Fujimori's Deeper Problems eru's President Alberto Fujimori, who has assiduously cultivated the image of an iron-fisted imposer of order, was badly shaken by last month's hostage-taking at the home of the Japanese ambassador to Peru. Since the fateful capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmdn in late 1992, Fujimori has had the political capital to deal with sticky situa- tions-from serious accusations of human rights crimes to allegations of military involvement in drug traf- ficking. [See Newsbriefs, pp. 1-2.] But when the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), a guerrilla group seemingly on the verge of disappearance, took some 500 powerful party-goers hostage on December 17, Fujimori-who has often repeated his absolute unwill- ingness to negotiate with Peru's armed groups-found himself in quite a pickle. To give in to the MRTA's demands might embolden the more dangerous Shining Path guerrillas to carry out similar moves to free their comrades, and would certainly cause problems for his alliance with Peru's hard-line mili- tary. But a commando-style rescue attempt would risk a bloodbath that would harm his image at home and abroad-perhaps beyond repair. Fujimori's two most powerful international allies-the United States and Japan-were sending him opposite signals. While the Japanese government, with several of its officials' lives at stake, urged him to consider first and foremost the lives of the hostages, the U.S. government reiterated its position, in State Department lingo, not to "reward terrorists." Washington's tone no doubt bolstered the hard- line position of the armed forces, who are unwilling to change their no-concessions policy to guerrillas. The takeover came at a difficult time for Fujimori, whose popularity rating has been steadily declining over the past year. Jobs are scarce and the economy is stagnating. As his economic model unravels, toler- ance for his authoritarian style is wearing thin. Opposition was wide- spread, for example, to a recent law allowing him to run for a third term (the Constitution imposes a two- term limit). And, after publicized rows with the armed forces, his principal alliance is showing signs of strain. In this context, the MRTA's spectacular action under- mined the main leg of his populari- ty: keeping political violence under control. With Shining Path's Guzmin behind bars, and the MRTA barely visible, nearly everyone began to believe the government propaganda that the "subversive threat" no longer existed. As the security forces began to relax their guard, the guerrillas-the MRTA as well as Shining Path-began to rebuild their organizations. Analysts say that the police were aware of attempts by the MRTA to regroup in the last several months, but their efforts to re-assemble a special task force to begin intelligence gathering came too late. In part, the security forces were far too willing to believe the government's own pro- paganda that the guerrilla move- ments had been wiped out. The local and international press ate up Fujimori's propaganda like candy, churning out stories about the government's success in control- ling inflation, stopping the guerril- las, and installing a free-market par- adise. Now the press is obsessed with the "return of terrorism" in Peru. The fact is that neither the MRTA nor Shining Path had ever left; they simply switched gears, reassessed their plans, and tried to adapt to circumstances that were largely unfavorable to their activi- ties, given the growing power of Peru's military. Political violence has declined significantly since 1992, but the strength of guerrilla groups cannot be measured only by the number of violent attacks they engage in. The local and interna- tional press were far too willing to believe the Fujimori myth that everything was under control. The deeper problem, of course, is that Fujimori's neoliberal policies have aggravated the conditions that gave rise to armed movements in Peru in the first place. Neoliberal economic reforms have deepened poverty in the country- especially in the cities, where the bulk of the population is now con- centrated. Fujimori's "poverty alle- viation" program has done precious little to address the needs of most Peruvians, who have benefited not at all from neoliberal economics. And his "success" against Shining Path and the MRTA has been predi- cated on repression and the denial of any semblance of judicial due process. Military courts have sent hundreds of innocent people to rot in Peru's inhospitable jails. Police units based on intelligence gather- ing, like the special unit responsible for capturing Guzmin, have been systematically disassembled by Fujimori and his military cronies, who saw them as a threat to their consolidation of power. With no attempt at addressing the underlying causes of political violence, the Fujimori government now finds itself face to face with the failure of its neoliberal counter-insurgency policy. The hens, it seems, are com- ing home to roost.
