TIME OFTEN STRETCHES OUT LONG AND slow in El Salvador,slow in El Salvador, as it has for OFTEN STRETCHESas it has for centuries.OUTcenturies. LONGThere are There are AND occasional ugly explosions, when for a brief violent occasional ugly explosions, when for a brief violent instantinstant the class hatred which permeates everything the class hatred which permeates everything condensescondenses into a critical mass. Then the pressure sub- into a critical mass. Then the pressure subsides, and the oldsides, and the old rhythms resume. These days, however, rhythms resume. These days, however, the air crackles with activitythe air crackles with activity and expectation. Among the and expectation. Among the members of the Farabundo MartI National Liberation members of the Farabundo Martf National Liberation Front, the sense of urgency is palpable. Front, the sense of urgency is palpable. AnAn underground FMLN leader sat fidgeting in the underground FMLN leader sat fidgeting in the capitalcapital city just prior to the March elections, drumming city just prior to the March elections, drumming his fingers on his knee incessantly. "The military factor his fingers on his knee incessantly. "The military factor can be accelerated because it's in our hands," he said. can be accelerated because it's in our hands," he said. "But"But the political process can't be accelerated by sheer the political process can't be accelerated by sheer will. It's a gradual process...but it has to speed up, will. It's a gradual process...but it has to speed up, because things can't stay static. Sometimes the momen- because things can't stay static. Sometimes the momentum is too fast for contradictions to emerge, and at other tum is too fast for contradictions to emerge, and at other times the growth of the movementi itself creates contra- times the growth [of the movement] itself creates contradictions. The point is to see the whole picture, to be in the dictions. The point is to see the whole picture, to be in the forest yet see both the trees and the mountain. We have to forest yet see both the trees and the mountain. We have to seek velocity in order to defeat time." seek velocity in order to defeat time." FMLN cadre FMLN cadre havehave not always been in such a hurry. not always been in such a hurry. Indeed, during the previousIndeed, during the previous decade the movement, influ- decade the movement, influencedenced by the guerrilla doctrine of "prolonged popular by the guerrilla doctrine of "prolonged popular war," sought to stretch out the war. But now the FMLN war," sought to stretch out the war. But now the FMLN hashas initiated a new phase of its struggle, the "strategic initiated a new phase of its struggle, the "strategic counteroffensive,"counteroffensive," which it hopes will bring the long which it hopes will bring the long armedarmed conflict to a close-either through a negotiated conflict to a close-either through a negotiated settlement orsettlement or an insurrection. an insurrection. TheThe strength of the FMLN's offensive has come as a strength of the FMLN's offensive has come as a surprisesurprise to some observers. As late as October of last to some observers. As late as October of last year,year, one widely-cited analyst declared that there was one widely-cited analyst declared that there was "no"no reason the situation cannot continue, as is, indefi- reason the situation cannot continue, as is, indefinitely."nitely." And even some guerrilla commanders admit that And even some guerrilla commanders admit that 1984-19881984-1988 were the "most difficult" years for the rebels. were the "most difficult" years for the rebels. YetYet as early as 1986, a time which appeared to many as as early as 1986, a time which appeared to many as thethe guerrillas' low point, the FMLN was secretly plan- guerrillas' low point, the FMLN was secretly planningning the "strategic counteroffensive" to be launched at the "strategic counteroffensive" to be launched at the endthe end of 1988. of 1988. UnderstandingUnderstanding how this shift in strategy came about how this shift in strategy came about requires a closer look at the recent past. Today's offensive requires a closer look at the recent past. Today's offensive isis not a rabbit the rebels pulled out of their hat at the last not a rabbit the rebels pulled out of their hat at the last moment, but the culmination of an elusive, difficult phase moment, but the culmination of an elusive, difficult phase of the war, a phase conceived of by FMLN strategists as of the war, a phase conceived of by FMLN strategists as the "warthe "war of resistance." of resistance." T HE CONFUSING APPEARANCE OF THE WAR HE CONFUSING APPEARANCE OF THE WAR of resistance is in part the result of inevitable com- of resistance is in part the result of inevitable comparisons with the heady fireworks of the period which parisons with the heady fireworks of the period which came before. After a failed attempt at urban insurrection came before. After a failed attempt at urban insurrection in earlyin early 1981 and the ferocious repression that followed, 1981 and the ferocious repression that followed, the FMLN withdrew from the cities to the countryside the FMLN withdrew from the cities to the countryside wherewhere a long and difficult process of constructing a revo- a long and difficult process of constructing a revolutionarylutionary army and a defensible strategic rear guard, or army and a defensible strategic rear guard, or "zones"zones of control," began.' By 1983 the revolutionary of control," began.' By 1983 the revolutionary movement hadmovement had successfully transformed itself into a so- successfully transformed itself into a sophisticated, almostphisticated, almost professional revolutionary army. professional revolutionary army. The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla insur- The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla insurgency, acquired somegency, acquired some increasingly conventional charac- increasingly conventional characteristics. Beginning in 1982, the FMLN grouped its fight- teristics. Beginning in 1982, the FMLN grouped its fighters into larger and larger concentrations and launched a ers into larger and larger concentrations and launched a series of spectacular actions. These culminated in the series of spectacular actions. These culminated in the 1984 destruction of the country's1984 destruction of the country's largest and most heav- largest and most heavily-defended bridge, the Cuscatlan, an action that brought ily-defended bridge, the Cuscatlin, an action that brought togethertogether forces from over half the country, from the forces from over half the country, from the eastern province of Morazdin to the bridge itself at theeastern province of Morazan to the bridge itself at the RIo Rio Lempa. Lempa.2 (2) InIn smaller, yet more significant actions during the smaller, yet more significant actions during the samesame period, rebel forces systematically overwhelmed period, rebel forces systematically overwhelmed governmentgovernment outposts in the zones of control and their sur- outposts in the zones of control and their surroundings.roundings. The Armed Forces finally had to abandon The Armed Forces finally had to abandon these fixedthese fixed positions-implicitly acknowledging loss of positions-implicitly acknowledging loss of these areas.these areas. They then attempted to regain the initiative by They then attempted to regain the initiative by using mobileusing mobile forces with extensive air and artillery sup- forces with extensive air and artillery support, seekingport, seeking out the guerrillas on their own terrain. At this out the guerrillas on their own terrain. At this point U.S.point U.S. assistance became crucial. The United States assistance became crucial. The United States trainedtrained immediate reaction and cazador immediate reaction and cazador (hunter) battal- (hunter) battalionsions and provided helicopters for rapid troop transport, and provided helicopters for rapid troop transport, withoutwithout which the Armed Forces would have been unable which the Armed Forces would have been unable to make the difficult transition toto make the difficult transition to this war of movement. this war of movement. ByBy 1984 the fireworks were largely over. In place of 1984 the fireworks were largely over. In place of brigade-sizedbrigade-sized assaults on fixed army positions, FMLN assaults on fixed army positions, FMLN fighters were blowing up telephone poles.fighters were blowing up telephone poles. Instead of cap- Instead of capturingturing prisoners of war and valuable war materiel, the prisoners of war and valuable war materiel, the rebels were dispersing in the face of army advances. rebels were dispersing in the face of army advances. HomemadeHomemade mines left in the path of enemy soldiers be- mines left in the path of enemy soldiers becamecame the guerrillas' weapon of choice.* the guerrillas' weapon of choice.* Armed Forces and U.S. Embassy spokesmen claimed Armed Forces and U.S. Embassy spokesmen claimed anan important corner had been turned. Noted one U.S. important comer had been turned. Noted one U.S. military adviser, "Look,military adviser, "Look, in guerrilla strategy you're sup- in guerrilla strategy you're supposed to progress to larger and larger concentrations of posed to progress to larger and larger concentrations of *Spectacular*Spectacul actions did not, however, end completely. Major as- actions did not, however, end completely. Major assaults were launched at a rate of about two per yearsaults were launched at a rate of about two per year on several of the on several of the Armed Forces' most strategic installations, including the Fourth Armed Forces' most strategic installations, including the Fourth Brigade in Chalatenango and the Third Brigade in San Miguel.Brigade in Chalatenango and the Third Brigade in San Miguel. Many Many of theseof these actions produced heavy government casualties, but they actions produced heavy government casualties, but they werewere not central to the accumulation of guerrilla strength during not central to the accumulation of guerrilla strength during those years. Rather, they served to "maintain the perspective of those years. Rather, they served to "maintain the perspective of victory"victory" in a period when much of the struggle was invisible, even in a period when much of the struggle was invisible, even to participantsto participants who lacked a "big picture" of the clandestine work. who lacked a "big picture" of the clandestine work. forces forces.... ....TheseThese guys' units are getting smaller. What more guys' units are getting smaller. What more evidenceevidence do you want [of rebel declinel?"3 The Armed do you want [of rebel decline]?"' The Armed Forces were so convinced of this that they actually made Forces were so convinced of this that they actually made plansplans on the assumption of steadily decreasing guerrilla on the assumption of steadily decreasing guerrilla activity. The secretactivity. The secret operational manual for the most am- operational manual for the most ambitiousbitious counterinsurgency plan to date, "United to Re- counterinsurgency plan to date, "United to Reconstruct,"construct," for example, asserted in 1986 that "terrorist for example, asserted in 1986 that "terrorist actions will be maintained at an equal or lesser level of actions will be maintained at an equal or lesser level of operationsoperations than they are today," and claimed that "the than they are today," and claimed that "the developmentdevelopment of the terrorist forces has been stopped."4 of the terrorist forces has been stopped." (4) P ARADOXICALLY, WITH THE ADVANTAGE ARADOXICALLY, WITH THE ADVANTAGE of hindsight one could argue that for the Left it is the of hindsight one could argue that for the Left it is the pre-1984 period of guerrilla concentrations and spectacu- pre-1984 period of guerrilla concentrations and spectacularlar actions that deserves the most negative marks. With- actions that deserves the most negative marks. Withoutout doubt, victories were won that were indispensable to doubt, victories were won that were indispensable to thethe further advance of the struggle. The elimination of further advance of the struggle. The elimination of fixed governmentfixed government positions in large parts of the country- positions in large parts of the countrysideside opened space for a new relationship to develop opened space for a new relationship to develop betweenbetween the FMLN and the residents of these zones, as the FMLN and the residents of these zones, as wellwell as for the rebel army to train new fighters and as for the rebel army to train new fighters and consolidateconsolidate its political and logistical structures. its political and logistical structures. DespiteDespite these achievements, new problems emerged. these achievements, new problems emerged. As one FMLNAs one FMLN member close to the strategy discussions member close to the strategy discussions of the time describes it, "Theof the time describes it, "The FMLN's growth from 1981 FMLN's growth from 1981 toto 1984 was essentially the transformation of the popular 1984 was essentially the transformation of the popular movementmovement of 1979-1980 into a popular army. Through of 1979-1980 into a popular army. Through 19831983 there was no social limit to growth; the problem was there was no social limit to growth; the problem was lack of arms and time to train militarylack of arms and time to train military units. This process units. This process reached a limit byreached a limit by 1984; the social reserve was exhausted. 1984; the social reserve was exhausted. InIn just three years, the FMLN converted a guerrilla just three years, the FMLN converted a guerrilla nucleus and a radical mass movement into a large, almost nucleus and a radical mass movement into a large, almost professional revolutionary army, which had brought the professional revolutionary army, which had brought the ArmedArmed Forces to the point of collapse. But the Armed Forces to the point of collapse. But the Armed Forces enjoyed the advantage of limitless resources. And Forces enjoyed the advantage of limitless resources. And whenwhen they did not collapse, this advantage suddenly they did not collapse, this advantage suddenly becamebecame decisive." decisive." Given the increasingly conventional characteristics Given the increasingly conventional characteristics thethe war was assuming, the instruments placed at the war was assuming, the instruments placed at the disposal of the Armed Forces by escalating U.S. aid-in disposal of the Armed Forces by escalating U.S. aid-in particular the rapidly expanding air force-became ever particular the rapidly expanding air force-became ever moremore effective. To maintain the tempo of the fighting, effective. To maintain the tempo of the fighting, rebelrebel cadre were pulled from irregular structures such as cadre were pulled from irregular structures such as militiamilitia and guerrilla units to fill the ranks of the larger and guerrilla units to fill the ranks of the larger concentrations.concentrations. The transformation of the FMLN into an The transformation of the FMLN into an encamped,encamped, full-time force meant losing important day-to- full-time force meant losing important day-today contact with the rebels' civilian base of support, and day contact with the rebels' civilian base of support, and thatthat meant a political decline. Yet it was precisely such meant a politicaldecline. Yet it was precisely such organizing and daily contact which were needed to re- organizing and daily contact which were needed to replenishplenish the "social reserve" that was becoming ex- the "social reserve" that was becoming exhausted. hausted. Behind these problems was a much more fundamental Behind these problems was a much more fundamental one:one: The incorporation of FMLN cadre into the popular The incorporation of FMLN cadre into the popular army had sapped the above-ground popular movement of army had sapped the above-ground popular movement of whateverwhatever energy it might have reserved in the face of the energy it might have reserved in the face of the repression.repression. The movement was sorely missed, in the The movement was sorely missed, in the words of the same FMLN source,words of the same FMLN source, "partly as a reserve for "partly as a reserve for the growth of thethe growth of the guerrilla army, but especially as a force guerrilla army, but especially as a force which could combine its own struggles with the military which could combine its own struggles with the military struggle of the FMLN." struggle of the FMLN." InIn the end, pressure to keep up with the dynamic of the end, pressure to keep up with the dynamic of escalation even led to forced recruitment in some areas to escalation even led to forced recruitment in some areas to fillfill the holes left by the high casualty rate conventional the holes left by the high casualty rate conventional warfarewarfare entails. FMLN leaders have since publicly criti- entails. FMLN leaders have since publicly criticized this practice. Remarkedcized this practice. Remarked Francisco Jovel of the Gen- Francisco Jovel of the General Command, eral Command,5 "In 1983 and 1984 we committed errors. (5)"In 1983 and 1984 we committed errors. OftenOften comrades who had only joined recently, including comrades who had only joined recently, including some who weresome who were forcibly recruited, were sent into combat forcibly recruited, were sent into combat rightright off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions, off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions, unnecessaryunnecessary deaths, people who had a very negative psy- deaths, people who had a very negative psychological responsechological response to combat... .We learned that the only to combat.....We learned that the only powerfulpowerful guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We have to guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We have to involveinvolve people gradually, and never, never take a guer- people gradually, and never, never take a guerrilla fighterrilla fighter away from his people."6 away from his people."' It is hard to distinguish between a strategy which suc- It is hard to distinguish between a strategy which successfully makes the most of a difficult situation, one cessfully makes the most of a difficult situation, one whichwhich encounters problems in implementation, and one encounters problems in implementation, and one whichwhich is simply inadequate. But one thing is certain: is simply inadequate. But one thing is certain: DuringDuring the period of guerrilla concentrations, the dy- the period of guerrilla concentrations, the dynamicnamic of the rebels' "accumulation of forces' '-that is, of the rebels' "accumulation of forces' -that is, the building of a social base of support, political clout and the building of a social base of support, political clout and militarymilitary power, which is the central axis of all guerrilla power, which is the central axis of all guerrilla strategy-was channeled into a scheme which ultimately strategy-was channeled into a scheme whicj ultimately became unsustainable. By late 1983, at the height of the became unsustainable. By late 1983, at the height of the apparent success of the guerrillaapparent success of the guerrilla concentrations, the FMLN concentrations, the FMLN waswas forced to completely restructure its strategy and forced to completely restructure its strategy and forces. The process of transition was not as clear at the forces. The process of transition was not as clear at the time as it now appears in hindsight. In the words of FMLN time as it now appears in hindsight. In the words of FMLN Commander Leo Cabral, "In a war like this, in which Commander Leo Cabral, "In a war like this, in which irregular factors are so important, to establish boundaries irregular factors are so important, to establish boundaries between one stage andbetween one stage and another is very complicated and is another is very complicated and is almost always done after the change has occurred."7 almost always done after the change has occurred." (7) TheThe process was prolonged and difficult, with much process was prolonged and difficult, with much trial and error, leadingtrial and error, leading the U.S. Embassy and the Armed the U.S. Embassy and the Armed ForcesForces to make the kind of exultant declarations noted to make the kind of exultant declarations noted above. Nevertheless,above. Nevertheless, the result was the development of a the result was the development of a newnew strategic line-the "war of resistance"-that, in the strategic line-the "war of resistance -that, in the eyeseyes of the FMLN leadership, could carry the rebels to of the FMLN leadership, could carry the rebels to victory. victory. INI N ESSENCE, BEGINNING IN 1984, THE WAR OF ESSENCE, BEGINNING IN 1984, THE WAR OF resistanceresistance marked a return to guerrilla war: Military marked a return to guerrillawar: Military unitsunits were dispersed and returned to a more irregular were dispersed and returned to a more irregular status,status, a mixing of the "fish" back into the "sea." In a mixing of the "fish" back into the "sea." In place of the emphasis on a permanent revolutionaryplace of the emphasis on a permanent revolutionary army, army, thethe clandestine scaffolding of collaborators, militia, and clandestine scaffolding of collaborators, militia, and guerrillasguerrillas was renewed and strengthened.* Some cadre was renewed and strengthened.* Some cadre leftleft the armed struggle and returned to the city to work the armed struggle and returned to the city to work with thewith the reemerging workers' movement. Others formed reemerging workers' movement. Others formed underground urban commando cells, so that the next time underground urban commando cells, so that the next time the guerrillas launched an offensivethe guerrillas launched an offensive the regime would be the regime would be forced to divide its troops between hitting the rebels in the forced to divide its troops between hitting the rebels in the countrysidecountryside and defending its own strategic rear guard in and defending its own strategic rear guard in thethe cities. (The core of the permanent forces that re- cities. (The core of the permanent forces that remained,mained, however, became even more specialized. An however, became even more specialized. An elite reserve of "specialelite reserve of "special forces" was developed, and used forces" was developed, and used only for actions of strategic importance, such as the attack only for actions of strategic importance, such as the attack on the headquarterson the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade at El Paralso in of the Fourth Brigade at El Paraiso in 1988.) 1988.) TheThe objective was to return the process of accumula- objective was to return the process of accumulation of forcestion of forces to a more "popular" footing: to become a to a more "popular" footing: to become a more grass-roots, multi-dimensional, and political force more grass-roots, multi-dimensional, and politicalforce that could again becomethat could again become self-sustaining. At some future self-sustaining. At some future point, such a force could launch an offensive against point, such a force could launch an offensive against which the conventional war waged by the Armedwhich the conventional war waged by the Armed Forces Forces wouldwould be inadequate. Meanwhile, new military tactics be inadequate. Meanwhile, new military tactics were implementedwere implemented to disperse and wear down the enemy to disperse and wear down the enemy while the revolution adjusted to the transition: mine while the revolution adjusted to the transition: mine warfare, economic sabotage, traffic stoppages (paros), warfare, economic sabotage, traffic stoppages (paros), and and aa constant harassment of the Armed Forces that constant harassment of the Armed Forces that caused greater government casualties than had the spec- caused greater government casualties than had the spectacular actionstacular actions of the previous four years. of the previous four years. Some of theseSome of these new tactics carried a cost, and raised new tactics carried a cost, and raised issues that have yet toissues that have yet to be resolved, as the FMLN attempts be resolved, as the FMLN attempts toto balance their military effectiveness with their political balance their military effectiveness with their political consequences.consequences. During the paros, for example, the guerril- During theparos,for example, the guerrillaslas order a halt to all commercial transportation (buses, order a halt to all commercial transportation (buses, taxis, and commercialtaxis, and commercial trucks) for a given period of time on trucks) for a given period of time on penalty of destruction by rebel forces. According to polls penalty of destruction by rebel forces. According to polls taken by the University of Central America (UCA), the taken by the University of Central America (UCA), the * FMLN* FMLN forces areforces are structured into a hierarchy of several tiers. At the structured into a hierarchy of several tiers. At the lowestlowest level are the civilian supporters who do political organizing level are the civilian supporters who do political organizing or provide intelligence or logistical support. Militia members are or provide intelligence or logistical support. Militia members are part-time fighters who maintain a public identity by day but fight as part-time fighters who maintain a public identity by day but fight as guerrillas by night. Guerrilla forces are given more training and guerrillas by night. Guerrilla forces are given more training and better weapons, but only fight in the area in which they live. Regular better weapons, but only fight in the area in which they live. Regular forces are full-time fighters who move throughout the country. forces are full-time fighters who move throughout the country. Finally, special Finally, special forces(forces)are highly trained specialists who usually are highly trained specialists who usually have long political experience. have long political experience. parosparos are widely disliked by the population.8 They are are widely disliked by the population They are further seen as disproportionatelyfurther seen as disproportionately affecting the poor, who affecting the poor, who must walkmust walk to work or miss it altogether, while the Cher- to work or miss it altogether, while the Cher-okees and Toyotas of the bourgeoisie circulate freely. Yet okees and Toyotas of the bourgeoisie circulate freely. Yet inin military terms the paros are enormously effective. It military terms the paros are enormously effective. It takes fewtakes few actual acts of sabotage to enforce compliance actual acts of sabotage to enforce compliance withwith the boycott, and thus requires the mobilization of the boycott, and thus requires the mobilization of only a small number of FMLN troops. The Armed Forces, only a small number of FMLN troops. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, are obliged to mobilize tens of thou- on the other hand, are obliged to mobilize tens of thousands of troops to defend highways and bus lines,sands of troops to defend highways and bus lines, leaving leaving corridorscorridors open for the unharrassed transport of guerrilla open for the unharrassed transport of guerrilla forces and materiel. forces and materiel. The FMLN campaign against local mayors is another The FMLN campaign against local mayors is another contentiouscontentious issue. In this campaign, the FMLN has de- issue. In this campaign, the FMLN has demanded that mayors of towns in areas of guerrilla strength manded that mayors of towns in areas of guerrilla strength resignresign on penalty of execution. Only eight mayors have on penalty of execution. Only eight mayors have actuallyactually been killed in this campaign, but an incredible been killed in this campaign, but an incredible 120, or 45 percent of all the mayors in the country, have 120, or 45 percent of all the mayors in the country, have resigned.resigned. Another 64 live and work in the provincial Another 64 live and work in the provincial capitals under the protection of military garrisons. But in capitals under the protection of military garrisons. But in some towns, such as San Francisco Gotera, even the pres- some towns, such as San Francisco Gotera, even the presenceence of brigade-sized garrisons has not convinced of brigade-sized garrisons has not convinced the mayorsmayors to stay on. to stay on. FMLNFMLN leaders argue that the mayors' offices are the leaders argue that the mayors' offices are the nerve centers for local counterinsurgency organizing, and nerve centers for local counterinsurgency organizing, and thusthus are legitimate military targets. Indeed, according to are legitimate military targets. Indeed, according to aa recent study commissioned by the Agency for Interna- recent study commissioned by the Agency for Internationaltional Development (U.S.AID), the only components of Development (U.S.AID), the only components of the government's counterinsurgency campaigns of recent the government's counterinsurgency campaigns of recent yearsyears that have been at all successful are those "civic that have been at all successful are those "civic actions"actions" that bypassed the corrupt central state apparatus that bypassed the corrupt central state apparatus and wereand were administered directly by local mayors.9 administered directly by local mayors.' WithWith the campaign against the mayors, the FMLN the campaign against the mayors, the FMLN choppedchopped off the last feeble leg on which civic action was off the last feeble leg on which civic action was standing.standing. But while the effectiveness of the campaign is But while the effectiveness of the campaign is beyond dispute, the contention that mayors are legitimate beyond dispute, the contention that mayors are legitimate militarymilitary targets has little basis in relevant international targets has little basis in relevant international law,law, and the campaign has been harshly condemned by and the campaign has been harshly condemned by bothboth Americas Watch and Amnesty International.'0 Americas Watch and Amnesty International.'o PP OLITICAL ORGANIZING BECAME THE CRUX OLITICAL ORGANIZING BECAME THE CRUX of the rebel plan during the 1984-1988 war of resis- of the rebel plan during the 1984-1988 war of resis tance. The Armedthe tance. The Armed Forces moved in a similar direction, in Forces moved in a similar direction, in lineline with the "hearts and minds" approach pushed by with the "hearts and minds" approach pushed by U.S.U.S. advisers as part of the low-intensity conflict strategy. advisers as part of the low-intensity conflict strategy. InIn the words of one FMLN political officer working the words of one FMLN political officer working among cottonamong cotton pickers in the steamy South, "For the first pickers in the steamy South, "For the first time, both parties have put the dispute for the masses at the time, both parties have put the dispute for the masses at the center of their politicalcenter of their political and military strategy." and military strategy."" InIn the countryside, poder de doble cara (literally, the countryside, poder de doble cara (literally, "double-faced"double-faced power") emerged as the principal form of power") emerged as the principal form of revolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-roots revolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-roots organizations which show a legal "face" to the regime organizations which show a legal "face" to the regime whilewhile also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face" also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face" to the revolution.to the revolution. Doble cara developed as a response to Doble caradeveloped as a response to severalseveral factors: the Armed Forces' war of movement, the factors: the Armed Forces' war of movement, the dispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLN dispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLN debate on how to relate to its civilian supporters (masas, debate on how to relate to its civilian supporters (masas, inin Salvadoran political jargon))2 Salvadoran political jargon).' (2) The local masas served, in theory, as the rear guard for The local masas served, in theory, as the rear guard for the guerrilla army, providing them with food, logistics, the guerrilla army, providing them with food, logistics, and intelligence. In practice, they often became a burden and intelligence. In practice, they often became a burden on the fighters, who were obliged to care for and protect on the fighters, who were obliged to care for and protect hundreds and even thousands of people against army hundreds and even thousands of people against army incursions, which grew increasingly destructive as the incursions, which grew increasingly destructive as the government forces became more adept at their war of government forces became more adept at their war of movement.movement. These problems confronted the FMLN in all These problems confronted the FMLN in all its rear guard areas, but they were particularly severe in its rear guard areas, but they were particularly severe in those zones where "local popular powers" had been those zones where "local popular powers" had been organized. "Local popular powers' '-civilian governing organized. "Local popular powers ---civilian governing bodies formed by some FMLN member organizations bodies formed by some FMLN member organizations during the period of guerrilla concentrations-were in- during the period of guerrilla concentrations-were intended as an open,tended as an open, formal expression of dual power in the formal expression of dual power in the ruralrural areas where the Armed Forces had lost permanent areas where the Armed Forces had lost permanent control.control.'3 But the particular characteristics of this form of (3)But the particular characteristics of this form of organizing exacerbatedorganizing exacerbated many of the difficulties the revo- many of the difficulties the revolutionary movement faced. lutionary movement faced. "The FMLN, by openly declaring its relationship "The FMLN, by openly declaring its relationship with these people,with these people, made them illegal, which put them into made them illegal, which put them into confrontationconfrontation with the enemy," notes Mercedes del with the enemy," notes Mercedes del Carmen Letona ("Commander Luisa"), one of the prin- Carmen Letona ("Commander Luisa"), one of the principal architects of the doble cara strategy, in an FMLN cipal architects of the doble cara strategy, in an FMLN paper on the topic)4 "But the masas were unarmed and paper on the topic.'" "But the masas were unarmed and only had the options of running or hiding, which in turn only had the options of running or hiding, which in turn made them even more illegal." Friction developed be- made them even more illegal." Friction developed between rebel combat units and niasas in some areas, and tween rebel combat units and masas in some areas, and "the masas became isolated from the rest of the civilian "the masas became isolated from the rest of the civilian population,population, who did not want to turn themselves into who did not want to turn themselves into militarymilitary targets and who preferred to maintain their sub- targets and who preferred to maintain their subsistence activities without being forced to live on the sistence activities without being forced to live on the run." run." Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its fight- Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its fighters throughout the country. Instead of massing combat- ers throughout the country. Instead of massing combatantsants in a zone of control, where they would have to be in a zone of control, where they would have to be supplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke its supplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke its fighters up into small groups to carry out political and fighters up into small groups to carry out political and military work on a much broader, though more clandes- military work on a much broader, though more clandestine basis. Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebel tine basis. Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebel column pass through a few times a year now had a con- column pass through a few times a year now had a continuingtinuing guerrilla, and often militia, presence. These units, guerrilla, and often militia, presence. These units, operating in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, could operating in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, could not rely on support structures which functioned only in not rely on support structures which functioned only in areas of rebel control. areas of rebel control. In some areas, "popular power" structures had never In some areas, "popular power" structures had never been developed. There, the FMLN experimentedbeen developed. There, the FMLN experimented with dif- with dif-ferentferent forms of organization to define a more flexible forms of organization to define a more flexible relationshiprelationship between the rebels and their civilian support- between the rebels and their civilian supporters. As military pressureers. As military pressure and political problems threw the and political problems threw the popularpopular power structures into crisis, these experiments power structures into crisis, these experiments gradually formalized into what today is known as doble gradually formalized into what today is known as doble cara. cara. By workingBy working simultaneously aboveground as legal en- simultaneously aboveground as legal entitiestities and underground as FMLN collaborators, doble and underground as FMLN collaborators, doble caracara organizations are both more overt and more covert organizations are both more overt and more covert thanthan the "popular powers." The form is intended to be the "popular powers." The form is intended to be flexibleflexible enough, in the words of one organizer, for "the enough, in the words of one organizer, for "the civilian population to organize as such, not simply in civilian population to organize as such, not simply in accordanceaccordance with the needs of the guerrilla fronts." It seeks with the needs of the guerrilla fronts." It seeks the establishment, above all, of legality: of civilians the establishment, above all, of legality: of civilians insistinginsisting on their right to be civilians and to build legiti- on their right to be civilians and to build legitimate and legal community organizations. At the same mate and legal community organizations. At the same time,time, doble cara is an ambitious effort to develop more doble cara is an ambitious effort to develop more autonomous,autonomous, self-determining mass organizations which self-determining mass organizations which areare not dependent on FMLN combatants for political not dependent on FMLN combatants for political directiondirection or military protection. Unlike the "popular or military protection. Unlike the "popular powers,"powers," doble cara organizations involve many people doble caraorganizations involve many people who arewho are not sympathizers of the FMLN but who neverthe- not sympathizers of the FMLN but who neverthelessless feel the organizations fight for their interests. "Our feel the organizations fight for their interests. "Our lineline is participation," writes Commander Luisa, "in is participation," writes Commander Luisa, "in whichwhich the masas debate ideas, and conduct, organize and the masas debate ideas, and conduct, organize and decidedecide on their own actions. This means the real practice on their own actions. This means the real practice of democraticof democratic liberties, and we have to make an effort to liberties, and we have to make an effort to havehave people understand this."5 people understand this."" WW HILE DOBLE CARA WAS EMERGING IN THE HILEDOBLE CARA WAS EMERGING IN THE countryside,countryside, new developments were occurring new developments were occurring in the cities. In 1985 unions began to mobilize again and in the cities. In 1985 unions began to mobilize again and the mid- 1 980s saw one of the largest strike waves in Sal- the mid-1980s saw one of the largest strike waves in Sal-vadoran history. The National University, closed by the vadoran history. The National University, closed by the regimeregime since 1980, reopened and immediately resumed since 1980, reopened and immediately resumed itsits role as an anti-government organizing center. Follow- role as an anti-government organizing center. Following theing the earthquake in 1986, squatter communities became earthquake in 1986, squatter communities became a new locus of Left activity. The FMLN moved to create a new locus of Left activity. The FMLN moved to create urban militia, as well as deeper cover "urban commando urban militia, as well as deeper cover "urban commando cells." Working on political terrain controlled by the cells." Working on political terrain controlled by the state,state, advances came slowly and urban organizing lagged advances came slowly and urban organizing lagged behind the rural insurgency. behind the rural insurgency. ThoughThough most of the FMLN's clandestine organizing most of the FMLN's clandestine organizing remainedremained invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986 a invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986 a newnew dynamic of accumulation of forces had developed to dynamic of accumulation of forces had developed to the point where the leadership believed plans could be the point where the leadership believed plans could be laid for thelaid for the next stage, the strategic counteroffensive. next stage, the strategic counteroffensive. An FMLN General Command strategy paper later An FMLN General Command strategy paper later captured by the Armed Forces shows how clearly the captured by the Armed Forces shows how clearly the guerrilla leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the path guerrilla leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the path ahead:16 1988 seems to be the best or most appropriate 1988 seems to be the best or most appropriate momentmoment for launching the strategic counteroffen- for launching the strategic counteroffen-sive. By that time, the party structure of the FMLN sive. By that time, the party structure of the FMLN willwill have developed considerably, the experience ac- have developed considerably, the experience accumulatedcumulated by the mass movement will be great, the ac- by the mass movement will be great, the accumulationcumulation of insurrectional forces will have isolated of insurrectional forces will have isolated thethe regime, and elections will have been shown to be regime, and elections will have been shown to be unable to offer any solution to even the most back- unable to offer any solution to even the most backwards elements... wards elements... The enemy will be encircled by its own internal The enemy will be encircled by its own internal contradictionscontradictions and hegemonic disputes, exacerbated and hegemonic disputes, exacerbated by theby the 1988 elections for mayors and deputies and the 1988 elections for mayors and deputies and the search,search, through the 1989 presidential elections, for a through the 1989 presidential elections, for a newnew partner for the North American government... partner for the North American government... IfIf the masses spontaneously move to more de- the masses spontaneously move to more decided struggles and show a willingness to insurrect cided struggles and show a willingness to insurrect wewe must not hold them back must not hold them back.... .... ButBut we must guard we must guard againstagainst provoking any artificial or voluntaristic explo- provoking any artificial or voluntaristic explosions. The situation is entirely favorable and we must sions. The situation is entirely favorable and we must bringbring together all the people, in the most widespread together all the people, in the most widespread and simultaneousand simultaneous way possible... way possible... "Time"Time is with us," the General Command concludes, is with us," the General Command concludes, "but we have not a moment to lose." "but we have not a moment to lose." Rethinking War I. The FMLN is one of the few insurgencies that, from the start, conceptualized and then constructed its strategic rear guard within the borders of the nation in which it was fighting. For an insightful and extended treatment of the political aspects of this period, see Mario Lungo, El Salvador 1981-3984: Ia dimension poiltica de Ia guerra (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1985). 2. An early action employing this new dynamic was the 'Campafla Gonzalo" in Morazan in August, 1982, for which the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the FMLN faction based in that area, amassed its entire contingent of fighters. The largest and best-known of the FMLN concentrations was the Rafael Arce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ). The actual number of FMLN combatants is a closely guarded secret. However, by our best estimate, by the end of 1983 the BRAZ had some two thousand fighters in arms in two groupings, one in the north and another in the south, and could concentrate them for specific actions. 3. Col. James Steele, author's interview, 1986. 4. Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador, 'Campafia de Contrain- surgencia Unidos Para Reconstruir," March 1986. 5. In t989, following a diplomatic tour of Latin America by members of the FMLN General Command, the three General Command members who had used newts de guerre began to use their real names instead. Francisco Jovel had gone by the name of Roberto Roca, Eduardo Sancho had called himself Ferman Cienfuegos, and Salvador Sanchez Ceren had been known as Leonel Gonzalez. The other two members, JoaquIn Villalobos and Schafik Jorge I-Iandal, had been using their real names previously. 6. Authors' interview, April 1989. 7. Cabral also noted a similar difficulty in characterizing the period beginning in 1981, after the FMLN's failed "final offen- sive," when the FMLN began to regroup in the countryside. Au- thors' interview, January 1989. 8. See Ignacio Martin-BanS, As'! piensan los saivadoi'eOos or- hanos, (1986-1987) (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987). 9. Allan Austin et al, CONARA Impact Evaluation, Sept. 20, 1988, Research Triangle Institute. The campaign against the mayors also has proven enormously embarrassing for the Armed Forces, as it reveals the degree to which government forces have lost control in large parts of the country. The FMLN maintains it has executed only seven mayors; the eighth, they say, was caught in crossfire during a battle. 10. See, for example, Americas Watch Report, "Nightmare Revisited: 1987-88," September 1988. It is worth noting that 80 Christian Democratic mayors were assassinated by right-wing death squads in 1980. II. Author's interview, April 1985. The development of the 'low-intensity conflict" strategy on the part of the Armed Forces and their U.S. advisers has been developed in depth elsewhere, See Sara Miles, "The Real War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America," Reporton the Americas, Vol. XX, No.2 (April/May 1986), and Paul Martin, "The Dispute for the Masses," AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol. 18, No. I. 12. We should stress that our use of the term masas is not used in the traditional Left sense of masses, or large numbers of unorganized people. Rather we follow the particular Salvadoran sense of the word, meaning those people who are at the base of the multi-layered scaffolding of the revolutionary movement, and who are fully organized by that movement. 13. A comprehensive description of the structure and func- tioning of local "popular powers" can be found in Jenny Pearce, Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in Chalatenango El Salva- dor, (London: Latin America Bureau, 1986). 14. Mercedes del Carmen Letona, ("Commander Luisa") "El Poder de Doble Cara," internal FMLN manuscript, Mo- razan, 1987. 15. Letona, ibid. 16. 'Fase Preparatoria de la Contraofensiva Estrategica," identified as a document prepared for the November 1986 meeting of the FMLN General Command.
