Although New York Times reporter Simon Romero attempts to characterize the truly complex relationship between Bolivia and the United States in "Bolivia is an Uneasy Ally as U.S. Presses Drug War," (NYT, 8/29/09) the article contains multiple inaccuracies and misleading information. It is crucial to have a clear vision of the intricacies of the coca issue in Bolivia to understand it.
Here are some quotes from the article and the Andean Information Network's response:
1) "[. . .] an elite wing of the Bolivian military that survives on American Support."
Response: Jose Cuevas is the Commander of UMOPAR, the unit Romero makes reference to, is an elite force in the Bolivian police, not the Military
2) "Bolivian officers who have been trained alongside the Green Berets at the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, GA."
Response: For more than a decade, the majority of UMOPAR officers have been trained at the Garras International Antinarcotics Training School, in Chimore. It is sort of a School of the Americas in the Chapare.
3) "Mr. Morales has been hesitant to sever ties with the United States, especially since it provides Bolivia with about $100 million in development aid each year."
Response: In truth, the Morales administration has repeatedly denounced the US government for a lack of transparency around its development aid, which Morales feels is being used to strengthen opposition from regional lowland elites. The government has passed legislation to regulate foreign aid in an attempt to address their concerns and has threatened to reject assistance. Although the Morales government accepts many types of aid, it is joined by its constituents in vehemently protesting other forms with political conditioning. With the influx of European, Venezuelan and other assistance, the importance of U.S. development aid to Bolivia has diminished significantly.
Several paragraphs later Romero recognizes that US development assistance is not popular Morales constituents when he mentions that by stating that American aid workers were "expelled" from the Chapare, although a negative view of alternative development there extends far beyond what Romero calls "radical parts of Mr. Morales's political base. In truth Chapare residents affirmed that they would not sign any further alternative development agreements, and most many US development employees withdrew from the area.
It is more likely that Morales continues to engage in US-funded interdiction to justify continued controlled legal coca growth and redistribution, and to maintain his platform that there should be a distinction between coca and cocaine.
4) "It also grants duty-free access for Bolivian textiles, an economic lifeline for his country."
Response: The U.S. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) provides duty free access for other products as well. According to the Bolivian government, which advocates extension, ATPDEA directly benefits at most 15,000 workers and another 35,000 indirectly. This is clearly a significant contribution, but far from "an economic lifeline." The Bolivian government actively seeks the extension of these trade preferences, and affected workers would most likely vehemently protest its termination. To a great extent, Bolivians feel that the ATPDEA should be maintained as compensation for the high price Bolivians have paid as a result of US- funded forced eradication in the past.
5) "On the American side, officials argue that a sharp increase in coca cultivation could drive more cocaine to the United States, even though it is currently a negligible market for Bolivian cocaine."
Response: There is no indication suggesting a potential a "sharp increase in coca cultivation," in Bolivia as has happened in Colombia. Nor is there any evidence that Bolivian cocaine would shift back into the US market; Colombia, and Peru to some extent, have that market handily covered.
I do agree that US officials remain engaged because they can remain involved in the drug war here.
6) "He [Morales] announced that Bolivia would stop sending officers to receive combat training in the U.S."
Response: The February 2008 Morales administration applies only to WHINSEC, the School of the Americas, and other military training exercises scheduled for the rest of 2008 and 2009.
7) "Two months ago a mob of 20,000 protestors marched to the gates of the American Embassy, clashing with police and threatening to burn the building down, prompting the State Department to temporarily recall Ambassador Phillip S. Goldberg in protest. After the episode, Mr. Morales praised the protestors."
Response: This version of the protest at the US Embassy is overstated. Eyewitnesses calculate the presence of several thousand protestors, far less than the suggested 20,000.
Although protestors were quite vocal, they did not "clash" with police or threaten to burn the building down, despite the claims made by La Razon and other sources. The Bolivian Police force secured the perimeter of the embassy and tear-gassed protestors, who then left the area.
Although he demanded an explanation from the Bush administration about the granting of asylum to Sánchez Berzaín, President Morales never praised the protestors. Government Minister Alfredo Rada did criticize the police for tear-gassing protestors, and fired the La Paz Departmental Police Commander.
8) "He then rose through the ranks of the region's coca growers unions in the 1980s and 1990s, a time when American-backed troops were aggressively trying to eradicate every illegal coca plant in Bolivia."
Response: Sporadic forced eradication began in Bolivia in the mid-nineties, and sustained "aggressive" forced eradication with the military began in 1998.
9) "But in a twist to his pro-coca thinking, Mr. Morales has also sought to clamp down on cocaine."
Response: In the eyes of most Bolivians, there is no "twist" here; the coca leaf is something clearly and legally distinguished from cocaine. Morales' strategy seeks to explicitly emphasize this difference---permitted limited coca, with zero tolerance for cocaine.
10) "First in a nod to coca farmers, he nearly doubled the amount of land that growers can legally devote to growing coca. But then he tried to make them stick to another rule that prevents them from devoting more than a cato, less than half an acre, to growing coca."
Response: This is backwards. The agreement on the part of the Chapare coca growers to grow only a cato per family or union member dates back to October 2004, over a year before Morales's election. The permitted growth of a cato in the Chapare had been a long term coca grower demand, not a result of Morales or union leader pressure.
Since his inauguration, Morales has attempted to expand this initiative to other regions.
It is also important to note that the authorization of a sixty percent increase (not exactly "nearly doubled") in the amount of coca legally permitted reflects, in part, the extension of the cato system to Chapare farmers. In addition, the permitted total will be reevaluated based on the results of the legal market study, which, admittedly, has been slow to start.
The Bolivian government's anti-drug strategy promises to eliminate any additional coca that cannot be absorbed by the legal market.
11) "Taking a page from cartels like OPEC, organizers in the Chapare coca growers unions, where doctrinaire support of the president is prized, fanned out to convince farmers that the limit would dampen supply and keep coca prices stable The pressure worked on the growers, who were faced with stiff penalties for disobeying."
Response: First, it is quite a stretch to compare a rural union system to OPEC!
Furthermore, it is doubtful that coca growers needed to be convinced of the law of supply and demand, or persuaded that the permission to grow limited coca for subsistence, in the absence of forced eradication, and the accompanying poverty and human rights violations, is beneficial to them.
Prior to this, coca growers had repeatedly pressured the government for the concession to grow a cato, not the other way around.
12) "On weekends, traffic slows to a crawl in town like Chimore as farmers take their newly acquired used minivans, known here as surubís, out for a spin."
Response: These vehicles are used primarily for public transportation, not by individual families.
13) "[. . .] coca farmers do not seem bothered that a large part of their crop becomes cocaine smuggled to Brazil and Argentina, it main markets."
Response: It seems a lot to ask subsistence farmers to prioritize keeping cocaine from consumers in other nations over their own families' survival. Cocaleros support the Morales administration's efforts to stamp out cocaine production and trafficking as they vehemently continue to affirm their right to grow the coca leaf.
Kathryn Ledebur is the director of the Andean Information Network (AIN), which originally distributed this analysis.
