In the 1990 presidential election, political unknown IAlberto Fujimori conducted a deliberately simple campaign, in sharp contrast to the multimillion- dollar media blitz of Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori visited dozens of remote Andean villages in the "Fujimobile," a makeshift cart pulled along by a tractor. Dressed in ponchos and chullos (hats with ear flaps worn in the Andes), he danced with the locals to their regional music. His motto was "honor, technology and work." Promising to be "a president like you," he delivered short public speeches, talked and dressed simply, and interacted informally with ordinary people. This style revealed Fujimori's profound, if intuitive, understanding of Peruvian political culture. Several observers attributed Fujimori's electoral victory to the growing crisis of Peru's traditional political parties and the decline of the Lima-based white criollo establishment that these parties histor- ically represented. Over the past several decades, new social groups have emerged in Peru, including rural migrants who have adopted urban ways, known as "cholos," and a new "mestizo" middle class of first- and second-generation migrants who obtained professional degrees at state-funded uni- versities. Traditional parties have proven incapable of representing their interests and aspirations. These new social groups voted for Fujimori, who had no apparent ties to Peru's traditional criollo elite, rather than support Vargas Llosa, who was considered a pituco-a derogatory Peruvian term for someone from the upper class who is snooty and pretentious. They identified with Fujimori because he was not white, but he wasn't a cho/lo either, which in Peru's complex ethnic hierarchy would have alienated some groups. As the son of Japanese migrants, Fujimori was seen by many Peruvians as simple and hard-working like themselves. After six years in office, Fujimori remains a wide- ly popular president. In public opinion polls since 1990, he averages an approval rating of about 65%. His popular appeal is the consequence in part of his skillful use of the electronic media, especially televi- sion. In the middle of an official televised meeting, for example, Fujimori will pepper his speech with colloquial language or crack a joke or two. Frequent T.V. appearances have also helped him develop a style of relating directly to the people without the intermediation of political parties. With the help of a well-honed discourse stripped of ideological content, Fujimori has been able to cir- cumvent obsolete and discredited party structures.
Fujimori's Popular Appeal Fujimori has also staged several "media events" to dis- tract attention at particularly difficult moments. During the outbreak of a cholera epi- demic in 1991, for example, a series of images of a weeping virgin "appeared" through- out Lima. In a highly publi- cized visit, Fujimori prayed for Peru's future before one of these images. Fujimori has also developed a personal and direct style of relating to the poor by assiduously cultivating his Fujimori, wearing traditional image as a "common man." carries a vicuna at the Inti Fujimori distances himself from "traditional" poli- tics. He tries, for example, to defy convention when- ever possible. In visits to Lima shantytowns and rural Andean villages, he has been known to tease the crowd by pretending to throw water at them. On other occasions, he has interrupted his speeches to jump on a bicycle, mount a donkey, or climb onto a tractor. Fujimori's speeches are laced with constant attacks against traditional politicians for being uninterested in the fate of ordinary Peruvians. These politicians are the vilified "other" responsible for Peru's mis- fortunes, while he and the people are the authentic "we." He claims that political parties are merely vehicles for these corrupt politicians, and not the channels for popular demands that they purport to be. Fujimori says he needs no party because he embodies the interests of Peru's majority. At the same time, however, he has a very tradi- tional image of poor Peruvians. He relates to the poor as if they were children who need a wise and strong parent to take care of them. He uses simple language to inform people of the work he has done and to outline his future plans. He righteously defends his government's actions in the face of the opposition's criticism, which he dismisses as a lack of gratitude. A helicopter has replaced the "Fujimobile" as the preferred mode of presidential transport, permit- ting Fujimori to visit remote parts of the country sev- eral times a week. He goes out to the "forgotten vil- lages," as he likes to call them, in order to personally supervise government programs. During these visits -which are broadcast almost nightly on the evening news-Fujimori asks each community what their greatest needs are, and promises to send mate- rials if the people agree to chip in with their labor. In the first few years of his presidency, when the Shining Path insurgency was at its peak, the media portrayed an active presi- dent traveling throughout the country, supervising public-works projects, and speaking directly to the people. Fujimori wanted his presidency associated with the act of building and gen- erating new resources at a time when Shining Path's message was perceived as one of total destruction. Fujimori's frequent visits to outlying areas have helped mold an image of him as an accessible, "hands-on" pres- campesino clothing, ident who "goes to the mi Festival in Ayacucho. places where things are happening" and gets things done. "Philosophizing and saying nice things won't get us anywhere," he says. Fujimori contrasts this hands-on approach to the unfulfilled promises of the "traditional politi- cians," whom he chides for being unfamiliar with the "profound" Peru and motivated only by their own self-interest. His government, Fujimori boasts, has "done away with the style of governing at cocktail parties." He is a "doer" who provides solutions by dint of his own hard work and dedication. He asks the people to let him do his work, and in return, he asks for their approval and trust. The flip side of this "doer" image is Fujimori's will- ingness to bypass laws and other legal norms that get in his way. There are numerous examples of his indifference to rules and institutional norms. The most obvious, of course, is the autogolpe, or "self- coup," of April, 1992, when he gutted the Constitution and shut down Congress. If the law is an obstacle to his goals, Fujimori finds a way of get- ting around it, or he simply changes the rules in order to achieve his objectives. This is an appealing trait in a country where over half of the working population labors in the informal sector, and where bribing a police officer to overlook a traffic infrac- tion or paying a judge to hand down a favorable sentence has become commonplace. In general, Fujimori symbolically fulfills the strong desire of Peru's historically excluded majorities to be included in the political system. He does not, how- ever, pretend to incorporate the poor in govern- ment decision-making, or even to encourage them to strengthen their own self-help organizations. The style of his presidency-coupled with the substance of his economic and social policies-reassures the upper classes that his government will protect their interests. At no time does Fujimori's relationship with his country's impoverished majority threaten the status quo.
