WHEN HERRERA CAMPINS WAS INAU- gurated in March 1979 he pledged to concen- trate on the domestic shambles inherited from Demo- cratic Action and lower Venezuela's international profile. It soon became apparent that foreign policy would be taking a conservative turn. Both internal and external circumstances came prominently into play. In the first place, the new president had entered office with the image of a progressive politician. Like his Christian Democratic colleague Jos6 Napole6n Duarte in El Salvador, he was taunted by conserva- tive opponents as a "watermelon' '-green, the color of COPEI, on the outside, but pink on the inside. Herrera had ruffled the feathers of the business com- munity with his rhetoric of social justice; now he would need to soothe their fears. His advisers reasoned that a conservative foreign policy would be a cheap trade-off for retaining his populist image at home. In the second place, Herrera used his conservatism in foreign policy to distance himself, in time-honored fashion, from his predecessor. This helped neutralize the still active Caldera faction of COPEI, which held the most progressive views in the party on interna- tional affairs. The 1978 election was only the second occasion since 1958 that Caldera had not stood as the COPEI candidate. International political winds, too, favored Herrera's conservatism. The downfall of Michael Manley in Jamaica was only the spearhead of a rightward trend in the Eastern Caribbean. Further afield, the North- South dialogue was at a stalemate; disillusionment with the prospects for South American and Caribbean regional integration had set in. President Carter il- luminated the benefits of closer cooperation with Washington when he ended the exclusion of Vene- zuela-as an OPEC member-from the Generalized System of [Tariff] Preferences (GSP) in 1980. As if this were not enough, at the end of that year the United States elected a right-wing president who clearly announced his intention of making anti-com- munism the major issue in the region. "HERRERA CAMPINS SAW NO CONTRADIC- titn in hitchino hi wa onn tn RnnIrl Rp r n' star. At the core of his foreign policy was the historic opposition to Marxism of COPEI and the Christian Democratic movement. The guiding rationale behind the emergence of Christian Democracy was the need to offer a political alternative to godless socialism. Charting a course between the extreme emphasis on the individual under capitalism and Marxism's sub- mergence of the individual in the social mass, the movement posited a political system based on a kind of corporate social responsibility. In the final analy- sis, though, its most conservative ideologues believed that communism-not capitalism, even in its authori- tarian variants-posed the greatest threat to Christian Democratic values. 1 This assumption was shared by the new Adminis- tration in Washington, and a close friendship devel- oped between the Reagan team's chief intellectual mentor on foreign affairs, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and COPEI's principal ideologue, the conservative Jos6 Rodriguez Iturbe. Rodriguez Iturbe was also linked to Opus Dei, the Roman Catholic lay order formed today by professional and business elites and dedicated to promoting traditional conser- vative values in the political and religious spheres. 2 If Caldera's foreign minister Calvani had on occa- REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Ui 30sion taken conservative positions for tactical reasons, Rodriguez Iturbe did so out of conviction. 3 With the elevation of Rodriguez to head of the Advisory Com- mission on Foreign Relations (CARE)-the govern- ment's chief consultative body on foreign affairs-the way was paved for the dominant influence of con- servatives and the reactionary Opus Dei in decision- making. FROM NOW ON, OIL WOULD MORE THAN ever be mixed with ideology. Herrera used the strength of the oil economy for the export of partisan interests, most notably in Central America. His ad- ministration's scarcely concealed aid to fellow Chris- tian Democrats in the region could be explained in part by the strength of kindred feeling among Chris- tian Democratic parties with their clear and narrowly defined identity-a contrast to the eclectic alliance of Social Democratic parties to which AD related. With the eclipse of Chile's powerful Christian Democrats after the 1973 coup, Venezuela's COPEI became the unchallenged leader of Latin America's Christian Democratic community. Herrera used this position to compete with the regional influence of the Socialist International, for which Carlos Andrrs Perez had acted as a Latin American standard bearer. AD had touted political pluralism in Central America as a goal in itself; for COPEI, this became secondary to the aim of boosting its fraternal parties in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In addition, international links with the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA) and the Christian Democratic World Union (CDWU) re- inforced Venezuela's ties to Washington. In May 1980, for example, Copeyano representatives attended a conference in Washington sponsored by the neo- conservative American Enterprise Institute and West Germany's Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The ob- jective of the conference was to mobilize Latin American Christian Democratic support for the elec- tion of Reagan. The participants did not necessarily share the Manichean assumptions of a Jeane Kirk- patrick, but they agreed on the desirability of a tacti- cal alliance with those who gave primacy to the struggle against communism. 4 For a government which linked national security with the advancement of Christian Democracy, an alliance with the Reagan Administration held special appeal, notwithstanding the real differences of style and emphasis. On a pragmatic level, Venezuela knew that U.S.'aid and trade benefits depended on the country's loyalty to Washington's aims in Central America and the Caribbean. Thus, COPEI presented itself to Washington as the model democracy, ideo- logically secure and a bulwark against any regional deviation to the left. After the U.S. election, Venezuelan Interior Minis- ter Rafael Andrrs Montes de Oca declared that he and Secretary of State Haig "saw eye-to-eye" and pro- claimed "the absolute coincidence of views between the United States and Venezuela."' Such chummi- ness between Caracas and Washington provoked stiff domestic criticism, to the point where Foreign Minis- ter Jos6 Alberto Zambrano Velasco was forced to fend off opponents by declaring that "Venezuela is not a puppet of the United States."' V ENEZUELAN COOPERATION IN THE CAR- ibbean Basin came to involve more than just moral and material support. It would have a military dimension as well, especially in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Since the overthrow of the Perez Jim6nez dictatorship and the establishment of Venezuela as a counter-model in Washington's mind to Cuban com- munism, the Venezuelan military had developed an intimate relationship with its North American coun- terpart and sponsor. Venezuela had been one of the nations most fa- vored by U.S. military aid. Between 1959-69 it re- ceived over $93 million worth of military equipment on credit. In 1973 alone it was given $15 million in credits, more than any other Latin American country.I In the wake of soaring oil revenues, the level of credits dropped, but even during the presidency of the independent-minded Perez, U.S. military sales to Venezuela, relative to population size, were second only to Chile. From 1973-78, the United States sold Venezuela $130 million worth of arms under com- bined Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commercial arms export agreements. The most troublesome aspect of this military rela- tionship arose with the Herrera government's request in 1981 for 48 F-16 aircraft, the most sophisticated combat jets in the U.S. arsenal. The request caused ripples in both Caracas and Washington. The Nixon Administration had banned sales of such sophisti- cated military hardware as a threat to regional sta- bility. 8 With a price tag of $22 million each, Vene- zuela stretched to justify the $1 billion plus purchase by citing the Cuban threat and the air strike capacity of its Soviet-supplied MIGs in the Caribbean. The Ad- ministration agreed. When Under Secretary of State James Buckley was asked by the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee why Venezuela needed the fighter bombers, he shot back, "Something called Cuba." Said the State Department, "The sale strengthens our ties with an important nation, enhances its capabili- ties, and contributes to the stability of our 'third JULY/AUGUST3' JULY/AUGUST 31ROil on Troubled Waters Oil on Troubled Waters border,' the Caribbean." 9 In this vision, Venezuela could play a surrogate role analogous to that of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Although only half the number of jets requested was eventually approved, the sale marked the first occasion that they had been made available to any developing nation. The F-16s converted the Vene- zuelan air force, much to its neighbors' dismay, into the most technically advanced in Latin America. Venezuela clearly hoped to use the aircraft to bolster its bargaining position in the dispute with Colombia over the oil-rich gulf between the two countries, and in the row with Guyana over the Essequibo region. Needless to say, both neighbors protested the pur- chase. Herrera lashed out at "unpatriotic" domestic critics who condemned the half-billion dollar purchase as egregious waste-it was, after all, equivalent to three times the total arms sales from the United States during the oil-boom decade of the 1970s. He need not have been overly concerned, for reaction from the parties and the press was muted. The Venezuelan military enjoyed an almost sacrosanct autonomy, due in large measure to AD's long pampering of the institution. In September 1983, Venezuela duly took delivery of the first three jets." VENEZUELAN POLICY TOWARD THE CAR- ibbean, both English- and Spanish-speaking, mirrored its general international attitudes. Two fac- tors predominated in Venezuelan thinking. The driv- ing force had for two decades been the desire to contain Cuba. Over the last few years, that had been accentuated by the development of what Caracas saw as a series of socialist triangles: Cuba-Nicaragua- Grenada; Cuba-Jamaica-Guyana; Cuba-Grenada-Suri- nam; and, on a smaller scale, Grenada-St. Lucia- Dominica. Second, the arrival of Reagan in the White House coincided with a general shift of political gears in the English-speaking Caribbean. By the end of 1980, Michael Manley's PNP was swept out of office in Jamaica, to be replaced ,by Edward Seaga's free market showcase. Conservative regimes had replaced progressive ones in the Eastern Caribbean islands of St. Lucia and Dominica. Ideological predispositions aside, realpolitik argued for Venezuela's taking a conservative line. With the inevitable expansion of the U.S. presence under Rea- gan, and in the vacuum left by the stagnation of CARICOM, COPEI policy-makers felt that a line parallel to Washington's could best maintain an ef- fective Venezuelan presence in the area.'" Venezuela continued, then, to exercise its considerable economic power on behalf of congenial center-Right regimes and to push for one-to-one agreements with them. This bilateralism in turn accelerated one of the many disintegrative forces at work within CARICOM. Others included the continued strength of ties to the U.S. economy; the emphasis on individual diplomatic strategies of member states to the detriment of a coordinated intra-regional foreign policy; and the contention by some that CARICOM should be en- larged to embrace Latin American nations. 3 The most divisive issue during the 1980s was the wide range of attitudes toward the Marxist government of Grenada. The frictions within CARICOM have persisted: re- cently Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago expressed his fear that the organization was in danger of "becoming shipwrecked."" Seaga's Jamaica could now be wooed without qualms, and the relationship could serve to isolate Trinidad, Venezuela's most persistent critic in the Caribbean community. Venezuela had for some time espoused a broad vision of Caribbean integration, citing the need to expand CARICOM's resource base. Trinidad, lying hard off Venezuela's eastern coast, believed that CARICOM unity was best served by limiting its economic relations as much as possible to the 13 member nations. The continuing hostility between Venezuela and Trinidad was fuelled by their dispute over coastal fishing rights and rivalry as the two most important oil producers in the Caribbean. Trinidad, for example, was the only country to react unfavorably to the 1980 San Jos6 Accord between Mexico and Venezuela: it had already offered a simi- lar plan, which in the words of one Venezuelan scholar was "in many respects more generous."" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE PEREZ administration had been accused of unwarranted interference in Dominican internal affairs. The charges flowed from the limits it placed on economic as- sistance to the rightist regime of Joaquin Balaguer and its open sympathy for the election in 1978 of the social democratic PRD of Antonio Guzmiin. After Guzmin's election, Carlos Andr6s P6rez loudly con- demned the plotting by the military to void the elec- tions and extend Balaguer's rule. The threat receded and Guzmin's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) took office while Venezuela moved immediately to extend generous credits and sign bilateral trade agree- ments. Although Herrera continued these initiatives and included the Dominican Republic in its cash-loan program for oil purchases, he kept his distance from the political interests of the PRD. Even out of office, P6rez remained the most popular international figure among Dominicans." 1 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 32Relations with Cuba had been repaired after 1976 with Carlos Andrts acting as intermediary between Havana and Washington in exchange for Cuban promises not to intervene in the West Indian islands close to Venezuela. But times had changed, and Cuban-Venezuelan relations had cooled considerably. The icy winds blowing from Washington were partly responsible, but more important were two unresolved problems between Caracas and Havana. One was an incident in 1980 in which Cuban na- tionals had sought asylum in Venezuela's Havana Embassy. The other was the lingering problem of the detention of suspects from the 1976 Cubana airliner bombing. In the first case, the Cubans refused to allow the would-be refugees safe passage out of the country; in the second, the Venezuelan government appeared to be dragging its feet over sentencing the accused terrorists. A low point was reached in September 1980, when a military court voted to acquit the four men still held. Castro blamed the Herrera Administration for order- ing the decision and threatened to break relations in the event of a formal acquittal. Again, Venezuela backed away from the sensitive issue; the men re- mained in jail for the remainder of Herrera's term. By now the Cuban Embassy in Caracas stood abandoned, and all but a skeleton staff were pulled out of the Venezuelan mission in Havana. In the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, in which Cuba and Venezuela jointly championed the Argentine cause, discreet informal contacts were resumed. But official relations remained frosty as long as Herrera stayed in office. The Herrera government missed no opportunity to show off its anti-Cuban attitudes in public. In Oc- tober 1980, for example, it allowed 300 Cuban exiles led by Huber Matos to convene a congress in Cara- cas, which resolved to "encourage conditions for an anti-Castro uprising in Cuba" and to open an office in Caracas. Leading Copeyanos participated openly in the meeting. 1 8 HE MOST CONTROVERSIAL ASPECT OF Venezuelan foreign policy under Herrera, how- ever, was the support given to Jose Napole6n Duarte and his Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador between 1980 and 1982. While Democratic Action had been friendly with the Social Democrats who had briefly participated in the governing coalition at the end of 1979, COPEI enjoyed ties to the Salvadorean Christian Democrats that were more than just ideo- logical and political. During his seven years of exile VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN AID Venezuela's International Multilateral Finance 1974-41 In the first two years of its technical aid program, Venezuela recycled one-third of its trade surplus, disbursing $2.3 billion in aid---more than twice the U.S. commitment to the Alliance for Progress. By 1981 Venezuela had disbursed $5.3 billion out of a total commitment of $7.5 billion. This represented 2.25% of its GDP, almost eight times the average proportion of GDP devoted to foreign aid by the industrialized nations. The late 1970s saw a shift away from multilateral to bilateral aid. ($ million) Year Disbursed Committed 1974 1980 816 44 319 293 1415 639 233 392 (multilateral) (bilateral) (multilateral) (bilateral) After 1981, "adjustments to new realities" forced a reduction of aid, and in March 1983 aid programs under the Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) were suspended. The bulk of aid from 1981-84 has taken the form of cash loans for oil purchases. Recipient International Monetary Fund Inter-American Development Bank World Bank LAFTA Reciprocal Credit OPEC Fund U.N. Special Funds Securities/Market Bonds International Fund for Agricultural Development Santo Domingo Agreement Andean Development Corporation Caribbean Development Bank Andean Reserve Fund Central American Integration Bank Coffee Stabilization Other International Organizations TOTAL Amount ($ million) 962 616 549 351 268 143 94 66 56 54 46 45 40 23 89 3402 Sources: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores et al., The Inter- national Cooperation of Venezu e la: Achievements between 1974- 1981, (Caracas, no date); Norman Gall, "The Challenge ofVene- zuelan Oil," Foreign Poicy, No. 28, Spring 1975; Venezuelan periodicals. JU Y/UG S 33-JULY/AUGUST 33Reoir on z4 AmWers Oil on Troubled Waters in Venezuela in the 1970s, after his fraudulent elec- toral defeat in 1972, Duarte had developed a strong personal friendship with Herrera, former president Caldera and ex-foreign minister Calvani. When he returned to El Salvador in 1979 he was flown into the Ilopango airport aboard a Venezuelan military air- craft. 1 Herrera's emerging partisanship in foreign policy was given strong encouragement from Washington. The United States enlisted Venezuelan support for the new Salvadorean regime when Duarte stepped in to head the Junta in March 1980. Venezuelan efforts soon went beyond mere diplomatic and moral sup- port; by June 1980, AD was charging that Venezuela was training Salvadorean military and police officers and covertly shipping arms to the Junta. 2 0 The ac- cusations were vehemently denied by the government. As the March 1982 presidential elections drew nearer, Venezuela placed itself solidly behind the candidacy of Duarte, while Herrera chastised Washington for ignoring the threat from the Salvadorean Right. Herrera's pleas for moderation did not, however, extend to the military. Venezuela was by now virtu- ally the only Latin American ally of the Christian Democrats in the Junta. It believed that rebel suc- cesses and an insecure, inefficient military posed the greatest threat to Duarte's political future, and there- fore saw no contradiction in showing support for Duarte by stepping up covert military assistance.21 NICARAGUA OFFERED THE HERRERA AD- ministration another clear choice, and an even better opportunity to break with the policies of P6rez. Carlos Andr6s, the Sandinistas' chief international supporter, left office in March 1979, four months before the Sandinista victory. His successor quickly decided to reduce Venezuela's role in the conflict, leaving a vacuum that was immediately filled by Mexico. It was Mexico, not Venezuela, which ac- celerated the Sandinistas' victory by breaking dip- lomatic relations with Somoza in May. Like the Carter Administration, Caracas began pressuring the new government to conform to its own non-revolutionary notions of political freedom. Just before the Sandinista victory, Nicaraguan Archbishop Obando y Bravo had traveled to Caracas to confer with the new COPEI authorities on ways of broaden- ing and "moderating" the new revolutionary Junta. During a state visit to Managua in 1980, Herrera lectured the Sandinistas on the virtues of democracy and warned ominously that continued aid would de- pend on efforts by the revolutionary government to diversify its political base."22 The stance was an ironic I Caracas: a booming capital one: Herrera's approach in El Salvador scarcely fa- vored power-sharing. By 1981, Venezuela's qualified support gave way to a more patently anti-Sandinista posture. Caracas aligned itself more openly with the conservative REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 34Church hierarchy in Nicaragua, which had grown increasingly critical of the revolution, and upgraded its links with the Nicaraguan Christian Democrats (nowhere near as potent a force as their Salvadorean counterparts). At times, the Venezuelan ambassador's conduct almost made him seem like an accredited representative of the small Social Christian Party (PSC). Party officials, rather than government lead- ers, would greet the ambassador on his arrival at the airport and escort him to the embassy. 2 3 In 1981, Jos6 Est6ban Gonzilez, head of Nicaragua's Permanent Human Rights Commission and a prominent Chris- tian Democrat, travelled abroad and issued statements hostile to the regime. When he was briefly jailed on his return, the top leadership of COPEI rallied to his defense. President Herrera even hinted that relations might be broken over the incident." 4 ACCORDING TO THE VENEZUELAN JOUR- nalist Jesuis Puertas, "COPEI and its govern- ment not only took any opportunity to accuse the present Nicaraguan regime of totalitarianism but also attempted to present a project of aiding and counsel- ling anti-Sandinista parties and groups." Puertas states that Guillermo Yepes Boscan, Venezuela's am- bassador to Nicaragua until late 1981, "surrounded himself with those sectors arrayed against the San- dinista process." At a public forum to discuss na- tional problems, the ambassador appeared as an observer in the section reserved for the political opposition. 2 " It was, to say the least, unusual behavior for a diplomat. In the ensuing criticism of his conduct, the conservative daily La Prensa rallied fiercely to his support. Herrera Campins "on repeated occasions expressed his affinity with La Prensa," and the em- bassy established a close working relationship with its editors. Ambassador Yepes' frequent talks at op- position group headquarters were published regularly in the paper, along with articles praising the Vene- zuelan regime and its political model. 2 6 In August 1981 Yepes decorated Archbishop Oban- do y Bravo with the prestigious Order of Francisco Miranda. In the ceremony, Yepes praised the now actively anti-Sandinista bishop as "a champion of democracy" in a speech heavily covered inLa Prensa. Yepes was recalled from Nicaragua in late 1981; the Nicaraguan private enterprise confederation COSEP sponsored his farewell dinner. 2 7 The ambassador pulled out just in time, for in January 1982 an ugly incident threatened to jeopardize Venezuelan-Nicaraguan relations. The Sandinistas uncovered a plot by the counterrevolutionary UDN- FARN to blow up an oil refinery and a cement plant. Papers found on the leader of the plot, William Bal- todano-alias Comandante R6mulo--revealed that one of the captured conspirators was a Venezuelan citizen, Julio Gonzilez Ferr6n, whose documents identified him as an agent of Venezuelan Military Intelligence (DIM).28 On January 12, Nicaraguan Interior Minister To- mis Borge announced that an official residence of the Venezuelan mission had been used as a rendezvous for planning the sabotage. He further charged five embassy personnel, including military and commer- cial attaches, with active collaboration with the con- tras, "picking them up at their hiding places in em- bassy vehicles. "" Fearful that Venezuela would use the incident and Nicaragua's response as an excuse to break relations and suspend vital oil shipments, Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto was dispatched to Caracas to talk directly to Herrera before the Sandinistas disclosed their findings publicly. To minimize the embarrass- ment to Venezuela, Borge took pains to reiterate that Nicaragua did not see the plotters as representative of their government's position "of friendship and soli- darity with Nicaragua." Even Gonzilez Ferr6n was dismissed as an agent of the CIA, not the DIM, "be- cause the friendly government of Venezuela would not send a spy here." 3 I After this pantomime, however, the Herrera gov- ernment gave evidence in 1982 of hardening its line against Nicaragua. It accepted observer status in the Central American Democratic Community, a short- lived alliance of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica which Washington put together to isolate Nica- ragua. In April 1982 Venezuela took part in the joint Ocean Venture 82 naval exercises in the Caribbean with the United States, Honduras, Argentina and Brazil. Foreign Minister Zambrano summed up the gov- ernment's position in a speech the same month at the military's Institute of Higher Studies: We oppose violent formulas which attempt to channel the Latin American process into ab- solutist and totalitarian roads. The so-called revolutionary processes which have developed on the American continent cannot be termed wars of liberation. This language made for a natural dovetailing of policies with Washington. Zambrano concluded, "There are political coincidences in our positions... [but] even the divergences do not constitute an in- superable barrier for the co-ordination of efforts and working in common."
1978-82: EXPORTING IDEOLOGY 1. Demetrio Boersner, "El Caribe" in Perfiles Inter- nacionales, p. 38. See also Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, (Chapel Hill Press, University of North Carolina, 1980). 2. Author's interviews with Demetrio Boersner and Juan Jos6 Monsant, Caracas, January 1, 1984. 3. Author's interview with Demetrio Boersner, Cara- cas, January 12, 1984. 4. Demetrio Boersner, "Cuba y Venezuela: Conflicto y convivencia," in Andr6s Serbin, ed., Geopolitica de las relaciones de Venezuela con el Caribe, (ASOVAC, Cara- cas, 1983), pp. 176-77. 5. John D. Martz, "Venezuela," in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, (Holmes and Meier, New York, 1983), Vol. I, p. 378. 6. Leslie Manigat, "Geopolitica de las relaciones entre Venezuela y el Caribe: problemiitica general y problemas,' in Serbin, ed., op. cit., pp. 49-50. 7. Harold E. Davis and Larman C. Wilson, Latin Ameri- can Foreign Policies: An Analysis, (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1975), pp. 428-29. 8. Steve Ellner, "F-16s for Caracas," Commonweal, March 26, 1982; Manigat, op. cit., p. 50; Martz, "Vene- zuela," in Hopkins, op. cit., p. 381. 9. Martz, "Venezuela," in Hopkins, op. cit., p. 381. 10. "Llegaron los F-16," Sic, (Caracas) December 1983, p. 467. 11. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1984, (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1984). 12. Boersner, "El Caribe," op. cit., p. 38. 13. Vaughan A. Lewis, "The Commonwealth Carib- bean," in Christopher Lapham, ed., Foreign Policy Mak- ing in Developing States, (Praeger Books, New York, 1979), pp. 110-130. 14. The New York Times, July 8, 1984. 15. Mirlande Hippolyte de Manigat, "Venezuela, la CARICOM y la integraci6n del Caribe," in Serbin, op. cit., p. 106. 16. John D. Martz, "Ideology," in Erisman and Martz, op. cit. pp. 124, 130. 17. Boersner, "Cuba y Venezuela" in Serbin, op. cit., pp. 177-178; Diario de Caracas, March 8, 1984. 18. Martz, "Ideology," op. cit., p. 132. 19. Robert D. Bond, "Venezuelan Policy" in Feinberg, op. cit., pp. 195-196; author's interview with Juan Jose Monsant, Caracas, January 12, 1984. 20. Cynthia Arnson and Delia Miller, "Update: Back- ground Information on El Salvador," Resource, (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., June, 1980), p. 9. 21. Cynthia Arnson, "Update No. 8: Background Infor- mation on U.S. Policy," Resource, (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., March, 1983), p. 11; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), February 16, 1983, p. 8. 22. Bond in Feinberg, op. cit., p. 194. 23. Author's interview, Caracas, January, 1984. 24. Jestis Puertas, "La politica de COPEI y su gobierno para con Nicaragua," Sic, November, 1981. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Barricada Internacional, (Managua, Nicaragua), January 30, 1984. 29. "Las denuncias de Tomis Borge," Sic, February, 1982; pp. 91-92. 30. Ibid.