Recent events in Nicaragua threaten to bring an end to the infamous Somoza dynasty which has been in control for the past 42 years. A broad spectrum of Nicaragua's political forces, including some former adherents of the regime, have stepped up demands for the ouster of General Anastasio Somoza Debayle and for the recognition of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as a legal organization. In fact, the overtures of Nicaragua's "traditional" anti-Somoza sectors toward the Front is indicative of the inherent weaknesses of the regime which underlie all current developments. Essentially, there has been a growing "crisis of confidence" in the State. The total identification of the State with the Somoza family interests has begun to result in a decline of investment by the private sector, particularly in long-term productive activities. Corruption and inefficiency, the lack of clear business rules, the concentration of power in one man, and four years of a state of seige have all contributed to the increasing uneasiness of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. This underlying crisis had been obscured by the inflow of reconstruction funds after the Managua earthquake in December 1972 and by the more recent rise in coffee and cotton prices, but its severity is increasingly becoming apparent. Then last July, Somoza suffered a cardiac arrest, unleashing an internal power struggle which has virtually paralyzed the regime. Some of his underlings attempted to usurp power in anticipation of the dictator's death, while traditional opponents exploited the political vacuum to advance their demands for political reform. Somoza managed to dismiss the overly ambitious officials and is still intent on keeping Nicaragua in the hands of the family. He has designated his 27 year-old son, Anastasio Somoza III, and his brother-in- law and Ambassador to the U.S., Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, to succeed him. Sources in Nicaragua say that key civilian and military elements would not accept such a blatant continuation of family rule. It is within this context that the FSLN has emerged as an important force. (For background on the FSLN and Nicaragua in general, see NACLA's Report, Vol. X No. 2, February 1976.) Obviously, the Front also wants to take advantage of the new political conjuncture. However, divisions in the FSLN in the last few years make the situation complex. Beginning in the 1960s, the Front had a strong base of support among the agrarian workers and peasants. This activity caused the National Guard to launch an indiscriminate campaign of terror in the country- side-thousands were killed and in many areas a mass exodus resulted. By the mid-70's, the FSLN began an internal re-evaluation which eventually induced a three-way split. One group continued the strategy of the "Prolonged Popular War" or "Guerra Popular Prolongada" and is therefore known as the GPP. Another argued that priority should be given to working in urban areas with the aim of forming a revolutionary party of the proletariat, abandoning immediate military objectives. A third group, the "Terceristas," tried to reconcile the two groups and then opted for developing their own strategy. It is this last group that made headlines by launching a nation- wide attack in October. Their conviction is that the time is ripe for armed popular uprisings drawing support from broad sectors of the population, including bourgeois elements. To some extent, they have succeeded. On the military front, students and non-Marxist revolutionary elements joined in the assaults on Guardia barracks in the capital and Masaya; guerilla forces also briefly occupied the towns of San Carlos and Ocotal distributing arms to the population until the arrival of Guardia reinforcements forced a withdrawal. On thepolitical front, timed to coincide with the military attacks, a group of prominent Nicaraguans including wealthy businessmen, lawyers and clergy issued a declaration calling for a national "dialogue" to bring peace and democratization. In addition, they praised the "political maturity" of the guerillas and insisted that the FSLN must participate in any solution to Nicaragua's political crisis. Since then, others from all sectors of society have supported these demands. Some in the Left are very suspicious of the involvement of bourgeois sectors in this "dialogue." The GPP has denounced the Terceristas as betraying the revolution. The Terceristas, on the other hand, believe that the departure of Somoza and the restoration of basic democratic rights is a necessary prerequisite to further struggle. Thus, in the name of the FSLN, the Terceristas have called for Somoza's immediate ouster and the holding of free elections by a provisional government in which the FSLN would be represented. Among their demands are a sweeping reform of the agrarian structure, the nationalization of the banks, a concentration on social welfare programs and education in particular, the establishment of diplomatic relations with socialist countries, and the expropriation of Somoza's massive, business empire. At the same time, relations between Somoza and the U.S. (on which the regime is highly dependent) are currently undergoing severe strain. Extensive violations of human rights are proving to.be an embarrassment to the public stance of the Carter administration. Only after large sums were paid to professional lobbyists, did the U.S. Congress approve $3.1 million in military assistance. The State Department, however, decided to withhold $12 million in economic aid as political pressure. Privately, high administration officials concede that Somoza's corrupt and repressive government is more than just an embarrassment to the U.S.-of late it is also a threat to stability in Central America, and therefore, to U.S. interests. These officials reason that the U.S. would do well to be rid of the family and thus defuse the mounting political mobilization taking place in Nicaragua. But, should Somoza refuse to step down, a military coup with some form of U.S. backing would not be unexpected. Despite the absence of significant support from most sectors, Somoza remains in power. He still controls the army, partly because its members are major beneficiaries of the system's corruption. He controls the state apparatus, its finances, and his own vast resources. Additionally, the opposition is internally divided. However, Somoza's control is shaky. Confronted by a shrinking base of support, armed uprising, and a bad heart, he is no longer viewed as invulnerable. But even with Somoza out of the picture, the changed political conditions will present new con- tradictions. For the Terceristas, this means they must build a political apparatus to complement their military strength. Otherwise, they will either be forced to return to a military strategy or will be made dependent on extraneous political formations to implement their programs. For continuing information write for Nicaragua People's News, a bulletin published by: _Nicaragua Solidarity Organization, P.O. Box 32074, Washington, D.C. 20007. (Donations welcome).
