When the new Costa-Gavras film State of Siege opened in commercial theaters in 1972 (a scheduled premier showing at the federally-funded J. F. Kennedy Arts Center was cancelled because of official displeasure), U.S. movie critics generally confined their comments to the "aesthe- tic" qualities of the film and avoided discussion of the movie's charges of U.S. complicity in right-wing police terrorism in Latin America. Now, over a year later, comes new evidence that State of Siege was unerringly accurate in its portrayal of U.S. counterinsurgency programs in Latin America. At one point in the film, an Uruguayan police officer is shown receiving training in the manufacture and use of explosive devices at a secret training school in the Southwestern United States. Later, the same officer is linked to a rightist "Death Squad" implicated in multiple murders--some performed with explosives--of pro- minent Uruguayan radicals. For most American viewers, these scenes must have appeared as mere cinemagraphic flourishes in a controversial film. But State Department documents unearthed by Sena- tor James Abourezk (D-S.D.) show beyond a doubt that the U.S. Government has trained foreign police officers in bomb design at a remote camp in Texas, and that at least 16 Uruguayan police- men received such training. The existence of the Abourezk papers was first disclosed in Jack Anderson's syndicated column for October 8, 1973; subsequently, NACLA received a full set of the documents which were used in preparing the following story. In a memorandum to Senator Abourezk, Matthew Harvey of the U.S. Agency for Interna- tional Development (AID) acknowledged September 25, 1973 that AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS) provides instruction for foreign policemen in the design, manufacture and employment of home- made bombs and incendiary devices at the U.S. Border Patrol Academy in Los Fresnos, Texas. At least 165 policemen--mostly from Third World countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America--have taken this "Technical Investigations Course" since it was first offered in 1969. All costs of the training--rated at $1,750 per student--are borne by AID. According to the AID documents, students in the Technical Investigations Course first attend a four-week preliminary session at the Interna- tional Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C., where they are treated to lectures on such sub- jects as: Basic Electricity ("Problems involving electricity as applied to explosives are given"), Introduction to Bombs and Explosives ("A lecture/ demonstration" on "the various types of explosives and explosive systems"), Incendiaries ("A lecture/ demonstration of incendiary devices"), and Assassination Weapons ("A discussion of various weapons which may be used by the assassin"). After completion of the preliminary course, the "trainees" are flown to Los Fresnos for the four week "field sessions." Here, all lectures are delivered at an outdoor "laboratory" presided over by CIA instructors. Lecture/demonstrations encompass such topics as: Characteristics of Explosives; Electric Priming; Electric Firing De- vices; Explosive Charges; Homemade Devices; Fa- brication and Functioning of Devices; and Incen- diaries. According to AID, these sessions include "practical exercises" with "different types of explosive devices and 'booby-traps."' (In State of Siege, sample bombs are exploded in buildings, automobiles, and in a 'public plaza' filled with dummies.) In its memo to Senator Abourezk, Harvey argues that the Technical Investigations Course was set up to help foreign policemen develop "countermeasures" against terrorist attacks on banks, corporations, and embassies. In order to develop countermeasures, however, the trainee must first study "home laboratory techniques" used "in the manufacture of explosives and incen- diaries"--only then, according to AID's argument, will he be able "to take preventive action to protect lives and property." Although Harvey stresses the "defensive" nature of the training program, he admits that the Department of Defense found the subject mat- ter so inherently sensitive that it refused to provide instructors for the course--thus forcing AID to get help from the CIA. Indeed, once a "trainee" becomes proficient in bomb techniques, there is no stopping him from using them offen- - 19TABLE I: FOREIGN POLICEMEN TRAINED AT U.S. BOMB SCHOOL LOS FRESNOS, TEX. 1969-73 Number Country: Trained: LATIN AMERICA Bolivia ................... Brazil .................... British Honduras .......... Colombia .................. Costa Rica ................ Chile ..................... Ecuador ................... El Salvador ............... Guatemala ................. Guyana .................... Honduras .................. Jamaica ................... Mexico .................... Panama .................... Rep. Dominicana ............ Trinidad .................. Uruguay ................... Venezuela ................. E. ASIA & PACIFIC Guam ...................... Korea ..................... Philippines ............... Thailand .................. Vietnam ................... NEAR EAST & S. ASIA Afghanistan ............... Iran ...................... Jordan .................... Pakistan .................. Saudi Arabia .............. AFRICA Kenya ..................... Nigeria ................... Sudan ..................... Tunisia ................... Zambia .................... EUROPE Germany ................... 3 6 1 19 4 5 6 7 18 1 4 2- 2 7 4 5 16 3 1 3 5 10 1 1 2 2 1 6 3 2 2 4 6 3 TOTAL ....................... 165 Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, memo to Senator J. Abourezk, Sept. 19, 1973. - 20 - sively--against criminal enterprises or, as in State of Siege--against opponents of the ruling oligarchy. Such concern becomes justified when one examines a list of countries represented at the Texas bomb school: almost every country in Latin America is on the list, as are such conser- vative Middle Eastern nations as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Prominent entries include Bolivia (3 students), Brazil (6), Guatemala (18), the Dominican Republic (4), Chile (5), Uruguay (16), Korea (3), Thailand (10), Iran (2), and the Philippines (5). (See Table I.) Indeed, there is mounting evidence that some Third World police- men (particularly in Latin America) are themselves engaged in terrorist activities, utilizing their U.S.-supplied training in vigilante assassination teams like La Mano Blanca (White Hand) and Ojo por Ojo (Eye for an Eye) in Guatemala, La Banda (The Band) in the Dominican Republic, and the "Death Squads" in Brazil and Uruguay. It is generally acknowledged that the Death Squads are made up of "off duty" policemen and representatives of the civil and military intel- ligence services. ("The members of the Death Squad are policemen," Sao Paolo's top criminal judge affirmed in 1970, "and everyone knows it.")I As depicted in State of Siege, these groups en- gage in kidnapping, torture, assassination and bombing; their victims range from petty criminals to students, folksingers, academicians, and poli- tical activists. 2 Week after week, the Latin American press announces the death of yet another body; some estimates of the number of persons executed by the Death Squads in Brazil exceed 1,500.3 Frequently, the bodies of these victims are found with cards boasting of the work of the Death Squad--clearly the intent is to intimidate the population and discourage the development of any opposition to the established regime. 4 The use of terrorism to intimidate Third World populations is considered an essential ele- ment of America's post-Vietnam strategy for social control in the Third World. Since it is obvious that the American public will not permit massive numbers of U.S. ground troops to be employed in future counterrevolutionary wars, the Nixon Administration seeks to eliminate all threats to pro-U.S. Third World regimes without deploying U.S. combat forces. By building up a powerful and ruthless police force in each country, the United States can insure that radi- cal movements will be destroyed before they pre- sent a significant military threat. This "pre- emptive" strategy was described by Under Secre- tary of State U. Alexis Johnson in a 1971 speech to IPA graduates as follows: "Effective polic- ing is like 'preventive medicine.' The police can deal with threats to internal order in their formative states. Should they not be prepared to do this, 'major surgery' may be required in the sense that considerable force would be needed to redress those threats. This action is painful and expensive and often disruptive in itself." 5With Johnson's words in mind, it comes as no sur- prise that the countries with the most active para-police assassination squads--Brazil, Guate- mala, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay--are also the recipients of the largest U.S. police training grants in the region. (See Table II.) U.S. involvement in the organization, train- ing and equipping of Uruguay's Death Squad is abundantly described in the testimony of Nelson Bardesio--a police photographer and Death Squad member who was kidnapped and interrogated by Tupamaro guerrillas in 1972. In his testimony (which was recorded in the presence of the Presi- dent of Uruguay's Chamber of Deputies), Bardesio affirmed that the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII)--a government agency which provided an official "cover" for the Death Squad-- was set up with the advice and financial assis- tance of U.S. Public Safety Advisor William Can- trell. Bardesio also testified that Cantrell (who he sometimes served as chauffeur) made daily trips between the DII, Montevideo police head- quarters and the U.S. Embassy to insure the steady transfer of intelligence data and effec- tive coordination of extra-legal operations. As part of this process, U.S. Embassy personnel periodically solicited specific informat on from the DII for their own intelligence work. Bardesio also speculates that Cantrell was in fact working for the CIA--which is highly possible given the fact that ex-AID official David Fairchild revealed that the CIA used the Public Safety program in the Domigican Republic as a cover for six of its agents. In addition to Cantrell, Bardesio identified other U.S. Embassy and Public Safety personnel as intelli- gence operatives who met regularly with members of the DII. In his testimony (which served as the basis for several scenes in State of Siege) Bardesio named Uruguayan police officers and military of- ficials who participated in specific Death Squad assassinations and bombings with the approval of government officials--including the Minister of the Interior. He also reported that the Death Squad had ample supplies of explosive materials used in the manufacture of homemade bombs and booby traps. The Brazilian Death Squads--notorious for the mutilation of their victims--are closely linked to the police and the military intelli- gence service and operate with the tacit approval of the military junta. For years no one dared testify against the Death Squad members, but in 1970 the incidence of murders increased dramati- cally: the "Ten for One" (reprisal) dictum had become a basic tenet of police work in Brazil, and, following the murder of a Sao Paulo police investigator, nearly 20 people were summarily executed by the police. After event, several dozen police officers were arrested and later convicted of murder and other terrorist crimes During their trials, links were established be- tween the Death Squads and numerous military officers, officials, and even a state governor. The investigation was finally suspended when wit- nesses implicated Sergio Fleury--a top officer of the political police--in Death Squad executions. 8 (Fleury, a leader in the campaign against Brazil's urban guerrillas, has been identified by hundreds of political prisoners as the man who supervised their torture.) 9 Considering the extent of U.S. involvement in the Brazilian police apparatus, it is safe to assume that U.S. AID officials knew of and sup- ported police participation in Death Squad raids against Leftists. The Public Safety program in Brazil has assisted in training locally over 100,000 federal and state police personnel, while an additional 600 high-ranking officers received training at the International Police Academy and other schools in the United States. In addition, the United States can take credit for the con- struction, equipping and development of curricu- lum, staff and faculty for Brazil's National Police Academy, National Telecommunications Center and National Institutes of Criminalistics and Identification. 1 0 In line with the Nixon Doc- trine, it is likely that these institutions are also being expanded to take over the training of other Third World policemen because of the grow- ing criticism of such training in the United States. Already the relationship between the - 21 -r U.S. Public Safety Program, 1961-72 Dollars in Thousands) Officers Expend- Trained itures in U.S.b U.S. Public Safety Advisorsd WORLDWIDE, Total .... 308,623 7,480 419 EAST ASIA, Total 212,487 1,600 352 Burma 195 - - Cambodia 2,583 - - Guam - 3 - Indonesia 10,121 240 - Korea 7,432 47 - Laos 4,567 61 9 Philippines 5,106 215 8 Thailand 88,436 561 39 Vietnam (S.) 94,047 439 196c Other Countries - 34 - N. EAST & S. ASIA 14,014 731 8 Greece 129 34 - Iran 1,712 218 - Jordan 2,536 65 - Lebanon 149 15 - Nepal 188 - - Pakistan 8,553 125 1 Saudi Arabia - 75 7 Turkey 200 41 - United Arab Rep. 312 97 - CENTO/Region 235 61 - AFRICA, Total Cent. African Rep. Chad Dahomey Ethiopia Ghana Ivory Coast Kenya Liberia Libya Malagasy Rep. Niger Nigeria Somali Republic 25,802 241 527 323 2,924 131 743 697 3,464 444 454 398 3,400 4,560 983 11 12 22 116 43 3 16 113 22 1 16 43 125 16 2 3 Region/Country Expend- Officers U.S. itures Trained Advisors Tunisia 924 118 1 Upper Volta 219 14 - Zaire (Congo) 4,729 139 10 Other countries 1,624 169 - LATIN AMERICA, Total 54,285 4,170 43 Argentina 120 84 - Bolivia 2,141 119 2 Brazil 8,612 654 1 Chile 2,386 107 - Colombia 6,584 446 5 Costa Rica 1,794 150 4 Dominican Rep. 4,091 206 3 Ecuador 3,715 229 3 El Salvador 2,040 220 1 Guatemala 4,480 373 7 Guyana 1,299 45 - Honduras 1,625 102 3 Jamaica 695 72 1 Mexico 745 65 - Nicaragua 224 28 2 Panama 1,979 336 3 Paraguay - 21 - Peru 4,142 151 - Uruguay 2,188 141 4 Venezuela 3,375 583 4 Other countries 582 38 - Regional costs 1,468 - - NON-REGIONAL 2,025 - "aSource: U.S. Agency for International Development, Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1972; b and previous editions. Includes training at the International Police Academy, the FBI Academy, and other schools. CAll U.S. police advisers were officially with- drawn under the terms of the Jan. 1973 peace settlement. dSource: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ap- propriations, Foreign Assistance Appropria- tions for FY 1973, Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Part II, 1972, p. 805. - 22 - (By Fiscal Year; Region/Country r IUruguayan and Brazilian police forces is very strong, with one Brazilian diplomat offering to install equipment for direct radio communications between Brasilia.and Montevideo. 1 1 In addition, according to Bardesio, two Uruguayan intelligence officials received Death Squad-type training in Brazil. A macabre legend has emerged surrounding the operation of such para-police groups as "Ojo por Ojo", in Guatemala, "La Banda" in the Domini- can Republic and other Death Squad organizations. Thus a recent article in a conservative Costa Rican newspaper called for the formation of a native Death Squad to deal with the growing crim- inal violence in that country.1 2 Often, the pro- government press has portrayed the Death Squads as executing petty criminals in an effort to wipe out crime in the streets; but this myth only pro- vides a cover for the kidnapping and assassina- tion of political activists, and their sympathi- zers, while creating a climate of terror in the country. Despite such obfuscation, there is a grow- ing consciousness in Congress that the United States is deeply involved in political terrorism in Latin America. Thus in hearings on the Foreign Aid program, Senator Proxmire summed up the re- sults of the Public Safety Program in Brazil as follows: "The biggest program we had was in Brazil, a program which went on for more than 10 years--at the end of a 10-year period we have an account of a death squad in which 15 police have been arrested."l 1 3 In a report of U.S. aid pro- grams to Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, Pat M. Holt, a staff assistant to the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, re- ported that "The U.S. is politically identified with police terrorism." The police assistance program in Guatemala, where right-wing paramili- tary organizations have run rampant for many years and have carried out nearly 1,000 murders, "has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency." Holt concluded that the ef- fect of the public safety program has been mar- ginal. 1 4 As a result of such findings, and the grow- ing opposition to U.S. police programs abroad, Congress in December 1973 took the first steps toward abolition of the Public Safety program, 400 - 23 - After defeating more decisive measures (the "Abourezk Amendment" calling for complete term- ination of all police programs), the legislature voted, in the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill (S. 1443) to require an orderly phase-out of existing police training programs abroad and a oan on any new programs. The compromise measure failed to affect training at the International Police Academy, however, and it is already ob- vious that opponents of the Public Safety program will have to watch very carefully for Administra- tion maneuvers designed to evade the intent of the bill. Nevertheless, passage of these restric- tions indicates a new determination on the part of some Congresspeople to obstruct Administration efforts to strengthen the repressive forces of favored Third World dictatorships. FOOTNOTES: 1. Nelson Fonseca, quoted in the Miami Herald, July 24, 1970. 2. For the script of State of Siege and sup- porting documents, see State of Siege (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973). 3. See: Jeff Radford, "The Brazilian Death Squads," The Nation, July 30, 1973, pp. 71-3. 4. "Rio's Death Squads," Newsweek, August 9, 1971 5. U. Alexis Johnson, "The Role of Police Forces in a Changing World," Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1971, p. 282. 6. Bardesio's testimony was inserted in the Uruguayan Congressional Record and subse- quently published in Marcha (Montevideo), April 28, 1972. The material on U.S. in- volvement appears in: "Uruguay Police Agent Exposes U.S. Advisors," NACLA's Latin A- merica & Empire Report, July-August, 1972, pp. 20-5. 7. "USAID in the Dominican Republic - An In- side View," NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report, November, 1970, pp. 1-10. 8. Charles Antoine, "Indicting the Death Squad and the Regime," Le Monde, Weekly English Edition, May 6-12, 1971; and, Joseph Novitaki, "It Doesn't Pay to Take on the Death Squads," The New York Times, August 8, 1971. 9. "Tortures Continue Unabated," Brazilian In- formation Bulletin, August-September, 1971, p. 11. 10. "AID Police Plan for 1971-72," NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report, July-August, 1971, p. 18. 11. "Uruguay Police Agent," p. 25. 12. El Grafico (Guatemala City), October 30, 1973. 13. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Hear- ings, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. 748. 14. The Washington Post, January 3, 1972. For full text of the report, see: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, Staff Memoran- dum, 92d Cong., 1st Sees., 1971.
