On January 22, 1980- the 48th anniversary of the unsuccessful rebellion of 1932- 200,000 people filled the streets of San Salvador in a unity march of the popular organizations. Gabriel Cienfuegos, 47, two children, a worker: Q: Why have you come to this demonstra- tion? A: Because we have to be one single body in this battle against the rich. Magdalena Bonilla, 42, a street vendor: Q: Who are you marching with today? A: We are going with the BPR. I came last night with my two daughters. Back where I'm from, things are ugly. It was hard to get here. They wanted to frighten us, but here we are. Carlos Vazquez, 36, tailor; with his 3-year old son: Q: How do you feel in this demonstration? A: Brave and strong. We're ready to show them that we are more thqn a few!' The streets were so crowded that each organization had to await its turn to enter the procession. As members of FAPU approached the National Palace, sharpshooters on the rooftops of the palace and surrounding buildings opened fire on the march. Thousands started to run. The bodyguards accompanying the march returned the fire. Members of the BPR still waiting to get on- to the streets sought shelter in the National University. The security forces surrounded it as a plane sprayed insecticide on the crowd. In the center of the city, 21 lay dead, 120 wounded. The new junta denied any involve- ment in the massacre. "All the security forces were in their barracks. The right is to blame." This theme would be used repeatedly by the Christian Democratic Party to justify its con- tinued presence in the junta. They washed their hands of the blood, and shook hands with U.S. strategists and the Salvadorean bourgeoisie. 12JulylAugust 1980 Christian Democracy sank its roots in Latin America in the late 1950s. The mother church was the Christian Democratic parties of Germany and Italy-whose money and training created a generation of Latin American politicians, determined to be the third choice between capitalism and com- munism. During the 1960s, the Christian Democrats were a growing and formidable force. They held power in Chile; they challenged power in Venezuela; and created new parties through- out the hemisphere. In 1960, Christian Democracy came to El Salvador. Its reformist platform and Chris- tian identity were powerfully attractive to the exploited masses of this Catholic country. It offered an opportunity for advancement to the small but expanding middle class. 2 By 1980, Christian Democracy had lost its lustre. In Chile, it was a U.S. handmaiden in the overthrow of Allende. In Venezuela, it 13NACLA Report represented the conservative business com- munity. And in El Salvador, its electoral ef- forts to unseat the military had failed. The fall of the first junta gave the PDC the chance it was waiting for and saved the U.S. government from having to abandon its cen- trist pretensions. The PDC had all the necessary qualities: a moderate image and the memory of popular support in the 1960s; an international network to complement its own structures; cordial relations with the business community; and, above all, a thirst for power. The PDC filled two slots on the junta and packed the cabinet. Their rationale for enter- ing as others resigned was simple: Only they could prevent a civil war between left and right. Where the first junta had failed, they could succeed in pushing through reforms. U.S. officials admitted that the "center" had shifted to the right--but "only slightly," they said. 3 A new ambassador, Robert White, with his human rights credentials earned in Paraguay, was brought in to win votes for U.S. policy among liberals in Congress. He launched scathing attacks on the oligarchy's greed, but blamed the left for the escalation of violence. Meanwhile, a major military aid package was being prepared to give "logistical and communications support" to the Salva- dorean armed forces. Counter-insurgency plans were being dusted off and examined. THE WAR BEGINS Throughout the countryside, the fledgling people's army was testing its strength. The ERP attacked the principal headquarters of the National Guard. The FPL harassed and pummeled the security forces in the moun- tainous northern areas of Chalatenango and Cabanas. The FARN was active in the region of the western coffee fincas. The brutality of the Salvadorean military and its greater weaponry outgunned the guer- rilla armies. Their targets were different. The guerrillas attacked the armed forces and members of the para-military squads. The military went after the unarmed members of the popular organizations. Death squads combed the cities for their leaders and decapitated the bodies. They were less discriminating in the countryside: any pea- sant would do to intimidate the rest. The right was becoming more brazen as the left grew stronger. It found a champion in Roberto D'Abuisson, a former intelligence of- ficer in the National Guard, dismissed by the first junta as one of Romero's chief torturers. D'Abuisson was handsome, charismatic and totally committed to the destruction of the left. He headed the Broad National Front (the reincarnation of ORDEN) and many said he led the death squads, the White Warrior Union and the Secret Anti-Communist Army. D'Abuisson had close ties to the American right. His first trip to the United States was sponsored by the American Security Council, a right-wing lobby group in Washington. He lunched with the American Legion, lobbied for more arms and accused the U.S. Am- bassador of "leftist sympathies." D'Abuisson's message was clear: get rid of the Christian Democrats and make way for a Chilean solu- tion to the crisis. 4 In mid-February, he appeared on Salvadorean TV to denounce a list of persons who, he said, were linked to the political- military organizations of the left. Among them was Mario Zamora Rivas, then Solicitor General of the second junta. Zamora was a bridge between the left and right wings of the Christian Democratic Party. Destroying that bridge might force the party out of the junta. Several nights later, armed men entered Zamora's house through the roof and killed him with a tommy gun. The Christian Democrats were stunned and outraged. They pointed the finger at D'Abuisson and threatened to resign if Zamora's killers were not brought to justice. But no one was ar- rested and the Christian Democrats stayed on. The party, however, could no longer stand the strain. THE PARTY SPLINTERS We have not been able to stop the repres- sion and those committing acts of repres- sion ... go unpunished; the promised dialogue with the popular organizations fails to materialize; the chances for produc- ing reforms with the support of the people are receding beyond reach. Letter of resignation, Hector Dada, Christian Democratic member of the junta, March 3, 1980. 14Christian Democratic leader, Jose Napoleon Duarte. The Christian Democratic Party should not participate in a regime which has unleash- ed the'bloodiest repression ever experienc- ed by the Salvadorean people . . . The 600 victims of repression between January and February clamor for justice. Statement of the Popular Tendency, 20% of the Party, upon its resignation, March 10, 1980. Respect for human rights is incompatible with the exacerbated and growing repres- sion exercised against the popular organizations and against the people in general ... a program of 'reforms with repression' runs contrary to fundamentals of Christian Democracy. Resignation letter of 7 key party leaders. 5 By May, the entire left wing of the party had resigned, as well as those associated with the Central American University. But there were others, less scrupulous than they, to fill the vacancies. Napoleon Duarte- the charismatic mayor of San Salvador in the 1960s, presidential candidate in 1972--would now save the junta from total abandonment. He was joined by Antonio Morales Erlich, another stalwart of the party's right wing. Again, the U.S. government breathed a sigh of relief. Duarte was well known interna- tionally; the myth of a moderate center might still be swallowed. But time was running out, as the right grew more bellicose and the left continued to grow. In mid-February, the U.S. ambassador had to summon the military high command, along with members of the oligar- chy, to convey that the U.S. government would not tolerate a coup. It was high time for some dramatic strokes. So on March 9, the second junta announced a set of "sweeping reforms": land would be redistributed, banks and foreign trade would be nationalized, the power of the oligarchy would be broken, they said. And the people would desert the popular organizations, they believed.NACLA Report A Son's Letter to His Father Jose Antonio Morales Carbonell, a militant of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), writes to his father, Antonio Morales Erlich, member of the second junta [on June 13, Jose Antonio was cap- tured and is imprisoned in the jail of the National Police]: Dear father, On May 30, 1979, I had to leave the country with a group of companeros to visit the Embassies of France, Venezuela and Costa Rica, to demand freedom for our captured leaders. . . . Today, on my return after a long trip through various countries of Europe, I want to tell you that the entire world is exasperated. From every corner you hear !Basta Ya!-Enough!-to the repression against the Salvadorean people. It is inconceivable that after so few months in government, your seemingly good intentions. . .have been converted into such enormous compromises and complicities with the number one enemy of Humanity: Yankee Imperialism. Compromises that seem to know no limits! Compromises that have taken more lives than the last years of the Military Tyranny! I remember that some time ago you told me . . that the enormous crisis of imperialism in our coun- try, caused by the uncontainable rise of the revolutionary movement, had to be used to present a more favorable alternative to U.S. interests and, at the same time, to carry out genuine changes in our coun- try.... But in the end, what are those promised changes? The famed Agrarian Reform? Or the permanent state of siege . . .? The famed nationalization of banks and foreign trade? Or the growing and shameless intervention of Yankee Imperialism, that sends personnel trained in counter-insurgency techniques and other specialties; that sends a permanent and constant stream of arms and war supplies to strengthen the puppet armies and the para-military bands of assassins ... It is really dishonorable to be in your situation, and still try to hide from the world the reality of violence and repression that our people suffer daily, crudely attributing it to the supposed provocations of the revolutionary organizations. I am certain that you yourself don't believe that! You should follow the example of the other Christian Democrats that decided to stop supporting the repressive regime, to stop serving as a "progressive" cover, in exchange for afew crumbs of power and to stop cynically attributing these desertions to merely "sentimental" motives. At this point there are no longer intermediary positions, things are totally clear: one is either on the side of the oppressed, or on the side of the oppressors. To stay on their side makes you responsible as well for the crimes committed against the people-crimes committed by your very colleagues. The least you can do at this moment is to be loyal to the principles you taught me. Do it for your family, your children ... Do it for the thousands of workers and peasants and for all our people who suffer hunger, misery, ex- ploitation and oppression. Do it for a minimum sense of human compassion, that I cannot believe you have lost. It is lamentable to me that you find yourself in this situation, but I remember that you taught me to be clear, a clarity that obliges me to tell you . . . that I am ready to give the last drop of my blood for the liberation of our people; I have faith in the power and creativity of the people's forces and I am convinced that the only way to defeat the enemy is with arms in hand, destroying completely the repressive apparatus and creating a more just society, free of misery and exploitation .... Your son, Jose Antonio Morales Carbonell El Salvador, April 19, 1980 16JulylAugust 1980 THE CARROT AND THE STICK On paper, the agrarian reform seemed im- pressive, even drastic. First, all properties in excess of 1,250 acres would be expropriated to form peasant cooperatives. Owners would be generously compensated in cash and govern- ment bonds, and encouraged to invest in industry. At a second stage, properties of 250 to 500 acres would be affected; and later, the small plots would become the property of ten- ant farmers and sharecroppers. Mobilizing its forces like a military cam- paign, the junta rushed its reform into place. A state of siege was declared throughout the country and troops rolled into the largest ha- ciendas, ostensibly to stop the landowners from fighting back. But there was no resist- ance. Most landowners took their compensa- tion in cash, packed their bags and went to Miami. From there they would finance a more subtle resistance. The real objectives of the military occupa- tions became all too clear. Each hacienda was to be a military outpost in the junta's cam- paign to destroy the left. Each occupying force received a list, prepared by ORDEN, of suspected members of.the popular organiza- tions. Reform was a cover for repression. A technician with the government's In- stitute for Agrarian Reform (ISTA) tells this story: "The troops came and told the workers the land was theirs now. They could elect their own leaders and run it themselves. The peasants couldn't believe their ears, but they held elections that very night. The next morn- ing the troops came back and I watched as they shot every one of the elected leaders."6 In late May, the ISTA technicians went out on strike, protesting the massive repression, the harassment of ISTA personnel by the Nation- al Guard, and the lack of fertilizers, seed and financial credit for the new cooperatives. The Washington Post reports that "a squad of more than 20 men in National Guard uni- forms with complete battle dress and an ar- mored car drove to a government agricultural cooperative with a list of cooperative leaders considered to be subversives. Twelve of the leaders...were killed and the 160 families liv- ing there fled in terror."' Refugees began to flood the capital, seek- ing protection within the Catholic Church. They brought blood-curdling stories of mas- sacres and sadistic brutality. The repression was not confined to areas affected by the agrarian reform. The greater brunt of the killing was borne by people in areas known to be strongholds of the popular organizations: Chalatenango, Cabanas, Morazan. The monthly murders of members of the popular organizations rose from 487 in March; 480 in April; 500 in May; to 1,000 in June. 8 The greatest sham of the agrarian reform was that the coffee oligarchs, the heart of bourgeois power, were not even touched. In 1971, 91% of all coffee holdings were less than 1,250 acres--the limit of the agrarian reform's reach. Since 1971, coffee magnates had further subdivided their estates among family members in anticipation of reform. One estimate is that only 2% of the coffee plantations were affected by the "sweeping reforms."- VIET NAM REVISITED When the first phase of the agrarian reform failed to attract any popular support, the jun- ta jumped to stage three: giving land to share- croppers and tenant farmers. They called it "Land to the Tiller" and a U.S. official com- mented on the program's intent: "There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to breed capitalists like rabbits.""' The original "Land to the Tiller" program was implemented in Viet Nam. Its purpose was to politically isolate the Viet Cong by giving land to peasants in targetted areas. But it was one component of a larger "rural develop- ment" project that included the infamous Operation Phoenix, run by former CIA direc- tor William Colby. Approximately 30,000 people were murdered through Colby's efforts to eliminate Viet Cong supporters. The parallels between Vietnam and El Salvador are not far-fetched. Not even the names have changed. The author of the "Land to the Tiller" program in Viet Nam is now advising the Salvadorean junta. His name is Roy Prosterman, a law professor at the University of Washington and currently under contract to the Land Council, a private New York-based organization." His work in El Salvador is also being subsidized by the 17NACLA Report American Institute for Free Labor Develop- ment (AIFLD), a known conduit for CIA funds in the 1960s.12 AIFLD itself is now under contract to the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), another familiar actor in Vietnam, to advise the Salvadorean Communal Union (UCS) on managing the new cooperatives. The UCS is a peasant organization with tradi- tionally strong ties to the Salvadorean govern- ment. By June, however, even the UCS had withdrawn its support from the reforms after several of its leaders were murdered by the National Guard.' Counter-insurgency is also part of the package in El Salvador. On April 1, 1980, the U.S. government re-programmed another $5.7 million to El Salvador, for transport, communications and intelligence equipment. For fiscal year 1981, it proposes an additional $5.5 million to purchase patrol boats, heli- copters, jeeps, parachutes, trucks and radios; plus $500,000 for military training.14 By 1981, the United States will have spent $12.2 million on El Salvador's military, in the post-coup period alone,. This represents 73% of what it spent there from 1950 to 1979. Archbishop Romero had implored Presi- dent Carter to halt the flow of arms. He had exposed the lies of U.S. policy, declaring that so-called reforms "had to be judged within a context of death and annihilation.""' He de- cried the torture and killings from his pulpit and said defiantly, "When all peaceful means have been exhausted the Church rcognizes the right to insurrection.""16 And finally, on March 23, he called on the National Guard to disobey the orders of their superiors and end the killings. On March 24, Archbishop Romero was killed by an assassin's bullet as he offered mass for the mother of a friend. His voice had expressed the hopes and determination of the Salvadorean people. But in Washington, it was ignored. The war that the United States is fighting in El Salvador is the first step in its typical response to liberation movements around the world. It is a neo-colonial war, whose instru- ments are a puppet government and a mili- tary trained and financed by the United States. In the first stages, U.S. involvement is usually limited to military advisors, who give technical assistance to the surrogate army. In El Salvador, Venezuelan advisors have been used to cover U.S. involvement."7 Ven- ezuela-ruled by friendly Christian Dem- ocrats-waged a successful anti-guerrilla campaign in the 1960s. But the guerrillas in El Salvador are different. They are peasants, workers, students and other members of the popular organizations who have now joined the ranks of the popular army. They are everywhere in the cities and villages. Viet Nam is the clearer analogy. O 18JulylAugust 1980 During the funeral mass for Archbishop Romero, an ex- plosion stampeded the enor- mous crowd. Rightist sharp- shooters located in nearby buildings engaged armed guards of the popular organ- izations who attempted to defend the mourners in a gun battle that lasted more than an hour. 19 NACLA Report San Salvador: June, 1980 I was returning to El Salvador for the third time since I'd lived there 11 years ago as a Peace Corps volunteer. In 1974, when Ifirst went back, I saw the signs of crisis: people were edgy, uncertain about the future. They were afraid to have community meetings. Political activists were just finding their bear- ings. I was there last December, during the brief period of thefirst junta. It was extraordinary. I had never seen people so determined, so hopeful that things would finally change. They were coming out of their houses again. Every day there was another demonstration by the popular organizations. I followed a march of lottery vendors, some of the poorest of the capital's poor. At their rally, I listened to men and women who had never spoken in public, start forward, get lost in theirfeelings, then burst free in torrents. Their demands were simple: benches and toilet facilities in the National Lottery Office. Simple things, but they were tired of waiting. I returned at the beginning of June. Government soldiers were everywhere. The popular organizations were no longer in the streets, since a state of siege had made all demonstrations illegal. But the slogans and struggle had escalated beyond demands for daily needs. A poster in a working class barrio showed a young man holding a machine gun: "Join the Armed Forces of Popular Libera- tion. Venceremos. " By 8:30 p.m., the streets were deserted. A queer calm set in, punctuated by occasional gunfire, bomb explosions and the purr of the National Guard convoys heading toward another night of murder. I went to see old friends in the tugurios on the edge of the city. Everyone had a horror story to tell, corroborated by neighbors and others who needed to tell the stories as a form of catharsis: Dona Teresa had gotten up early one morning to do marketing. On her way, she found a body cut in half; one half left on one street corner, the other on the next. A mother of five children told me of a woman, a militant of the popular organizations, whose head was cut off and tied by the hair to a fence, her nude body lying beneath it. REPRESSION (WITH A DOSE OF REFORM) 1. Francisco Andres Escobar, "En la linea de la muerte," Estudios Centroamericanos, Nos. 375-376, January-February, 1980, pp. 25-27. 2. Stephen Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics 1960-1972, (Baton Rouge and London: 1979). 3. Memorandum of Meeting with Robert White on June 4, 1980 with representatives of 6 Congresspeople, Washington, D.C. 4. Washington Post, July 2, 1980. 5. Cynthia Arnson and Delia Miller, "Background Information on El Salvador .. ," p. 4. 6. NACLA interview with ISTA technician, San Salvador, June 2. 1980. Also comments by Ruben Zamora in conference held at the Center for Inter- American Relations, New York City, July 28, 1980. On March 17, 1980 Amnesty International called on the government of El Salvador to halt a campaign of murder and abduction against peasants, launched following an announcement of agrarian reform. Amnesty Interna- tional news release, New York City, March 17, 1980. 7. Washington Post, July 1, 1980. 8. Solidaridad, Nos. 13-15, 1980. Solidaridad is the bulletin of the Legal Aid Office of the Archbishop of San Salvador. It is published weekly and includes a weekly review of the government's violations of human rights. Over the July 4 weekend, the government sent troops into its offices and confiscated all of the files, including signed statements by eyewitnesses of atrocities committed by Na- tional Guardsmen and other members of the security forces. Its address is SocorroJ uridico del Arzobispado de San Salvador, Apartado Postal 06-294. San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A. 9. NACLA interview with Enrique Alvarez Cordova, President of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, New York City, July 28, 1980. Agrocenso del Gobierno de El Salvador, San Salvador, 1971. 10. New York Times, March 13, 1980. 11. Interpress Service, "El Salvador: 'Land Reform' as a 'Counter Insurgency' Programme like CIA's 'Phoenix' Operation in Vietnam," July 25, 1980. Also, Carolyn Forche and Philip Wheaton, History and Motivations of U.S. Involvement in the Control of the Peasant Move- ment in El Salvador (Washington, D.C.: EPICA, 1980). Copies of this pamphlet are available from EPICA, 1470 Irving Street N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20010, U.S.A. for $2.00 plus 50 cents postage in the U.S.A. 12. For information on AIFLD's history in Latin America see the following back issues of NA CLA Report on the Americas: Smoldering Conflict: Dominican Republic, 1965-1975, Vol. 9, No. 3; Argentina: AIFLD Losing its Grip, Vol. 8, No. 9; Chile: The Story Behind the Coup, Vol. 7, No. 8. 13. Communique of the Salvadorean Communal Union (UCS), San Salvador, June 5, 1980. 14. Cynthia Arnson and Delia Miller, "Background Information on El Salvador .. .. ," p.6. 15. Miami Herald, March 11, 1980. 16. This Week Central America and Panama, February 4, 1980. 17. Cynthia Arnson and Delia Miller, "Background Information on El Salvador . . .," p. 9.
