We are approaching the 30th anniver- sary of the October 1967 death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia-an event one would think of as favorable for the appearance of remembrances, homages, business deals and, hope- fully, serious reflections. In fact, a Carlos Vilas is a sociologist and historian at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and a member of NACLA's editorial board. His most recent book is Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes: Market, State, and the Revolutions in Central America (Monthly Review Press, 1995). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA. number of seri- ous books and films on Che are in the works, and a few-Paco Ignacio Taibo's sensitive account of Che's ill-fated African cam- paign, and a Swiss documentary on Che's last days in Bolivia-are already out and in circulation. Also among the authors of forth- coming books, we find the mercur- ial Regis Debray, the French intel- lectual who did more than anyone else to popularize the idea that "Guevarism" was the one true road to the revolution. In a widely circu- lated essay which will surely boost the sales of his soon-to-be-published book, Debray paints a personally and politically damning portrait of the famed guerrilla of whom he was once so fond. It is a portrait that conflicts with the memories of many people who knew Che per- sonally, and with the image that arises from countless testimoni- als-those of individuals who shared particularly difficult moments with Che, as well as those of his political enemies. "Che believed in the people," says one of his compafieros of the African guerrilla movement. "Che was authoritarian and sectarian," the Vol XXX. No 3 Nov/DEc 1996 9 ny rA, nVILA Vol XXX. No 3 Nov/DEC 1996 9ANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA once-adulatory French intellectual now tells us. According to Debray, Che was hard, implacable, and ex- cessively demanding of the people with whom he worked-an author- itarian leader who overstepped the bounds of severity. Che undoubtedly had a strong character. ("He could be so Argentine...," his ex-wife, the his- torian Aleida March once told me.) The guerrilla army, more than any other kind of army, is hard. Discipline becomes a fundamental factor for survival and victory. But all the first-hand testimony coin- cides in identifying Che as a firm, responsible and enormously human leader. To what, then, can we attribute Debray's new attitude? Is it simply a cheap recourse to sell expensive books? Aleida Guevara, Che's daughter and a doctor like her father, offers a hypothesis: Debray is responsible for the Bolivian army finding Che's column, and finally, although indirectly, for his death. In statements made this August to the Buenos Aires daily Clarin, Aleida suggests that Debray's statements upon being captured in April, 1967 made the army's work easier. To facilitate Debray's exit from the jungle, she suggests, Che's column changed its original plans, lost time, and all this was taken advantage of by the military. Is this the clue to the sudden change in Debray's long and sup- posedly deeply held allegiances? It is quite conceivably part of it. Upon the publication of Aleida's comments, Debray counterat- tacked, attempting to discredit Che's daughter: she was only a child at the time; how could she know what was happening; she is repeating what others have told her; she is obeying the orders of the Stalinist Cuban government to dis- credit him; these orders simply Vol VIII, No 2, FebruarY 1974 NACLAI LATIN AMERICA & EMIPIRE REPORT F1 ,, ' Encouraged by the undying militancy of Boivian workers, Che foresaw the liberation of Bolivia as a strategic step in the liberation of all Latin America.. Che encountered the same problem that has plagued the Boifvian left since 1952; no political party existed to direct and focus the struggle developing in the Nancahuazu region of Southeastern Bolvia. The importance of this cannot be underes- timated. Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Workers' party, has written: "The revolutionary army .. can only be the work- ers' and peasants' army. .placed under the immediate and undivided leadership of our Party, the party of the working class.... In general, one can say that revolutionary violence is based on two forms of struggle: armed struggle and political struggle, one combined with the other." Thus a greater danger exists for revolutionaries when these two struggles are separated. -Vol. 8, No.2, February 1974 prove the dictatorial character of the Cuban regime. Over the past 30 years, Debray has always adopted a more or less progressive stance, in contrast to his current attitude. But his present criticism is not that of someone who demands more or another type of socialism. Rather, it is Mas Canosa-style invective-the invec- tive of those who condemn social- ism under its difficult Cuban condi- tions. What had led Che's one-time popularizer to draw this caricature and to spew invectives against his daughter and the besieged Cuban regime? The outbursts of Regis Debray oblige us to ask ourselves just who Debray is, and in particular, what role he played in Che's Bolivian guerrilla movement. In the publici- ty campaign for the sale of Debray's book, some news sources-like the progressive Mexican daily La Jornada-have elevated the figure of Debray to "comrade in arms" of Che in Bolivia, and even to "Che's advisor." This is not the reality that emerges from the pages of Guevara's own diary. Regis Debray spent less than a month with Che in Bolivia, and it isn't certain that he was involved in any military confrontations or deci- sion making. But better yet, let's allow Che to speak through his diary. The first mention of Debray (identified as "Danton" and "the Frenchman" until his capture by the army was confirmed) was in refer- ence to his arrival at the guerrilla camp on March 20, 1967. On March 21, Che wrote: "The Frenchman...comes to stay, but I asked that he return to organize a support network in France, and that on the way he stop in Cuba, some- thing that coincides with his desire to marry and have a child with his compaihera." [My emphasis.] In other words, Che locates Debray in external solidarity; he understands 10 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA A continent in arms. NACLA illustration, 197 his desire to marry and be a father, and he offers him the opportunity to satisfy this desire at the same time that he continues his support work. Where is the arbitrary leader who Debray now paints? The next mention of "Danton" is on April 19 in an entry concerning an English reporter who arrives at camp. Che and others suspect that the reporter is a spy or an infiltrator. Debray proposes instead that the reporter may be useful in allowing him (Debray) and Bustos (referred to as "Carlos" or "El Pelado" ("Baldy")) to leave the guerrilla zone. Bustos accepted "unwillingly and I washed my hands of the mat- ter," writes Che. Debray, Bustos and the Englishman leave. Four days later, the 23rd, Che notes: "The unknown hangs over Danton and El Pelado and the English jour- nalist; it is not known what has hap- pened to them." April 27: "It is con- firmed that Danton is a prisoner near Camiri." April 30, in his "Summary of the Month," Che writes: "Danton and Carlos fell victim to their haste, almost desperation, to leave, and also to my lack of energy to deter them, so that the lines of communi- cation with Cuba have been cut (Danton), and the plan of action in Argentna nas oeen lost (Carlos)." [My emphasis.] We have to emphasize the soberness with which Che refers to the mat- ter, above all because he is writ- ing for himself. The reference to Debray and Bustos' "almost des- peration" to leave suggests that if Debray had in fact come to stay with the guerrilla forces (note of March 21), the desperation to leave would have been due to a decision made by someone else, though it is possible that the man was very interested in getting married. In any case, Che recog- nizes his own "lack of energy" in the face of the decision of 0o Debray and Bustos to leave, con- sistent with the principle that participation in a guerrilla organi- zation is voluntary. On May 5, Guevara notes that according to the radio, "Debray is to be judged by a military court in Camiri as the alleged leader and organizer of the guerrillas." This is possibly the first instance of the inflation of the figure of Debray. By presenting him as the guerrilla "leader," the Bolivian army inflates its own importance. 1___ L The countryside and the agricultural proletariat remain central in the [Nicaraguan] struggle. But new forms of organization are necessary, as the base in the urban proletariat is becoming more important (and not merely a support for the rural struggle). Even in as agrarian a country as Vietnam, that proletariat, though small, was considered to play the leading role in the Vietnamese Workers' Party. In evolving from a guerrilla foco to being part of a revolu- tionary party, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, representing the worker-peasant alliance, the Frente can gain the capacity to struc- ture and lead mass struggles. -Vol.10, No.2, February 1976 LATINRICA $1 & EMPIRE L~i.RPO~lr Vol XXX, No 3 Nov/DEc 1996 On June 29, Guevara makes a serious notation: "On the political level, the most serious thing is the official statement of Ovando [the army's commander-in-chief] that I am here. Furthermore, he said that the army is confronting well- trained guerrillas among whose ranks are Vietcong commandos who have defeated the best U.S. regiments. This is based on the dec- larations of Debray who, it seems, spoke more than necessary, although we can't know what implications this has, nor the cir- cumstances under which he said what he did." [My emphasis.] July 10: "The declarations of Debray and El Pelado are not good, above all, they have confessed the interna- tional intentions of the guerrilla, something they didn't have to do." [My emphasis.] There are neither epithets nor outbursts nor anger in Che's notation. But the careful choice of words clarifies his assess- ment of the conduct of Bustos and Debray. From that point onwards, Debray is presented by the Bolivian government as the princi- pal protagonist of the matter. August 19: "The news is full of Debray. There is not a word of the other accused. October 3: "An interview with Debray was broad- cast, very courageous before a stu- dent provacateur." [My emphasis.] Five days later, Che is captured and assassinated. It is undeniable that Che died convinced that Debray confessed to more than he had to, but in fair- ness he ventures no judgements regarding the circumstances (tor- ture? complicity? simple fear?) under which he did so. The final reference to Debray is positive: a recognition of his valor in a public confrontation with a provacateur, with the same soberness with which he earlier noted that Debray had talked too much with his cap- tors. The image of Che that arises from all this is not the obsessive authoritarian that Debray now wishes to sell us; on the contrary, it reveals the deep humanism of Che. In these difficult circumstances, his capacity for human sympathy allows him not to rush any judge- ments against the failings of individuals. Guevara's diary entries also reveal a different image of Debray than the one cur- rently being sold-a Debray who is less central than his reputation would suggest. A look at Debray's theoretical background gives more hints as to who he is and the basis for his ideological position. In the 1960s, Debray stud- ied at the University of Paris with the Marxist theoretician Louis Althusser, and was greatly influenced by his pro- fessor's abstract conception of the capitalist economy. According to Althusserian QtlrtltrJlienm -nit4alm I F I wore upon the appropriation of tra- ditional peasant lands and the con- version of peasants into wage labor- ers, creates the conditions for its own negation-the proletarian revo- lution. Once the objective conditions mature, that is, once the capitalist mode of production consolidates By the early 1970s, [U.S.] operations in the Guatemalan highlands had decimated the guerrilla bands there. Similar successes were scored in Bolivia and Venezuela. Pentagon planners were encour- aged by the results. After all, the man who had become a symbol of guerrilla struggle in Latin America, the man who countered the green beret with a black one emblazoned with a small red star, was dead. But these successes were more a testimony to the errors of the foco theory of struggle than to the effectiveness of counterin- surgency. These small guerrilla organizations had tried to be cata- lysts for revolution, to spark a reaction from the masses without ever being a part of them. A painful and costly lesson had been learned. Che Guevara's death marked the beginning of a new era for Latin America. -Vol. 15, NoI. 3, May/June 1981 rs Power. From the NACLA archives, 19/2. itself and the historical subject of its destruction-the proletariat-arises, the conditions for liquidating capi- talism and, by way of a proletarian revolution, of constructing socialism are at hand. The fundamental tasks of a proletarian party, according to this conception of the world, are to make the masses aware of their exploitation and convince them of the historical-structural role that his- tory calls upon them to play. If the situation is "ripe for revolution," the role of the vanguard consists simply of shaking the tree. Carried to Latin America by Debray, this perspective saw in the rural guerrillas the equivalent of the "vanguard party" rising out of advanced capitalism. The guerrilla enlightened the rural proletarianized masses (peasants without land, agricultural wage laborers, the poor of the country- side...) as to the road to follow and their own role along that road. At the same time, the guerrilla organi- zation constituted the objective realization of the Leninist theory of "dual powers." Contrary to the urban and legal strategies of the tra- ditional Communist and socialist NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12ANNIVERSARY ESSAY/ CHE GUEVARA parties, Debray affirmed that only "from outside" of the state would it be possible to effectively smash and destroy it. In two books which achieved a wide circulation, Castroism, the Long March of Latin America, and Revolution in the Revolution?, Debray affirmed that the only pos- sible and authentic revolutionary path was the guerrilla foco. The vulgar image of Che's thought (vol- unteerism, Guevarism, foquismo) comes from these books. The repu- tation of the young French intellec- tual was built up by the pro-Cuba solidarity networks and perhaps by the ideological apparatus of the Cuban Communist Party as well. This was a moment in which Cuba was isolated in the Western Hemisphere, and in which many Communist parties had rejected the armed struggle. In this context, Debray's arguments were debated and rejected by many organizations which, without denying their soli- darity with and/or political debt to Cuba, had other designs more appropriate to their countries. The abstract and hyper- rationalist character of Debray's Structuralist approach prevented him from taking note of the socio- logical, historical, anthropological and cultural characteristics of rural Latin American capitalism and of its working masses. Debray's about-face, in which he goes from being an absolute ideological fol- lower of the Cuban revolution to a sworn enemy of all it represents, suggests that the man never held a well-considered position with respect to Cuba's revolution and socialist experience. When was Debray honest? When he followed the line of the left, or now that he follows the line of the right? In the face of these spectacular turnabouts, it is impossible for me not to recall the similarly volatile behavior of General Augusto Pinochet in regard to the Popular Unity government of Chile. The testimony of ex-foreign minister Orlando Letelier just before his assassination at the hands of the Pinochet regime reveals a genu- flecting and opportunist military officer who surprisingly turns to the extreme right and heads the fascist coup of 1973. The attitude of Debray towards Che Guevara and the Cuban politi- cal system shows similar, if more slowly moving pirouettes. Don't get me wrong, I am not comparing indi- viduals, but rather, styles of political behavior. Pinochet betrayed a live man. Debray betrays a dead one. The EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor - Guatemala) was one of a Inew breed of revolutionary organizations that had taken to heart the defeats of the 1960s. The foquista efforts of that decade had failed for lack of a clear strategy for mass involvement in the war; military action had not ignited mass insurrection and, in the end, the guerrilla organizations had been destroyed by the Army. - Vol.17, No.2, March/April 1983 In the early 1980's, Soviet attitudes toward Latin American revolu- tionaries shifted toward selective, low-key support in a few coun- tries. The Sandinista revolution convinced most Soviet analysts that "political-military fronts" were more effective than traditional CPs in overthrowing entrenched right-wing dictatorships. A number of new works appeared praising Che Guevara, including one by the USSR's leading Central American historian and another that pur- ported to prove Guevara's sympathies for the Soviet Union. In Guatemala and El Salvador, the CPs opted to join broad fronts engaged in guerrilla struggle that were more effective in popular organizing and confronting government repression. - Vol.21, No.1, January/February 1987 In retrospect, armed struggle was a grave error...Even in his book on guerrillas, Che Guevara says-almost on page one-that even in an imperfect democracy, it's useless to start a guerrilla war. Interview with Teodoro Petkoff, a leader of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement of the 1960s - Vol.21, No.3, May/June 1987 We insist that armed struggle is the only way, because we've tried everything else and it got us nowhere. It's only when armed struggle erupts that the country becomes affected and is shaken, even at the level of international relations. Interview with Subcomandante Marcos - Vol.28, No.1, July/August 1994
