THE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE GOVERN T HE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE GOVERNment'S ment's counterinsurgencycounterinsurgency plan has shifted away from plan has shifted away from thethe integrated civic action/psychological warfare approach integrated civic action/psychological warfare approach characteristiccharacteristic of low intensity conflict. The new panacea is of low intensity conflict. The new panacea is "special'special operations' ' the catch all phrase for unconven operations" the catch all phrase for unconventionaltional narrowly targeted actions ranging from disappearing narrowly targeted actions ranging from disappearing keykey activists of the urban popular movement to long range activists of the urban popular movement to long range patrolspatrols in FMLN zones of control. As coordinator of all in FMLN zones of control. As coordinator of all special operations, the shadowy National Directorate of In special operations, the shadowy National Directorate of Intelligencetelligence (DNI) has emerged as the nerve center of the (DNI) has emerged as the nerve center of the war. Although it occupies more physical space than the war. Although it occupies more physical space than the EstadoEstado Mayor located in the same complex, officially the Mayor located in the same complex, officially the Armed Forces do not even recognize its existence. It ap Armed Forces do not even recognize its existence. It appearspears on no line in the Salvadoran national budget. nor in on no line in the Salvadoran national budget, nor in anyany foreign aid budget. According to Salvadoran Col. Juan foreign aid budget. According to Salvadoran Col. Juan OrlandoOrlando Zepeda. 'the DNI receives most of its aid from the Zepeda, "the DNI receives most of its aid from the CentralCentral Intelligence Agency." * Intelligence Agency."* The importance of specialThe importance of special operations and intelligence in operations and intelligence in thethe Armed Forces' plans is underscored by the career paths Armed Forces' plans is underscored by the career paths of the personnel involved. Col. Zepeda. formerly army of the personnel involved. Col. Zepeda, formerly army chief of intelligence, then head of the critical First Brigade chief of intelligence, then head of the critical First Brigade in the capital city, was recently named vice minister of in the capital city, was recently named vice minister of defense. defense. Col. JoaquIn Carlos Cema Flores, formerly head Col. Joaquin Carlos Cema Flores, formerly head of the Transmissions Center which coordinates communi of the Transmissions Center which coordinates communications and is a key part of a new joint intelligence working cations and is a key part of a new joint intelligence working groupgroup recently set up for urban warfare in the capital, was recently set up for urban warfare in the capital, was made chiefmade chief of army operations in December. Thus two key of army operations in December. Thus two key positionspositions in the counterinsurgency plan are now occupied by in the counterinsurgency plan are now occupied by intelligence specialists, both strong advocates of special intelligence specialists, both strong advocates of special operations of all sorts. operations of all sorts. S ALVADORAN MILITARY SOURCES ESTIMATE ALVADORAN MILITARY SOURCES ESTIMATE that for each U.S. military adviser there is at least one that for each U.S. military adviser there is at least one other U.S. adviser working in intelligence or security, often other U.S. adviser working in intelligence or security, often with ties to the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), with ties to the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), or the National Security Council. One such source esti or the National Security Council. One such source estimated the current number of military advisers at 300. which mated the current number of military advisers at 300, which would bring the total U.S. in country personnel directly would bring the total U.S. in country personnel directly involvedinvolved in the war to 600. in the war to 600. Among that number one can no longer include former Among that number one can no longer include former U.S.U.S. defense attache and army attache George Maynes. defense attach and army attach George Maynes. Maynes,Maynes, who in the early 1980s was defense attache in who in the early 1980s was defense attach in Guatemala, recently retired from the U.S. Army to work as Guatemala, recently retired from the U.S. Army to work as a private, full time consultant to the DNI. SM&BO a private, full time consultant to the DNI. SM&BO *Max*Max G. Manwarring and Court Prisk, eds.. El Saltador At War: G. Manwarring and Court Prisk, eds., El Salvador At War: An Oral History. (National Defense University Press, 1988). p. An Oral History. (National Defense University Press, 1988)., p. 311. 311.
