The treaty ending the border conflict divided public opinion in both Peru and Ecuador, fanning the virulent flames of nationalism in both countries. Latin America's nation-states were born of the wars of independence against the Spanish Empire, and the borders adopted were based on the admin- istrative divisions established by the colonial regime. It took several decades to define these borders, which were clearly fixed to suit the interests of the colonial power rather than the characteristics and necessities of the peoples separated by these new frontiers. A long-standing dispute between Ecuador and Peru over the defini- tion of their common border culmi- nated in a brief war in 1941. The military conflict ended with the A child carries the Peruvian flag in the border town ofAguas Calientes, located on the signing by the two countries of the a disputed section of the border between Peru and Ecuador. Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which was backed by four guarantor coun- Nelson Manrique is a Peruvian historian who teaches at the Catholic University of Peru. tries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile and He is author of several books, including La historia de la Reptblica (1995) and Vinieron a los sarrecenos: El horizonte mental de la conquista de Am6rica (1993). the United States. The treaty did R Translated from the Spanish by NACLA. not, however, resolve the problem. , NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6ESSAY / BORDER WARS In the following decades, successive Ecuadorian gov- S ernments chose to ignore the treaty with the hope of renegotiating it, and ba opposed the placing of bor- der landmarks to close the 47 miles that remained to be mapped along the 1,000- mile border. During the 1980s, know- ing that it was impossible to obtain international sup- port to overturn a recognized treaty, the Ecuadorian authorities opted to recognize the Rio Protocol while at the same time proclaiming its inapplicability due to the technical problems of map- ping the final strip of the border. The result was two brief military conflicts, in 1983 and 1995, and subsequent negotiation efforts. The failure to reach a resolution made the role of the guarantor countries increasingly important. In this context, the guarantor coun- tries secured the agreement of the current presidents of Ecuador and Peru, Jamil Mahuad and Alberto Fujimori, to cede to them the task of coming up with a proposal to resolve the crisis. The legislatures of both countries voted to abide by this solution. On October 25, 1997, the pro- posal developed by the guarantor countries to bring an end to the Peru-Ecuador border conflict was signed by Presidents Mahuad and Fujimori. The proposal divided public opinion in both countries, with numerous discordant voices protesting the proposed solution as a "betrayal" and a "sell-out." In the Peruvian department of Loreto, where the undefined portion of the border is located, violent protests against the treaty resulted in a series of confrontations with police in which several people were killed. The inhabitants of the region-who have long suffered from the marginalization of a crushingly centralist system-mis- adly, the left was also guil of waving the nationalist nner, preaching the discot of the offended nation and the humiliation of the fatherland. trusted the government's decision, fearing that Ecuador would take advantage of the right granted by the Rio Protocol to freely navigate along the Amazon River to launch a military attack. It is worth noting that in Peru, politicians spanning the ideological spectrum, including many avowed Marxists, have denounced the accord, arguing that it betrays the country's interests and that it is an affront to the Peruvian people. The surprisingly vociferous nature of this nationalist sentiment prompted these reflections on the perils of nationalism. n his seminal work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, historian Benedict Anderson discusses the paradoxes of nationalism. The first paradox he discusses is that unlike other important "isms" (Marxism, liber- alism, anarchism, fascism, etc.), nationalism does not have a major theorist. There is no Marx, Smith or Bakunin of nationalism. Yet, no other idea has had a greater impact on human societies in the past two centuries. The biggest conflicts of the past 200 years--including the two world wars--were spurred on by nationalism. The second paradox of national- ism is that the basis of national identity is a constructed version of history that is often inaccurate. Peruvians, for example, tend to believe that we are the descendants Ity urse of the Incas, although in terms of our indigenous heritage, we are in fact descendants of a number of cultures-the Chancas, the Huancas, the Chimties, the Huancavilcas, the Chachapoyas, etc.-that had been militarily con- quered by the Incas, often with great cruelty, creat- ing animosities that in some cases pushed these groups to ally themselves with the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro against their hated oppres- sors. The same can be said of the Ecuadorians, who proclaim them- selves descendants of the "Kingdom of Quito"- a controver- sial claim, but one that awakens such passion that few Ecuadorian historians dare to openly challenge the inconsistency of the data claim- ing to prove the existence of this kingdom. The third paradox is that for nationalists, the nation is above history-it is eternal, without a beginning or an end--despite the fact that the history of the twenti- eth century has demonstrated repeatedly that nations are in fact quite fragile constructions that may appear and disappear sudden- ly and, usually, painfully. This is evident by a look at the changing map of Europe over the past cen- tury as a result of the world wars and the recent collapse of the Soviet empire, or the explosive emergence of the new nations of the so-called Third World after decolonization. Yet when nationalist passions are ignited, nothing else matters. As Anderson points out, it is impossible to comprehend nation- alism if one tries to equate it with ideology (though at some level nationalism can be an ideology). It is more useful, he suggests, to compare nationalism to religion because, like many of the world's most powerful religions, it mobi- Vol XXXII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1999 7ESSAY / BORDER WARS Ecuadorians celebrate the signing of the October 1997 peace treaty with Peru at a public mass in downtown Quito. lizes commitments and passions people are willing to die for. This helps explain the fact that national wars are to our time what the religious wars were to theirs. They are charged with the same intensity of commitment, altruism, passionate and unreflective adher- ence. Both are, moreover, based on the demonization of the "other." In religious wars, the "other" is the heretic, the infidel, the apostate, the enemy of the true god. In the nationalist wars, it is the foreigner, the enemy just across the border who is waiting for us to drop our guard, who is always desiring what is ours, and conspiring to take it away from us. Like the images in the mirror, the face of the "other" reveals to us our own inverted image, since the defects of the other are symmetrically inverse replicas of our highest virtues. The "other" is a liar, while we are sin- cere; he is devious and traitorous, while we are correct and loyal; he is a coward, while we are valiant; petty and covetous, while we are generous and disinterested. This demonization ignores the fact that virtues and defects are distributed more or less equally in all human societies. In all societies there are people who are sincere, frank, open, loyal, trustworthy, as well as those who are cynical, malicious, dishonest, traitorous and corrupt. The foreigner is the "other" par excellence. For Peruvians, all Ecuadorians are the same, while in the eyes of the Ecuadorian patriots, all Peruvians are exactly the same. It does not matter that the reactions to the recent peace treaty have been complex and contradictory. In contrast to the reaction in Loreto, in the Peruvian departments of Tumbes and Piura, where there is a long tradition of good border rela- tions with the neighboring provinces of Ecuador, the peace treaty was widely celebrated. In Ecuador, many people were happy that the dispute was finally over, while others flew the Ecuadorian flag at half staff and wore black bands as a sign of mourning. General Paco Moncayo, Ecuador's most honored military leader of the 1995 conflict, described the deci- sion of the guarantors as "shame- ful" and said that the square kilo- meter that Peru is required by the treaty to give to Ecuador in the border area known as "Tiwinza" to commemorate their dead is little more than a token. The president of the Commission of International Affairs of the Ecuadorian Con- gress, Heinz Moeller, went so far as to propose that the piece of land not be accepted to preserve nation- al dignity. Some Peruvians will surely construe these reactions as evidence that the Ecuadorians are never satisfied with any- thing unless they get everything. Apparently the ultimate proof of Peruvian nationalism is not to cede an inch of territory to the enemy. NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS C 0 0 8ESSAY / BORDER WARS In such a view, the only acceptable terms of negotiation are those which impose each and every one of our conditions. wo centuries ago, the heroes of independence dreamed of a united Latin America. This was the dream of Bolivar and San Martin, but the contradictions fueled during the long period of colonial domination kept this from becoming reality. The result was a rosary of republics whose first con- cern was to define their national borders. By establishing them on the basis of the old colonial admin- istrative divisions, the result was that the borders of the majority of the incipient nations, as they were imagined by their inhabitants, had been extended over territory that their neighbors believed to be theirs. This was perhaps inevitable, given the rela- tive absense of population in these distant frontier regions. When the Republic of Peru was founded, for example, its population was estimated at 1,250,000 inhabitants, a small num- ber given the size of its ter- ritory. Its far-away fron- tiers, especially those in the inaccessible jungle regions, were mere ab- stractions on a map. This made it almost inevitable that marking the definitive borders would have to involve either negotiations or war. Peru has had wars with all of its neighbors except Brazil, probably because the two countries The line are separated by the vast been tI Amazon rainforest. As a lower b consequence, the majority was reo of our neighbors feel, like we do, that they lost territory once the borders were fixed. Negotiating always supposes mutual conces- sions; when both parties refuse to he or cede then the only recourse is that was that in the most recent of taking up arms. Those who in instance, they had enough time to Peru protest because not all of our more securely install their posi- national objectives were met in the tions, thanks to the fact that Peru's treaty with Ecuador apparently military posts had been aban- ignore the fact that the only way to doned-for reasons that no obtain these goals, in the current Peruvian authority has explained. conditions, is to launch another The Ecuadorian authorities estab- wat. lished an impregnable position, It is true that the Rio Protocol defended with land mines and supports Peru's claims to maintain- sophisticated military technology. ing the border exactly the way it is, In Peru, two people must be held but for Ecuadorian nationalists that constitutionally responsible for treaty was a betrayal of its oli- these events: the President of the garchy, which fed the resolve of Republic, as commander in chief one Ecuadorian government after of the armed forces, and the then- another to ignore it. Proclaiming head of the Joint Command of the that they had been stripped of Armed Forces, the "victorious" 80,000 square miles of territory, general, NicolAs de Bari Hermoza. Ecuadorians engaged in a series of It is now obvious that "Tiwinza" military infiltrations over the past was never recovered during the two decades along the undefined February 1995 armed conflict, as border in an attempt to force a Fujimori and Hermoza claimed, the heroism of Peruvian soldiers notwithstanding. But time was running short. The presidential elections were to be held in April, and Fujimori's chance of reelection was at stake. He decided to trick the entire country, announcing the recovery of "Tiwinza" and declar- ing a unilateral cease-fire. This is the context in which the recent negotia- tions took place. "Tiwinza" is an excel- lent example of how nationalist myths are con- structed. Based on a review of available histor- ical records, the real Tiwinza is located some- where within Ecuadorian territory. After infiltrating drawn in 1942 by the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro has territory. After infiltrating de facto border between Ecuador and Peru. The Peruvian territory along order, running along the Amazon and Marahion Rivers, the undefined border area, gnized by Ecuador until last year's agreement, the Ecuadorian armed forces gave this name to renegotiation. They did this in the position where they built their 1983 in Falso Paquisha and they fortresses. What had been an tried it again in 1995 in the place unnamed piece of land has become called "Tiwinza." The difference the center of the confrontation Vol XXXII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1999 9ESSAY / BORDER WARS between two national imaginations. Some Peru- vians believe that we must reclaim this invented place by sending our children to Ct war. The only other option is that we accept the strate- gic priority of finishing, once and for all, the demarcation process, which will help prevent armed confrontations in the future. This will not of course guarantee the absence of war-Peru did not even share a border with Chile when the terrible armed conflict of 1879 exploded. But tying up the loose ends is important because putting them off transforms military infil- tration into an act of conquest-an irony if one considers that the Ecuadorian high command has for decades tried to present itself as the good David, constantly harassed by the arrogant and powerful Peruvian Goliath. The big losers of the treaty signed last October are the mili- tarist hawks in both countries, who have justified their privileges over the last several decades as the pro- tectors of the fatherland in the face of the threat of the enemy just across the border. ome Peruvians have argued that since the Rio Protocol supported our claims, we have made too many concessions. After all, Peru ceded one square kilometer now known as "Tiwinza" to Ecuador, as well as an additional 10 square miles along the unmapped border, two pieces of land of 370 acres apiece along the Amazon riverbanks to build port facilities, and a road to access its navigation facilities. Mean- while, they argue, Ecuador has conceded nothing. Such arguments ignore the fact that since the birth of Ecuador as a republic, its citizens have been taught that its territory extended far into Peruvian territory [See The big losers are the military hawks in both countries who have justifie heir privileges by claiming to protect the fatherland from the enemy just across the border. map, p. 9]. In the maps used in Ecuadorian schools, the border with Peru was located south of the Marafi6n and Amazon Rivers, and the 80,000 square miles to the north of this line, including Tumbes, part of Piura, and most of Loreto, was considered Ecua- dorian territory. For more than half a century, Ecuadorians were taught by school teachers and pop- ulist caudillos alike that Peru had taken these territories from their weaker neighbor by force, and demanding their return had become a national crusade. In fact, the protests of some Peruvians aside, the border fixed in 1942 has not changed. It is crucial to reflect on the tremendous psychological adjustment that the 1997 treaty demands of Ecuadorian citizens. The maps used until late last year in Ecuador's schools must be redrawn, and Ecuadorians must come to terms with the fact that the land they were taught to believe was rightfully theirs belongs to Peru. Is it possible to affirm, then, that Ecuador has made no concessions? I would like to conclude with a brief reference to the militant opposition to the October treaty adopted by several leftist leaders. Some have argued that things should have been left the way they were--an unviable scenario which would have only postponed any final resolution to the conflict. Others, their faith in the nationalist cause unshaken, argue that no solution is acceptable except one which meets all of Peru's conditions. Still d others, seeking to link dis- content over the treaty with the growing wave of protest against the current regime, have argued that the Fujimori government should not be permitted to resolve this long-standing conflict. I believe that this is mistaken, because it equates a tactical question-the struggle against the efforts of Fujimori to perpetuate his power-- with strategic questions involving Peru's existence as a nation. We refuse to accept the demarcation process at our own peril. Consider the Falklands/Malvinas war of the early 1980s. When the genocidal military regime in Argentina need- ed to clean up its image, the gener- als sought to do so by manipulating a strategic issue: Argentina's claim to national sovereignty over the islands. Fortunately, the Argentine people knew how to defend their historic claim without blindly fol- lowing the military butchers. This experience can teach us a valuable lesson. While tactical victories are tempting because they yield excel- lent benefits in the short term, a coherent political project can only be possible if we know how to put the strategic interests of the nation above short-term tactical interests, even if this means renouncing easy immediate victories. The peoples of Latin America existed long before the birth of any of the region's nation-states, and they will continue to exist, even if those nations expire. It is painful to see old friends on the left waving the nationalist banner, preaching the discourse of the offended nation and the humiliated father- land, and agitating passions that are antithetical to our historical dreams of a Latin American com- munity of peoples.
