President Menem and his Peronist party have ruled Argentina unchallenged for nearly a decade. An electoral alliance that formed last year-and defeated the Peronists in legislative elections-has set its sights on the presidency in 1999. Argentina in the late 1980s was devastated by hyperinflation and a political crisis linked to a series of military uprisings against the constitu- tional regime. While the government of Radl Alfonsin, of the Radical Civic Union Party (UCR), held out great VOL XXXI, No 6 MAY/JUNE 1998 RaOl Alfonsin hands over the presidency to Carlos Menem at the Casa Rosada on July 8, 1989, six months ahead of schedule. hope in the early 1980s as the country was emerging from seven dark years of military rule, it had collapsed by 1989 to the point that Alfonsin handed power over to President-elect Carlos Menem, of the Peronist Party (PJ), six months ahead of schedule. The UCR and the PJ, the country's traditional parties, seemed to enjoy widespread support during the transi- tion elections of 1983. Both parties successfully recruited new members, and participation in internal elections and campaign rallies was high. But the impact 11 a a Marcos Novaro is a researcher at the Gino Germani Institute. He is co-author with Vicente Palermo, of Polftica y Poder en el Gobierno de Menem (Flacso/Norma, 1996) and Caminos de la centroizquierda: Dilemas y desafios del FREPASO (Losada, 1998) Translated from the Spanish by Margot Olavarria.REPORT ON ARGENTINA Over the years, Menem's decidedly non-Peronist social and economic policies have undermined the loyalty of the party's traditional constituency. As a result, traditional Peronists began to look elsewhere when it came time to vote. of the country's economic and political crisis under- mined voter loyalties. While 84% of Argentines polled in 1984 said they approved of political parties, by 1988 that number had dropped to 63% and then to 15% in the early 1990s.1 Voluntary membership and local-level party organizations also suffered a significant decline after the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s, two-thirds of Argentine citizens identified themselves as indepen- dents.2 Carlos Menem ably took advantage of this situation when he assumed the presidency in 1989. With the UCR discredited after the collapse of the Alfonsin gov- ernment, and with the Peronist party in a deep internal crisis-racked by disputes between the reformist and orthodox factions and between trade-union and local leaders of the party-both parties willingly delegated broad powers to Menem at the beginning of his term. In fact, between 1989 and 1991, Menem governed without input from his party or from Congress, implementing an aggressive program of pro-market reforms by decree-reforms that fundamentally challenged the basic tenets of Peronism and the developmentalist state it had helped create. Menem's reforms exacerbated the internal crisis of the PJ. The deep divisions within the Peronist leadership made it impossible for those in the party who opposed neoliberalism to mount an effective challenge to Menem's policies. Another faction within the party sup- ported the Menem government in exchange for certain favors, including numerous shady "business deals" which benefited legislators and provincial governors as well as some trade unions. 3 It was Menem's ability to turn these divisions within the PJ to his advantage that secured his hold on power after 1991 and permitted him to sustain the neoliberal course he had embarked upon. In effect, Menem turned the institutional crisis of the Peronist party into an opportunity to redefine and strengthen its organization, identity and program. The PJ was reorganized com- pletely, from the highest positions to each one of its local chapters. Today it is akin to the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), a "state" party, commanded-and financed-from the heights of power and used as a political instrument of govern- ment. 4 This does not mean the party is irrelevant. On the contrary, in the hands of the President, the party is fundamental to guaranteeing the success or at least the viability of the government's policies. This restructur- ing of Peronismo was crucial to the legislative victories of the PJ in 1991 and 1993 and to Menem's reelection in 1995. These victories reinforced Menem's control over the party apparatus by assuring the loyalty of party officials who had ridden Menem's coattails to public office and to bureaucratic positions of power. In sum, Menem has not tried to marginalize and weaken the PJ, as some have argued, but rather, he has progressively incorporated it into the government itself. This has allowed him to use the party not only as an instrument of control from above, but also as a means of connecting the party's grassroots constituency to the government by channeling social demands and regulat- ing public policy. The PJ has thus played a decisive role in articulating a heterogeneous electoral coalition in support of the Menem Administration. This coalition brings together business and middle-class sectors who favor pro-market reforms, on the one hand, and more traditional supporters, linked to old-style Peronist clientelism and populism in the provinces and in the poor neighborhoods of the large cities, on the other. 5 As a result of this reconversion of Peronism, party leaders have greater difficulty communi- cating with the grassroots. Moreover, Menem's decidedly non-Peronist social and economic policies began to undermine the loyalty of the PJ's traditional electoral constituency. As a result, traditional Peronist voters began to look elsewhere when it came time to vote. This, in turn, gave rise to a new opposition force, the National Solidarity Front (FREPASO), a center-left coalition established in 1994. From the outset, FREPASO was a harsh critic of Menem's relentless neoliberalism and consistently challenged him to respond to the growing problems of unemployment and poverty. Paradoxically, then, neoliberal structural reforms and the transformation of Peronism brought about by Menem and his cronies created the conditions for the emergence of a progressive movement in Argentina. NACILA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12REPORT ON ARGENTINA Children eat lunch at a Peronist- sponsored soup kitchen in Moreno, a shantytown 20 miles from downtown Buenos Aires. Argentina's other traditional party, the Radicals, was facing serious internal problems of its own-a situation which also favored the emergence of FREPASO. The UCR, besieged by crisis after the collapse of the Alfonsin Administration, had difficulties adopting a unified and consistent position against Menem. 6 In effect, Menem had coopted the economic program that Alfonsin and the Radical presidential candidate in 1989, Eduardo Angeloz, had been advocating. The pro- Alfonsin faction of the UCR thus had little credibility when it criticized the growing concentration of wealth and the corruption increasingly evident in the Menem government. The pro-Angeloz sector of the UCR, meanwhile, openly backed Menem's policies. This division within the UCR, coupled with the party's defeat in the 1991 and 1993 legislative elections, prompted Radical governors in C6rdoba, Catamarca, Chubut and Rio Negro as well as hundreds of UCR mayors throughout the country to distance themselves from the party's national leadership. They preferred to limit themselves to local politics and avoid national problems in order to rebuild local-level support for the UCR in their districts, and, at the same time, to avoid antagonizing the central government, which retained control of the purse strings for local government. This situation came to a head in 1993, when several Radical governors publicly expressed their support for the official proposal to reform the Constitution in order to allow Menem to run for reelection in 1995. The risk of an irreversible rupture within the UCR was one of VOL XXXI, No 6 MAY/JuNE 1998 the motives behind Alfonsfn's decision to sign the reelection agreement, known as the Olivos Pact. That decision precipitated a more dramatic electoral loss for the Radicals, marked by a flight of votes and leaders to FREPASO. These problems did not, however, cause the complete disintegration of the UCR. It retained four governor- ships in the 1995 elections, in addition to the province of Chaco, which it governed in alliance with FREPASO. By the end of 1995, the Radical Party had renovated its national leadership and recovered its unity-a key element to the UCR victory in the munic- ipal elections of 1996, when it won the city government of Buenos Aires. The partial recomposition of the UCR was crucial in allowing the party to redefine its strategy and seal an alliance with FREPASO in 1997. FREPASO was unquestionably the most dynamic opposition force of this period. It was the result of the convergence of dissident groups from the PJ and the UCR with Socialist Unity and other smaller groups from the left and center-left, including the Christian Democrats, the Intransigent Party and the Communist Party. A wide gamut of social activists and leaders were also crucial to the founding of FREPASO. In marked contrast to the country's traditional parties, the group's organizational and territorial presence is minimal. Its success is based essentially on the prestige of a handful of leaders who are dynamic and effective communica- tors-primarily congressional leaders Carlos "Chaco" Alvarez, a former Peronist who abandoned the PJ in 13 CREPORT ON ARGENTINA FREPASO and the Radicals knew that if the Peronists won the 1997 legislative elections, it would be impossible to defeat them in the presidential elections two years later. Together, they formed the Alliance for Jobs, Justice and Education, and swept the 1997 vote. 1990 due to his opposition to Menem's neoliberal poli- cies, and Graciela Ferndndez Mejide, a former school- teacher who became a prominent human rights activist after one of her children was disappeared by the mili- tary dictatorship. FREPASO saw its first electoral success in the April 1994 Constitutional Assembly. With voters upset over the signing of the Olivos Pact, the FREPASO list won in Buenos Aires and the province of Neuqu6n. In the pres- idential elections the following year, FREPASO won nearly 30% of the vote, displacing the Radicals as Argentina's second-largest political force. Key to FREPASO's electoral success in both election cam- paigns was the fact that the mass media and a broad sec- tor of independent public opinion were increasingly receptive to the group's center-left discourse, which crit- icized corruption and the government's abuse of author- ity, the concentration of wealth, and the dramatic rise in poverty under Menem's watch. In effect, FREPASO was able to take advantage of a growing popular demand for a progressive, nationalist opposition at a time when the UCR appeared to have abandoned this role. The presence of FREPASO has had a notable impact on Argentine politics. First, it prompted the traditional parties, and especially the Radicals, to renew their party leadership and to revise their policies and strategies. Second, its emergence as a third force effectively opened the door for the formation of governing coali- tions and for a more open game of competition and col- laboration between political parties than was ever possi- ble under the previous bipartisan system. Finally, FREPASO has stimulated public debate and prompted a flurry of legislative activity. The formation in 1997 of the Alliance for Jobs, Education and Justice-a coalition of FREPASO and the UCR-consolidated these changes, producing a fundamental shift in Argentine politics. As early as 1995, FREPASO and the UCR began to entertain the possibility of forming an alliance with a view to the July 1999 presiden- tial elections. Aware of the difficulty of confronting Peronism divided, the two parties began to negotiate a series of concrete agreements. In Congress, for exam- ple, they agreed that the special powers to legislate demanded by the President had to be curtailed, and they declared their opposition to both the structural-adjust- ment policies implemented in mid-1996 and to the 1997 budget. To address the pressing problem of unemploy- ment, the UCR and FREPASO called for a special ses- sion of Congress that resulted in the formation of a per- manent joint committee. There was also collaboration at other levels. In early 1996, Carlos Alvarez of FREPASO and Rodolfo Terragno, president of the UCR, organized a Multi- sector Forum, an assembly of party, social, union and business organizations that planned a series of creative protests against government policies. Some of these protests, including the blackout of September 12, 1996 and the cacerolazo, or pot-banging, against the hike in telephone rates on February 10, 1997, had far-reaching repercussions in terms of mobilizing public opinion in favor of FREPASO and the UCR. The success of the blackout in particular marks a point of rupture in the political scenario. Not only did it reveal the growing consensus among the opposition-even on the issue of economic policy, which until then had been the govern- ment's strong suit-but it also convinced the Radicals and the Frentistas, as members of FREPASO are called, of the benefits of an alliance between the two groups. They had enough foresight to see that if the Peronists were successful in the 1997 parliamentary elections, it would be difficult if not impossible to defeat them in the presidential elections two years later. Formally established in August 1997, just two months before the legislative elections, the Alliance openly announced that its intention was to redraw the political map in Argentina, beginning with the 1997 elections, as part of a larger process of building a new majority and a new government in 1999. Its first steps were to criticize the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive during the Menem Administration and to reaffirm the importance of Congress in consolidating a democratic political system based on checks and balances. The Alliance then developed a series of themes that would guide the 1997 campaign and shape the future legisla- tive agenda, which included the creation of the Council of the Magistracy, charged with appointing judges and NAC1IA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 14REPORT ON ARGENTINA Graciela Fernandez Meijide, a congressional leader for the Alliance for Jobs, Justice and Education, is a leading contender for the 1999 presidential elections. overseeing their conduct, the Public Ministry and an investiga- tive committee on corruption. Also among the Alliance's leg- islative priorities are limiting the powers delegated to the President, approving laws on public ethics and the financing of political parties, and eliminating reserve funds, which consist of budgeted funds that are con- trolled by the President, who is not required to report how they are spent. The Alliance has also sought to establish a job-creation program, to promote small and medium businesses and the development of regional economies, to obtain funding to increase the abysmally low salaries of schoolteachers, and to reduce taxes on basic food items. While the Menem Administration had proven adept at keeping such issues out of the campaign agenda on previous occasions, it was unable to do so in the 1997 legislative elections, which were swept by the Alliance. This was partly due to the fact that Fernindez Meijide, the Alliance candidate for the province of Buenos Aires, proved to be an adept and persuasive advocate. Ferndndez Meijide is well known for her ability to translate institutional debates into practical issues, and for championing human rights, justice and social inte- gration. She is perceived as an honest leader who is effective and reasonable, and she combines a spirit of opposition with a vocation for public service that the Alliance seeks to project. The conservative populist discourse of Eduardo Duhalde, the Peronist governor of Buenos Aires and Menem's likely successor as presi- dential candidate, stands in marked contrast to that of Alliance leaders like Fernmndez Meijide. The Alliance swept the elections at the national level, with 45.6% of the vote, compared to 36.2% for the PJ. The Alliance won 61 seats in the lower house, effec- tively breaking the Peronist majority in the Chamber of Deputies. But perhaps the most significant and surpris- ing result of the election was the Alliance victory in Buenos Aires-long considered a bastion of Peronism-where it won 48.3% of the vote, compared to the PJ's 41.3%. The electoral results have been devastating for the PJ. Duhalde's status as the Peronists' "natural candidate" in the 1999 presidential elections is now up for grabs-giving Menem a chance to redouble his attempt to change the Constitution yet again in order to run for a third consec- utive term as president. Given Menem's apparent deter- mination to remain in the Casa Rosada, the 1999 elec- tions represent an important test for Argentine democ- racy-the first peaceful transfer of power from a Peronist to a president of another political party. While the alternation of power from a Radical president to a Peronist in 1989 was an important step towards the con- solidation of democracy-particularly since it repre- sented the first peaceful transfer of power in Argentina this century-the problem of succession remains at least partly unresolved. The upheavals of the late 1980s-hyperinflation and the crisis of governability- which led to the early transfer of power to Menem were partly the result of the uncertainty generated by the imminent change in presidential leadership. It remains to be seen whether the PJ will accept the electoral defeat of an incumbent Peronist president and step down from power peacefully. This is especially problematic given the restructuring of the Peronist party under Menem and the fact that the PJ remains united and active primarily due to its intimate links to the state. In this sense, handing over power to another party may be perceived by some Peronist leaders as a threat to the party's very existence. Will this lead the PJ to seek to retain power at all costs, even the demise of constitutional rule in Argentina? The fact that Peronism has already played the role of an opposition party dur- ing the Alfonsfn government offers some hope that if the PJ loses the elections, it will peacefully hand over power to its elected successor. Only then will Argentina have passed this crucial test for the consolidation of democracy. Shifting Alliances: Party Politics in Argentina 1 .James W. McGuire, "Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 200-246. 2. Edgardo Catterberg, Los argentinos frente a la politica. Cultura politica y opinion pOblica en la transicifn argentina a la democra- cia (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1989). 3.On the behavior of unionists, see Victoria Murillo, "Union Responses to Economic Reform in Argentina: Organizational Autonomy and the Marketization of Corporatism," 1994, Mimeo- graph. On governors, see Edward Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, "Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence from Argen- tina," 1997, Mimeograph; and Vicente Palermo and Marcos Novaro, Politica y poder en el gobierno de Menem (Buenos Aires: Norma, 1996). On the relationship between the Executive and the party in Congress, see Sebastian Etcheruendy and Vicente Palermo, "Conflicto y concertaci6n. Gobierno, Congreso y organizaciones de interns en America Latina," in Desarrollo Econdmico, No. 133 (1998). 4. Steven Levitsky, "Crisis, Party Adaptation, and Regime Stability in Argentina: The Case of Peronism, 1989-1995," 1997, Mimeograph. 5. Edward Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, "Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms"; and Steven Levitsky, "Crisis, Party Adaptation, and Regime Stability in Argentina." 6. Vicente Palermo and Marcos Novaro, Politica y poder en el gob- ierno de Menem.
