NON-ALIGNMENT IS A RECENT CON- cept in international relations. It originated among the emerging nations of the Third World as a way of avoiding involvement in the U.S.-Soviet ten- sions which have dominated world politics since World War II. Its definition is dynamic, changing with the ebbs and flows of East-West tension and the emergence of new problems among Third World countries. The most straightforward definition of non-align- ment comes from the four principles that qualify na- tions for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). They are peaceful coexistence; non-partici- pation in military pacts and no granting of military bases to the great powers; and support for national liberation struggles. But non-alignment is not 'neutrality." Some countries have argued that non- alignment requires equidistance from the superpow- ers, but that is a minority view. Since Jawaharlal Nehru of India first enunciated the concept of non- alignment in the late 1940s, calling it 'positive neutrality." it has been broadly accepted that a ten- dency toward either the United States or the USSR does not disqualify a nation from membership in the NAM. Non-alignment, then, is not an ideology but a smorgasbord of positions which have varied over time. Its importance and application in bilateral rela- tions are determined by the changing governments of NAM member nations, who cover the political spectrum from Indonesia to India, from Argentina to Cuba. When Daniel Ortega spoke at the Non- Aligned conference in Havana in 1979, he pledged the six-week-old Sandinista government to a catalogue of common positions of NAM members: We are entering the Non-Aligned Movement because . . . we see Itherel the broadest or- ganization of Third World states that are play- Nicaragua: Sovereignty and Non-Alignment BY ROBERT ARMSTRONG A legacy of anti-yanqui feeling N ON-ALIGNMENT IS A RECENT CON- cept in international relations. It originated among the emerging nations of the Third World as a way of avoiding involvement in the U.S.-Soviet ten- sions which have dominated world politics since World War II. Its definition is dynamic, changing with the ebbs and flows of East-West tension and the emergence of new problems among Third World countries. The most straightforward definition of non-align- ment comes from the four principles that qualify na- tions for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). They are peaceful coexistence; non-partici- pation in military pacts and no granting of military bases to the great powers; and support for national liberation struggles. But non-alignment is not "neutrality." Some countries have argued that non- alignment requires equidistance from the superpow- ers, but that is a minority view. Since Jawaharlal Nehru of India first enunciated the concept of non- alignment in the late 1940s, calling it "positive neutrality," it has been broadly accepted that a ten- dency toward either the United States or the USSR does not disqualify a nation from membership in the NAM. Non-alignment, then, is not an ideology but a smorgasbord of positions which have varied over time. Its importance and application in bilateral rela- tions are determined by the changing governments of NAM member nations, who cover the political spectrum from Indonesia to India, from Argentina to Cuba. When Daniel Ortega spoke at the Non- Aligned conference in Havana in 1979, he pledged the six-week-old Sandinista government to a catalogue of common positions of NAM members: We are entering the Non-Aligned Movement because ... we see [there] the broadest or- ganization of Third World states that are play- MAY/JUNE 1985 15, A Sandinista Foreign Policy ing an important role and exercising a growing influence in the international sphere, in the struggle of peoples against imperialism, colo- nialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and every form of oppres- sion. Because they are for active peaceful coexistence, against the existence of military blocs and alliances, for restructuring interna- tional relations on an honorable basis, and for the establishment of a new international economic order. Since the organization of the NAM in 1961, its concerns have shifted. The movement's first lead- ers-Nehru, Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser-aimed to create a secure space for smaller nations who feared being caught in the Cold War. As armed struggle against colonial and neocolonial rule intensified in the 1960s and 1970s in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, as well as in Indochina and the Middle East, support for national liberation movements be- came the predominant concern. With the advent of detente, the NAM focussed its attention on the worsening economic position of the Third World, and its deepening dependency on the West, especially the United States. Cuba, a found- ing member of the NAM, was a prominent influence on this trend, and as criticism of the United States grew, it led an effort by several nations at the 1979 Havana summit to have the NAM declare that a "natural alliance" existed between non-aligned na- Hemispheric Nations in the NAM, With Date of Entry Members Cuba (1961) Bolivia (1979) Guyana (1970) Grenada (1979) Jamaica (1970) Surinarn (1979) Trinidad and Tobago (1970) Babamas (1983) Argentina (1973) Barbados (1983) Chile (1973)* Belize (1983) Peru (L973) Colombia (1983) Panama (1976) Ecuador (1983) Nicaragua (1979) St.Lucia (1983) Permanent Observers tions and the Soviet Union, But the issue never came to the floor; several weeks after the meeting, the in- vasion of Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, de- finitively killed the Cuban initiative. At the next NAM meeting in New Delhi in 1983, the agenda again focussed on the questions of economic depen- dency and the need for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). S OVIET AND U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD non-alignment have been strikingly different. The United States has generally been suspicious, even hostile, both toward countries which practice non-alignment and toward the NAM itself. The Soviet Union has generally supported both. Wash- ington has preferred the dependable loyalty of allies to the uncertainty of non-alignment. After the crisis of the Great Depression and World War II, its global task was to rebuild the capitalist order while resist- ing determined challenges both from the socialist bloc and from the new nationalist upsurge in the Southern Hemisphere. Since World War II, Wash- ington has seen international relations as a zero-sum game, calculating any loss for the United States as a Soviet gain. The decision by any country to move away from the U.S. orbit to a non-aligned position has thus produced Consternation. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, has always sup- ported such non-aligned concerns as national libera- tion and an end to colonialism and imperialism. Un- like the United States, the Soviets have not felt their interests threatened by non-alignment (although the invasion of Afghanistan challenges the Soviet com- mitment to its founding principles). There is a con- sistent certainty, from Lenin to contemporary Soviet theorists, that anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ad- vances weaken capitalism and potentially can ma- ture into full-blown socialist experiments. The Soviets have used aid, trade, diplomatic and military support, and influence in local Communist parties, to push for the transition to socialism in Third World countries. However, the underlying Soviet belief in historic inevitability means considerable tolerance and patience if events take an unexpected turn. In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba was alone in opting for non-alignment until the late 1960s. After World War lithe United States had quickly sewn up hemispheric allegiance by pledging a new era of in- ternational respect through a mutual defense treaty and the Organization of American States. However, U.S. post-war policy toward Latin America con- tinued its old interventionist course in Guatemala (1954 and 1968), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Re- public (1965) and Chile (1973). Nor did Washington 16 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Antigua Brazil Cos Rica El Saivador Mexico Uruguay Veneniela * Chile has boycotted NAM meetings since 1976. 1R4t O4, te Am ericas Sandinista Foreign Policy ing an important role and exercising a growing influence in the international sphere, in the struggle of peoples against imperialism, colo- nialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and every form of oppres- sion. Because they are for active peaceful coexistence, against the existence of military blocs and alliances, for restructuring interna- tional relations on an honorable basis, and for the establishment of a new international economic order.' Since the organization of the NAM in 1961, its concerns have shifted. The movement's first lead- ers-Nehru, Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser-aimed to create a secure space for smaller nations who feared being caught in the Cold War. As armed struggle against colonial and neocolonial rule intensified in the 1960s and 1970s in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, as well as in Indochina and the Middle East, support for national liberation movements be- came the predominant concern. With the advent of detente, the NAM focussed its attention on the worsening economic position of the Third World, and its deepening dependency on the West, especially the United States. Cuba, a found- ing member of the NAM, was a prominent influence on this trend, and as criticism of the United States grew, it led an effort by several nations at the 1979 Havana summit to have the NAM declare that a "natural alliance" existed between non-aligned na- Hemispheric Nations in the NAM, With Date of Entry Members Cuba (1961) Bolivia (1979) Guyana (1970) Grenada (1979) Jamaica (1970) Surinam (1979) Trinidad and Tobago (1970) Bahamas (1983) Argentina (1973) Barbados (1983) Chile (1973)* Belize (1983) Peru (1973) Colombia (1983) Panama (1976) Ecuador (1983) Nicaragua (1979) St.Lucia (1983) Permanent Observers Antigua Brazil Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Uruguay Venezuela * Chile has boycotted NAM meetings since 1976. tions and the Soviet Union. But the issue never came to the floor; several weeks after the meeting, the in- vasion of Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, de- finitively killed the Cuban initiative. At the next NAM meeting in New Delhi in 1983, the agenda again focussed on the questions of economic depen- dency and the need for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). S OVIET AND U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD non-alignment have been strikingly different. The United States has generally been suspicious, even hostile, both toward countries which practice non-alignment and toward the NAM itself. The Soviet Union has generally supported both. Wash- ington has preferred the dependable loyalty of allies to the uncertainty of non-alignment. After the crisis of the Great Depression and World War II, its global task was to rebuild the capitalist order while resist- ing determined challenges both from the socialist bloc and from the new nationalist upsurge in the Southern Hemisphere. Since World War II, Wash- ington has seen international relations as a zero-sum game, calculating any loss for the United States as a Soviet gain. The decision by any country to move away from the U.S. orbit to a non-aligned position has thus produced consternation. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, has always sup- ported such non-aligned concerns as national libera- tion and an end to colonialism and imperialism. Un- like the United States, the Soviets have not felt their interests threatened by non-alignment (although the invasion of Afghanistan challenges the Soviet com- mitment to its founding principles). There is a con- sistent certainty, from Lenin to contemporary Soviet theorists, that anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ad- vances weaken capitalism and potentially can ma- ture into full-blown socialist experiments. The Soviets have used aid, trade, diplomatic and military support, and influence in local Communist parties, to push for the transition to socialism in Third World countries. However, the underlying Soviet belief in historic inevitability means considerable tolerance and patience if events take an unexpected turn. In the Western Hemisphere, Cuba was alone in opting for non-alignment until the late 1960s. After World War II the United States had quickly sewn up hemispheric allegiance by pledging a new era of in- ternational respect through a mutual defense treaty and the Organization of American States. However, U.S. post-war policy toward Latin America con- tinued its old interventionist course in Guatemala (1954 and 1968), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Re- public (1965) and Chile (1973). Nor did Washington REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 16offer any real assistance in resolving chronic economic problems: instead, it demanded a harsh anti-communism that strengthened economic and military elites and strangled social change. In response, political parties and governments. ranging from nationalist to Marxist in outlook, searched for alternatives. In the late 1960s and early 1970s. a number of factors hastened the regional trend toward non-alignment: the world economic crisis: the effective example of OPEC; the growing NAM concern for the NIEO: the success of national liberation movements in Africa and Asia; and Fidel Castro's promotion of Third World solidarity. Sev- enteen Latin American and Caribbean countries are members of the NAM: seven others are permanent observers. In 1979 Nicaragua became the eighth non-aligned nation in the hemisphere. Over and above the inter- national trends that made non-alignment attractive throughout Latin America, the Sandinista leadership was powerfully influenced by a special factor: the historic relationship between Nicaragua and the United States. Only Puerto Rico can equal Nicaragua's history of U.S. intervention. The way in which most Nicaraguans read that history explains how the fa- mous reference to the "Yanqui" as the "enemy of humanity" in the Sandinista anthem is less rhetori- cal excess than the expression of a suppressed 'truth" whose very utterance is an act of psycho- logical as well as national liberation. In the light of Nicaraguan history, anti-Americanism and suspi- cion of U.S. intentions are not irrational responses by the Sandinista government. On the contrary, a new distance from the insensitive neighbor to the north, based on a less exclusive relationship, ap- pears a sine qua non of national integrity. The opposition to President Reagan's controver- sial May visit to Bitburg was based, among other things, on the conviction that 'history matters." It lives on into the present; human survival itself re- quires that it not be forgotten. With a deep sense of the lessons of Nicaragua's past experience, the San- dinistas have chosen non-alignment as the best way of guaranteeing that history will not repeat itself. What makes that history so special? I N 1855, A TENNESSEE MERCENARY named William Walker-with tacit support from the U.S. government-landed in Nicaragua in the pay of the Liberals, one of the two warring factions of the local elite. After defeating the Conservatives, he turned against his employers, overcame them, declared himself president of Nicaragua (though he spoke no Spanish), re-established slavery and set out to conquer the rest of Central America. After losing to the combined armies of the Central American re- publics. he returned to the United States to a hero's welcome. At the end of two more unsuccessful Cen- tral American campaigns, he was eventually de- feated and executed in 1860 in Puerto Trujillo, I-Ion- duras. The United States. Great Britain and France schemed and competed for years to build a canal be- tween the Atlantic and the Pacific; Nicaragua and Panama were the most promising sites. Even after U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt-in his own fa- mous boast- "took Panama" in 1903, Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya, backed by a dynamic new class of coffee growers, insisted on building a second canal through Nicaragua. Zelaya, attempted to balance growing U.S. influence in Central Ameri- ca by improving relations with Great Britain, then withdrew a business concession from a U.S. re- sident. Most seriously, he ordered the execution of two U.S. citizens caught placing mines in Nicara- guan waters. In response, Washington forced Zelaya out of office in 1909 and installed a more malleable Conservative government with the help of 400 U.S. troops. Marines were dispatched in 1912 to crush a Sandino to Borge: Fifty years of tradition MAY/JL'NI 1985 17 Sandino to Borge: Fifty years of tradition offer any real assistance in resolving chronic economic problems; instead, it demanded a harsh anti-communism that strengthened economic and military elites and strangled social change. In response, political parties and governments, ranging from nationalist to Marxist in outlook, searched for alternatives. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of factors hastened the regional trend toward non-alignment: the world economic crisis; the effective example of OPEC; the growing NAM concern for the NIEO; the success of national liberation movements in Africa and Asia; and Fidel Castro's promotion of Third World solidarity. Sev- enteen Latin American and Caribbean countries are members of the NAM; seven others are permanent observers. In 1979 Nicaragua became the eighth non-aligned nation in the hemisphere. Over and above the inter- national trends that made non-alignment attractive throughout Latin America, the Sandinista leadership was powerfully influenced by a special factor: the historic relationship between Nicaragua and the United States. Only Puerto Rico can equal Nicaragua's history of U.S. intervention. The way in which most Nicaraguans read that history explains how the fa- mous reference to the "Yanqui" as the "enemy of humanity" in the Sandinista anthem is less rhetori- cal excess than the expression of a suppressed "truth" whose very utterance is an act of psycho- logical as well as national liberation. In the light of Nicaraguan history, anti-Americanism and suspi- cion of U.S. intentions are not irrational responses by the Sandinista government. On the contrary, a new distance from the insensitive neighbor to .the north, based on a less exclusive relationship, ap- pears a sine qua non of national integrity. The opposition to President Reagan's controver- sial May visit to Bitburg was based, among other things, on the conviction that "history matters." It lives on into the present; human survival itself re- quires that it not be forgotten. With a deep sense of the lessons of Nicaragua's past experience, the San- dinistas have chosen non-alignment as the best way of guaranteeing that history will not repeat itself. What makes that history so special? IN 1 8 5 5 , A TENNESSEE MERCENARY named William Walker-with tacit support from the U.S. government-landed in Nicaragua in the pay of the Liberals, one of the two warring factions of the local elite. After defeating the Conservatives, he turned against his employers, overcame them, declared himself president of Nicaragua (though he spoke no Spanish), re-established slavery and set out to conquer the rest of Central America. After losing to the combined armies of the Central American re- publics, he returned to the United States to a hero's welcome. At the end of two more unsuccessful Cen- tral American campaigns, he was eventually de- feated and executed in 1860 in Puerto Trujillo, Hon- duras. * The United States, Great Britain and France schemed and competed for years to build a canal be- tween the Atlantic and the Pacific; Nicaragua and Panama were the most promising sites. Even after U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt-in his own fa- mous boast-"took Panama" in 1903, Nicaraguan President Jos6 Santos Zelaya, backed by a dynamic new class of coffee growers, insisted on building a second canal through Nicaragua. Zelaya, attempted to balance growing U.S. influence in Central Ameri- ca by improving relations with Great Britain, then withdrew a business concession from a U.S. re- sident. Most seriously, he ordered the execution of two U.S. citizens caught placing mines in Nicara- guan waters. In response, Washington forced Zelaya out of office in 1909 and installed a more malleable Conservative government with the help of 400 U.S. troops. * Marines were dispatched in 1912 to crush a MAY/JUNE 1985 17efri;l i 4 Sandinista Foreign Policy revolt against the U.S.-imposed government. Be- sieged in a hilltop fort near Masaya, the lawyer and judge Benjamin Zeledon fought the Marines until he was forced to retreat. He was later killed by govern- ment troops. Two years later, the United States negotiated the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with the new government, which ceded to Washington the per- petual right to build a canal in Nicaragua. Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1898, 1909 and 1912. The United States maintained a military garrison of 100 Marines in Nicaragua from 19 12-25; they returned in greater numbers in 1926 and remained until January 1, 1933, leaving only after training a special security force, the National Guard, under the direction of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. U.S. troops fought their first countenn- surgency war in Latin America in Nicaragua against Augusto Cesar Sandino's guerrilla army from 1927 to 1932. Sandino kept the U.S. forces on the defen- sive for five years, and earned hemispheric fame rivalling that of Simon BolIvar and Benito Juarez for his David-and-Goliath defense of Nicaraguan sovereignty. Twelve years before Guernica, on June 16, 1927, U.S. planes undertook the first ever aerial bombardment of a civilian population, in the war against Sandino's army. The bombing of Ocotal that day took 300 lives. With the probable knowledge of the U.S. am- bassador, National Guard commander Somoza Gar- cIa ordered Sandino's murder on February 21, 1934. After Sandino's death, his followers in the province of Nueva Segovia were persecuted and massacred. Somoza established himself as the founder of a fam- ily dynasty. The Somoza family ruled Nicaragua for 43 years. When the Somozas were overthrown, they controlled 20% of the Nicaraguan economy, from sugar plantations and cattle farms to casinos and prostitution rings. They used the U.S-armed and trained National Guard as a personal army to enrich the family and its cronies through extortion, harass- ment and terror. Nicaragua was virtually the Somozas' family property. Until the final days of Somocismo, U.S. support was constant, even clubby. In return, the Somozas made Nicaragua a sure vote for the United States in the United Na- tions, the backbone of U.S. regional military strate- gy through the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA) and the training site for the CIA inva- sion of Cuba in 1961. In July 1979, the Somoza dynasty was over- thrown in a massive insurrection led by the FSLN. Two years of fighting left 50,000 dead- 2% of the population. Right up to the end, the United States, in alliance with Nicaragua's traditional parties, at- tempted to preserve the National Guard, which had the highest number of U.S.-trained officers of any Central American army, and to prevent significant FSLN influence in a post-Somoza government. Nicaragua is the size of the state of Iowa; its population is now approaching three million. There is an intimacy to history that one finds especially in small countries; memory sears deep. Nicaraguan history bred frustration, rage and a sense of violation in an entire population, among all classes; but that history also contained the memory of defiance and resistance. These were the feelings which the FSLN organized to shape the insurrection. And it is from the resistance of Sandino and Zeledon that the San- dinistas have created an alternative vision of Nicara- gua. AN ACUTE FORM OF ETHNO-CENTRISM pervades debate about Nicaragua in the United States, which relies on "Western" political symbols and categories as the only legitimate framework for discussing Nicaragua. Policy analysts regard San- dinismo not as a serious expression of nationalist and working-class aspirations, but as an intellectual hodgepodge without independent vitality, and/or a cover for Soviet expansionism. Sandino himself never enters the debate; the Kissinger Commission report on Central America, for example, does not mention his name. Yet there is by now a considerable history of the kind of "ideology" represented by Sandinismo operating as a key element of Third World nationalist development. Nasserism, African social- ism, the legacy of Gandhi in India, all have paral- lels. The Sandinista decision to opt for non-align- ment is firmly rooted in the tradition of Sandino. It lies in Sandino's opposition to U.S. interference and Nicaraguan dependency, in his belief in the cooperation of Latin Americans against the United States, and in his recurring dream-shared with many in the region- of a single Central American nation. In 1928 Sandino wrote, We are well into the 20th century. and the times have shown the whole world how the Yanquis' slogans can be turned against them. When they speak of the Monroe Doctrine, they say, 'America for Americans." Fine, well said. AU of us born in America are Amer- icans. But the imperialists have interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as "America for the Yan- quis." Well, in order that the blonde beasts not continue deceived, I reformulate the 18 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Sandinista Foreign Policy revolt against the U.S.-imposed government. Be- sieged in a hilltop fort near Masaya, the lawyer and judge Benjamin Zeled6n fought the Marines until he was forced to retreat. He was later killed by govern- ment troops. Two years later, the United States negotiated the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with the new government, which ceded to Washington the per- petual right to build a canal in Nicaragua. * Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1898, 1909 and 1912. The United States maintained a military garrison of 100 Marines in Nicaragua from 1912-25; they returned in greater numbers in 1926 and remained until January 1, 1933, leaving only after training a special security force, the National Guard, under the direction of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. * U.S. troops fought their first counterin- surgency war in Latin America in Nicaragua against Augusto C6sar Sandino's guerrilla army from 1927 to 1932. Sandino kept the U.S. forces on the defen- sive for five years, and earned hemispheric fame rivalling that of Sim6n Bolivar and Benito Jtiarez for his David-and-Goliath defense of Nicaraguan sovereignty. * Twelve years before Guernica, on June 16, 1927, U.S. planes undertook the first ever aerial bombardment of a civilian population, in the war against Sandino's army. The bombing of Ocotal that day took 300 lives. * With the probable knowledge of the U.S. am- bassador, National Guard commander Somoza Gar- cia ordered Sandino's murder on February 21, 1934. After Sandino's death, his followers in the province of Nueva Segovia were persecuted and massacred. Somoza established himself as the founder of a fam- ily dynasty. * The Somoza family ruled Nicaragua for 43 years. When the Somozas were overthrown, they controlled 20% of the Nicaraguan economy, from sugar plantations and cattle farms to casinos and prostitution rings. They used the U.S.-armed and trained National Guard as a personal army to enrich the family and its cronies through extortion, harass- ment and terror. Nicaragua was virtually the Somozas' family property. Until the final days of Somocismo, U.S. support was constant, even clubby. In return, the Somozas made Nicaragua a sure vote for the United States in the United Na- tions, the backbone of U.S. regional military strate- gy through the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA) and the training site for the CIA inva- sion of Cuba in 1961. * In July 1979, the Somoza dynasty was over- thrown in a massive insurrection led by the FSLN. Two years of fighting left 50,000 dead-2% of the population. Right up to the end, the United States, in alliance with Nicaragua's traditional parties, at- tempted to preserve the National Guard, which had the highest number of U.S.-trained officers of any Central American army, and to prevent significant FSLN influence in a post-Somoza government. Nicaragua is the size of the state of Iowa; its population is now approaching three million. There is an intimacy to history that one finds especially in small countries; memory sears deep. Nicaraguan history bred frustration, rage and a sense of violation in an entire population, among all classes; but that history also contained the memory of defiance and resistance. These were the feelings which the FSLN organized to shape the insurrection. And it is from the resistance of Sandino and Zeled6n that the San- dinistas have created an alternative vision of Nicara- gua. A N ACUTE FORM OF ETHNO-CENTRISM pervades debate about Nicaragua in the United States, which relies on "Western" political symbols and categories as the only legitimate framework for discussing Nicaragua. Policy analysts regard San- dinismo not as a serious expression of nationalist and working-class aspirations, but as an intellectual hodgepodge without independent vitality, and/or a cover for Soviet expansionism. Sandino himself never enters the debate; the Kissinger Commission report on Central America, for example, does not mention his name. Yet there is by now a considerable history of the kind of "ideology" represented by Sandinismo operating as a key element of Third World nationalist development. Nasserism, African social- ism, the legacy of Gandhi in India, all have paral- lels. The Sandinista decision to opt for non-align- ment is firmly rooted in the tradition of Sandino. It lies in Sandino's opposition to U.S. interference and Nicaraguan dependency, in his belief in the cooperation of Latin Americans against the United States, and in his recurring dream-shared with many in the region--of a single Central American nation. In 1928 Sandino wrote, We are well into the 20th century, and the times have shown the whole world how the Yanquis' slogans can be turned against them. When they speak of the Monroe Doctrine, they say, "America for Americans." Fine, well said. All of us born in America are Amer- icans. But the imperialists have interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as "America for the Yan- quis." Well, in order that the blonde beasts not continue deceived, I reformulate the REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 18phrase in the following way: The United States of North America for the Yanquis. Latin America for the Indo-Americans.2 The FSLN has attempted to capture those aspira- tions as elements of what it calls Sandinismo. San- dinismo is at once political mythology and a theoret- ical framework, a strategy and a program to guide the Nicaraguan revolution, with the breadth and res- onance needed to replace a system as coherent and all-embracing in its own way as Somocismo. T HE IMPETUS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT came from Carlos Fonseca Amador, one of the founders of the FSLN. Fonseca was in many ways typical of a generation of Latin American intellectu- als who came of age in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He saw Marxism as an attractive alternative to the elite concerns of traditional political parties, yet was frustrated by the passivity of the Moscow- line communist parties. He was galvanized instead by Fidel Castro's ex- ample of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare in Cuba. Like many of his contemporaries, Fonseca chose to go "to the mountains" to try and replicate Castro's triumph. His early efforts were a failure, but from 196 1-63 he was a key figure in bringing to- gether a new organization which called itself the Sandinista Front for National Liberation. According to Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's minister of the interior and a fellow FSLN founder, it was at Fonseca's in- sistence that the title "Sandinista" was included.3 The FSLN survived the 1960s, unlike most guer- rilla groups of the time whose combatants died of exposure or were killed by U.S.-trained counterin- surgency forces. But Fonseca's special contribution to Nicaraguan history and to the development of the FSLN went beyond his obvious skills as a political! military leader. It lay in his study of the writings of Sandino, in finding their internal coherence and de- veloping from them what he called a "national revo- lutionary ideology." To grasp Fonseca's accomplishment, one must understand that the Somoza regime tried systemati- cally to destroy the memory of Sandino just as the first Somoza had eliminated the man himself. Ed- gardo Garcia, the charismatic young leader of the Rural Workers' Union (ATC), told how, as a young boy growing up in the mid-1960s, he first heard of Sandino: "It was a kind of ghost story that my grandfather told me. Sandino was a man who had helped the peasants. But one day, he mysteriously went away, and all the people were very sad. 'Someday, though,' my grandfather said, 'he will return.' Fonseca went back through Sandino's writings, organized them and talked to survivors of the origi- nal Sandinistas. He isolated certain key themes and symbols, which through his own and others' writ- ings, and the political education work of the FSLN, stimulated a revival of interest in the guerrilla leader and restored his memory as a symbol of resistance to inspire the anti-Somoza struggle. Fonseca and the FSLN organized these materials in easily readable pamphlet form, and used them as the basis for educating both Sandinista militants and grassroots activists. In 1974, Sergio RamIrez, one of Nicara- gua's foremost intellectuals and now the country's vice president, published a widely circulated anthol- ogy of Sandino's writings.4 FONSECA AND RAMIREZ AGREED THAT the core themes of Sandino's resistance were: 1. anti-imperialism-an end to all political and economic dependency on the United States and to all treaties which injured Nicaragua's interests; 2. Nicaraguan national sovereignty; 3. lack of confidence in traditional Nicaraguan political parties and the interests they repre- sent; 4. the necessity for armed guerrilla struggle against oppression, and a people's army in times of peace; 5. an independent government that meets the needs of the peasantry and the working class; 6. preference for non-capitalist forms of econom- ic organization, with an emphasis on coopera- tives; 7. international solidarity, especially among La- tin American nations, to protect Nicaragua from the United States. There is, however, sharp debate over whether Fonseca's Marxism may have distorted the legacy of Sandino. The Eden Pastora faction of the contra op- position, for example, claims Sandino's heritage as its own and charges the FSLN with usurping it. In defense of their argument, they cite the hostility of the Latin American communist parties during San- dino's lifetime, when they dismissed him as a "petit-bourgeois nationalist" in charge of a peasant movement that was not led by the urban proletariat. Opponents of the FSLN also cite the support given to Sandino by the president of Mexico and other non-communist politicians, as well as his own re- fusal to declare his movement "communist." Sandino was not a politically sophisticated man; his politics were narrowly anti-imperialist. Certainly he was not a Marxist, but nor was he an anti-com- MAY/JUNE 1985 19 phrase in the following way: The United States of North America for the Yanquis. Latin America for the Indo-Americans. 2 The FSLN has attempted to capture those aspira- tions as elements of what it calls Sandinismo. San- dinismo is at once political mythology and a theoret- ical framework, a strategy and a program to guide the Nicaraguan revolution, with the breadth and res- onance needed to replace a system as coherent and all-embracing in its own way as Somocismo. T HE IMPETUS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT came from Carlos Fonseca Amador, one of the founders of the FSLN. Fonseca was in many ways typical of a generation of Latin American intellectu- als who came of age in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He saw Marxism as an attractive alternative to the elite concerns of traditional political parties, yet was frustrated by the passivity of the Moscow- line communist parties. He was galvanized instead by Fidel Castro's ex- ample of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare in Cuba. Like many of his contemporaries, Fonseca chose to go "to the mountains" to try and replicate Castro's triumph. His early efforts were a failure, but from 1961-63 he was a key figure in bringing to- gether a new organization which called itself the Sandinista Front for National Liberation. According to Tomits Borge, Nicaragua's minister of the interior and a fellow FSLN founder, it was at Fonseca's in- sistence that the title "Sandinista" was included. 3 The FSLN survived the 1960s, unlike most guer- rilla groups of the time whose combatants died of exposure or were killed by U.S.-trained counterin- surgency forces. But Fonseca's special contribution to Nicaraguan history and to the development of the FSLN went beyond his obvious skills as a political/ military leader. It lay in his study of the writings of Sandino, in finding their internal coherence and de- veloping from them what he called a "national revo- lutionary ideology." To grasp Fonseca's accomplishment, one must understand that the Somoza regime tried systemati- cally to destroy the memory of Sandino just as the first Somoza had eliminated the man himself. Ed- gardo Garcia, the charismatic young leader of the Rural Workers' Union (ATC), told how, as a young boy growing up in the mid-1960s, he first heard of Sandino: "It was a kind of ghost story that my grandfather told me. Sandino was a man who had helped the peasants. But one day, he mysteriously went away, and all the people were very sad. 'Someday, though,' my grandfather said, 'he will return.' " Fonseca went back through Sandino's writings, organized them and talked to survivors of the origi- nal Sandinistas. He isolated certain key themes and symbols, which through his own and others' writ- ings, and the political education work of the FSLN, stimulated a revival of interest in the guerrilla leader and restored his memory as a symbol of resistance to inspire the anti-Somoza struggle. Fonseca and the FSLN organized these materials in easily readable pamphlet form, and used them as the basis for educating both Sandinista militants and grassroots activists. In 1974, Sergio Ramirez, one of Nicara- gua's foremost intellectuals and now the country's vice president, published a widely circulated anthol- ogy of Sandino's writings. 4 F NSECA AND RAMIREZ AGREED THAT the core themes of Sandino's resistance were: I. anti-imperialism-an end to all political and economic dependency on the United States and to all treaties which injured Nicaragua's interests; 2. Nicaraguan national sovereignty; 3. lack of confidence in traditional Nicaraguan political parties and the interests they repre- sent; 4. the necessity for armed guerrilla struggle against oppression, and a people's army in times of peace; 5. an independent government that meets the needs of the peasantry and the working class; 6. preference for non-capitalist forms of econom- ic organization, with an emphasis on coopera- tives; 7. international solidarity, especially among La- tin American nations, to protect Nicaragua from the United States. There is, however, sharp debate over whether Fonseca's Marxism may have distorted the legacy of Sandino. The Ed6n Pastora faction of the contra op- position, for example, claims Sandino's heritage as its own and charges the FSLN with usurping it. In defense of their argument, they cite the hostility of the Latin American communist parties during San- dino's lifetime, when they dismissed him as a "petit-bourgeois nationalist" in charge of a peasant movement that was not led by the urban proletariat. Opponents of the FSLN also cite the support given to Sandino by the president of Mexico and other non-communist politicians, as well as his own re- fusal to declare his movement "communist." Sandino was not a politically sophisticated man; his politics were narrowly anti-imperialist. Certainly he was not a Marxist, but nor was he an anti-com- MAY/JUNE 1985 194 A.sti Sandinista Foreign Pohcy munist. He was a nationalist with a single goal-to expel the United States from Nicaragua-and a broad strategy: 'Neither extreme right nor extreme left, but united front, is our slogan," he wrote.5 San- dino rejected any affiliation with international bodies, whether the International Labor Organiza- tion, the Anti-Imperialist League or the Quakers.6 He did not aspire to presidential power and had neither a platform for mobilizing support nor a pro- gram of government. Beyond his anti-imperialism lay only vague ideas of social justice. Toward the end of his life, these grew more radical, but Sandino never developed them systematically. T O ASSESS THE PLACE OF MARXISM IN Sandinismo means recognizing that Fonseca represents a tradition within Latin American Marx- ism quite distinct from that of the communist parties of Sandino's time. That latter tradition has been ex- pressed in the Moscow-oriented parties whose anal- ysis and strategy Fonseca and the FSLN rejected. Until about 1980, those parties vehemently favored elections over armed struggle, and called for an al- liance with-and subordination to-the "progres- sive" political parties of the bourgeoisie. Within the "progressive alliance" their task would be to or- ganize the urban working class, which in the under- developed economies of Latin America-and nowhere more so than Nicaragua-was only a frac- tion of the workforce. Fraternal parties" with the Soviet Union, their programs reflected Soviet analyses and concerns. Their relations with Cuba were stormy at best. Though Castro was very dependent on the Soviet Union, his conception of revolutionary strategy often was at odds with the desires of the Moscow- oriented parties. His revolution had succeeded through armed struggle, based on peasant support and the building of a broad nationalist alliance, and was oriented toward Third World concerns. The FSLN, meanwhile, saw armed struggle as the only way to liberate Nicaragua. It built its initial support among the peasantry (the largest sector of Nicaraguan society) and the middle classes, espe- cially students. Only later did it secure a base among the urban working class. The core of its appeal was the nationalist tradition of Sandino and the revival of his struggle of national resistance-however 'petit bourgeois" others on the Left might regard that. It did not avoid broad coalitions with progressive busi- ness sectors, but formed them on the basis of FSLN hegemony, not subordination. The issue of the Soviet Union was not a burning question for the FSLN as it is for leftists in the de- veloped countries. Nor in general did the Sandinis- tas show it the same regard as the traditional com- munist parties. The Sandinista leadership had vary- ing attitudes toward the USSR. Fonseca made a brief visit to Moscow and came home impressed; other FSLN leaders stayed longer and had mixed reactions. Some found nothing of relevance to Nica- ragua, while others-including some of the present National Directorate-saw it as a useful model and essential ally. Cuba, however, was a different case. It was the vindication of the thesis of armed struggle, and throughout the 1960s the Soviets looked on with chagrin as Castro enthusiastically backed Latin American guerrillas and vocally disagreed with the line of sister communist parties. For the FSLN, Cuba was a beacon, and many Sandinista leaders lived and studied there. It was a Latin American country with similar traditions, customs and history. Most of all, it had made a complete break with the United States. I T IS HARD TO RECALL TODAY HOW heretical the FSLN's views of revolutionary strategy were, or how bitter the debates grew in the declining years of Somocismo. On one side was the Sandinista nationalism of the FSLN's independent Marxists; on the other the arguments of the tradi- tional Marxists loyal to Moscow. Until close to the end of Somoza's rule, both the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and the splinter Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCdeN) accused the FSLN of both "ultra-leftism" and "petit-bourgeois" tendencies. That rancor contributed to the continued existence of a left opposition to the FSLN in Nicaragua today. In general, however, for the Latin American Left, the Sandinista revolution represented the victory of an independent, nationalist-oriented Marxism over Moscow-inspired orthodoxy. The debate in Nicaragua was not unique. It grew out of frustration at the inadequacy of traditional prescriptions for development, both capitalist and communist. Both sides argued a remarkably similar line: that only full capitalist development would open the door to general prosperity in the Third World. The advocates of capitalism argued that once the productive forces were developed, wealth would trickle down to all; the communists argued that once the productive forces were developed, the working classwhose emergence dialectically followed the growth of capitalism-would grow strong enough to take power. It added up to a common counsel of pa- tience; wait for the future. But as that future of true economic and political independence for the Third 20 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS RSandnsta Foregn Polcy Sandinista Foreign Policy munist. He was a nationalist with a single goal-to expel the United States from Nicaragua-and a broad strategy: "Neither extreme right nor extreme left, but united front, is our slogan," he wrote. 5 San- dino rejected any affiliation with international bodies, whether the International Labor Organiza- tion, the Anti-Imperialist League or the Quakers. 6 He did not aspire to presidential power and had neither a platform for mobilizing support nor a pro- gram of government. Beyond his anti-imperialism lay only vague ideas of social justice. Toward the end of his life, these grew more radical, but Sandino never developed them systematically. TO ASSESS THE PLACE OF MARXISM IN Sandinismo means recognizing that Fonseca represents a tradition within Latin American Marx- ism quite distinct from that of the communist parties of Sandino's time. That latter tradition has been ex- pressed in the Moscow-oriented parties whose anal- ysis and strategy Fonseca and the FSLN rejected. Until about 1980, those parties vehemently favored elections over armed struggle, and called for an al- liance with-and subordination to-the "progres- sive" political parties of the bourgeoisie. Within the "progressive alliance" their task would be to or- ganize the urban working class, which in the under- developed economies of Latin America-and nowhere more so than Nicaragua--was only a frac- tion of the workforce. "Fraternal parties" with the Soviet Union, their programs reflected Soviet analyses and concerns. Their relations with Cuba were stormy at best. Though Castro was very dependent on the Soviet Union, his conception of revolutionary strategy often was at odds with the desires of the Moscow- oriented parties. His revolution had succeeded through armed struggle, based on peasant support and the building of a broad nationalist alliance, and was oriented toward Third World concerns. The FSLN, meanwhile, saw armed struggle as the only way to liberate Nicaragua. It built its initial support among the peasantry (the largest sector of Nicaraguan society) and the middle classes, espe- cially students. Only later did it secure a base among the urban working class. The core of its appeal was the nationalist tradition of Sandino and the revival of his struggle of national resistance-however "petit bourgeois" others on the Left might regard that. It did not avoid broad coalitions with progressive busi- ness sectors, but formed them on the basis of FSLN hegemony, not subordination. The issue of the Soviet Union was not a burning question for the FSLN as it is for leftists in the de- veloped countries. Nor in general did the Sandinis- tas show it the same regard as the traditional com- munist parties. The Sandinista leadership had vary- ing attitudes toward the USSR. Fonseca made a brief visit to Moscow and came home impressed; other FSLN leaders stayed longer and had mixed reactions. Some found nothing of relevance to Nica- ragua, while others-including some of the present National Directorate-saw it as a useful model and essential ally. Cuba, however, was a different case. It was the vindication of the thesis of armed struggle, and throughout the 1960s the Soviets looked on with chagrin as Castro enthusiastically backed Latin American guerrillas and vocally disagreed with the line of sister communist parties. For the FSLN, Cuba was a beacon, and many Sandinista leaders lived and studied there. It was a Latin American country with similar traditions, customs and history. Most of all, it had made a complete break with the United States. IT IS HARD TO RECALL TODAY HOW heretical the FSLN's views of revolutionary strategy were, or how bitter the debates grew in the declining years of Somocismo. On one side was the Sandinista nationalism of the FSLN's independent Marxists; on the other the arguments of the tradi- tional Marxists loyal to Moscow. Until close to the end of Somoza's rule, both the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and the splinter Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCdeN) accused the FSLN of both "ultra-leftism" and "petit-bourgeois" tendencies. That rancor contributed to the continued existence of a left opposition to the FSLN in Nicaragua today. In general, however, for the Latin American Left, the Sandinista revolution represented the victory of an independent, nationalist-oriented Marxism over Moscow-inspired orthodoxy. The debate in Nicaragua was not unique. It grew out of frustration at the inadequacy of traditional prescriptions for development, both capitalist and communist. Both sides argued a remarkably similar line: that only full capitalist development would open the door to general prosperity in the Third World. The advocates of capitalism argued that once the productive forces were developed, wealth would trickle down to all; the communists argued that once the productive forces were developed, the working class-whose emergence dialectically followed the growth of capitalism-would grow strong enough to take power. It added up to a common counsel of pa- tience; wait for the future. But as that future of true economic and political independence for the Third REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 20Somoza: Always a sure U.S. vote World receded ever further, a new generation of political leaders forged fresh responses to the ques- tions of nationalism, development and revolution. By the late l950s, the monolithic influence of the Soviet Union over Marxist-Leninist theory and political development had splintered. China and Yugoslavia offered alternatives to the Soviet model. The arena for social change shifted to the rural, semi-capitalist societies of the Third World, where traditional approaches to revolution and develop- ment were of dubious relevance. Guerrilla warfare became the chosen path to liberation, and its relative success encouraged its repeated use. Broad accep- tance grew for the heretical notion that peasants and the petite bourgeoisie could take the lead in building independent nations. In the former colonies, leaders devised an unorthodox blend of nationalism, ethnic- ity, religion and Marxism. Each new nation virtually became a new model. D URING THE CRISIS OF THE 1970s, THE FSLN challenged not only the Somoza dynasty, but all traditional opposition to Sornocismo in Nicaragua. All those opposition forces, to a great- er or lesser degree, had bought into the system of MAY/JUNE 1985 Somocismo. Sandinismo existed outside the system, as its negation. When the dynasty began to alienate the business elite after the 1972 earthquake, the tra- ditional parties found they could offer no alternative to Sornocismo that could compel mass support. The Moscow-oriented PSN and the splinter PCdeN, with their tiny trade-union base and their long history of subordinate alliance with the mainstream opposi- tion, offered only a stuffy and turgid Marxism. The FSLN, meanwhile, came to recognize that Sandino's memory expressed deeply felt aspirations for independence, self-determination and social jus- tice. The Sandinista strategy, as it evolved over time, was to build a broad mass coalition, centered on the peasantry. Its needs and desires challenged the entire history of political competition in Somocisra Nicaragua; its platform rejected obei- sance to Washington and the privileges of Somoza. Like many of their Third World contemporaries con- templating national liberation, therefore, Fonseca and other leaders and intellectuals of the FSLN used their understanding of Marxism to fashion a new theory and political practice; one which drew on the historic memory of national resistance to find inspi- ration for a new nationalism. Somoza: Always a sure U.S. vote World receded ever further, a new generation of political leaders forged fresh responses to the ques- tions of nationalism, development and revolution. By the late 1950s, the monolithic influence of the Soviet Union over Marxist-Leninist theory and political development had splintered. China and Yugoslavia offered alternatives to the Soviet model. The arena for social change shifted to the rural, semi-capitalist societies of the Third World, where traditional approaches to revolution and develop- ment were of dubious relevance. Guerrilla warfare became the chosen path to liberation, and its relative success encouraged its repeated use. Broad accep- tance grew for the heretical notion that peasants and the petite bourgeoisie could take the lead in building independent nations. In the former colonies, leaders devised an unorthodox blend of nationalism, ethnic- ity, religion and Marxism. Each new nation virtually became a new model. DURING THE CRISIS OF THE 1970s, THE FSLN challenged not only the Somoza dynasty, but all traditional opposition to Somocismo in Nicaragua. All those opposition forces, to a great- er or lesser degree, had bought into the system of Somocismo. Sandinismo existed outside the system, as its negation. When the dynasty began to alienate the business elite after the 1972 earthquake, the tra- ditional parties found they could offer no alternative to Somocismo that could compel mass support. The Moscow-oriented PSN and the splinter PCdeN, with their tiny trade-union base and their long history of subordinate alliance with the mainstream opposi- tion, offered only a stuffy and turgid Marxism. The FSLN, meanwhile, came to recognize that Sandino's memory expressed deeply felt aspirations for independence, self-determination and social jus- tice. The Sandinista strategy, as it evolved over time, was to build a broad mass coalition, centered on the peasantry. Its needs and desires challenged the entire history of political competition in Somocista Nicaragua; its platform rejected obei- sance to Washington and the privileges of Somoza. Like many of their Third World contemporaries con- templating national liberation, therefore, Fonseca and other leaders and intellectuals of the FSLN used their understanding of Marxism to fashion a new theory and political practice; one which drew on the historic memory of national resistance to find inspi- ration for a new nationalism. SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 1. Tomas Borge, Daniel Ortega et a!., Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982), p.45. 2. Letter to Froylan Turcios, June 10, 1928, quoted in Gre- gorio Selser, Sandino (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p.108. 3. Tomas Borge, Carlos, el arnanecer ya no es una tentacion (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980), p.31. 4. Sergio RamIrez, Pensamiento vivo de Sandino (San Jose, Costa Rica: EDUCA, 1974). 5. Quoted in Selser, Sandino, p.132. 6. Selser, Sandino, p.97. THE LIMITS OF FRIENDSHIP I. Susanne Jonas, 'The Nicaraguan Revolution and the Emerging Cold War," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., Nicaragua in Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp.383-84. 2. William M. LeoGrande, 'The United States and the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Walker, op. cit., pp.73-75. 3. The Washington Post, December I, 1979. 4. LeMonde (Paris), March 21, 1980. 5. Jorge Timossi, "Tres entrevistas: Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega y LuIs Carrion," Casa de las Americas (Havana), No. 117 (November-December 1979), p.191. 6. Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala City), November 17, 1979; Latin America Political Report, August 3, 1979; For- eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAM), October 16 and November 3, 1979; Los Angeles Times, October 6, 1979. 7. Cited in George Black, Triumph of the People: The San. dinista Revolution in Nicaragua (London: Zed Press, 1981), p.224. 8. Ibid., pp.224-26. See also Timossi, op.cit., pp.191-93. 9. Central Intelligence Agency, "Background Article," Sep- tember 6, 1978, Declassfied Documents Reference System, Document no.81 (281B). 10. The New York Times, July 20, 1980; Envio (Managua: In- stituto Historico Centroamericano), No. 28 (October 1983), p.4b. II. The Washington Post, December I, 1979. 12. Congressional Presentation Document, Security Assist- ance Programs, FY 1981, p.419. 13. Latin America Political Report, August 3, 1979. 14. The Washington Post, August 12, 1979; The New York Times, August 12 and 13, 1979. 15. ACAN (Panama City) in FBIS-LAJi'.f, September 6, 1979. 16. Leslie Geib, "On Arms for Nicaragua," op-ed, The New York Times, August 29, 1979; The Washington Post, August 30, 1979; The Miami Herald, August I and 17, September 13, 1979; Latin America Political Report, August 10, 1979. 17. The Miami Herald, August 17, 1979. 18. The New York Times, August 13, 1979. 19. NACLA interview with former State Department official, April I, 1985. 20. The Miami Herald, November 18, 1979; for further de- tails, see ibid., September 13, 1979; The Washington Post, De- cember I, 1979. 21. The Miami Herald, February 2, 1981. 22. ACAN (Panama City) in FBIS-LAM, October 10, 1979. 23. The Miami Herald, August 7, 1981. 24. Latin America Weekly Report, December 21, 1979. 25. Ibid.; see also Central America Report (Guatemala City), November 19, 1979; Panama City Domestic Service in FBIS- LAM, November 30, 1979; Televisora Nacional (Panama) in FBIS -LAM, February 4, 1980. 26. Latin America Regional Report (Mexico and Central America), May I, 1981. 27. The Defense Monitor (Washington, D.C.: Center for Tie- fense Information), Vol. XIII, no. 3 (1984), pp.4-5. 28. Latin America Regional Report (Mexico and Central America), May 3, 1985. 29. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, September 30, 1983, p.33; Central American Historical Institute, "U.S-Honduran Relations: A Background Briefing Packet," (Georgetown, 1984). 30. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1984), p.215. 31. The New York Times, July 30, 1981. 32. The Washington Post, July 14, 1982. 33. Robert Matthews, "Oil on Troubled Waters: Venezuelan Policy in the Caribbean," Report on the Americas, Vol. XVIII,. no. 4 (July-August 1984), p.37. 34. See The New York Times, January 9, 1982; The Financial Times (London), March 10, 1982. 35. The New York Times, January 9, 1982. 36. Latin America Weekly Report, January IS, 1982. 37. The New York Times, January 30, 1982. 38. The Financial Times, December 15, 1981. 39. Ibid., March 10, 1982. 40. Ibid. 41. The Washington Post, July 10, 1982. 42. EFE (Madrid) in FBIS -LAM, June 14, 1983; Radio San- dino (Managua) in FBIS-LAM, September 3, 1983; C.G. Jacob- sen, "The Jacobsen Report: Soviet Attitudes towards, Aid to and Contacts with Central American Revolutionaries," paper pre- pared for the Department of State external research program (June 1984), p.19. 43. The Financial Times, March 31, 1982; The Washington Post, July 10 and 29, 1982; ibid., April 6, 1984. 44. Author's interview with Alejandro Bendana, Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, Managua, February 19, 1985. 45. Figures from Ministerio de Cooperacion Exterior, Man- agua, 1985. 46. Figures from Banco Central de Nicaragua, 1985. 47. Figures from Ministerio de Cooperacion Exterior, 1985. 48. Author's interview with senior 1DB official, Miami, March I, 1985; see also Kai Bird and Max Holland, "Nicaragua: No Friend at the JDB," The Nation, March 2, 1985; The Wash- ington Post, January 20, 1985; Washington Report on the Hemis- phere, March 19, 1985. 49. Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to 1DB Presi- dent Hon. Antonio OrtIz Mena, January 30, 1985. See also Cen- ter for International Policy Aid Memo, January IS, 1985; and Michael Gardenswartz, "Has Politics Spoiled the 1DB?," Institu- tional Investor (March 1985), pp.97-100. 50. Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1984. 51. The New York Times, November 16, 1983. 52. The New York Times, December 25, 1984. LIFELINES I. Carlos Fonseca, Viva Sandino (Managua: Departarnento de Propaganda y Educacion PolItica del FSLN, 1984), p.7. 2. JesUs M. Blandon, Entre Sandino y Fonseca (Managua: DPEP del FSLN, 1981), pp.86, 109. 3. Tomas Borge, Carlos, el amanecer ya no es una tentacton (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980), p.20. 4. Comments of Cabs Fonseca, Jose Valdivia and Bayardo Arce in Pilar Arias, ed., Nicaragua revoluciOn (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980), pp.31, 80, 86; Omar Cabezas, La montana es algo mas que una inmensa estepa verde (Managua: Nueva Nicaragua, 1982), p.27; Lea Guido in Margaret Randall, Todas estamos des- 54 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS Uc Ase' Sandinista Foreign Poficy Repot onr te AI olica Sandinista Foreign Policy SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 1. Tomas Borge, Daniel Ortega et al., Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982), p. 4 5 . 2. Letter to Froylin Turcios, June 10, 1928, quoted in Gre- gorio Selser, Sandino (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p.108. 3. TomAs Borge, Carlos, el amanecer ya no es una tentacidn (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980), p.31. 4. Sergio Ramirez, Pensamiento vivo de Sandino (San Jos6, Costa Rica: EDUCA, 1974). 5. Quoted in Selser, Sandino, p.132. 6. Selser, Sandino, p.97.
