U S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAD A REMARK- . able consistency over the span of seven presidencies from Eisenhower to Reagan. It was rooted in three objec- tives: to overthrow the Cuban government; to isolate and "contain" Cuba; and to reduce the Soviet presence in Cuba. Initially, U.S. policy-makers focused on the first goal. Isola- tion was one of several means to that end. By 1971 isolation and containment had become ends in and of themselves, apart from the objective of overthrowing the Cuban govem- ment, and Cuban ties to the Soviet Union became a primary consideration. At first, the Eisenhower Administration watched the unfolding revolution without a clear determination about what course the United States would follow. But even as early as March 10, 1959-at a point when Cuba had not yet nationalized the holdings of any U.S. corporations-the Na- tional Security Council discussed ways of bringing "another government to power in Cuba."'' By mid-1959, the admini- stration clearly had opted for some form of antagonistic relationship. Cuba initially stayed quite distant from the Soviet Union, which had shown little interest in the revolution. It was not until February 1960 that a high-level Soviet delegation travelled to the island. By this time U.S. public opinion had begun to shift against the new Cuban government, because of the "show" trials of former Batista soldiers and press reports that Cuba might become socialist. In mid-1960, the United States ordered U.S. oil companies in Cuba not to refine any crude from the Soviet Union. Castro retaliated by nationaliz- ing the refineries, and soon thereafter the United States cancelled the quota on how much Cuban sugar could enter the United States. (Though the total U.S. economic embargo was instituted on February 6, 1962, nearly all trade calculated attempt at military intimidation. State Depart- ment officials asserted that such a high seas interdiction is routine, and that State had received permission from Panama (the country of registry) to board the boat. Whether the order to fire at the Hermann emanated from the "highest levels" of the U.S. government, as one Cuban official said in an interview, or whether it was a routine interdiction as the State Department claimed, the incident illustrates what is striking about the Bush Ad- ministration's Cuba policy in general: a lack of rancor. No Elliott Abrams in the State Department or Jos6 Sorzano in the National Security Council revels in attacking Cuba, or sees the overthrow of the Cuban government as a personal mission." Denunciations now are made with an almost ritualistic banality that reflects both bureaucratic inertia and the routine nature of hostility toward Cuba. UBA'S DIMINISHING NATIONAL SECURITY importance has had a curious effect on the way U.S. policy is determined. Career foreign policy officials said with Cuba ended shortly after the United States set the Cuban sugar quota at zero, in July 1960. In 1964 the United States persuaded the Organization of American States to institute a hemispheric embargo against Cuba. 2 ) On January 3, 1961, President Eisenhower broke diplo- matic relations with Cuba. Ten months earlier he had author- ized preparations for an invasion of the island by 1,500 Cuban exiles, who were trained and supplied by the CIA. The invasion became the ill-fated Bay of Pigs episode of April 17- 19, 1961, in which the invading forces were routed in 72 hours.) President Kennedy's policy response to the defeat came seven months later when he authorized a covert war against Cuba. One element of the war was diplomatic pressure to undermine the legitimacy of the Cuban government. In January 1962, at U.S. urging, the OAS suspended Cuba's membership. The OAS contended that Cuba had become a member of the "Sino-Soviet bloc of countries," and in fact Cuba had turned to the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries when the United States cut off trade and aid. Castro responded to the OAS vote with the Second Declaration of Havana on February 4, 1962, saying, "The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution." 4 The Kennedy Administration's covert war developed out of a well-orchestrated, multifaceted plan named Operation Mongoose intended to "bring about the revolt of the Cuban people...[which] will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace."' Operation Mongoose involved the follow- ing: several attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro; weekly landings in Cuba of arms, supplies, and mercenary soldiers for anti-government forces fighting largely in the Escambray Mountains; the creation and maintenance of a large CIA base in Florida to support the war; and the sabotage of Cuban agriculture and industry, including the destruction of ma- chinery, the burning of fields, and the poisoning of harvested crops bound for export. 6 Operation Mongoose planners rec- ognized that to succeed in destabilizing the Cuban govern- VOLUME XXIV, NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER 1990) 17RCubaeo o AmIeia Cuba II in interviews that the policy has been taken out of their hands and is being made in the White House. That would suggest Bush has attached great importance to the policy. But these officials also say that inside the White House, little attention is being given to Cuba. One official explained the seeming paradox by re- marking that "the President is letting himself be pushed by external forces because he is comfortable about the direction in which they are pushing him." In effect, he has delegated Cuba policy to an active congressional group, inspired by domestic lobbies, that regularly pushes the administration into a position of aggressive posturing. While State, Treasury and Defense Department actions against Cuba reflect a bureaucratic imperative to continue thirty years of animosity, Bush's hostility toward Cuba is largely a reaction to domestic pressures. Notably, the most hostile efforts directed against Cuba have originated in Congress. T.V. Marti did not emerge from the White House. It was spearheaded by Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-SC). Proposals to expand the embargo against ment, the United States would likely have to use its own military forces. 7 In an incredible historical irony, the target date set for the revolt and possible U.S. invasion was October 1962, when the so-called Cuban Missile Crisis occurred. Notably, planning for the revolt began before either the Cubans or Soviets ever discussed missiles." The missile crisis has become the stuff of legend. But Operation Mongoose is usually missing from the legend. Most accounts exclude Cuba and begin the confrontation between the superpowers on October 14, 1962, when a U-2 spy flight confirmed reports that the Soviet Union was building a facility for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles at San Crist6bal. From the Cuban perspective, the crisis began when Mongoose was approved in 1961; Cuba saw the missiles as a way of deterring the impending U.S. aggression envisioned in Mongoose. On October 22, President Kennedy announced that the U.S. had initiated a naval quarantine to prevent completion of the missile sites, and he demanded the facilities be dis- mantled. Tension mounted as Soviet ships steamed toward Cuba and the waiting U.S. warships, and finally broke when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to the demands on October 28. This came shortly after an errant Soviet com- mander gave the order to shoot down a U-2 with a surface-to- air missile, which nearly led to a U.S. invasion. In return for Khrushchev's concession, President Ken- nedy promised not to invade Cuba.' But the crisis actually ended a month later, after Cuba agreed to allow the Soviet Union to remove IL-28 bombers from the island as well as the missiles. The missile crisis may have chastened the superpowers about the danger of nuclear war. But it continues to stand as an enduring irritant in U.S.-Cuban relations. It was a confron- tation that gave the United States an unprecedented sense of vulnerability, and Cuba was the locus of this threat. Though the confrontation ended peacefully, and included a no- invasion pledge, Cuban leaders did not believe the United States would adhere to its promise. And the removal of Soviet Cuba by including third country U.S. subsidiaries, and by mandating that vessels be seized in U.S. ports if they had docked in Cuba within six months, were initiated by Sen. Mack and Rep. Smith. These efforts were focal points for the Cuban Ameri- can National Foundation, a tax-exempt organization, and its lobbying arm, the Cuban American Foundation. Cre- ated in 1981, CANF modelled itself on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), by establish- ing local chapters throughout the country and developing active ties to Congress." 4 AIPAC reportedly even trained CANF staff in tactics for transforming a foreign policy issue into a domestic one that would be susceptible to interest group pressure. CANF's greatest influence lies with the Florida con- gressional delegation because of the large Cuban-Ameri- can and conservative Latino population there. Rep. Smith, for example, has been especially solicitous of CANF and chairman Mis Canosa during congressional hearings, and his foreign policy voting record shifted to the right after an weaponry vital for Cuba's defense against potential U.S. aggression exposed their own vulnerability."' The remainder of the decade after the missile crisis was a period of cold war between the United States and Cuba. There was little direct contact, and the contact that did occur only served to deepen antagonisms. Despite Kennedy's pledge, the United States maintained some support for the counter-revolutionaries who actively fought inside Cuba until 1966. The attempts on Fidel Castro's life also continued until at least 1965." Meanwhile, Cuba supported revolution- aries in Latin America who were attempting to overthrow U.S. client states. N 1970, THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTED THE Soviet Union again, in a mini-missile crisis, over the con- struction of a submarine base at Cienfuegos. National Secu- rity Advisor Henry Kissinger "quietly" demanded that the base be dismantled, and the Soviets complied." The incident was a harbinger of the reduced tension that marked much of the decade. A movement to relax the hostility between the two countries began in the U.S. Congress in 1971, and it gained force over the next four years." The United States appeared isolated, while the intent of the policy had been the reverse--to isolate Cuba. A growing number of Latin American coun- tries were breaking the trade embargo and calling for a change in the OAS prohibition on trade with Cuba. While congresspeople acted independently, the admini- stration signaled its support for their activities at key junc- tures. The United States signed an anti-hijacking treaty with Cuba in February 1973. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger named William Rogers--an advocate of negotia- tions with Cuba-as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs. By the end of 1974, Rogers was meeting with Cuban U.N. diplomats in New York. In 1975, the Ford Administration relaxed its position on economic sanctions by voting to lift the OAS embargo. While the United States chose to continue its bilateral embargo, it did begin to allow NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICASinitial pattern of liberalism. Smith's South Florida district was considered to be a closely contested one in the mid- 1980s, partly because of the increasing number of Cuban- Americans moving into it. But there has been no signifi- cant Cuban-American opponent to challenge him, and CANF continues to praise him. He is also a stalwart supporter of aid to Israel. President Bush's son, Jeb Bush, also figures into the equation of CANF influence. Prominent in Florida Re- publican politics, the younger Bush has worked closely with CANF in promoting T.V. Marti. Last year, he was the campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinin (R-FL), who became the first Cuban-American member of Congress. She succeeded Democrat Claude Pepper in a hotly con- tested race that featured an appearance by the President. CANF's greatest achievement is its ability, like AIPAC, to move beyond a narrow constituency. It has succeeded in making anti-Castro politics a litmus test of conserva- tism used by other right-wing organizations. Indeed, as in- creased military spending and anti-Sovietism lose their third country subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to trade with Cuba. These efforts to reduce tension were dashed by the war in Angola. Kissinger perceived Cuba to be thwarting U.S. interests there, and saw little reason to "reward" Cuba with relaxed tension. In October 1976, terrorists-several of whom were Cuban-Americans previously on the CIA payroll-blew up a Cuban civilian airplane, killing the 73 passengers. Cuba then abrogated the anti-hijacking agree- ment, which included provisions that mandated each country to try to prevent such attacks. The Carter Administration moved quickly to reduce the renewed tension with Cuba. By April 1977, the United States had signed a fishing and maritime boundary agreement with Cuba, and in September the two countries exchanged diplo- mats, though without formal recognition. Carter also eased currency restrictions and permitted charter flights, which facilitated tourist travel to Cuba. In turn, Cuba permitted a large number of political prisoners to emigrate to the United States, and allowed the return in 1979 of more than 100,000 exiles for family visits.' 4 However, by then the warming trend had been reversed, largely because of the Carter Administration's reaction to Cuban support for Ethiopia in its 1977-1978 conflict with Somalia, and Cuba's alleged training of Katangese exiles who invaded the Shaba province of Zaire in 1978. Carter railed against Cuba over the Shaba incident, though his charges proved unconvincing to the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee." From then on, the administration reverted to the traditional posture that Cuba was a major enemy of the United States. To underscore that view, the president issued a policy statement-Presidential Directive 52 in October 1979-that ordered national security agencies "to devise strategies for curbing Cuba's activities [in the Third World] and isolating it politically." 6 This followed on the heels of the U.S.-Cuban confrontation overan alleged 3,000-member Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, which turned out to be a Soviet training group that had been stationed in Cuba since potency for arousing conservative ire, anti-Castroism has become an even readier vehicle for these groups. Thus, conservative Cuban-Americans can credibly threaten electoral retaliation around the country through their links to nationwide conservative organizations. In fact, talk of a strong conservative opponent facing Sen. Hollings in 1992 has faded since Hollings championed T.V. Marti. Such electoral clout may have moved the usually unshakable Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) to flip his position on U.S. Cuba policy. In June, he joined 27 senators in demanding that President Bush ask Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to terminate Soviet military aid to Cuba. Characterizing Cuba as "the Albania or the North Korea of the Caribbean," he also endorsed the Mack amendment. This came shortly after Pell, who is in a tough re-election fight against Republican Congresswoman Claudine Schneider, met in Miami with Mis Canosa. 1 5 Pell is the CANF's biggest catch. His stature as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his long advocacy of negotiations with Cuba and eventual nor- the 1962 missile crisis. President Carter demanded that the Soviets withdraw the brigade, and he ordered the creation of the Caribbean Joint Task Force, a small military unit on Key West. to counter the supposed danger. On top of these strains, the Mariel boatlift of April-May 1980 helped push United States-Cuban relations to the heights of tension they had reached in earlier years. Approximately 120,000 Cubans emigrated from the port of Mariel when the Cuban government permitted essentially unrestricted exo- dus from the island-the United States welcomed them. The United States charged that the Cuban government forced some prisoners and mental health patients to emigrate. EVERAL REAGAN OFFICIALS HAD ADVOCATED harsh measures against Cuba long before they assumed office. In 1981, Cuba quickly became the focal point of their anticommunist crusade, as they pursued a "get tough" pol- icy." Secretary of State Alexander Haig set the tone in a February 1981 declaration, saying that the United States must "deal with the immediate source of the problem [in El Salvador]-and that is Cuba." "' This sort of rhetoric shaped public debate about Cuba, but Reagan Administration policy depended on time-worn techniques that included economic pressure, propaganda broadcasts, military intimidation and diplomatic isolation. The Reagan Administration enforced the economic embargo more stringently by threatening to confiscate any imported goods that contained Cuban nickel. It also pres- sured European allies not to renegotiate Cuba's outstanding loans." In 1982, President Reagan effectively revoked per- mission for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba by banning the expenditure of dollars in Cuba except by scholars, journal- ists, and Cuban exiles who wished to see their families. 2 0 First proposed by the arch-conservative Committee of Santa Fe as Radio Free Cuba, Radio Marti was embraced by the Reagan Administration in 1981 as a means of exacerbat- ing tensions within Cuba through propaganda broadcasts. In its original form, it was to be akin to Radio Liberty and Radio VOLUME XXIV, NUMBER 3 (NOVEMBER 1990) 19RCet bn td Am4eAL4a Cuba II malization of relations, had effectively provided legiti- macy for others who supported a moderate stance. Pell's turnabout undoubtedly will shift congressional debate to the right and enhance CANF's reputation. Conservative Cuban-Americans also have used cam- paign financing to gain footholds outside of their Florida base.' Sen. Hollings received $5,000 from the Free Cuba PAC, a political action committee with many of the same board members as CANF, and "sizable supplements from foundation directors" in his 1986 campaign." 7 Of the $165,897 total contributions given during the 1987-1988 electoral cycle, the Free Cuba PAC donated only $46,350 to Florida candidates.'" ONLY WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION SEES real foreign policy interests at stake in dealing with Cuba, has it eschewed ideological posturing and tried to regain control over policy from Congress. The State Department opposed the Mack and Smith amendments, for example, by arguing that "U.S. allies and trading Free Europe, and was to be housed in their agency--the Board for International Broadcasting. Congress forced the administration to run the station as part of the Voice of America.. On October 30, 1981 the U.S. Navy began extensive maneuvers in the Caribbean. A week later, the New York Times reported that Secretary of State Haig "has been pressing the Pentagon to examine a series of options for possible military action in El Salvador and against Cuba and Nicaragua," including with respect to Cuba, '"an invasion by American and possibly Latin American forces." 2 ' Six months later, in April 1982, the U.S. Navy again demonstrated a show of force in the Caribbean. Called "Ocean Venture 82," the three-week set of maneuvers involved 45,000 troops, 350 airplanes, and 60 ships. It included an exercise to evacuate non-combatants from the U.S. naval base at Guantinamo. 2 2 Cuba responded by placing the country on full military alert. It also requested more military aid from the Soviet Union and began to reorganize the island's defenses with a new militia. The United States encouraged Latin American countries to break the ties they had developed with Cuba in the 1970s. Jamaica and Colombia, which had recently elected conserva- tive governments and which were in great need of U.S. assistance, complied and broke relations in 1981. The United States successfully blocked Cuban participation in major international conferences. During the Reagan Administration's first term, Cuba returned the verbal attacks with equivalent calumnies. However, Cuba generally welcomed any possibility for negotiations with the United States, although it refused to discuss the return of 2,700 "excludable" exiles who had entered the United States during the Mariel boatlift. 2 3 Only in 1984 did Cuba indicate a willingness to discuss this issue. The agreement reached in December 1984 specified that 2,746 exiles would be repatriated to Cuba, and 20,000 Cubans would be allowed to emigrate to the United States an- nually. 2 4 However, within hours of Radio Martf's first broadcast in partners are likely to object strongly to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Argentina are major allies likely to protest. Indeed, Can- ada has already contacted us."" By restricting the behav- ior of a foreign company (even a U.S. corporate subsidi- ary) in another country, the proposed law would challenge the sovereignty of that country. In effect, the State Depart- ment appears to have developed its position from a practical consideration of U.S. foreign policy interests, rather than from a narrow calculus of gains linked to Cuba or from an ideologically rooted posture. Similarly, State and Commerce Department officials have worked quietly to oppose propaganda television broadcasts to Cuba because these challenge the legiti- macy of international law, a key to restructuring post- Cold War relationships with U.S. allies. It is striking that the usually conservative deputy editorial page editor of the Washington Post, Stephen Rosenfeld, also came out against the project in a signed column. He is well known for his close contact with the State Department and for his May 1985, Castro suspended the immigration agreement, and he announced Cuba would no longerpermit exiles to visit the country." In response, Reagan issued a decree barring virtually any Cuban from the United States, thereby closing the door on contact in the United States between Cubans and U.S. citizens. 2 6 By 1987, relations were at their lowest ebb since the 1962 missile crisis." As the year began, Cuba denied U.S. diplo- mats the right to land cargo charter planes, thus making the shipment of cars, office equipment and similar large items more difficult. In March, the United States aggressively pursued passage of a resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Commission which accused Cuba of persecuting political dissenters. It failed when Latin American members of the Commission supported Cuba. Then in July, Cuba aired a television documentary which detailed in an unprece- dented fashion espionage activities by personnel in the U.S. Interests Section. 2 8 Yet in November 1987, the two countries restored the immigration agreement that Cuba had cancelled in 1985. Two months later, U.S. and Cuban representatives met for the first time to discuss the war in Angola. (The United States previously had refused to attend any meeting about Angola with Cubans present.) This led to the historic accord at the end of the Reagan Administration in which Cuba agreed to withdraw troops from Angola, and South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia and allow free elections to occur there. Though the Reagan years ended on this positive tone, officials were quick to dispel any suggestion that the agree- ments could lead to normal relations. This relatively unchanged policy over thirty years has generated what historian Thomas Paterson calls a "fixation with Cuba." Cuban resistance to U.S. pressure and attacks has made Cuba a threat to U.S. hegemony. That has provided an ongoing rationale for hostility, which has been buttressed by a bureaucratic imperative to resist change. This was the legacy handed to the Bush Adminstration as it began to chart U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Thirty-Year War 1. Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: Morrow, 1986), p. 480. 2. Paul Hoeffel and Sandra Levinson, eds., The U.S. Blockade: A Documentary History (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, 1979); Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 191-202; Donna Rich, The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Its Evolution and Enforcement, A Study Prepared for the Commonwealth Countries (Washington, D.C., July 1988), pp. 24- 37. 3. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) provides the best detailed study of the operation. For reference to the President's authorization, see p. 25. 4. Fidel Castro, "The Duty of a Revolutionary is to Make the Revolution: The Second Declaration of Havana," in Martin Kenner and James Petras (eds.) Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove Press, 1969), pp. 8 5 - 1 0 6 (esp. p. 104); Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 115-16; H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 20-1. 5. Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale, "The Cuba Project," (Program Review for The President and ten others) Jan. 18, 1962, p. 1, (classified Top Secret, partially declassified 5 Jan. 1989), available at the National Security Archive (Washington). 6. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Op- erations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, "Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," Report No. 94-465, 94th Cong. 1st Sess., Nov. 20, 1975, pp. 71-180. 7. Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale, "The Cuba Project," p. 2. 8. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security (Winter 1989/1990); Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Revised Edition (Washing- ton: Brookings, 1989). 9. Herbert Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976); Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). 10. Philip Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22 (Feb. 1990), pp. 134-138. 11. Senate Intelligence Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots," pp. 174-180. 12. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 635-651. 13. Philip Brenner, The Limits and Possibilities of Congress (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 45-52. 14. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest ofEnemies (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 161-162. 15. Ibid, pp. 137-140; New York Times, June 10, 1978; William M. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 13 (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), pp. 26-27. 16. Barry Sklar, "Cuba: Normalization of Relations," Archived Issue Brief #75030, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Re- search Service, Jan. 13, 1980,p. 13; New York Times, Oct. 17,1979. 17. For good reviews of the first two years of administration policy, see: William LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," Foreign Policy, No. 46, Spring, 1982; Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, No. 48, Fall, 1982. 18. Jane Franklin, Cuban Foreign Relations: A Chronology 1959-1982 (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, 1984), pp. 36-37. 19. Washington Post, April 20, 1982; Miami Herald, Sept. 5, 1982. 20. The travel ban had little practical effect. Its purported ration- ale was to deny hard currency to Cuba, but the largest number of U.S. citizens spending money in Cuba had been exiles who were able to continue their travel there under the new regulations. Miami Herald, June 29, 1984. 21. New York Times, Nov. 5, 1981. 22. Philip Brenner, "U.S.-Cuba: Ambiguous Signals," Cuba- Times, Summer, 1982; Washington Post, June 10, 1982. 23. Wayne Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," p. 161. Also see New York Times, April 6, 1982. 24. Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1984; Miami Herald, Dec. 24, 1984. 25. Miami Herald, May 21, 1985. 26. Ronald Reagan, "Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants by Officers orEmployees ofthe Government ofCuba or the Communist Party of Cuba," Proclamation 5377, Oct. 4, 1985, Weekly Compila- tion of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, No. 41, Oct. 14, 1985, p. 1210. 27. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1987 and May 2, 1987. 28. Miami Herald, March 12, 1987; Washington Post, July 27, 1987.
