When riots broke out in Venezuela on February 27, the government of- fered explanations that were as numer- ous as they were contradictory. The governor of the state of Miranda (which includes part of the capital, Caracas) and the minister of defense blamed "subversive elements." The secretary general of the ruling Demo- cratic Action party (AD) insisted that foreigners "have penetrated the slums with a style of struggle which is not typical of Venezuelans." Carlos Lan- der, acting president of the principal union confederation and a leader of AD, maintained that ordinary people were not involved, only "loafers, thieves and vagabonds who have never worked in their lives." A more realistic analysis was pre- sented by the country's new president, Carlos Andrds P6rez, who described the disorders as "an action of the poor against the rich." Yet he also said the riots were "not an action against the government." As proof, P6rez pointed out that not one of AD's headquarters had been targeted by the rioters. The number of deaths was offi- cially set at 247 but reporters who vis- ited Caracas' central morgue gave higher estimates. The press reported that the violence had erupted in the wake of the new government's auster- ity measures, including price increases on basic goods and services, imple- mented as part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, resentment in Vene- zuela's slums had been building for some time, particularly in response to the illegal hoarding of products by merchants waiting for official authori- zation to increase prices. Foods such as spaghetti, sardines and corn flour, basic staples in the diet of the poor, disappeared from the shelves for weeks. When government measures increased the price of gasoline, reset maximum interest rates and eliminated cheap "preferential" dollars for cer- tain basic imports (which in effect amounted to a devaluation of the local currency), the price of public transpor- tation increased by as much as 100%, far in excess of the government-ap- proved hike of 30%. The first reaction to the news of higher bus fares was not violent. Com- munity leaders-including those of AD-participated in spontaneous but peaceful marches in Caracas and else- where. These protests quickly got out of hand and commercial establish- ments, especially grocery stores and supermarkets, were ransacked. The government's effort to recuperate sto- len goods and make mass arrests was met with gunfire in slum dwellings where, under normal circumstances, neither police nor soldiers dare enter. The riots came at a time of growing popular discontent. In the last year Venezuela has seen a sharp upsurge in student and worker unrest, and a mili- tary massacre at Amparo, a town on the Colombian border, outraged many throughout the country. The last time that Venezuela witnessed such turmoil was after the overthrow of dictator Marcos P6rez Jim6nez in 1958. On that occasion the organized Left played a leadership role and the violence was concentrated in Caracas. In contrast, the recent disorders shook all major urban areas and took everyone by sur- prise, including the Left which has not promoted armed actions in over a dec- ade. Moreover, the behavior of the military was in marked contrast to its image as a "popular" and "non-elit- ist" force. Witnesses saw soldiers shoot people who were merely walk- ing on the street or who happened to look out their windows. Six days later, the United States and private banks sent a $450 million bridge loan to tide the government over until the IMF could approve loans of $450 million, and $1.2 billion for the rest of 1989. Other foreign lenders quickly sent $600 million in short-term financing until permanent loans could be arranged. Michel Camdessus, presi- dent of the IMF, wrote to President P6rez, saying he was "profoundly moved" by the many deaths that oc- curred during the five days of rioting. Nevertheless, he "confirmed that the economic policies were well-con- ceived; we back them and will con- tinue to back them." Stable Democracy? This sort of violence is not sup- posed to happen in Venezuela, a coun- try that regards itself as an exception in Latin America due to its vaunted democracy and economic prosperity. REPORT ON THE AMERICAS a w 0 0 0 0 o a 4 Steve Ellner teaches economic history at the Universidad de Oriente in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela.Following P6rez's victory in the presi- dential elections in December of last year, some observers remarked that the mandate to return Democratic Action to power for another five years dem- onstrated the solidity of the political party system and the stability of the nation. This belief that Venezuela is different from its Latin neighbors, even superior, has influenced and often mis- guided government policy. On the foreign debt, Pdrez's prede- cessor, Jaime Lusinchi (1984-89), played down proposals to draw close to other Third World debtors on grounds that any association with them would tarnish Venezuela's image as a "responsible payer." Under Lusinchi, Venezuela was the only Latin Ameri- can nation to dutifully pay interest and principle on its $35 billion foreign debt. Such rigorous adherence to credi- tors inevitably left its mark on the population. In 1981, 22.5% of Vene- zuelans lived in acute poverty. Just six years later, that number was up to 54%. The December election of the populist Perez, whose campaign gen- erated support among Venezuela's poor, was greeted with suspicion by business and foreign creditors. Many remember Perez for extending mas- sive material support to the Sandinista guerrillas during his first presidency (1974-1979) and for his efforts to play a leadership role in the Third World. During the campaign, P6rez commit- o0 w w_ ted himself to reversing Lusinchi's consistently pro-United States foreign policy and to hardening Venezuela's position toward foreign creditors. He pledged to limit payment on the debt to 20% of the nation's annual foreign exchange earnings. Under the guise of evenhanded- ness, Perez also harshly criticized the Sandinista government and the con- frontational debt stance of Peru's Alan Garcia. PNrez's talk of Latin American solidarity is tempered by his adher- ence to bilateral debt negotiations and rejection of a Third World "debtors club." Under P6rez, Venezuela will most likely promote international meetings to discuss the problem, but will not support collective negotiations with the banks. The occasional gap between P6rez's rhetoric and actions was dem- onstrated by the austerity plan and concurrent "letter of intention" which his administration drew up with the IMF. Over the years, P6rez had been a harsh critic, referring to the IMF as "the bomb that kills people, not prop- erty; it does not kill with explosive chemicals but with hunger." Just prior to the riots, members of the Perez administration argued that the IMF- recommended measures would not produce the traumas that they have in other Latin American nations due to the basic soundness of the Venezuelan economy. Even after the riots, P6rez refused to reconsider his dealings with the agency, commenting: "Going to the IMF is not one option; it is the only option for a country that has exhausted its international reserves." Domestic Reform Beyond the debt and foreign pol- icy, perhaps the most far-reaching change which P6rez promises to im- plement is in the area of political re- form. A blue-ribbon presidential com- mission set up in 1984 advocated a series of modifications in government structure and electoral practices. Its recommendations, which have re- ceived widespread acclaim, include election of state governors (who up to now have been appointed by the presi- dent) and nominal voting for congress and municipal councils rather than se- lection by party slates. P6rez supports Causa R challenges the old Left these proposals but he faces opposi- tion from his own party machine. A group of the president's closest followers has been particularly vocal in support of applying the political re- forms to the party itself, particularly by organizing primary elections. The most prominent member of this group is national deputy Carlos Canache Mata who is in the running for the 1993 presidential contest. Canache believes that AD's status as a multi- class party was never meant to take in economically powerful groups. If his views were to prevail, a number of top AD leaders who are part of the busi- ness elite would be forced out of the party. P6rez himself, however, is un- likely to favor severing AD's ties with wealthy individuals. P6rez takes power at a time when the country's political structures, es- pecially of the old Left, are under pres- sure from the grass-roots. Although a majority of organized workers voted for Pdrez, he will not have an easy alliance with the labor movement. AD has dominated the Venezuelan Con- federation of Workers (CTV)-the nation's largest labor organization-since its founding in 1947, never tolerating open challenges to the party. But CTV president Juin Jos6 Delpino broke with this tradition during Lusinchi's administration and became one of the government's harshest critics. Even though AD-la- 9bor backed P6rez's wing over that of Lusinchi's, the CTV is not about to go back to the role of party handmaiden. At the annually televised "CTV New Year's Message to the Nation," Delp- ino declared, "We defend the inde- pendence and autonomy of the labor movement vis-a-vis the bosses, politi- cal parties, the government and reli- gious denominations." One sign that times are slowly changing in the labor movement is the determination of the nation's largest union-the steelworkers of the Guay- ana region-to resist outside interfer- ence. In 1981 their union was taken over by affiliates of the CTV, and its leaders were thrown out. These be- longed to "Causa R," a small leftist party which has harshly criticized the rest of the Left for placing ideology ahead of concrete worker demands. Last year the CTV finally sponsored new elections which Causa R won, in spite of the inclusion of upper echelon employees in the roster of voters. Venezuela's enduring two-party system is also under revision, as was evident in the recent national elections. Although between them P6rez and his principal rival from the Social Chris- tian Party (COPEI) polled 96% of the vote, AD and COPEI's combined con- gressional vote declined to 75%. Much of the remaining vote went to the Left, with the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) drawing 10%. Causa R ran the former head of the steelworkers union, Andr6s Veldsquez, as presidential can- didate and drew 13% in the Guayana region. MAS' and Causa R's strong showing at the state level augurs well for the Left's chances in the guberna- torial elections later this year. Perhaps the most telling indication of popular discontent with the nation's political system is that 22% of the elec- torate did not vote at all despite man- datory voting laws. Up until now the abstention rate has always been under 12%, even in 1963 when the Left car- ried out armed actions in support of an electoral boycott. Bolivar's Ideal All Venezuelans venerate Sim6n Bolivar, the country's "Liberator," but many ignore his essential argument for Latin American unity in the face of the long-term danger posed by U.S. expansionism. In the December elec- tions, P6rez's principal rival catered to provincial nationalism by harping on the Colombian threat to Venezuelan territorial claims, while he failed to question U.S. policy in Central Amer- ica. In contrast, P6rez's rhetoric is an affirmation of the holivariano ideal of Latin American solidarity and a rejec- tion of the view that Venezuela is in a special category unto itself. P6rez's most fervent detractors say he is a demagogue who cannot deliver on his campaign promises, especially since resources are scarcer and prob- lems are greater than during his first administration. Venezuela's oil boom period ended in 1986, shortly after P6rez left office, and was already de- clining before then. Perhaps the most stark evidence of the persistence of dire poverty and deplorable health fa- cilities is the recent outbreak of ma- laria, reaching nearly epidemic pro- portions in certain areas, decades after the government announced that the scourge had been forever eradicated. With an economy in decline, sec- tors of the Left suspicious of him and a Republican administration in Wash- ington hostile to Third World asser- tions of autonomy and schemes of in- ternational cooperation, President P6rez will have difficulty translating his militant slogans into effective pro- grams. His strategy of avoiding con- flict with foreign creditors is a disap- pointment to many voters who be- lieved he would follow a more mili- tant course. And, as was vividly dem- onstrated by the people in the barrios during the week of February 27, Vene- zuelans are no longer satisfied with hollow rhetoric.
