, foreign editor at National Public Radio and author of a forth- coming book on Noriega, shows that most of the Gen- eral's involvement with drug-trafficking took place be- tween 1981 and 1984. Since then, Noriega has cut back Panama's role in the drug trade and stepped up coopera- tion with the Drug Enforcement Agency. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE PRESS PAID LITTLE attention to Panama, despite the importance ac- corded it by U.S. policy makers. It is the site of the Southern Command, the largest permanent station of U.S. troops and military equipment in Latin America. From its bases there U.S. forces send supplies to the contras, launch spy flights over El Salvador and Nicara- gua and coordinate all military activities from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. In addition, 12% of U.S. trade goes through the canal, and 12% of the oil the United States consumes travels by the transisthmic pipeline. O MAR TORRIJOS, WHO RULED PANAMA from 1968 to 1978, liked to say about Panama's independence that the United States behaved like the midwife who kept the baby in payment for her services. The fact is that, except for Puerto Rico, no other Latin American country has been so dominated by the United States, suffering 18 military interventions and the con- tinuous occupation of the Canal Zone. Small wonder nationalism colors Panama's politics so deeply. Sociologist Ra6il Leis, director of the Panamanian Center for Research and Social Action (CEASPA), points out in "The Cousins' Republic" that U.S. vice- royalty has given rise to a class of elite politicians who specialize in bowing and scraping before Uncle Sam. For them, nationalism is the opiate of an idealistic people; realism demands obedience to the imperial master. Panamanian nationalism is also a reaction to the extreme denationalization of the country's economy, comprised of financial and related services to transna- tional corporations and banks. Despite its dynamism, six of every ten families cannot satisfy their basic ne- cessities and most Panamanians live in mud and straw shacks in the countryside, or in dilapidated slums in the cities. In "Serving Foreigners," economist Char- lotte Elton of CEASPA examines this superdependent development in which a minority of Panamanians par- ticipate and only a select few directly benefit. The progeny of this boom, a new class of wealthy young professionals, are at the forefront of opposition to military rule. John Zindar, an analyst at the Center for Defense Information and former instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama, shows in "Opposition Outflanked" that after the events of this year even these prosperous businessmen have come to hate the United States. LL FACTS ASIDE, THE NORIEGA DEMON makes for a powerful image, one that seems to have built a nasty consensus in favor of a return to bald- faced intervention as a proper tool of U.S. policy. Rather than instill caution, Reagan's last stand in Pan- ama, like Custer's at Little Big Hornm, seems to have only fueled bipartisan yearning for cheap and easy vic- tories.
